Teleportation physics question

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Trinopus

You didn’t start there: in your original raising of the point, you said that the information to fold them was sent, but not the paper. If the paper is identical, too, then, yes, certainly, the origami birds are identical, and thus the same.

Well, I had hoped to have been sufficiently clear in intending the origami bird example to be analogous to the teleportation one. When I saw I hadn’t achieved that intent with you, I clarified.

A dead person is not identical to a living one. Once again, you insist on creating a distinction between the two individuals, and then try to get me to say they’re “the same.” They aren’t the same any longer. One is dead and one isn’t.

I’m not saying that the dead and the living individual are the same; I am asking you whether if of two (according to you) identical persons, one ceases to exist, the experience of that person nevertheless continues within the other, or, as would be the case if no copy existed, that person’s experience ceases.

Those are only contradictions according to one possible interpretation of the word “identical.”

On what interpretation of ‘identical’ would it not be paradoxical if contradictory propositions held of one and the same thing?

If two things, A and B, are identical, then A = B. This means, for instance, that there is no difference between A and B; hence, everything that is true of A, needs to be true of B—otherwise, there would be an identity and simultaneously a difference, as you keep erroneously claiming I hold.

It is not a contradiction to my point of view, because I hold Alice to be identical to Alice. She is in two places;

This would be the case if ‘Alice’ denoted the set of both objects; but then, that set is not a person, but a set of things (persons are not sets). For instance, then you could not point at one and say, ‘that is Alice’; then, only the collection of both would be Alice (and hence, not identical to the thing that went into the teleporter originally; cf. my comments on a diverging object in a four-dimensionalist setting to eburacum45).

So, Alice before entering the teleporter is not a thing that can be in two places at once; if after having been teleported, she now is such a thing, she is obviously different from that Alice that went in.

You can point to her and not point to her, since your pointing is not one of her physical properties.

Indeed! Which shows that the (intrinsic) physical properties do not exhaust the ways in which two things differ. If there were no difference between the two Alices, I could not point to one, and not point to the other, since, if A = B, and I point to A, I also point to B.

Yes, they are. But no, they are not logical contradictions.

Of course. They are propositions of the form ‘x and not-x’.

You aver and assert that they are, but that’s only because you adhere to a different definition of the word “identical.”

The only definition I need is that if A is identical to B, then A = B. If you hold to a notion of identity in which that’s not the case, then you’re simply not talking of an identity.

We have a breakdown of communication, because the language isn’t competent to cover this issues unambiguously.

The language is perfectly fine; you simply object to its usage when it does not agree with you preconceived conclusions.

And yet you very recently insisted that two objects are not “identical” because they’re in different locations.

At this point, you seem to be modifying that claim. Can you clarify this, please?

I can, and I have. But I can also do it again: an object can be in different locations, but it can’t be in one location and not be in that location, as that would be contradictory.

You and I simply aren’t going to come to any agreement: we’re using basic concepts completely differently.

This isn’t right: I am using your concepts, and showing where they lead. (I have also proposed different concepts—the type-token distinction and four-dimensionalism—but those have no bearing on my arguments against your position; they simply provide an alternative not vulnerable to these problems.) You don’t want to go where they lead, and so you are inventing some ineffable difference in our concepts—because you a priorily believe your concept of identity to be right, and hence, to you, there must be some mistake to my arguments.

[Trinopus]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

. . . I’m not saying that the dead and the living individual are the same; I am asking you whether if of two (according to you) identical persons, one ceases to exist, the experience of that person nevertheless continues within the other, or, as would be the case if no copy existed, that person’s experience ceases. . . .

I can’t answer that question explicitly, because I don’t know what the phrase “within the other” means.

However, if you had two identical copies of Jim Smith, and someone killed one of them, I would hold that Jim Smith is still alive. You can see him, right there, the guy who’s breathing and everything.

On what interpretation of ‘identical’ would it not be paradoxical if contradictory propositions held of one and the same thing?

One where two identical things can be in separate locations but still be identical. Your examples depended on location. My definition does not define two identical objects to be “non-identical” solely on the basis of being in different locations.

