It seems aviation has come a long way since then. Communications have improved – standardization in jargon and language between towers and a/c and between a/c. Miscommunication was a root cause in the incident, because it led the commander of one of the aircraft to believe he had departure clearance when he didn’t – and, in fact, rolled out and collided at near takeoff speed with the other airplane taxiing up the runway.
Crew Resource Management (CRM) has gotten a lot better. The ability of any crew member to speak up about a situation they believe is incorrect was a lesson learned in this. There have been situations since then that may have been saved (or severity reduced) because of CRM lessons learned in this incident.
The fact that ground control wasn’t aware of the positions of the aircraft in the aerodrome was caused by heavy fog and the lack of ground surveillance radar. The second aircraft was still on the runway because they missed a planned exit from the runway onto an adjacent taxiway, largely because the tower couldn’t help them find the correct exit in the fog. I think GSR is now a lot more common than it was.
CRM didn’t just get better; it didn’t exist as a concept prior to Tenerife.
I’m not a pilot, but CRM has been a fascinating subject for me. With the clarity of hindsight, it’s bizarre to think that anyone ever believed the best way to manage a cockpit was for all the subordinates to shut up and do as they’re told, and that it was regarded as rude or insubordinate to express safety concerns about the PIC’s decisions/actions.
It’s still that way in some airline cultures; see Korean Air Cargo 8509 and the recent Asiana crash in San Francisco; both had as contributing factors the lack of communication between the flight crew.
Hope LSL Guy and other pilots here check in, would love their views on this.
Quoting myself to correct myself (or qualify myself) – deadliest aviation incidents to this date were the two flights that were flown into the World Trade Center Towers 1 and 2 on 9/11/2001. Including the ground casualties caused by the collapses, each of those flights outnumber Tenerife by 2-to-1 or more. But those are also substantively different than the pure chain of accidents that led to Tenerife.
This self-hijack is now ended, and we return you to your regularly scheduled MPSIMS thread.
Actually, if you look at casualties that only involved the people in the plane(s), it still is the deadliest aviation accident, followed by JAL123 in 1985 (deadliest single-airplane accident).
I have read a lot about the Tenerife accident, and I am still amazed at the chain of events that ended up in catastrophe. It is a very sad but utterly fascinating story.
When KLM heard about the crash, they called for their best pilot to head the investigation. The pilot who wasliterally the poster boy for KLM.
Turns out her was already there. First to the scene of the accident.:eek:
The Pan Am pilot stories were the scariest - after the collision, they reached up to turn off switches, and there was no panel overhead! That’s how close they came!
I saw a special on the crash, filmed like 20 years after. You could still find parts on the ground.
Deadliest or not, how sensible is it to have a runway active with planes taking off and landing, when no one can see the end of the runway, the middle of the runway, the start of the runway, the planes that are on the runway, near the runway, or even 500 ft in front of you?
Discovery Channel had an episode of the crash series Mayday about the incident.
It wasn’t, but it was a unique situation. That wasn’t standard procedure. There were a lot of planes there because a terrorist act had diverted all the traffic to Tenerife. The airport never sees that much traffic normally.
That ceiling panel includes engine shut-off controls. That’s why, as the survivors of the Pan Am flight were evacuating over the starboard-side (unaffected) wing, engines were still running. :eek: Thankfully, no one got into an intake.
The Wikipedia article gives all the details, but the short answer is it was not at all a normal day. As JAQ notes, the airport was extremely crowded that day because of all the diverted planes; many of the planes were parked on the taxiway, requiring any departing aircraft to taxi down the runway to get into position for takeoff.
In addition, that particular airport apparently has unusually variable weather conditions, with dense ground-level clouds and clear air changing places at a rapid pace. The KLM plane had taxied down the runway in good visibility conditions, but at the far end of the runway, visibility started to turn crummy just as the Pan Am plane started taxiing, and quickly got much worse for them. At that point, there was nothing they could do but keep track of where the planes were with voice commands, i.e. Pan Am was supposed to call out on the radio as they passed specific runway exits on their way to their assigned exit c-3. They did so, but missed exit c-3 (the exits weren’t labeled) and continued toward exit c-4; that, plus Van Zanten incorrectly believing that the runway was clear and that he had takeoff clearance, set them on a collision course.
The Tokyo firebombing of March 9-10 1945 actually killed more people than either of the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan. The March 9-10 bombing is believed to have killed over 100,000 people, and perhaps as many as 200,000 (many bodies were completely obliterated, making an exact count impossible).
