It is not philosophical at all, but a very factual question. I’m not just talking about some philosophical question of who you are, but whether you are still in existence after you are dematerialized and rematerialized somewhere else.
Deconstruction and then reconstruction of an object is not magic.
You can intellectually believe that it is death but still teleport in exchange for a reward, because your lower brain correctly concludes that genetically it won’t make a difference since someone with your exact genetic makeup will be receiving the reward.
I myself still haven’t made up my mind. I am stuck on trying to imagine what it would be like to have all of your neurons gradually replaced with machinery. At no point would you be completely different, so I am forced to conclude that the end the mechanical you would still be you. However, suppose the machinery could be turned off. Fine, you may still be you when you’re turned back on. But then, suppose that the machinery was itself then replaced, bit by bit, slowly, until it was entirely new material, while you were still off. I don’t see any difference between that and teleportation.
You’re taking the fairly common in this day and age attitude. One I share as well.
“You” is your thoughts & memories; the rest is just dumb supporting machinery that can in principle be replaced wholesale or piecemeal. If you’re at all IT savvy, it’s essentially the difference between an OS on hardware and an OS in a VM on hardware. Or even a OS in a VM in a VM on hardware.
And under that approach, full fidelity teleportation would be the same as your other replacement scenarios. Whatever “you” means, it sure doesn’t (necessarily) mean meat.
The esteemed **Chronos **in post 4 asked a very pertinent question that got buried without comment. Whatever “you” are, it is undergoing continuous replacement and modification at the highest meta levels. In addition to the lower-level biological / chemical replacements **bob++ **called out in post #6. His link gives some useful further reading down this line.
It’s a lot harder to believe and stick to the belief that jumping in front of a train means death when you’re surrounded by friends who have jumped in front of a train and seem fine, and when jumping in front of a train means no more commute, a better job, space travel, a three way, or whatever. I think that people who say ‘teleportation is death’ really do mean it when they’re having an abstract philosophical discussion about what it means to be the same person - but I also think a lot of them would reexamine that belief if it was going to cost them a lot of opportunities, they were surrounded by ‘dead’ people who don’t seem to mind being dead.
It’s a lot like being a teenager and ranting about how you hate the whole corporate machine and you’re not going to do anything that violates any of your principles. Then getting out into the real world and realizing that you can’t buy much of anything without supporting a company that does bad stuff, and that paying rent or mortgage is a little bit more important than not contributing any of your labor for the benefit of some capitalist/socialist/statist/whichever fat cat.
Try this wrinkle on ‘Teleport’:
“You” get into a machine. Someone throws a switch, and “you” disappear, but a scoop full of “Human” granules is formed.
If there is a scoop of “Human” granules in the receiving machine, “You” are (or appear, in all measurable ways, to be) reconstituted.
Now, if there is no granules of any type in the receiving machine, “You” never materializes again.
But: it turns out that, if a scoop full of “Tree” granules is present in the receiving machine, “You” will be reconstituted as a tree (so not everything maps all that well - the teleporter technology makes do with whatever it is fed).
SO:
Two scenarios:
-
No granules in the receiving machine - what happens to “You” - are you ‘dead’, or just in a ‘potential’ state
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The granules in the receiving machine do not correspond to the received life form. Is that tree “You”?
How can a question about entirely imaginary “technology” be factual?
On a molecular level it is.
Well, the factual answer is yes. But that is more of a mathematical answer than a musical one.
Yep… And it didn’t end particularly well. Basically, the two viewpoints cannot communicate. They’re using basic language in different ways. The word “identical” isn’t well-enough defined for this debate.
Alas, it is purely philosophical, because it depends on different people’s interpretations of words such as “identical” and “you.”
Some people (myself included) believe that the “Star Trek Transporter” moves a person from one place to another, not much differently than a bus or airplane. But others insist that it destroys the original person and creates a duplicate, which is not the same as the original.
The two viewpoints cannot be argued successfully, because they depend on different philosophical values for key words.