“Transported and not transported” are not contradictory, as that solely depends on location. “I’m pointing a finger at one but not the other” solely depends on location.

If two things, A and B, are identical, then A = B. This means, for instance, that there is no difference between A and B; hence, everything that is true of A, needs to be true of B—otherwise, there would be an identity and simultaneously a difference, as you keep erroneously claiming I hold.

Again, I don’t define different locations to be an identity-demolishing property of objects.

Thus, my view is not self-contradictory.

(“I like white chocolate.”
“That’s self-contradictory, because white chocolate is icky, and you can’t like icky things.”)

. . . So, Alice before entering the teleporter is not a thing that can be in two places at once; if after having been teleported, she now is such a thing, she is obviously different from that Alice that went in.

Again, I do not define “able to be in two places at the same time” as an intrinsic property. You and I differ on this definition.

My definition may very well be wrong. But it is not self-contradictory; just different than what you would hold.

Indeed! Which shows that the (intrinsic) physical properties do not exhaust the ways in which two things differ. If there were no difference between the two Alices, I could not point to one, and not point to the other, since, if A = B, and I point to A, I also point to B.

Depends solely on location.

The language is perfectly fine; you simply object to its usage when it does not agree with you preconceived conclusions.

I am not claiming that my definition is the definition, the only one true definition. I’m saying that my definition is a possible definition, a viewpoint, based partly on faith and partly on such evidence as quantum tunneling. You’re trying to deny my definition…but so far, you have only done this by appealing to your own definition, and holding it up as evidence.

You said something about circular arguments. Let’s avoid those, eh?

I can, and I have. But I can also do it again: an object can be in different locations, but it can’t be in one location and not be in that location, as that would be contradictory.

If two identical objects exist, they can exist in different locations. The property of “being the same” doesn’t include “being in the same location.”

Again, you’re arguing from your own conclusion, as if it were an axiom. It ain’t.

This isn’t right: I am using your concepts, and showing where they lead. (I have also proposed different concepts—the type-token distinction and four-dimensionalism—but those have no bearing on my arguments against your position; they simply provide an alternative not vulnerable to these problems.) You don’t want to go where they lead, and so you are inventing some ineffable difference in our concepts—because you a priorily believe your concept of identity to be right, and hence, to you, there must be some mistake to my arguments.

There is no mistake to your definition. It’s one valid viewpoint. It leads to certain consequences and implications, which, at present, we’re unable to test. The same is true of mine.

The mistake in your arguments is claiming that only your definition can be valid, and basing that claim on implications that follow from your definition.

This is the circular reasoning you excoriated me for relying upon. Maybe you should reconsider the grand strategy of your debate here, because it isn’t working.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Trinopus

I can’t answer that question explicitly, because I don’t know what the phrase “within the other” means.

Well, if there’s no twin, then the following story would obtain: upon being killed, the train of experience of Jim Smith ceases. He has no more experiences. But if there is a twin, then you seem to hold that this isn’t the case—Jim Smith’s train of experiences continues.

This has one strange consequence, which is that science as we know it doesn’t really work anymore: the question of whether there is an identical twin in some parallel universe may not be empirically decidable; yet the question of whether Jim Smith’s experience continues after being shot depends on whether there is an identical twin. Hence, the empirically decidable facts don’t suffice to answer the question of whether Jim Smith’s experience continues.

To me, this would be enough to abandon this conception of identity—but you’ve weathered worse, so I sense your reply will simply be ‘then so much for science!’. After all, nobody guarantees us the world is scientifically describable, so this consequence is merely unpalatable, but not fatal.

One where two identical things can be in separate locations but still be identical. Your examples depended on location. My definition does not define two identical objects to be “non-identical” solely on the basis of being in different locations.

I’ve given examples that don’t depend on location. To repeat one (infinitely many others can be constructed), take ‘I folded the origami bird and I did not fold the origami bird’.

“Transported and not transported” are not contradictory, as that solely depends on location. “I’m pointing a finger at one but not the other” solely depends on location.

But you still owe some form of construction of how, for some property p, an object can both possess p and not-p; again, you’re merely stipulating that this is the case, without proposing any actual argument. So, how is it that some object can have the property ‘being here’ and the property ‘not being here’?

