Disagree with what? I just showed how your position is logically inconsistent.
You need to either show some flaw in my reasoning, or concede the point.
No, you’re supposed to be an adult about it.
I’ve joined this thread with a particular position, but I would love it if someone described a good argument against my position. It would be the highlight of my day.
In an alternate universe where you just say “Yes, the multiverse hypothetical is very problematic for the ‘you are transported’ position” I would consider that the beginning of a productive discussion on the transporter problem.
Since it’s basically an established fact in most philosophical discussions of this problem that very problematic hypotheticals can be described for both the “you are transported” and “you are not transported” positions, and it’s nothing to do with terminology problems.
You mean the post where I cited you three times, pointing out a logical inconsistency in your argument, which you then first ignored, and then could only say “I disagree”, but had no substantive counter-argument? That one?
If you don’t think I can cite that post then by all means point out the error in my reasoning.
I think that there is nothing we can learn from the “coincidental identity” model. I’ve given you real-world examples – two people in distance cities write the same sentence. What do you think that proves? How do you think that has relevance to the transporter problem?
You’ve come up with a fascinating case: two people with a non-causal identity. It’s nifty. It’s a grand thought-experiment.
But what do you imagine that it actually teaches us? What do you actually draw from that model?
You appear to think it is significant. I think it is not significant.
I can happily agree to discuss it further, but I will not play your games of “you owe me an answer” and “you contradicted yourself” and “you must concede.” I don’t agree to those rules. I also don’t want to get bogged down debating the rules. Nothing kills a thread faster than such involution.
Please tell me what you think the “coincidental identity” model teaches us about a transporter. My belief is that the answer is “nothing.” You appear to disagree. Can you say why?
I honestly believe there is no point in going over this again. The gum has been chewed already, not once, but several dozen times. However, if you want, I’m game. Tell me what you believe the lesson is that we can learn from your model.
(Please don’t tell me what I believe. I know that a lot better than you do.)
Using HalfManHalfWit’s ‘four dimensional’ model to analyse the ‘coincidental identity’ thought experiment, we can see that it is not the same as the ‘transfer of information’ thought experiment.
In the ‘transfer of information’ thought experiment, it *looks like *there are two separate objects, but they are in fact physically connected by a data channel; whether this channel consists of photons, or electrons, or an imaginary ‘information-dense neutrino’ (as imagined by Larry Niven) is irrelevant. This connection makes the two objects into one temporally- and causally-linked entity.
This connection does not exist in the ‘coincidental identity’ thought experiment, so the two cases are not equivalent.
That’s a strange position. Do you believe that a consciousness that believes itself to be that of, say, Napoleon Bonaparte, actually is that of Napoleon Bonaparte? If not, what is the import of beliefs on identity?
But whether some such functional criterion is the right one to establish personal identity is exactly the question here. To me, there are clear examples where functional identity doesn’t suffice for an identity claim—e.g. the origami birds, and the logical contradictions that obtain when one supposes them to be identical (which also obtain in the case of teleportation).
Additionally, after teleportation, both original and copy ought to believe themselves to be in room A: alter the thought experiment such that a few seconds after the teleportation, the original will be shot. What you will experience is stepping into the teleporter, stepping out of it, and then being shot. Hence, both original and copy should expect themselves to be shot after the teleportation; only, the copy will be wrong about this. Likewise in the case of the identical rooms—both will believe themselves to be in room A, but the copy will be wrong. Of course, the fact that both may have identical beliefs, which either obtain or fail to, also says that they’re different: both have a justified belief of being in room A, but only for the original will that belief be true; hence, both differ in their knowledge.
Of course, if you needed to invent something first before you can talk about its implications, all of our discussing here would be completely pointless. But luckily, that’s not the case. We can discuss the ethics of human cloning without having invented human cloning, for instance. Likewise, we can give precise meaning to the concepts of token- and type-identity, and we observe that we generally consider both to be different; hence, one would need to make a special argument to make it plausible that they should be the same in the case of teleportation. Absent such an argument, the reasonable thing is to believe the transported persons just as different as two instances of the same word, or two instances of the folding pattern.
