I disagree. It’s one thing to have a subjective description of something be the result of a fuzzy function. It’s quite another for the reality of whether I am alive or dead to be a fuzzy function.
BTW I didn’t come up with that concept, I saw it at the website bad science.
But still, you’re probably just better off making your own.
We could ask the same question of non-teleporter-related questions - brain damage following trauma, disease or stroke, for example.
I don’t think it makes sense to think of ourselves as indivisible unit entities - so there’s no need to draw such a line. A brain injured person may be *partly *the person they were before - and part may be missing or attenuated (or in some cases, a brand new part of their personality may arise).
I don’t think this is useful. Lots of people don’t go to the dentist without hesitation. What we viscerally fear =/= what is necessarily real.
Not all sides in this debate recognise there being any meaningful difference between those two things. I’m not sure I do. Please explain further.
Right, and positions such as BC give a clear answer on such questions. BC says for example that following brain damage it is still one and the same person because there has been continuity of the body.
Your position is really not clear here. You are taking pretty much the BC line for brain injury of an individual, but the Psychological Continuity position in the transporter hypothetical.
Finally, for imperfect transporters I’m still none the wiser on what your position is.
This is irrelevant. We’re obviously talking about whether a person survives the transporter and therefore whether it is rational for them to volunteer.
I’m summarizing what the difference is between the positions. If you believe that “Mijin” and “me” are one and the same thing, then that’s consistent with that I was just saying about your position.
If you’re asking what is the difference, well that’s what we’ve been talking about for all these pages.
I would put it like this: When I say “me” I am not talking about appearances, memories, or names. “Me” is a particular set of connected subjective experiences.
I have no reason to believe that a person having the same memories as me will allow my subjective experiences to continue any more than someone with the same haircut as me.
The BC position is all we have, in actual real life, because we don’t have the facility to duplicate people, transplant brains or undergo fission. But that’s pretty much an accident of nature - there are organisms with sentience and organisms that can divide themselves, but the two sets do not overlap, here on Earth at least.
People who undergo brain damage are not necessarily ‘one and the same person’ - they may undergo drastic changes of personality, viewpoint, attitude, memory - in extreme cases, almost anything that they or others consider to be part of their person could be lost or significantly changed.
I believe that supports the view that the notion of there being a continuous, unique, indivisible, ‘me-unit’ is - not exactly an illusion - a mere effect of the normal function of a human organism.
I’ve no idea how to answer the question. Sorry.
I think you’re asking me to describe my position in terms that are only relevant to yours. A transporter wouldn’t move ‘you’ because the thing you’re describing as ‘you’ is an effect, not a cause, not a thing.
The sentence is a little confused: why not take the Psychological Continuity position, since we can’t disprove that either?
I think what you mean to say is something like that BC is the simplest position to take right now from a practical POV, and therefore the default. I would agree with that.
What I wouldn’t agree with is someone taking the PC position for the transporter, BC for everyday brain damage and just being evasive on the subject of imperfect transportation. It’s a grab-bag, not a self-consistent position.
First of all this again confuses the different kinds of “same”. In the brain damage scenario, by definition there will be changes to the organism.
What we were talking about was numerical identity i.e. the same (one).
And that is meaningful, not some magical thing as you keep trying to depict it. I think you would agree with me that I am not you. If you survive me, I will not wake up as you.
So at some point there is a line to be drawn between, say, trivial brain damage, which most people would agree is still the same person (and again “same” doesn’t mean qualitatively the same here), and a transport with so many errors that what results is as different as me and you.
And, unfortunately, it seems it must be a hard line. The notion of being, say, 70% alive doesn’t make a lot of sense.
No, that’s not what I meant to say at all. How did you get that?
Never mind. What I mean is that bodily continuity is the only thing that exists in this world at the present time. It’s the only thing we can actually test against.
I didn’t really understand that. Is this what you believe I’m doing?
I wonder if we should just call it a day. I don’t even understand half of what you’re saying. I don’t think you’re understanding me either.
On this, I disagree. I do not believe we are unit entities. I believe we can survive as only part of the person we previously were. In everyday terms when there are no significant injuries happening, we function as unit entities, but only as a consequence of the convenient and accidental unitary nature of our bodies.
I’m afraid this thread went “emeritus” a while ago.
In case I am called to defend this view, here is one of the reasons why I hold it:
-The human mind, it seems, is not just one thing. We’re not units of personality, we’re systems. We are composed of a collection of different subsystems that appear to act as one thing only under normal circumstances.
I’m aware of this. However, I said the notion of being partially alive made no sense.
I agree to call it quits at this point, we’re obviously going nowhere.
I’m not sure why you even brought this up. I agree that the notion of being only x% alive is problematic, but I thought we were talking about being x% complete as a person, which is not the same thing.
Indeed.
And another thing to consider is…
Hey, where did everyone go? Did you all “split”?
Well, I’ve been to Pompeii, this last week, and no, I didn’t teleport.
Well, that’s good, because if you did, you wouldn’t be who you think you are.
I’m still here. At least, someone resembling me is.
Jumping in to ask a question: this hypothetical teleporter, would it keep time stamps on my data the way all of my files do? Because I have a quite a few backups floating around, all with different “created” and “modified” dates, so even if everything else about them were identical, I can still identify which is which.
Assuming the technology was even possible, sure, why not?
Point (at least the point we’ve been arguing) is:
[ul]
[li]When you restore a file from backup, is it actually the ‘same’ file, or just one that looks the same.[/li][li]Is there any difference that matters?[/li][/ul]
The hypothetical transporter/duplicator might even be engineered to stamp “watermarks” or serial numbers on each duplicate. This was the schtick in George O. Smith’s “Venus Equilateral” stories. In this classic sci-fi series, his engineers developed a duplicator, and quickly realized it would destroy the economy. They tweaked it so that it clearly indicated duplicates as distinct from originals.
The premise of the thread, that a Star Trek type transporter works as depicted, doesn’t involve this additional complication. But it certainly could.
(Wouldn’t change my mind much. If a street gang or Nazi regime kidnapped me and forcibly tattooed me with a serial number…am I then no longer “myself?”)
+1
And you could phrase it so that Psychological Continuity is the position that sounds like it’s positing the existence of souls.
For example, you might think that once you’re dead, you’re dead. But according to PC, that’s not the case, all we have to do is make a brain sufficiently similar to yours to ressurect you.
(And, just like in previous threads, the notion of how similar an entity needs to be to be considered the continuation of your life has been ducked).
The teleportation debate has teleported to to IMHO forum, and, true to premise, is exactly indistinguishable from the original. Does it have “continuity?” 