Again, I do not define “able to be in two places at the same time” as an intrinsic property. You and I differ on this definition.

I haven’t said that I define it as an intrinsic property. But it’s certainly a property: if Alice is both here and there, then it’s a property of Alice that she’s here and there. And if she has that property, then something that doesn’t have that property isn’t Alice—as Alice has that property.

You’re trying to deny my definition…but so far, you have only done this by appealing to your own definition, and holding it up as evidence.

No. I have shown that your definition leads to problems—for instance, it leads to contradictory properties obtaining for the same object. It’s true that for many of my examples, location—or better, locatedness—is operative; but your mantra-like repetition of ‘depends only on location’ does not invalidate it, and neither does claiming that you don’t consider location to be an identifying factor: you still have to show that what you propose is a viable notion of identity.

For instance, I could hold that color is not an identifying factor. Hence, that red ball is the same as that green ball. Would you think this is a suitable identity relation? No, of course you wouldn’t, because it’s bullshit. I would be claiming that A = B, whereas manifestly, there are differences between A and B. One’s green. The other’s red.

The same thing holds regarding to your claim for location (or, if you choose to take into account my example above regarding the origin of the two origami birds, location and origin; or, already pre-empting the example I will pose in the next post regarding some other contradiction your view leads to, location and origin and whatever else I come up with). You’re claiming that A = B, even though one can point to a difference between the two; even though one can uniquely specify one, without specifying the other; even though propositions true of one fail to hold of the other.

Your justification for this? Nil. You simply say ‘I don’t consider location to be an identifying property’. Well, I don’t consider any of the differences between us to be identifying properties. Hence, we are both one and the same!

If two identical objects exist, they can exist in different locations. The property of “being the same” doesn’t include “being in the same location.”

First of all, being the same of course can’t be a property; it’s a comparison itself resting on properties (it’s like saying ‘being smaller’ is a property). Second, again, two objects are the same if wherever I could use one, I can substitute the other; this, not location, is what makes the difference between the original and the teleported Alice.

There is no mistake to your definition. It’s one valid viewpoint. It leads to certain consequences and implications, which, at present, we’re unable to test. The same is true of mine.

Yours, additionally, lead to absurdity.

The mistake in your arguments is claiming that only your definition can be valid, and basing that claim on implications that follow from your definition.

Please show me where I ever claimed that only my definition can be valid.

[Trinopus]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Well, if there’s no twin, then the following story would obtain: upon being killed, the train of experience of Jim Smith ceases. He has no more experiences. But if there is a twin, then you seem to hold that this isn’t the case—Jim Smith’s train of experiences continues.

This has one strange consequence, which is that science as we know it doesn’t really work anymore: the question of whether there is an identical twin in some parallel universe may not be empirically decidable; yet the question of whether Jim Smith’s experience continues after being shot depends on whether there is an identical twin. Hence, the empirically decidable facts don’t suffice to answer the question of whether Jim Smith’s experience continues.

Science can cope just fine; you’re engaging in absurd hyperbole. Show me one way in which a successful Star Trek transportation negates the workings of the scientific method. You can’t; that’s absurd.

In my scenario, you can easily determine if Jim Smith’s experiences continue: just ask him. He isn’t dead.

To me, this would be enough to abandon this conception of identity—but you’ve weathered worse, so I sense your reply will simply be ‘then so much for science!’. After all, nobody guarantees us the world is scientifically describable, so this consequence is merely unpalatable, but not fatal.

That just shows how execrably bad you are at predicting reality on the basis of past evidence. The fact that you can’t accurately predict my responses strongly suggests you don’t comprehend my viewpoints.

I’ve given examples that don’t depend on location. To repeat one (infinitely many others can be constructed), take ‘I folded the origami bird and I did not fold the origami bird’.

If you and your duplicate are identical, then they both must have the same experience. If one of you folded an origami bird, and the other one of you didn’t, then you aren’t identical.

Once more you engage in the same failed strategy. “We’re identical, except for some specific difference.” That isn’t how the word “identical” works.

