I think you’ve violating the uncertainty principle here. You would be claiming that no information is ever lost, and that the universe somehow “knows” everything that ever happened. But the more modern thinking is that this information simply doesn’t exist at all, anywhere. Even the universe itself doesn’t know which slit of the two slit experiment the electron passed through.
I think that what you are not appreciating at this point is that these are philosophical claims.
The idea that the past is just gone, that two objects with the same intrinsic properties can be considered a continuation of one another, and so on, these are philosophical / metaphysical claims.
The burden of proof is on you, and me, and neither of us have any on this point, so I think we’re at an impasse on this.
I think this just muddies the waters. Clearly the history of the particles matters somehow or else why do we detect electrons on the screen at all, and why is the umbra aligned with the point source?
It may be the case that which slit an electron passes through is unknown, but I think this is a different point.
We detect electrons, but not their paths.
re the umbra, that’s simply the closest approximation to Newtonian optics. It has nothing to do with the trajectory of the particles. It has to do with interference between the wave-descriptions of the particles. Besides, if you move the target back and forth a bit, you can get a “bright point” directly between the slits.
(Okay, I’m not absolutely sure of this, but pretty sure. It only means that you have to adjust the target so it is the right number of 1/2 wavelengths from the slits. You can force any given point to be a superposition of troughs…or of crests. But…I’d be happier if someone who knows the subject a little better could chime in on this.)
Good point. It possibly then depends on if it were made available to the public or only a few had the ability…
Perhaps so, however, I do believe your argument is more extraordinary than mine, because you seem to be framing us as pan-temporal beings - that we are somehow linked to, or dependent upon multiple different frames of references sounds almost like it should imply omniscience.
On the other hand, there is evidence supporting the notion that we are physical, locally-operating, thinking meat.
Well you “seem to be” misstating the BC position repeatedly.
The notion that we are physical, locally-operating, thinking meat is exactly the premise BC works from. That is why it concludes there is no association whatsoever between two identical entities. They are, and always will be, separate.
And again, BC is not actually my position, I’m just trying to explain the position because several people here are mis-characterizing it. If you think it’s a position that requires souls then I have not done a very good job, because it is widely accepted among philosophers (even those that disagree with it) that it is a Materialist position.
Not on purpose, I promise you.
Right, but separate reference frames somehow are associated?
I don’t think it requires souls, but you have repeatedly made or implied claims about some sort of unmeasurable extrinsic property. I’m not the only one that keeps tripping up and thinking this sounds a teeny bit soul-ish -I’m sorry it keeps happening, and that it annoys you, but I think it’s an almost unavoidable reaction.
Well location is an extrinsic property, and is very much measurable.
Yes, but we survive changes of location just fine. How is location a critical component of our selves?
Location, and pathway. How is the pathway we took to get where we are in any way intrinsic to ourselves?
I might have driven home by A street…but I used B street instead. Does that make me a different person?
I didn’t say it’s a critical component of the self. I’m saying it’s a different property and the basis for counting 2 objects. Remember, the basis for saying they are one and the same, or one object that has “split” is the fact that they have the same properties.
Well, they don’t. If we’re including extrinsic properties, they do not, and cannot ever, have the same properties.
At this point I may as well bring in the issue of error rate (since we’re just going round in circles anyway).
Let’s say the transporter does a perfect copy except for the relative position of a single atom. Is that me?
How about if the transporter makes so many errors that the guy that walks out is actually identical to Barack Obama. Is that me?
This is a problem for “transported person is you” because it seems we must draw a line somewhere: whether I am living (in any form) or dead is binary.
When this problem is usually brought up the standard response is that we experience changes, mutations etc all the time. However, this still doesn’t give an obvious answer to the question.
We might draw the line at the number of changes a human experiences moment to moment right now, but this would be a handwave; why does that amount of error, and only that amount, preserve the self?
Blimey, that goes back to Plato! If you cut off my arm, am I not still the man I was?
There can be no possible “answer.” It’s a conundrum, pointing to the “fallacy of drawing the line.” Tell me exactly how many hairs a man may have on a balding pate to be called “a bald man.” One hair? Two? Twenty? Now, surely if a man has only twenty hairs on his head, and is said to be bald, then a man with twenty-one is also bald. To generalize…
Well, you know the drill.
It’s also pretty much the same question as I posed a page or two ago. If we replace one of your atoms in situ, are you still you?
I don’t think error rate is a relevant sidetrack. The device is purely hypothetical and we are talking about the ‘what if’ of a perfect physical replica.
Well I would say that there are possible solutions to that problem e.g. fuzzy logic.
Each single hair you lose decreases your “hairiness” factor and increases your “baldness” factor. When asked if you are bald, a person must defuzzify the function, and conclude you are one or the other. And, different people may do so in slightly different ways, hence there may be some disagreement.
This is not necessarily how the brain works, it just illustrates that there are ways around this particular paradox.
Such solutions don’t seem to help in the transporter hypothetical I just raised however.
I don’t agree that that is the same, or even a similar question.
Well, I held off talking about it for quite a few pages. But imperfect transporters are very problematic for the “transported person is you” position.
Anyone still thinking at this point that TPIY is the common-sense, only Materialist position, should really consider this kind of what if.
Logically, it’s somewhat similar - a 99.99999% faithful copy should be expected to function in more or less the same way as a 0.00001% changed original.
In the TPIY position (which I’m not even really sure is my view, exactly*), an imperfect copy should be the same as the original suffering some kind of injury or brain damage.
*I’ve got a feeling your description of the TPIY scenario might be different from mine. What exactly do you consider the “transported person is you” position to be saying?
It sounds like we just spent a long time arguing about something we both agree is irrelevant to the topic.
Agreed…agreed…and semi-agreed. I think the transporter hypothetical is very much the same as Plato’s conundrum.
(And I really need to go out and make up a copy of that t-shirt!)
Well it would depend on the amount of error. The important question to ask is at what point we draw the line between it being a broken copy of you (i.e. you survive) and an entirely separate entity (you die).
TPIY says that you should go in the transporter without hesitation (assuming you want to be on Arcturus II). It goes further than saying the other person is, in my case, Mijin. It says the other person is you.