if I understand it correctly, it means the Universe created fundamental constants and physical laws in order for sentient life to arise: it is the cosmos’ way of understanding itself.
What if the laws and constants were altered slightly…organic biochemistry is no longer possible, but life…of a sort…arises from nuclear reactions on the surface of neutron stars.
Would that mean the principle is confirmed or refuted?
If I’m understanding correctly, that would refute the anthropic principle.
The big question, however, is not whether the anthropic principle is real or false, but how best to explain it–whether with a divine watchmaker, a multiverse, or something else.
I disagree with your interpretation. IMO, the anthropic principle refutes the argument from design because the fact that we can think about it guarantees a universe with the conditions necessary for us to think about it.
Imagine infinite universes with random physics. In some of them there will be life and that life will argue for a god that created everything for them. They’re just unaware of the endless universes where they couldn’t live.
There are two versions. The strong anthropic principle is the OPs interpretation. The weak version is the more generally held. It basically says that if there is something that could have a range of possibilities - Ie water on the Earth, physical constant of a precise value, we wouldn’t be here if it were not so, so we would not observe these other conditions. So, since we are here, they have to those values. It would be akin to asking why you were born and there was no unexpected visitor one evening nine months before your birth to disturb your parents. There wasn’t and you are here. The universe didn’t conspire to give your uncle a flat tire that night in order for you to exist. But since you do exist your parents were in disturbed.
The main observation here is that many of the fundamental constants of the universe appear arbitrary according to the current theories. There is no reason for them to have the particular numerical values they have.
It’s entirely possible, of course, that these problems are merely a difficulty with the current models of physics.
However, the anthropic principle really suggests that there are an infinite number of possible universes like ours, separated in either time or space - aka the universe might reset periodically with new constants, or there might be alternate versions of the universe someplace else - covering every possible value of these cosmic constants. The reason they have the values they have is only because we are here to observe them - the near infinite number of other possibilities exist (or will exist or did exist), we just aren’t there to see those.
Many speculative discussions that I’ve read about what the universe might be like, if some fundamental constants were just slightly different, suggest that such alternative universes would be very boring (in only there were some “observer” to see what it like).
The universe as we know it seems to consist of some kind of abstract zoo of complex probability wave function fields (or whatever), some of which have “congealed” to form quarks, photons, and electrons, and some of the quarks have glommed onto each other to form protons and neutrons, which in turn formed atoms, etc. Change some of the fundamental constants just a wee bit, and none of that could have happened. The whole vastness of the universe might consist of nothing more than an abstract zoo of wave functions that couldn’t even quark.
This is the detail that is sort of misunderstood, glossed over or distorted by those who argue on the watchmaker side of things. It’s not as if in any of those other permuations, where intelligent life isn’t possible, that there is a sad collection of beings bemoaning the fact that they don’t exist. Only in the cases where life is possible, is it also possible for anyone to notice that the porridge is just the right temperature.
Here’s a cite, describing what a dull universe it might be if the Higgs field were, on average, zero. He refers to another page describing all the fundamental particles and their interactions in the universe as we know it, then he describes what the fundamental particles might be and how they would interact if the Higgs field were zero.
TL;DR: In such a universe, the fundamental particles would not get as far as assembling themselves into atoms.
Surely there is an incredible circularity here. Only a universe which CAN and HAS produced sentient beings can consider such a question. For many years our universe had no sentience. Once sentience occurs whatever its material substrate), then the question can be asked. Universes that CANNOT develop sentience, or CAN and DON’T, do not have sentient beings.
Only a universe that is perfect for sentience in origin and development is able to consider the question.
Therefore all universes with sentience will see themselves as incredibly lucky in having a Goldilocks structure.
A weak anthropic principle is still a mind screw if you’re not comfortable with the idea of a Multiverse. And the idea of a Multiverse was a mind screw for people for a long time, it seems, although now it’s been a while since I’ve noticed anyone being bothered or surprised by such a concept.
And no one should be bothered or surprised by it. The idea that there is only One Universe, finely tuned for life by random chance, is much weirder than having a bunch of them, with random properties. If our Universe is just one of a litter, then the problem more or less goes away, it seems to me.