But you still owe some form of construction of how, for some property p, an object can both possess p and not-p; again, you’re merely stipulating that this is the case, without proposing any actual argument. So, how is it that some object can have the property ‘being here’ and the property ‘not being here’?

That’s how I define the word. If you have a concrete counter-example, feel free to produce it. You’re engaging in circular argument, claiming that my definition is self-contradictory, because it doesn’t match your definition. You, too, are “merely stipulating,” and, worse, you’re making claims about my views that don’t actually match my views.

You’re doing a really bad job here.

I haven’t said that I define it as an intrinsic property. But it’s certainly a property: if Alice is both here and there, then it’s a property of Alice that she’s here and there. And if she has that property, then something that doesn’t have that property isn’t Alice—as Alice has that property.

Great. That works under your definition of the word “identical.” It doesn’t work under my definition of the word. We’re using language differently.

No. I have shown that your definition leads to problems—for instance, it leads to contradictory properties obtaining for the same object.

No, you have failed in this, because you have defined “location” as one of the properties of an object, and I don’t. My definition leads to no problems at all…under my definition. There is no self-contradiction.

It’s true that for many of my examples, location—or better, locatedness—is operative; but your mantra-like repetition of ‘depends only on location’ does not invalidate it, and neither does claiming that you don’t consider location to be an identifying factor: you still have to show that what you propose is a viable notion of identity.

This is all true. However, your own mantra-like repetition of “location is an intrinsic property” also fails to demonstrate the truth of your definition. We’re both espousing what we hold to be true. I’m just honest enough to admit that your view is as valid as mine is. You are not making the same concession, but are improperly claiming that my views contradict my views. They don’t.

For instance, I could hold that color is not an identifying factor. Hence, that red ball is the same as that green ball. Would you think this is a suitable identity relation? No, of course you wouldn’t, because it’s bullshit. I would be claiming that A = B, whereas manifestly, there are differences between A and B. One’s green. The other’s red.

Yep. How fortunate, then, that neither of us have made such a claim.

The same thing holds regarding to your claim for location . . . You’re claiming that A = B, even though one can point to a difference between the two . . .

By my definition, the difference of location is not a property that denies “identity.” You seem to be claiming so, as all of your examples depend on location alone.

Please show me where I ever claimed that only my definition can be valid.

When you (wrongly) accuse my definition of being self-contradictory, you are discarding it, and holding up your own as the only surviving definition. That’s pretty much the definition of the reductio ad absurdum.

[Trinopus]

Afterthought: if location defines identity, then, not only does the Star Trek Transporter “kill you and produce a copy that wrongly thinks it is the original,” but so does the mere act of walking from your desk to the door. By moving from one location to another, you have annihilated the “identity” you used to have with yourself.

Going for a short walk is suicide, every bit as much as the transporter.

(If separate locations destroy identity.)

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Trinopus

In my scenario, you can easily determine if Jim Smith’s experiences continue: just ask him. He isn’t dead.

OK, just to be sure here: you’re claiming that no matter whether there’s a twin Jim Smith out there somewhere, Jim Smith’s train of experience ends when he’s killed?

That just shows how execrably bad you are at predicting reality on the basis of past evidence. The fact that you can’t accurately predict my responses strongly suggests you don’t comprehend my viewpoints.

Or that there’s no predicting that which does not behave according to reason.

If you and your duplicate are identical, then they both must have the same experience. If one of you folded an origami bird, and the other one of you didn’t, then you aren’t identical.

No. This was about the case of the origami birds: you hold them to be identical, yet I can point to a difference in that I folded one, and you folded the other. So, the origami bird has a contradictory, non-locational property: ‘being folded by me and not being folded by me’.

Once more you engage in the same failed strategy. “We’re identical, except for some specific difference.” That isn’t how the word “identical” works.

It’s you who keeps claiming that a difference in locatedness doesn’t count as a difference, not me. I’m not saying that I can point to a difference, even though both are identical; I point to that difference to show that they’re not.

That’s how I define the word. If you have a concrete counter-example, feel free to produce it.

You can’t simply engage in Humpty-Dumptying here. Your words don’t just mean what you want them to mean; otherwise, I could just simply refute your argument in three words: hopscotch periwinkle nascent.

