I think the Schiavo case has given us the opportunity to have some meta-ethical dialogue about some important issues.
- The principle of finality. Let’s start with the one that is least controversial but probably most divisive in this case. Under our system, we let courts make decisions. Sometimes they make mistakes, but we have recognized that perfect knowledge is unattainable, and factual and legal consensus is impractical. Therefore, we allow trial courts to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Once those decisions are made, our system of justice presumes that they are final (not necessarily 100% correct–but final).
A party who is unhappy with the result has a few chances to convince some courts with authority to review these decisions that the trial court made a mistake either by applying the wrong legal standards (These challenges are reviewed by appellate courts with no deference to the trial court. We call this standard de novo), or in evaluating the evidence (the standard applied here is more deferential to the trial court because the trial court actually heard the witnesses testify, and was in a better position to evaluate credibility than the appellate court, which can only read the paper record, and will normally only read the parts that the parties call to its attention), or applying the law to the facts.
In every case, issues will remain unresolved. Those who are convicted of certain crimes in some states are executed despite evidence that, if believed, would support the conclusion that they are innocent. Companies and individuals are ordered to pay large sums on money based on contested facts. If the facts were uncontested, a trial would be unneccessary.
Our system, then puts the final decision in the hands of judges, and it allows them to make mistakes and decisions involving discretion. Somebody has to make these decisions, and here it is our courts. See, Rehnquist’s 2004 year-end report.
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Treating like cases alike. Another meta-ethical principle that permeates our legal system is the principle of precedent: We treat like cases alike. This is not only a prudential concern, but one of equal protection. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). This principle is not without exception, but exceptions are made by the courts, especially for pending cases.
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Judicial independence. Once the judicial branch makes a decision, it is not for the legislative branch to dictate the results in that case. Rehnquist’s 2004 year-end report.
In view of these ideas, some of the arguments fall away:
a. There were factual issues in dispute. Not legally. The case was over, and all arguments had been presented to the courts. Of course courts can only give their opinions about factual issues, there is no epistemological archangel available to us who can judge cases. Here on earth, judges must decide, who else can? If we are talking about morality instead of legality, the existence of a factual dispute does not mean that one side’s version must be accepted. If the facts are truly in dispute a satisfactory moral solution must explain why the disputed facts are irrelevant, solve the moral dilemma while taking account of the disputed facts, or accept some pre-established method of resolving the factual dispute independently of the moral result desired. See, http://www.intractableconflict.org/m/fact-finding.jsp (and the links at the end).
b. This is a painful way for TS to die. This is one of those “disputed” issues. But for legal purposes, it doesn’t matter. In Schiavo, the issue was whether TS had indicated a desire to refuse treatment. Whether the refusal would result in suffering was not an issue that was before the court. I can refuse all sorts of medical treatment that results in my suffering. I realize others have pointed this out, but our laws legitimize killing of convicts and denial of food and medical care to indigent people. In fact,Michigan recently terminated dental coverage for medicaid recipients. If the elimination of suffering were of paramount importance, I would expect that those outcomes would be different. Getting back to finality, though, the legally approved decision makers all decided that TS had in fact indicated such a desire, and the error correction system had completed its work.
Legally, the discussion was over. But there were still objections. People claimed the decision was immoral.
By every established test, the decision was the law of the land, but does that end the inquiry? What about hard cases (cases where the law offends higher moral principles)? Does the law have moral force just because it is the law?
These questions have plagued philosophers for centuries. One answer is civil disobedience; http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/civ-dis.htm. Few would criticize a person for refusing to respect Dred Scott, for instance. And most would argue that Nazi laws were so immoral that they did not deserve respect. E.g., http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/Adobefiles/A85e-moral-dilemma.pdf. All well and good, but none of this establishes that the judges in this case acted wrongly. The fact that I morally disagree with a legal decision does not prove that my morality is the correct one. If we think that good judges are judges who follow the law as written, then a good batch handled the Schiavo case. If we don’t, then we need to come up with a different formula for describing good judges.