The question is not whether we can duplicate a consciousness; given the assumptions of the teleportation scenario, this is readily done, and I don’t think anybody here is fighting the hypothetical. The question is whether a duplicated consciousness means that both are the same person. And I think, just as with signs and symbols, or origami birds, what we have will rather be two instances of the same consciousness, but not twice the same person—absent any argument as to why this generalization from everyday cases should not hold here, at least.
But again, whether functional identity is sufficient is exactly the question.
Take again the hypothetical where the original is shot after the teleportation: what do you believe your experience would be? I think it can only be that you enter the teleporter, exit it, and then are shot. All the teleporter does, let’s say, is take a snapshot of you—an extremely detailed snapshot, but a snapshot nonetheless. Now, this snapshot may—or may not—ever be assembled into a functional copy of you; but whether it does can have no effect on your conscious experience (indeed, one can even arrange matters so that the decision whether or not to assemble the copy is made in causal separation to the original, thus ensuring that there can be no influence). Hence, there is no way for your train of experience to ‘jump’ into your clone’s body; you will experience that which happens to the original, and not that which happens to the clone, which, again, may never come into existence.
Hence, you definitely will experience being shot—or, perhaps, you may not experience it (if you’re shot to the back of the head, say), but afterwards, will cease to have any experiences. And again absent any convincing argument to the contrary, I think the natural thing to believe is that that’s also what happens in a teleportation scenario: your train of experience will cease, while another, that happens to have all the same memories you had, comes into existence.
Except that that’s not a valid stand towards any argument to take. If an argument is sound, you have no choice but to accept its conclusion; simply saying ‘I don’t agree’ does no work. If you wish to resist a given conclusion, you have to either show some premise to be false (or at least questionable), or the reasoning to be logically invalid. Otherwise, you simply have no justification for not agreeing.
That it doesn’t suffice for claiming an identity between two persons for them to merely be physically identical, since otherwise, those two would really be the same person.
But do you have any reasons for that, or is it merely an article of faith?
Certainly, not everything that is connected is one object—if you lean on a wall, you don’t become sort of wall-human hybrid. More importantly, if you wish to argue nevertheless that there is a kind of bifurcation going on, you also forfeit the identity claim of the teleportation experiment: because then, the teleported you is not an object at all, but merely a part of a larger object; hence, it’s not the case that the teleported and the original are the same, but merely that there is one large four-dimensional object that has both the teleported and the original as its parts, like the branches of a Y. Neither is one branch the same as the other, nor are they on their own the Y.
I believe that two physically identical persons (to the degree of having the same thoughts, same perceptions, etc.) are really the same person.
If I have stated this poorly in the course of this thread, I’m sorry. This is my actual view. If they’re identical, then they both “really are John Smith.”
The principal support I offer for this is that there is no experiment that can be performed that will tell you which one is the “original” or “real” John Smith. Being identical, you can’t tell them apart. They’re the same person, because the alternative claim requires a testable difference, which the word “identity” denies.
ETA:
Both! It’s an article of faith, in that it is how I personally define the word “identity,” and it is how I happen to believe a Transporter works. Others may have other views. We’ve seen this amply in the course of this (and previous) debates. People are holding different views, based on interpretation. To some degree, this is “faith based.” I also have reasons, which I have just given.
Why is the transported consciousness the only meaningful POV? Shouldn’t your POV (original “you” currently reading this) be the most important POV to you?
It appears even your choice of words in that sentence (using the definite article “the” instead of the possessive pronoun, “my”) betrays your subconscious feeling (correctly so, IMHO) that what is transported is not really “your” POV. If you were fully committed to idea that you can truly be successfully transported in the type of transporter we’re discussing, you should have said, *“…whether my transported consciousness believes it was transported.” *I think your gut is telling you something that you should heed: there’s only one POV per customer and yours remains in the departure pod.
