This is my feelings on it as well. If I ever had to have surgery which would stop my brain, I would have almost the same amount of apprehension as I would going through a destructive teleporter. But if the alternative is physical death, in addition to disruption of the stream of consciousness, then I would have no choice.
Ok, that’s fair but many people seem to be saying that since the process kills them, why should they care if a copy of them gets created that continues and I think the same logic could be applied to the medical procedure. If one really believes that then it would seem logical not to do the medical procedure either, because it’s not going to be “them” that wakes up, but just a copy.
Also, what about a brain “backup” system that operates similarly and in the case of death your brain gets recreated from the latest backup? Would that be acceptable, or would it be pointless since it would just create a copy and the actual “you” has already died?
What even is ‘continuity’ though?
Set aside consciousness for a moment (despite that it’s important) and consider:
I open MS Excel and type a number into the first cell, then start entering an incremental formula into each of the ten cells below - any one of the following things may happen:
[ul]
[li]I type the whole series uninterrupted in one session[/li][li]I fill the first few cells, then the phone rings - I type the remaining items in the series a few minutes later[/li][li]I fill the first few cells, then I’m called away to a meeting, so I save the document then retrieve it and complete it later.[/li][li]I fill in the first few cells, then it’s time to go home - so I save the document, email it to myself at home and complete it there in the evening.[/li][/ul]
In each and every one of these scenarios, the end result is the same - and the final value in the series is the result of a chain of dependent formulae.
In any of these scenarios (including the first), in what sense is the document at the end ‘the same document’ as the one at the start?
At any moment, the current document is only ever a descendant of what came before (even at the data level, the document is not represented by the same logic gates in the same components from moment to moment, and is not composed of the same electrons from moment to moment.
At any moment, the current ‘me’ is a descendant of what came before (or else where is it coming from?). Interrupt that process and the descendant can still be the same. Transfer that process (with sufficient accuracy) to another location and the descendant can still be the same.
We shouldn’t be worried about what happens when we step into a teleporter - we should be worried all the time about the demise of the current moment.
Time travel is most likely impossible for some very deep reasons (the grandfather paradox, etc). Star Trek-style teleportation doesn’t seem to have those problems. If it’s not against the laws of physics, then it’s just a matter of practicality.
Besides, maybe it doesn’t have to perfect, just good enough for most practical purposes. Your body changes from day to day, and you’re still you. So what if the transporter rearranges the position of a few brain cells? A weekend of drinking probably does more damage than that. Just as long as it doesn’t cause cancer, swap your arms with your legs or give you Michael Jackson’s nose, maybe you’d be OK.
Memories and patterns, yes, where “patterns” includes all known and unknown physics.
I’m not arguing for a soul, what I am saying is that I don’t see any reason to believe that in principle memory is the only thing connecting us with our past. Therefore I see no reason to assume that things like bodily continuity don’t matter.
I don’t know.
“Justified” here is a little misleading; we’re doing the best we can with what we know right now, and better that some human is alive than none.
We don’t have to claim to have solved the philosophical problem to make a pragmatic decision.
Fair enough: I’m not trying to talk you into it. I’m explaining my position, before hopping the bus to the starship.
Right: we don’t know, but we do know it’s possible to lose consciousness. There are obvious discontinuities.
Yeah, I wouldn’t blame you. Doc McCoy agrees with you, too.
Nope, I don’t - it’s just a shell being discarded, no person is being killed.
That article doesn’t say that teleportation is impossible in principle. Just *very *impractical. Okay, fine: Stupendously, ridiculously, outrageously impractical.
Still, as I said, it depends on how fine a resolution is really needed. Maybe a complete brain scan on a quantum level isn’t necessary for an individual to remain the same. A margin of error might be something we could live with. OK, so-post teleportation maybe you think your cat’s name is Fluffy, when it’s actually Chips. Might still be worth it, all things considered.
A bit too late for edit:
OK, I’m being facetious. I’m not actually holding my breath for anyone to solve those issues any time soon. Or ever.
Yes, philosophers have been grappling with the idea of Star Trek teleportation for thousands of years, but what do they know? Let me clear up this issue once and for all. 
We can do this with a thought experiment, that we take to the extreme in order to clarify the results.
Premise: We have an exact replication of the Milky Way Galaxy (MW2) on the other side of the universe from ours (MW1). At noon tomorrow, the you on MW2 will be killed (complete deconstruction of of all elemental particles) and a new you will be constructed with identical but not the same particles. By an unknown (and irrelevant) mechanism…or better still, let’s just call it an extreme coincidence, all the particles that constitute you on MW1 are in complete synchronization with all the particles that constitute you on MW2 for the following 24 hours. After 24 hours both MW1-you and MW2-you get in a Star Trek type transporter (the slurry type as you call it) and travel to each of your planet’s version of Paris.
