First, you have it backwards: deflation is an increase in the value of the currency. Second, there is no difference between “an increase in the value of the currency” and “all prices drop by some give proportion”.
There are two different definitions of inflation/deflation, though. One is an increase or decrease in the monetary supply (and according to many, without a corresponding increase or decrease in the size of the economy). The other is simple a decrease or increase, respectively, in the value of money, which is equivalent to an increase or decrease, respectively, in the cost of goods.
The two definitions are equivalent but only if we retain the parenthetical part. Folks who believe we need a fixed money supply leave out that parenthetical bit, but IMHO they’re crazy wing nuts.
Based on what criteria?
Thanks! That title rings a bell; I bet that’s it, and I may have glommed in some other stories. I’ve certainly read a lot of Azimov.
Yup. Assuming all other technical problems are solved, there will still be significant latency, for which there is no solution barring the repeal of the light speed limit.
That’s my theory – or better yet, there’s no difference between my dying and waking up a new consciousness, and it being the “same consciousness”. Identity doesn’t signify unless there’s an observable difference (and even then, well, see below.)
Based on this logic, I better not get any more colonoscopies! Because the result is a “me” that is devoid of some of the later experiences of the “me” that underwent – but does not recall – the colonoscopy.
If I died of an accident, I’d really prefer to have a backup. Too bad that service isn’t available.
Right.
Clever.
The bottom line is that the concept of identity gets murky when we talk about consciousness. Mijin is right that a lot of philosophers differ on the matter, but the ones that disagree with me tend to be the ones that take the same wrong turns (IMHO) regarding artificial intelligence and classic problems such as the knowledge argument.
Admittedly, as soon as a consciousness is duplicated and the two have different experiences, we now have two individuals. (Before that, there’s a philosophical argment, and it’s indeed debatable, as Mijin says.) Once we have two individuals, the loss of one represents the loss of one – the loss of that one’s experiences and its consciousness. We’ve lost everything new since the duplication.
That seems to contradict what I said earlier, but only if you feel there is a specific “identity” to a consciousness, other than what it remembers and thinks and experiences. I had to abandon that belief, to be consistent with what I believe (er, suspect) about consciousness being an emergent property of a mechanical substrate.