“Token” and “type” identity may be of interest in philosophy of the mind and have legitimate meaning to outside observers of “you” and your duplicate, but with regard to your POV (awareness of self, experience of qualia, personal identity…whatever you wish to call it), all that really matters…is your POV and, unless you believe two or more consciousnesses not physically connected can somehow be split or shared, then you should choose to keep pre-transported “you” alive in it’s original body, if *you *are currently pre-transported “you”. If I’m talking to post-transported “you”, then by all means, *you *should choose to keep post-transported “you” alive in your freshly minted body.
My point being that, although pre- and post-transported you are both valid versions of you…they are not the same person. They can’t be, unless you invoke magic.
I can’t understand how this isn’t blatantly obvious if you imagine being transported and original “you” remains alive in the departure pod. The departure pod loudspeaker (which you trust explicitly) says, “you were successfully transported. You’re alive and well in the arrival pod. You will now be disintegrated” I don’t believe your response will be, “okie dokie”; I think it will be more along the lines of, “whoa Nellie, let’s not be so quick with that disintegration button, pardner!”
If you’re John Smith at location #1, do you really believe you’ll feel like John Smith at location #1 and John Smith at location #2 at the same time? How exactly could that, even hypothetically, be? You each see through 4 eyes, hear through 4 ears, smell through 4 nostrils…etc.???
If the “out” is: “no, neither John Smith can see through the other’s eyes because they have diverged from each other and are now separate individuals", then the premise *still *fails. At what point were they ever converged? The correct answer IMHO, is that the two John Smiths were never converged. John Smith at location #1 never had a future in John Smith #2. Therefore, if you get into a transporter, you’re committing suicide.
I would like just one pro-transporter person to explain the MOA for successful transporter travel, with the understanding that that must allow for more than one instance of a consciousness being experiencing qualia at the same time.
I dislike the
[quote snippets & counter them]
format, but I’ll do it a bit here. Before I begin I think that overall we’re mostly talking past one another. My intent now is not to persuade, but rather to identify the spots where I think my position was unclear or misunderstood. Or spots where I think I missed your point.
IMO the only measure of merit is “does it work?”. Anything else is philosophical handwringing I’m disinterested in. If indeed that’s what the thread is about then I’ve inadvertently wandered into the wrong argument room and will depart promptly with no hard feelings. It certainly wasn’t what the thread started about, although it may well have morphed to that topic as various posters have come and gone.
Speaking to the import of belief about identity … Ref the classic “to be a bat” argument, non-conscious objects have trivial identities tied up in their external manifestations. Two identically constructed origami birds are trivially seen as type-identical but token-different. A transporter / duplicator that transferred inanimate objects fine, but rendered living things dead, or conscious things permanently unconscious would clearly be producing type-different as well as token-different dupes.
To declare identical vs different we must define a comparison function. Things are identical iff they pass our function. While there are many stupid candidates for such a function there is also more than one plausible choice.
When dealing with origami birds the type-identical function could sensibly address questions like: how carefully folded? what quality of paper? how humid the paper?, color? etc.
When dealing with sentient beings my vote is the proper comparison function is that which is most natural, and exploits the maximum amount of the available state space: Does the sentient being believe it’s identical between before and after? That’s the best way to ensure we got a deep copy, not a shallow copy. Obviously this comparison function falls apart if we have an insane sentient being, or an intoxicated one, or one who doesn’t speak our language so we can’t interrogate it. But in the main, that’s the best comparison function I can define. You and others may be more creative than I. Or more doctrinaire.
You’ve told half the story of my experiment in your retelling and analysis. Let me fill in the rest.
The subject steps in, knowing there will be a duplication. Followed by a shooting of one or the other. Take the seat. Poof; transportation / duplication happens.