(This is, admittedly, a very unlikely scenario, but as far as I know, it breaks no physical laws and therefore should be theoretically possible. However you wish to synchronize time between the two galaxies to make MW1-you and MW2-you match time-wise is up to you. But, importantly, the only point of view that we care about in this experiment is that of MW1-you, no other POV matters).
Question: Will the 24 hour existence of MW2-you affect you (MW1-you) in any way? Will there be any shared perception or exchange of information between you two, in real time (not just memories of perception)? Others have mentioned divergence as the point of splitting into separate personal identities (PI), but in this case, there is no point of divergence—no physical copying mechanism and complete syncronicity x 24 hours. For all intents and purposes the PI’s of both you’s should be the same if there is no difference between the two sets of particles (i.e. you shouldn’t just be identical people, you should be the same person).
Do you believe you will be the same person? If you answered, “yes”, think about it again without laughing and answer correctly—“NO”, or at least explain the physics involved in this level of action at a distance. At no time do you have a future in the person in the other galaxy—it may as well be a duck.
If “no” is the correct answer, how can we extrapolate that? Well, if an exact replication of your particles across the universe has no affect on you, then an exact replication of your particles on MW1 Earth should have no affect on you either. And if an exact replication of your particles on Earth, using new, but identical particles has no affect on you, then an exact replication of you using the same particles (deconstructed, then reconstructed) should have no affect on you either, because there is nothing unique about one set of particles compared to another identical set of particles. Therefore, just as you have no future in MW2-you, you likewise have no future in MW1-you or MW2-you who arrives in Paris via the transporter. The transporter will kill the pre-boarding you in both cases. But, were not done yet.
The real question is whether or not you have a future in the future you (same body, different time). Do you have a future in the person who wakes up in your bed tomorrow, or after waking from general anesthesia? A common (perhaps typical) materialist answer seems to be, “no.” But, why?
It’s pointed out that there should be nothing unique about one brain’s consciousness compared to another brain’s consciousness if the particles in both are exactly the same (type and arrangement). It’s further noted that brains change over time, atoms are exchanged (although, I’ve read, but can’t currently find a cite, that a significant number of cortical neuron atoms persist through a brains life), degeneration occurs, etc. Therefore, if you have no future in a replicated brain, then you should have no future in your brain + time. This assumes that there is no difference between the PI of a replicated brain and a brain +time. If this is true…it’s pretty damned depressing. It means you are going to be dead very soon…with not even a corpse to bury. In fact, the person reading this sentence may be different from the person who read the first sentence in this post.
But, I don’t buy that theory. Besides being depressing (who’s that stranger my wife’s going to be banging tomorrow…oh, wait, that won’t even be my wife…), it’s counterintuitive. And it’s messy, not the type of mechanism you’d expect to to survive Occams Razor. Shouldn’t the simpler, more intuitive explanation be the correct one? You should have a future in your future self, but no future in any type of replicated version of yourself (because, with regard to PI that leads to paradoxes that can’t be resolved). But, the only way for that to be correct is if there is a difference between your brain +time and a replicated (or reconstituted) brain. I believe there is a difference.
I believe self awareness (PI) is a higher order consciousness that supervenes on lower order consciousness and emerged at some point along the evolutionary tree, probably mammals. Let’s think of lower level consciousness as being the roof of a house, being suspended by brick walls (the substrate of the brain). Let’s further imagine that self awareness (PI) is a fire on the roof that ignites on completion of house construction (shortly after birth), and burns until the house collapses (death).
As long as the roof is suspended, the fire continues to burn. But, if the roof collapses, the fire goes out and a new fire will start if the roof is repaired and re-suspended. If all the bricks are removed at once, the fire goes out, whether you rebuild the house with the same bricks (teleportation), or new bricks (replication of brain). However, if you simply remove a few bricks at a time and replace them with the same, or different bricks, the fire remains burning continuously throughout the live of the house (you and your unique PI).
There is a unique difference between your PI (your brain + time) and that of anyone else’s, be they your replicant, or transported self. The difference is not in the “anatomy” or “geometry”of the elemental particles (they are not unique). The difference is in the “physiology.” Specifically, it’s in the unique continuity of your PI from birth to death. Nothing in the universe shares that. At least, that’s my opinion.