I am not assuming the existence of other universes, merely pointing out that any universe whether solitary or multiple will necessarily be seen as a Goldilocks one if it has the ability to comprehend that question.
We don’t need to consider currently existing fellow universes. Se just need to consider that our universe has expanded and collapsed previously and will do so in future. Only those times when the sub atomic physics turns out just right would the question of origin be capable of being asked or answered.
For over 4 billion years our universe was barren of life. It is only in the last few thousands of years have questions about origins be asked.
Or one out of a succession of incarnations of a single universe, each with a random set of properties. (It may be that the properties are governed by some higher level laws - you could imagine a manner in which say the various coupling constants always sum in some manner to some fixed value, but in any individual universe instance the split of values is otherwise random.)
I do find that the weak anthropic principle gets a tad overused as a justification. Sure, it is hard to imagine that nothing is a result of it, but there has been something of an over-reliance on it to justify the abundance of fiddle factors that seem to drive the universes operation.
Also, consider this – The vast, vast majority of life forms on Earth for all of history has died without reproducing, but of the huge number of ancestors tracing your lineage back to the original cell, every single one of them (every single one, without exception!) reproduced successfully.
Agree with the second two paragraphs, with a quibble. “perfect” should read “adequate”. And there’s a huge philosophical gap between those two.
We know, by WAP, that conditions are adequate for us to be here now to ask the questions. In no way are conditions “perfect” for us. In no way are we “perfect” for the conditions. Talking about “perfection” is simply opening the doors to the watchmaker enthusiasts.
As to your first paragraph, in one sense you’re right: the WAP is very circular. In another sense, the WAP is pointing out a tautological certainty that is often unwittingly (or deliberately) glossed over. It’s a bit like the early scientists who had no experience of the absence of gravity or of air. All their theories assumed those things were universal. Only when they learned that vacuums and zero G conditions exist did they notice the assumptions they’d built into their earlier theories.
The WAP shines a clear light on the idea that one of the preconditions for any observations we have ever made or will ever make is that the observation WILL be consistent with our own existence. Nothing more, but also nothing less.
All the stronger versions of the Anthropic Principle are IMO pure BS woo.
If just one of those individuals in my genetic tree hadn’t beaten the odds and reproduced - just one! - I wouldn’t be alive today. Do you realize how insanely small the chances are that all of my ancestors happened to mate with the exact perfect individuals to eventually lead to my existence!? The odds are immeasurably small, yet here I am. A higher power clearly designed it that way.
Went looking for the Krauss quote about which constant, the cosmological, isn’t perfectly tuned for life and found something that debunks the whole “finely tuned Universe - therefor God did it!” argument . . . what are the odds?
Personally, I think of the Anthropic Principle as less of a principle itself, and more as an exception to the Copernican Principle. The Copernican Principle says that we should assume that the place we happen to find ourselves in the Universe is typical of the Universe as a whole. The Anthropic Principle adds to that “…except insofar as conditions need to support us being here”.
Thus, for instance, we can look at the Cosmic Microwave Background and assume that it would basically similar to that if we were anywhere else in the Universe. But we can’t measure the average density in our immediate vicinity (which ranges between about 10^1 and 10^4 kg/m^3) and assume that that’s typical of the Universe as a whole, because we couldn’t have arisen in a place that had a much lower average density.
So far, all of that is just plain common sense, and is pretty much universally accepted. Where things start to get hairy is when you assume that there are multiple universes, which can have various values for the fundamental physical constants, or otherwise varying physical laws. In that case, “our location” encompasses not just three-dimensional coordinates in space, but also which of those universes we’re in. The AP still works in principle there, but it’s tough to justify basing anything on the existence of other universes whose existence we can neither prove nor disprove.
Where it gets really hairy is when you allow those extra universes to be purely hypothetical, instead of positing that they in some sense “really exist”. We still shouldn’t expect to find ourselves in a universe where we couldn’t exist, but should we be unsurprised to find that we exist where we can? Maybe the alternative isn’t “finding ourselves in an unsupporting universe”, but not finding ourselves at all. This calls back to perhaps the most fundamental of all philosophical conundrums: Why is there something rather than nothing?