Then an interviewer enters the room. “Q: Are you the original or the duplicate?” “A: I honestly don’t know, but this sure looks like the room I entered a minute ago, and I recall the whole preparation process before that, and having breakfast this morning and … back to childhood, so I guess / assume / conclude I am the original. If not, the duplication worked correctly and I can equally believe I am the duplicate.”
Notice I didn’t say which room. You could ask A, or B, or both and get functionally the same answer(s). I do not assert they’d say the same words at the exact same time. But I do assert their words would have the same import.
Let’s say we ask both their opinions. The interviewers leave the rooms and one is then shot. It actually doesn’t matter if A or B gets the bullet. Let’s flip a coin & shoot heads = A, tails = B.
Assuming the shooting isn’t back-of-the-head, the mortally wounded person thinks “Damn. This sucks. I lost the coin toss. My wife was right; I never should have volunteered for this.” He still doesn’t know if he’s the original or the duplicate. And he never will.
Meanwhile, what happens in the other room? The occupant hears the shot, flinches, then realizes he’s uninjured. He still doesn’t know if he’s the original or the duplicate. And he never will.
He does know he’s the lucky survivor. He steps out of the room and goes home to his wife. And continues his life with an interesting story about a really weird day at work. One where he stepped into a booth, felt a Poof, had a short conversation with an interviewer, then stepped out of the booth unchanged.
That is the *whole *story of the experiment. And I hold that for the only definition that has any operational utility, the person who went home that night to dinner is the same person as who got up that morning and had breakfast. He certainly thinks he’s the same person; who are we to disagree?
Bolding mine.
The distinction you attempt to make in bold is different words making, to me, the very same statement. You assert that two instances of the same consciousness are not two instances of the same person? Huh?
Yes, I believe the two experience exactly the same subjective sensations. They see the same thing through both sets of eyes. There’s no way for them to tell what their location is.
If there were (wait for it) they wouldn’t be “identical” and the premise is vacated.
I respectfully disagree. As long as they are identical, then each “has a future” in both persons. Both are the same person.
Once they diverge, that isn’t true any longer. But it is true for the period of their identity.
I get into a transporter, and am subsequently somewhere else. I’m there. Me, myself, with all of my physical and mental properties. Beats taking the bus.
You may believe it’s “suicide.” That is one possible interpretation of the case, based on a personal interpretation of the language we’re using. But it is not the only interpretation.
What does “MOA” mean? And why cannot two instances of a consciousness experience the same qualia? How do you propose to tell the two subjective experiences apart?
Also, it is entirely possible for a transporter to be envisioned which does not actually require duplication. It could open a gateway, or induce a quantum jump. Duplication and destruction is only one model: it is not agreed upon by all here as the only model.
Once again, you’re saying that by definition of being (qualitatively) identical then they must be one and the same personal identity.
But in other hypotheticals, such as the multiverse one, suddenly it’s not only not an apriori truth, it’s not even a sufficient condition.
When I called you out on this you had…nothing. “I disagree” and (paraphrasing) “I don’t have to answer your questions, you’re not the boss of me”, essentially.
On the one hand, it’s interesting to watch someone overtly display such cognitive dissonance, but on the other, you’ve worn out the patience of a number of people here and really spoiled not just this thread, but the previous one too.
This is not an argument for your position; it’s just a re-wording of it—being physically identical is the same thing as no experiment having any chance at telling a difference.
Furthermore, this of course also commits you to believing that the two origami birds are identical, and that two physically identical persons in the multiverse scenario are identical, and so on—there is no issue here regarding causal connections etc.
And again, are you seriously not bothered by the logical contradictions your position entails?
Besides, there are ways to tell physically identical systems apart. For instance, one is over here, the other over there. One is the one I hold in my hand right now, the other isn’t. If there were a true identity, then every statement true about one should also be true about the other (modulo some awkwardness regarding denotations and the like). But in fact, this is not the case here: there are statements true of the one, but not of the other. Hence, by virtue of these statements, I can distinguish between both: one is the one of which these-and-those statements are true, and the other is the one of which such-and-such statements are true. This identifies a fundamental difference and averts the logical contradictions.