All I’m saying is that two things are only identical if I can’t point to a difference; since I can point to a difference in the case of the scenarios we’ve been discussing, they aren’t identical. Against which your ‘argument’ is that whatever difference I point to doesn’t count, they’re still identical anyway; that’s just how you define the word.

You’re engaging in circular argument, claiming that my definition is self-contradictory, because it doesn’t match your definition.

No. Your definition is contradictory because it leads to contradictions; it leads to an object both having a property, and not having it. Your claim that ‘location doesn’t count’, thrown in the air fully unjustified, just doesn’t change anything about that.

Great. That works under your definition of the word “identical.” It doesn’t work under my definition of the word. We’re using language differently.

That paragraph didn’t even concern, nor depend on, ‘my definition’ of the word identical.

No, you have failed in this, because you have defined “location” as one of the properties of an object, and I don’t. My definition leads to no problems at all…under my definition. There is no self-contradiction.

With that attitude, you can define any claim you would like to be true as true. The moon is made of green cheese? Well, that’s just how I define green cheese! You disagree? Well, we’re just using language differently!

This is all true. However, your own mantra-like repetition of “location is an intrinsic property” also fails to demonstrate the truth of your definition.

I haven’t once said that location is an intrinsic property.

Yep. How fortunate, then, that neither of us have made such a claim.

Just exchange ‘color’ for ‘location’ and it’s exactly your claim.

By my definition, the difference of location is not a property that denies “identity.” You seem to be claiming so, as all of your examples depend on location alone.

Once again, no, that’s not my claim. I claim two things: one, whenever I can point to a difference between two things, they’re not identical; two, no object can have contradictory properties (or, if you somehow get hung up on the word ‘properties’, no object can have contradiction propositions true of itself).

You try to weasel out of that with the ‘but location doesn’t count under my definition’-strategy. But that doesn’t do any work.

When you (wrongly) accuse my definition of being self-contradictory, you are discarding it, and holding up your own as the only surviving definition. That’s pretty much the definition of the reductio ad absurdum.

No, I don’t, and no, it’s not. I am claiming that your definition leads to contradictions—because it does lead to both the claims ‘I have folded the origami bird’ and ‘I have not folded the origami bird’ to be true, which is a contradiction. This is the reductio of your position.

I am also positing an alternative, with the type-token distinction, and four-dimensionalism. But I’ve nowhere claimed that it’s the only possible alternative, nor do I even believe it’s without problems.

@Trinopus

Afterthought: if location defines identity, then, not only does the Star Trek Transporter “kill you and produce a copy that wrongly thinks it is the original,” but so does the mere act of walking from your desk to the door. By moving from one location to another, you have annihilated the “identity” you used to have with yourself.

This is at least the third time that you’re making that claim, and that I’m clarifying that this is not what I’m saying. I will also say it for a fourth time, fifth time, and so on; but I’d really wish you’d stop hurting that poor strawman.

I’m not claiming that two objects in different locations can’t be identical; an object can have different properties over time. But no object can have contradictory properties; hence no object can be in one location, and not in that location. That this should introduce some problem with an object changing its location is a childish fantasy.

[Mijin]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Or that there’s no predicting that which does not behave according to reason.

Yes, and I’m not really sure why you’re persisting at this point.

You found a logical contradiction in Trinopus’ reasoning, and I found a separate one, and his response, at least to mine, was essentially “I don’t need to answer yer stinkin’ questions!”, after which he continued repeating the contradictory points as though nothing happened.

There are plenty of other games he’s played in this thread (the repeated “After they’re different, then they’re different!” (as if anyone suggested otherwise) strawman being particularly annoying), but I think that one alone is sufficient to conclude that there is no “discussion” to be had here.

[Trinopus]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

OK, just to be sure here: you’re claiming that no matter whether there’s a twin Jim Smith out there somewhere, Jim Smith’s train of experience ends when he’s killed?

I’m saying that the ordinary language of our common usage doesn’t give an answer to that question. If there are two Jim Smiths, and only one of them is killed, Jim Smith is alive.

. . . This was about the case of the origami birds: you hold them to be identical, yet I can point to a difference in that I folded one, and you folded the other. . . .