As long as the Heisenberg compensators are functioning so as to prevent a tachyon pulse which causes the holodeck to become self-aware. In which case use proto-matter… 
Okay, try these wrinkles:
(1) The teleporter dematerializes you and doesn’t rematerialize you anywhere. Are you dead? (I imagine most respondents would say, Yes, you’re dead.) Would you be willing to let this happen to you? (You’re promised, and you believe, that it’s totally painless.)
(2) The teleporter scan you and makes an electronic image of your entire state at some suitably low level (that is, high level of detail – resolution to the atom or quark or whatever). This image is e-mailed to the remote site, where “you” are accurately re-constructed. When this re-construction is verified, the original “you” is then dematerialized.
In other words, in short, you appear at the destination before you disappear from the origin location, and for a brief time, you (or two copies of you) exist at both places at once.
NOW would you be willing to use this transporter?
(3) Assuming scenario (2), the teleporter in addition saves the interim e-file of you to some back-up medium, from which “you” can be reconstructed at any time. What do you think of this?
(ETA: These scenarios, especially (2), are not my idea, nor are they new. I first heard these questions asked 30-some years ago.)
We had a thread a while back by a guy who was scared shitless that an impending surgery would turn him into somebody else. He simply could not accept that after being anesthetized and re-awakened, he would still be the same person.
He had quite a number of threads about his medical questions.
It appears that not only was he eventually banned, but ALL his threads were wished away to the cornfield.
Suppose the machine first records the location of every particle in your body and assigns each particle an identity so you can be re-constructed correctly at the remote location. Now suppose it doesn’t have to send you over immediately. If you are transported later on you will be re-assembled as your old self. We could all just stop in for scan every once in a while and if we die our carcasses can be transported and re-assembled just as we were last Thursday or whenever it was we last got scanned. If my understanding of this machine is correct you’ll be losing all your memories past that last scan time, but you might prefer that to death. You could even go back to when you were much younger if you don’t mind losing a lot of memory. Wouldn’t bother me, I’ll just write myself some notes.
Anyway, are you still you? Yup, because if the machine works as advertised no one could tell the difference.
I don’t get the “magic” objections.
This is like asking what would happen if we traveled at 99% of the speed of light, as compared to asking what would happen if we traveled at 10 times the speed of light. The latter is certainly asking “what would physics be like if magic were allowed.” But the former is most definitely not: it has a perfectly sensible and physically consistent answer even if the level of required technology might as well be a warp drive.
There’s no evidence that human intelligence or consciousness is dependent on quantum physics (having an MRI done proves this much). Hence, any no-cloning theorems or the like aren’t a valid objection to any hypotheticals that involve making a copy.
At any rate, I’ll just leave this here.
What if someone started grabbing random atoms from your body, and swapped them with other items. A carbon gets ejected, to be replaced by another carbon. Some hydrogen gets vented from your abdomen, but is replaced by other hydrogen. In fact, what if your body was constantly sucking in molecules from one end and spewing out different molecules from the other end?
Are you still the same person when 10% of your atoms have been replaced? How about 15%?
Of course everyone knows that my hypothetical really happens. You breathe and drink and eat, and exhale and piss and sweat and shit and shed dead skin and hair and spew all sorts of substances out into the world.
What makes you into you? Are you the same person you were a second ago? A minute ago? 30 years ago? Does a caterpillar still exist after it turns into a butterfly? Does the baby you were decades ago still exist? If the baby was you and you’re still the same as the baby, what is it that makes you the same person? Your DNA? My sisters are identical twins. They have the same DNA. They are different people. Your memory? So you’re saying that if you got hit on the head and lost your memory that’s the same as dying?
In every one of these threads, somebody mentions this. But I think most of us also assume that the selfhood we experience (with qualia and everything) is probably based mostly (if not entirely) on the structure of the brain. So how much of the whole “all the atoms/molecules in your body are replaced every X years” factoid is true when it comes to the brain?
Ah yes, the “Grandfather’s Axe” question.
Same thing. Neurons are living cells, with metabolism of their own, taking in matter and ejecting it. Also, much of the brain is connecting tissue, some of which is cellular and some non-cellular: the same thing is happening. The matter is refreshed, slowly, but constantly.
It’s exactly this, which is why I refuse to travel on starships.