So, you’re either saying here that there is no right concept of identity—which means that you can’t claim that yours is the right one. Or, that your concept is the right one, but you know this only because of some sort of special revelation—which makes all dialogue impossible, since I don’t share in your revealed knowledge; indeed, I may have revealed knowledge contrary to yours.
But of course, it works if what comes out on the far side is the same person as what went in here; and the question of what counts as ‘the same person’ is a philosophical one. So you can’t discuss whether it works without the attendant philosophical issues coming up.
But nobody has proposed such a type of transporter, so I’m not sure what the relevance of this is…
To me, whether a given choice is plausible is exactly the object of this discussion.
But again, it’s clearly the case that beliefs do not suffice. Any given sentient being might believe it was you; but it won’t thereby become you. I don’t believe beliefs are a sensible choice at all: beliefs can be, and quite often are, false; but your comparison function effectively holds them to be infallible.
Well, I’ve proposed a comparison function that I consider to be reasonable, but which so far nobody has seen fit to discuss: two things are identical if all the propositions true of one are also true of the other. Otherwise, if there is something that is true of one, but false of the other, then by virtue of this difference, we can distinguish between both.
Well, somebody might think they’re Napoleon; I think we have good reasons to disagree in this case.
Let’s consider my addition to your thought experiment: the two teleportation booths are on spaceships, say, spaceship A and spaceship B. The original is in A, steps into the booth, is being scanned, and the scan is sent to B. Then, both ships accelerate in opposite directions such that they stay out of causal contact—i.e. nothing on ship A influences anything on ship B, and vice versa. On ship B, in the meantime, a coin is flipped: if it comes up heads, then the signals are decoded, and another copy of you is created; if it comes up tails, the signal is deleted.
Now, clearly, whether the coin comes up heads or tails has no consequences on ship A (unless you want to propose some form of nonlocal causation, contra relativity). Hence, whether a copy is being made does not have any influence on the original. So the story that is told of the original should be the same regardless of whether a copy is created.
If no copy is created, the story is the following: you enters the booth, step out, and are shot in the head. Certainly, in that case, there can be no question that it is you who this happens to.
But then, the same thing also holds in the case in which a copy is made, since whether it is made has no influence on the story. Hence, no matter whether a copy is made, you will die; your experience will always be ‘entering the booth, exiting it still in ship A, and being shot’—there is no question of whether it could be ‘entering the booth, exiting it in ship B, and surviving’. That train of experience may exist, or it may not; but it certainly will not be yours.
Yes, just as two instances of the word ‘apple’—apple apple—are not the same word. One is the leftmost one, the other the rightmost one, for instance. Indeed, again, the question is whether two instances of the same consciousness are the same person—it seems, to some, to be a foregone conclusion that this is the case, but once one actually thinks it through, one sees that this leads to logical contradictions, and hence, can’t possibly be right.
No one has said they are the same person. But they are the same person plus a bit extra, which is a bit extra that is different in each case.
Person A is teleported, becomes Person A+a. Time has elapsed, events have occurred, Person A has changed by factor a.
Alternately -
Person A is not teleported, becomes Person A+b. Time has elapsed, events have occurred, Person A has changed by factor b.
If a and b are changes which are roughly equivalent in magnitude, then the two different people have the same level of claim to be the new A. If not, not.
Really? I think several responders in this thread actually did say exactly that.
Again, whether both have the same claim to be A is the question. Just because you say they do don’t make it so.
Besides, what’s a ‘change of the same magnitude’ anyway? If I loose an arm, I’d still consider myself to be unchanged, person-wise; but cut just a few connections in my brain, and I might become a vegetable. So there’s a question as to what kind of change is relevant for the preservation of personal identity; and with that, we’re right back where we started, namely at trying to define what personal identity is.