In that case, they aren’t identical, and neither are the two “yous” who did/did not do the folding. They won’t be identical, because my hands are of different sizes than yours, so the folds won’t be the same shape. The two could be told apart by an ordinary high-school microscope.

One more time: you’re introducing a difference between two identical objects, and then demanding that I acknowledge them as identical.

And… You know what?

We’re done here. You’ve played this same game over a dozen times now. I’ve given the same answer over a dozen times.

We can make no possible progress here.

[Siam_Sam]

So you’re saying, “Beam me up, Scotty”?

[Trinopus]

Grin! (“And while you’re at it, Scotty, I’m wondering about a discreet personal ‘enhancement’ to my physiology. You know…”)

ETA: thank you for reading along as far as this. It’s a train-wreck, and I’ve been afraid it must be hella boring for anyone trying to pay attention.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Trinopus

I’m saying that the ordinary language of our common usage doesn’t give an answer to that question. If there are two Jim Smiths, and only one of them is killed, Jim Smith is alive.

Ha, what a brilliantly absurd answer! I wish I’d thought of it as a student. “I can’t answer this question, since the ordinary language of our common usage is insufficient!”

But no. It’s not language that lets you down; it’s your notion of identity. Under the type/token distinction view, it’s perfectly simple to express: both are distinct tokens of the same type, hence whether there is a twin does not have any implication on the question of whether the train of experience of the Jim Smith that’s killed continues: it doesn’t.

In that case, they aren’t identical, and neither are the two “yous” who did/did not do the folding. They won’t be identical, because my hands are of different sizes than yours, so the folds won’t be the same shape. The two could be told apart by an ordinary high-school microscope.

Of course, that’s in direct contradiction to your earlier agreement on the two birds being identical:

@Trinopus

If the paper is identical, too, then, yes, certainly, the origami birds are identical, and thus the same.

But anyway. Your fighting the hypothetical at least indicates that you now understand there’s a problem; but of course, this defense doesn’t really work—we could as well stipulate that either of us has access to a perfect folding machine, or, before you again try to construct some imaginary differences in this case, to an atomic-scale 3D-printer, which assembles the birds molecule for molecule. It would still be true that ‘I made this bird and I did not make this bird’.

One more time: you’re introducing a difference between two identical objects, and then demanding that I acknowledge them as identical.

And one more time, no, that’s not what I’ve done at any point. Rather, I point out a difference between two things you consider to be identical, and hence, argue that they are, in fact, different. Your response, so far, was ‘but those differences don’t count’.

We can make no possible progress here.

I think, quite to the contrary, that your sudden wish to cut me off, plus your fighting the hypothetical with the origami birds, strongly indicates the opposite—you’re beginning to have doubts, realizing that your position is indefensible, but aren’t quite ready to admit that yet. Thus, I think that these last couple of post have shown the greatest progress made so far in the discussion!

[Trinopus]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

. . . I think, quite to the contrary, that your sudden wish to cut me off, plus your fighting the hypothetical with the origami birds, strongly indicates the opposite—you’re beginning to have doubts, realizing that your position is indefensible, but aren’t quite ready to admit that yet. Thus, I think that these last couple of post have shown the greatest progress made so far in the discussion!

I’m thinking of a number between one and seven hundred. Since you’re now claiming to have mind-reading powers, identify it.

(I have future-predicting powers. You won’t name the number.)

Seriously, you’re completely wrong here: I’m tired of you and I saying the same things over and over. We aren’t making any progress.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Trinopus

I’m thinking of a number between one and seven hundred. Since you’re now claiming to have mind-reading powers, identify it.

I know exactly what it is, but the ordinary language of our common expression is insufficient to express it.

(I have future-predicting powers. You won’t name the number.)

OK, OK. It’s 372. (Oh and, did I mention that under my notion of numerical identity, differences in absolute value of less than 1000 don’t destroy identity?)

Seriously, you’re completely wrong here: I’m tired of you and I saying the same things over and over. We aren’t making any progress.

Yes, you’re right, I have said the same things over and over. Whenever you knocked down the same tired old strawmen, I have again and again explained how you’ve misrepresented my position.

