“Natural processes” means “Gypsies in the night”.
According to an answer posted at quora.com a person’s water is replaced every 16 days, carbon perhaps 8 months. (I’m suspicious of the answer since half-life – 50% replacement – would be a more logical way to present the answer than 100% replacement.) Another interesting factoid at the link is that your body contains ten times as many bacteria cells as human cells.
But that doesn’t clearly relate to OP’s question. If one assumes an impossible teleportation machine, why not just make it a replication machine. Two different yous follow two different future paths!
This is a philosophy question, not a physics one. And what you described isn’t teleportation.
How are you defining teleportation?
Any time you leave the laws of physics behind, even if you hand-wave it away with a “somehow”, then you’ve entered the realm of magic. Physics, and science in general, can only make predictions when we understand the steps involved in getting from A to B. Once that chain is broken, you’re on your own. Don’t expect science to be able to step in and fill in the blanks.
There’s absolutely nothing mysterious or unphysical about molecular disassembly and reassembly. We can already do it in very limited circumstances. Scaling that up is a hell of an engineering problem but no new science is required.
As I mentioned earlier, it’s like asking what happens in a spaceship at 99% of the speed of light. It’s far beyond our tech level and may always be, but nevertheless we can ask questions about it and get correct answers.
Let’s say that information is used to make multiple yous at multiple locations. Which one is the real you?
The technology seems to suggest that matter is destroyed at the original location and then created at the new location.
I can’t pretend to understand it. I seem to recall that an experiment to beam a water molecule to the moon was being worked on, but I can’t find anything on Google.
They are all exactly and equally “you”. Each of them would certainly say “I’m the real me, just moved over here.” And mean it sincerely.
If the machine left the original intact as well, he/she would also be “you”. IMO that person has no better claim to being the “real” one than any of the others.
Imagine using the duplicator to produce 10 duplicates all standing right next to the original in the same room. So now there are 11 of you. Turn the lights off for a minute and have everyone mill around at random. Turn the lights back on.
OK, who’s more real than who? No outside observer can tell and neither can any of them. All 11 had the same experience. The same experience *from birth *to stepping into the machine, and also from stepping out until now. Therefore all are equally “real”. Just like Einstein’s relativity, there is no privileged position here.
To be sure their experiences will begin to diverge from that moment forward. But they’re all still equally “you”, for whatever that word even means in a world with duplicator machines. And they’re all equally real.
If they’re identical, then all of them are “really me.”
If they began as identical, but have diverged, due to environmental differences, they’re still each as “real” as any other; they have simply gone on to pursue diverse destinies.
(If, forty years ago, I’d chosen to study chemistry instead of mathematics, would I still really be “me?” If not, why not?)
Sorry to reopen a semi-zombie thread, but it annoys me a little to see again on the Dope the implication that this is essentially a solved problem.
Frankly, I think that such people have failed to grasp the philosophical problem being raised, and this is evidenced by people pointing out “But the particles are indistinguishable!” as though this solves the problem when in fact it’s part of the premise.
In fact it’s a well-known philosophical problem, and both the positions “Teleported person is you” and “Teleported person is not you; you died on the start pad” have strong arguments and counter-arguments.
It’s only the uncomfortable third position: “There is never continuity of consciousness, no matter what you do” that has been resistant to refutation.
Who says there is no continuity of consciousness? The Star Trek Transporter could be interpreted as preserving that.
It can’t be addressed scientifically until we actually build one.
Meanwhile, the philosophical dispute comes because we’re using words differently. “Identical” for one moiety in this debate is not the same as “identical” for the other partisans, and the word “self” is similarly divided. We don’t have working definitions for these concepts, or at least not definitions that eliminate ambiguities.
It all falls down to the level of what people “feel” is correct. Logical discourse has been inadequate.
What I’m saying is that there are 3 (known) interpretations of what would happen if such a transporter was built.
The interpretation that not only do you not live on as the destination person, but you also do not live on as the source person (because you never actually have continuity of consciousness) is quite unpalatable, but it’s the one most resistant to refutation at this time.
Perhaps not even then. Or put it this way: there’s no third-person observation that could tell you which of the three interpretations is correct. So like consciousness in general, it presents a difficult problem for the scientific method, maybe an intractable one.
There are different meanings of identical, and self, yes, but they are not the cause of the dispute. In philosophical discussions of the transporter problem, step 1 is actually clarifying terms such as “identical” (e.g. numerically identical vs qualitatively identical). And then the debate about which interpretation is correct begins from there.