No-one on the teleportation-of-identity side of this debate has said that two copies of a person are the same person. They are two different people. Both have a claim to be a continuation of the original, but they are not the same person. They have branched - forked to use the vernacular. Two branches are not the same branch.
Cutting an arm off would not affect the personal identity directly, although as a life-changing event it would no doubt affect the person considerably. In fact, the copied personality could conceivably be instantiated inside a virtual body with no real arms, legs or other biological parts. But if it retains as much (or more) of the mental characteristics of the original than the original, then it has a good claim to be an instantiation of that original.
Yes, that’s what I believe the word “identical” means.
Well…I also don’t agree with your manner of engaging in a debate. Meanwhile, I believe that two "coincidentally identical’ persons are “the same person.” I’m sorry if this isn’t clear to you, but it is what I believe.
I also believe that the coincidental identity model is of no value to us in assessing teleportation issues.
You’re becoming far too emotionally involved. Calm down and attempt to engage in discussion. This kind of ad hominem rampage does nothing to help anyone understand teleportation machines.
No, because they are chemically different. They aren’t made from the same paper. They aren’t identical, but, in fact, can be told apart by simple tests available to anyone.
This is not the case for someone who has been through a teleportation device.
Agreed. I hold that two coincidentally identical persons are “the same person.”
You keep saying this. How, exactly, is believing that two identical persons are “the same person” self-contradictory?
I’ve already rejected location as a means of differentiating two otherwise identical objects. To begin with, I can switch them around behind a screen, “destroying” their locality. You can’t know which one was to the left a moment ago.
Also, if location differentiates between identical objects, then there can never be any identical objects. This definition nullifies the meaning of the word, making it logically self-contradictory.
“(Don’t the logical contradictions in your viewpoint bother you?)”
If you’re holding one in your hand, and not the other, they aren’t “identical” any longer. You continue to imagine that you can “mark one with an x” and yet still have them remain identical. This is also logically self-contradictory.
If you can tell the difference between the two, then they aren’t identical.
I can demolish the trivia of locational-based differences by switching the two around. You cannot tell me which of the two objects was the one that was “to your left” twenty seconds ago. There is no test you can apply.
You’re engaging in a kind of magical thinking, imagining that objects are “identical, but I know which one is original.” You don’t actually know which one was original: you don’t even know which one you held in your hand twenty seconds ago.
(Cheating by analyzing your fingerprints on one object is, of course, violating the principle that the two are identical.)
I’m saying there appear to be more than one concept of identity. I favor one. You would appear to favor another. There is no possibility of proving one to be correct and the other incorrect.
Dialogue is impossible. You’ve amply demonstrated that.
True. That’s what I believe also. The issue cannot be solved scientifically (well, not until we actually have a teleportation machine. At least then, we could start to make experimental tests.)
It reduces the debate to one of language. Since you and I hold different beliefs regarding the language of the discussion, we are at an obvious impasse.
I’m going to cut it off here; this post is already untenably long, and we’re obviously getting nowhere.
Oops, sorry, I do… As long as they are “identical” then they are “the same person.” They’re thinking the same thoughts, experiencing the same sensations, and believing themselves to be the same person.
This is why I believe that the teleportation machine is a “transporter” and not a “kill you and created someone else who wrongly thinks you are the dead guy” machine. Personal identity transfers between the identical persons, the one who went in and the one who came out.
Half Man Half Wit has helped make it abundantly clear that different definitions of “identity” are at play here.
I’m not even saying that his viewpoint is wrong. I don’t think either viewpoint is “wrong,” exactly. Since we’re only talking about abstract linguistic concepts, the phrase “not even wrong” would seem to apply. It’s like arguing, a priori, whether the three persons of the Trinity are “separate” or “the same.” We can’t know, because the Trinity is beyond our ability to examine critically.
And while others try and support their belief with arguments, and rebut counter-arguments, all you do is to take this as axiomatic, even rejecting arguments because it’s so ‘obviously’ true. Hence, the allegations of circular reasoning.