But anyway. I think it’s sufficiently clear that your notion of identity simply has no answer to the problems I posed—not the fate of poor Jim Smith, not how I can both make and not make one and the same origami bird, and not even of how many numerals there are in 112333. The only mystery, at this point, is why you so cling to that notion like a drowning man to the last plank keeping him afloat; but ultimately, untangling the snares of your psyche isn’t really my aim here.

Maybe you’ll think about the issues I’ve posed, that forced you to blatantly self-contradict, fight the hypothetical with trivial nitpicks, claim that the differences I showed just ‘don’t count’ for no good reason at all, and over and over, after repeated clarification on my part, to misrepresent my position. More likely, you won’t. I can’t say I care too much.

[Trinopus]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

. . . OK, OK. It’s 372. . . .

Dismayingly close, actually. 576.

[BwanaBob]

@Tibby or Not Tibby

The main issue seems to get buried in elaborate side arguments when debating “teleportation.” But, the issue really is quite simple.

Can you be conscious/self-aware/have a personal identity in more than one location at the same time? If “yes”, then it follows that teleportation could be a safe mode of travel. If “no”, then teleportation is absolutely not a safe mode of travel. It’s that simple.

To say that successful teleportation doesn’t necessarily need to involve being conscious in more than one location at the same time is to not fully understand the question.

I believe the “proof” that you can only be conscious at one location at a time is self-evident. Despite claims of traveling outside one’s body with hallucinogens, psychoses and whatnot, in reality, from the time you become conscious sometime after birth, until the day you die, your consciousness has been perpetually tethered to the matter of your brain. It’s what all sane people “feel” and experience every waking moment and there is no scientific evidence to the contrary.

There’s really not even a good reason for why you should have the ability to be conscious in more than one location. Why or how would consciousness (or any other physiological process) evolve that way?—it’s more complicated and unnecessary for the survival of the individual or species.

The claim that you can be conscious in more than one location at the same time (and can therefore teleport safely) is an extraordinary position in need of extraordinary evidence to back it up. This evidence simply doesn’t exist. The burden of proof lies with those making the extraordinary claims.

In classical physics terms, I believe consciousness should be thought of as a local event. Simply having another exact configuration of particles in a different location doesn’t magically turn a local event into a non-local event. All of a sudden your consciousness involves action-at-a-distance? Why? Sure, you can shoehorn quantum entanglement or whatnot into a possible mechanism for this to occur, but c’mon…really?

Oft times the counter arguers posit that since no particle is privileged and an exact configuration of the same type of particles mandates that there be no measurable difference between the duplicates. That’s all fine and dandy, and it’s true, but that has nothing to do with the locality or non-locality of an object or it’s physiological properties. However, for some reason, the pro-teleporters believe that it does.

Let’s look at both possibilities regarding you and your un-diverged duplicate:

1. You and your duplicate think exactly alike and you share consciousness. There is no measurable difference between the two of you.
2. You and your duplicate think exactly alike, but you don’t share consciousness. There is no measurable difference between the two of you.

What’s the common thread between these two scenarios? That’s right, there’s no measurable difference between the subjects in either case (the only difference is subjective and felt only by the subjects, but it’s not a difference that can be measured by any outside observer). Neither scenario breaks physical law.

So why not choose to believe the scenario that appears self-evident? That feels intuitive? That’s more in line with Occam’s Razor? The one that doesn’t allow conscious action at a distance and successful teleportation? Sure it’s the boring scenario, but you can get your fantasy fixes via comic books.

This analysis is the best one. It avoids playing the shell game of 3rd party observers who have no stake in what happens to the source body/person. The only view point that matters is the source person.

Say the Star Trek transporter worked exactly as on TV except that it held the source person in a force field where he couldn’t leave the platform, scanned them, and after beaming was complete on the receiver end, it set a timer for 1 minute and then dematerialized the person on the platform, no one in their right mind would enter this device. The only winner is the “clone” that thinks nothing bad has happened and continues on his merry way. Good for him. Bad for source body.

