Legend has it that Leibniz gave an answer to this question: That there are infinitely many ways that the universe could have contained something, but only one way that it could have contained nothing. Thus, the odds are ∞:1 that the universe would contain something.
All this talk here suggests that Leibniz blew it. It seems instead, with all the fundamental constants required to be within such narrow tolerances for there to be anything at all, that there are actually very limited ways (perhaps only one) that the universe could have contained something, but substantially infinite ways the universe could have contained nothing. (That is, nothing more than a seething [del]mass[/del] existence of abstract wave functions that couldn’t even organize themselves into atoms.)
Raymond Smullyan, in his book What Is The Name of This Book? (Full Text on-line (PDF)) tells of a philosopher who made it his life’s project to find the answer to this question, with an astonishing result! See Chapter 10.
The trouble with the fundamental question is that it infinitely recurses. Leibnitz doesn’t answer the question because he still requires a structure within which to place his infinite number of possibilities. He talked of a universe that contained nothing - that isn’t nothing, it is embedded in the logical structures to reason about an empty universe. An empty universe is not the same thing as no universe.
At the level of the universe. On a more local level we are here because of the existence of a planet with characteristics far from common in the universe. In our case we can prove the multi-planet-verse, and can be reasonably sure that other planets not exactly like ours can support life.
Making the AP planetary, we can note that we are happy the earth lets us exist, and note that the Martians don’t complain about a planet that doesn’t let them exist.