I’ve repeatedly now clarified that the origami birds are identical to any given level of detail you require.
So if you die in this universe, do you believe you will continue to have experiences in the other one?
Because, as I have now pointed out many times, it leads to propositions that are contradictions. Say, Alice enters the teleporter, and is cloned at a remote position. Then, according to your notion of identity, among infinitely many others, the following contradictions are true:
[ul]
[li]Alice has been transported, and Alice has not been transported[/li][li]I can point to Alice, and I can not point to Alice[/li][li]Alice has moved, and Alice is still in the same place[/li][/ul]
These are direct consequences of holding that the transported Alice is really the same as the non-transported Alice.
And I’ve already clarified, in response to you, that I don’t mean for location to be tied to identity.
But of course, what I know, or don’t, has no bearing on whether two things are the same or not—otherwise, identity would be contingent on our capacity to distinguish, and all sorts of things that we otherwise consider to be different would be identical, simply because we lack the means to access the differences. If the whole world would go blind, for instance, things that were distinguishable by sight alone—such as those having a different color—suddenly would become identical, to their great surprise.
This is confusing epistemic matters for ontological matters—confusing what we can know about with what there is.
Even if I had intended for location to be an identifier, which I nowhere did, this would not be true. Objects that remain in one location would retain their identity, for one, while objects that moved would simply cease to have a trans-temporal identity—which is, perhaps, a surprising conclusion, but completely consistent (it does not lead to logical contradictions).
Indeed! That’s the sort of contradictions that nullifies your notion of identity. If you don’t like me holding one, then just substitute me pointing at one, which certainly can be done without any identity-destroying influence on the object. And this is indeed why I don’t believe that they remain identical!
Again, what I know or don’t know has no bearing on what is the case; the world is the way it is, independent of what I think about it, no matter how much I might sometimes wish the opposite. And I have given a precise sense in which the two things are ‘identical, but different’: they are identical in as much as they are of the same type; they are different in as much as they are different instantiations (tokens) of the same type. How many numerals are there in 112333? If you wish to say three, then how does that number differ from 122133? The commonly accepted answer is that there are three types of numeral in either number, but one has two (distinct) instances of the type 1, one instance of the type 2, and three instances of the type 3, while the other has two instances of the type 1, two of type 2, and two of type 3.
Location does not play any role here, although it is true that if a thing is in one location, it can’t also be in another location—which is, again, just the principle of non-contradiction. But this does not mean that something just is that same thing while being in that particular location.
Indeed, you might have guessed as much (well, after missing that I already told you as much, that is) if you had just taken into account the four-dimensional model I provided.
You didn’t start there: in your original raising of the point, you said that the information to fold them was sent, but not the paper. If the paper is identical, too, then, yes, certainly, the origami birds are identical, and thus the same.
A dead person is not identical to a living one. Once again, you insist on creating a distinction between the two individuals, and then try to get me to say they’re “the same.” They aren’t the same any longer. One is dead and one isn’t.
You keep on making this childish mistake. I do not believe that a dead person is “identical” to a living one.
Those are only contradictions according to one possible interpretation of the word “identical.” It is not a contradiction to my point of view, because I hold Alice to be identical to Alice. She is in two places; there are two of her. You can point to her and not point to her, since your pointing is not one of her physical properties. If that pointing alters her character – e.g. if you spray-paint “Alice 1” one one of her, and “Alice 2” on another – then they are no longer identical.
Yes, they are. But no, they are not logical contradictions. You aver and assert that they are, but that’s only because you adhere to a different definition of the word “identical.”
We have a breakdown of communication, because the language isn’t competent to cover this issues unambiguously.
And yet you very recently insisted that two objects are not “identical” because they’re in different locations.
At this point, you seem to be modifying that claim. Can you clarify this, please?
Again, I’m simply going to cut off this response here, as there’s no possible gain to be had in repeating what has been said before. You and I simply aren’t going to come to any agreement: we’re using basic concepts completely differently.