[Czarcasm]

@BwanaBob

This analysis is the best one. It avoids playing the shell game of 3rd party observers who have no stake in what happens to the source body/person. The only view point that matters is the source person.

Say the Star Trek transporter worked exactly as on TV except that it held the source person in a force field where he couldn’t leave the platform, scanned them, and after beaming was complete on the receiver end, it set a timer for 1 minute and then dematerialized the person on the platform, no one in their right mind would enter this device. The only winner is the “clone” that thinks nothing bad has happened and continues on his merry way. Good for him. Bad for source body.

What a waste of source material. If P-2 is the real P once the transporter does it’s job, then P-1 should be used for food, spare parts, fertilizer etc.

[eburacum45]

We keep talking about copying, as if a perfect copy of something were possible right down to the quantum level. As I understand it there is no possibility of an exact copy if the no-cloning theorem applies to this sort of teleportation. P1 would have all the relevant information sucked out of it by the teleportation process, leaving behind random noise. Yes, the process would destroy P1, but it recreates it perfectly in P2 (according to the parameters of this thought experiment), so the only hope of personality survival is in P2.

I know that several people on this board understand the no-cloning theorem better than I do, but I wonder why this hasn’t come up in this discussion so far. Is it because the concepts of classical copying and quantum teleportation are so different that logical thought experiments become irrelevant?

[standingwave]

@eburacum45

We keep talking about copying, as if a perfect copy of something were possible right down to the quantum level. As I understand it there is no possibility of an exact copy if the no-cloning theorem applies to this sort of teleportation. P1 would have all the relevant information sucked out of it by the teleportation process, leaving behind random noise. Yes, the process would destroy P1, but it recreates it perfectly in P2 (according to the parameters of this thought experiment), so the only hope of personality survival is in P2.

I know that several people on this board understand the no-cloning theorem better than I do, but I wonder why this hasn’t come up in this discussion so far. Is it because the concepts of classical copying and quantum teleportation are so different that logical thought experiments become irrelevant?

Well, you see they have these things called Heisenberg compensators which uh, compensate for any quantum uncertainty. They work quite well. As well as the plot requires and no better.

But If this is the way it works, pattern buffers, etc. then why not make a copy of every individual that gets transported on an away mission, landing party or whatever they call it? Someone dies on the surface, just resurrect him later with the transporter. Identical to the original right up to the point he left the ship on that ill fated mission.

in fact, why not pay a visit to the transporter on a regular basis (weekly, daily) in order to update your “backup?” Do it for your loved ones, at least.

And another thing… That Star Fleet guy that wanted to disassemble Data? No problem. Here’s a copy of the Commander. Have at him, it, whatever you call androids. In fact, why not make a Data for every ship in the fleet? Everyone gets a Data. Maybe a few extra for HQ back home.

Star Trek had interesting ideas at times. They just never followed them through.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@eburacum45

Is it because the concepts of classical copying and quantum teleportation are so different that logical thought experiments become irrelevant?

I’d say that the question is rather whether the exact quantum state is relevant for personal identity. If not, then a copy of the classical information will suffice—in other words, if the phase coherence doesn’t matter, then you can just produce a copy, as you can in quantum mechanics.

Whether the coherence does matter is, in principle, an empirical question—ten years ago, it’s likely that the suggestion would simply have been thrown out without further consideration, since the brain is ‘too warm, wet, and large’ for quantum effects to play any functional role. However, recent developments in quantum biology, such as the (possible) relevance of quantum effects to avian magnetoception and even photosynthesis, make this a bit less of an open-and-shut case.

But still, the vast majority view is that the correlates of conscious experience—and hence, presumably underlying personal identity—should be sought on the level of neuronal activity, not on some inter- or intracellular coherent dynamics.

What might be perhaps more reasonable is an appeal to the classical no-cloning theorem: no-cloning is not limited to the quantum world, but is present in every theory that is intrinsically probabilistic. So, if there is some relevant probabilistic information underlying the working of the brain, then we might have to content with the impossibility of copying even in the classical case.

[Whiskey_Dickens]

As an aside:

CGP Grey (an awesome YouTube channel) just uploaded a related video. The Trouble with Transporters.

His opinion is that they would be basically suicide boxes.