If this is indeed the case, I certainly wouldn’t find it depressing. OK, a major “whoa!” moment and a huge change in perspective, but not in a bad way. I would find it liberating. For one thing, it would mean that death doesn’t have to be the end (as long as you have a backup). In fact, death wouldn’t be anything special or out of the ordinary. Just a minor hiccup.
There is similarly no reason to assume that things like continuity of location don’t matter. How do we know that, when you take a single step to the left, you didn’t die and become replaced by a new ‘you’ in the same body, in the new location. We only have the copy’s word that there was continuity of consciousness.
No!, Martian Bigfoot, don’t wish for the “many deaths” version of reality, it’s not as nice as it seems! Let’s put it in perspective. For the sake of argument let’s assume there is an afterlife…but no heaven, just hell. That means that the you reading this right now, after waking up tomorrow, or awakening from anesthesia, or taking a single step to the left, will be burning in hell with a pitch fork stabbing your buttocks, cursing the impostor now posing as you. But, at least you’ll be able take your revenge on him and others to follow, very soon.
It’s a simple matter of class versus instance. Clearly, there can be two instances of something, those instances being identical in every way except location.
The thing being discussed here is the subjective awareness created by the brain.
I say that the subjectivity exists and doesn’t require continuity and its identity is defined by its contents (memory & experiences).
I say there’s no observable difference between going to sleep and waking up, versus going to sleep, being deconstituted, reconstitued, and waking up. I say that it’s not only the same to external observers (who blink during the deconstitution/reconstitution part), it’s also the same to the subjective awareness created by the physical substrate (i.e., from your perspective).
If people teleported all the time, we’d think it no different than going to sleep and waking up. My belief is that there is no difference. Occam’s razor prefers my interpretation, which doesn’t require inventing anything (some persistent “youness”) to imply that there is a difference.
The two milky ways don’t shed any light. We can do the same with teleporting to duplicate rooms, except that rematerializing accidentally happens in both locations.
Is it a bit of a conundrum? Sure, it is, but any interpretation will face the same conundrum, other than positing some kind of essense that isn’t identical in two copies, and wholly created by the machinery.
Anyway, I do believe we die every night, for all intents and purposes (several times, actually). Continuity is merely an illusion of memory. The evidence for this is that after duplication, each duplicate will feel that he is the same person he was before the duplication.
At this time, this issue is merely a debate, since we can’t duplicate people. At some point, I believe we will have artificial intelligences that have subjectivity, and these issues will be real. However, I will have no moral qualms about storing that entity as a backup in case of a bluescreen. Even if I’m in love with it. I’d have no qualms about stopping the program and reloading it on another machine. Regarding duplication (and terminating a duplicate), I think I’d have to defer to its feelings on that subject.
Mind=blown.
Well, you have a point. Good thing I don’t believe in an afterlife. And thinking about it like that sure doesn’t make it more tempting to start believing in one, either.
Which means I’m good.
The problems are the same whether it’s an innate power or a technological invention (except that the latter case adds the complication that the devices are particularly attractive objects for theft).
Larry Niven’s essay “The Theory and Practice of Teleportation” touches on some of these issues. Note that he assumed that teleportation requires equipment on both ends because otherwise “you don’t get a society; you get a short war”.
Precisely. If teleporting thieves keep stealing your sandwiches just before you eat them, you’ll take to wearing a gun; whenever someone you don’t know or don’t trust materializes in front of you, you will only have seconds to react otherwise there goes your snack. Blam!
Is there anyone participating in this thread, on either side of the debate, who considers this a valid rhetorical technique?
Yes, I do.
The two opposing sides in the teleport identity debate can be labeled the ‘Continuity Identity theory’ and the ‘Pattern Identity theory’. In practice the two are the same, because at present you cant extract the pattern from the individual without bringing the body with it; this ensures continuity.
But in reality a human consciousness is not a physical object - it is a process, and it has a single, instantaneous moment of awareness which is forever trapped in the present. The human consciousness is aware of its past because of its memories, and predicts its future by a process of modelling and anticipation.
If that instantaneous spark of awareness has access to perfect copies of an individual’s memories, and has the same mental equipment required to make the same predictions about the future- then it is the same process, the same program, whether it is executed on the original hardware or on a perfect copy. It is, therefore, the same consciousness, looking backwards and forwards in time at the same data.
As Learjeff’s link demonstrates, perfect copies look as if they are impossibly difficult, if not actually impossible. So if you are ever going to submit to teleportation, it will have to be a less-than-perfect copy.