No, it isn’t. It’s the very essence of philosophy.
OK, fine. Pick the answer you like. It’s just as valid as the other one.
Even better, how about you wait for a year. Now there have been cognitive changes and physical changes, on both macroscopic and cellular levels. Is it still you?
I agree it’s philosophical, but it’s also a very trite question. Your last point bears this out. Of course there’s never continuity of consciousness – there are discontinuities when you sleep, and there are huge and disorienting discontinuities when you get knocked out by general anaesthetic for surgery, or the example previously given of the drug Versed. When you come out of major surgery having been entirely not in this world for a period of time in terms of consciousness, is it still you that wakes up? Of course it is, what a silly question. And it’s not even because all the cells and neurons are the same, because many of them are constantly being altered or replaced. No one would seriously claim that this affects one’s fundamental identity.
We had a poster show up who was terrified that he’d effectively die & be replaced with an imposter if he underwent general anesthesia. He was a wacko, but it’s a shame his threads have been disappeared; they’d be relevant reading right here.
FWIW I agree w your POV. It may be, *pace *mijin, that professional philosophers are still debating this issue. But that seems to me to be professional angels-on-pinheads stuff, not real world relevant stuff.
Well we can’t make transporters, and maybe never will. If you believe that makes the question uninteresting, then fine.
My objection is when people on the Dope either claim it’s a solved problem, or, worse, that it’s a solved problem among scientists and it’s just those la-de-da philosopher types that think otherwise.
This is not correct. My background is actually in neuroscience, and most of the stimulating discussions I’ve had on the hard problem of consciousness, and, yes, the transporter problem, were with fellow students, professors and neuroscientists while studying and working at the institute of neurology.
Not meaning to call you out or anything, and I don’t really believe that there’s much to models of quantum consciousness (as in, you really need quantum coherence for consciousness), but how doess that work?
Like I said before, it’s only a discussion because we’re looking at it in the abstract and aren’t dealing with real, working transporters. If you actually have transporters around that people can get great personal benefit from, then aside from a handful of amish-style people who reject the technology, the question will be settled as ‘no, you don’t die’ in practice, much like the way that people don’t consider going under general anesthesia death. It’s a lot easier to quibble over abstract philosophy than it is to give up a zero-time commute, instant tourism, and other huge benefits from technology.
That’s a fair criticism I suppose. I’m somebody who claims it’s not a solved problem, but rather a non-problem.
It won’t be solved until / unless we have transporters and folks don’t perceive their consciousness being disrupted by the process. (Assuming of course that’s what they really report experiencing).
But based on the evidence to date about what conscious is and isn’t caused by (and I am absolutely NOT an expert) ISTM that worrying about this hypothetical problem is akin to worrying about the hypothetical problem of “What should we do if gravity suddenly quit working one day?”
It’s interesting to consider the question in a dry antiseptic sort of way, but since the premise appears to violate a bunch of physics we do understand pretty well, the parsimonious answer is “It’s a nonsense hypothetical. Next!”
I may be guilty of Dunning-Krugering myself here, not realizing just how far into arm-waving territory I am with what we do and don’t understand about the biological-, chemical-, and physics-levels origin of consciousness.
But until someone posits a mechanism by which perfect duplication wouldn’t include consciousness I’m going to stick with “philosophical debate mostly about terminology.”
I suppose an interesting philosophical question line *might *be “If you transported somebody from A to B and they reported that they believed themselves to be unchanged by the experience, are they still in any useful sense the same individual? In what useful sense are they now a different individual?”
Not trying to stifle discussion or learning here. I’m if anything trying to spark it.
I was being slightly flippant there, but the basic idea is that MRI works by first aligning the spins of all of your hydrogen atoms (a large fraction of your body’s atoms), and then relaxes them to their “natural” state.
Spin is not the only quantum mechanical atomic feature, but it’s a big one (the majority of proposed quantum computers use spin as their fundamental quantum state). If your brain was using some kind of spin entanglement to achieve consciousness, the pattern would be destroyed in an MRI machine.
Maybe there are more robust QM states that the brain could use. It seems pretty unlikely, though, given the fragility of most QM systems that we know about. Quantum computing would be a lot easier if there was a state robust enough to survive body temperature, let alone all of the stray EM fields that we encounter day to day.