I think I found it. I hope it will be readable. I don’t think there’s a copyright on it or anything.
Case Name: UNITED STATES V. SEEGER 380 U.S. 163
NO. 50. ARGUED NOVEMBER 16-17, 1964. - DECIDED MARCH 8, 1965.* - 326
F.2D 846 AND 325 F.2D 409, AFFIRMED; 324 F.2D 173, REVERSED.
*TOGETHER WITH NO. 51, UNITED STATES V. JAKOBSON, ON CERTIORARI TO
THE SAME COURT, AND NO. 29, PETER V. UNITED STATES, ON CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
THESE THREE CASES INVOLVE THE EXEMPTION CLAIMS UNDER SEC. 6(J) OF THE
UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
WHO DID NOT BELONG TO AN ORTHODOX RELIGIOUS SECT. SECTION 6(J) EXCEPTS
FROM COMBATANT SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES THOSE WHO ARE
CONSCIENTIOUSLY OPPOSED TO PARTICIPATION IN WAR BY REASON OF THEIR
“RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF,” I.E., BELIEF IN AN INDIVIDUAL’S
RELATION TO A SUPREME BEING INVOLVING DUTIES BEYOND A HUMAN
RELATIONSHIP BUT NOT ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, OR
PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS OR A MERELY PERSONAL MORAL CODE. IN ALL THE CASES
CONVICTIONS WERE OBTAINED IN THE DISTRICT COURTS FOR REFUSAL TO SUBMIT
TO INDUCTION IN THE ARMED FORCES; IN NOS. 50 AND 51 THE COURT OF
APPEALS REVERSED AND IN NO. 29 THE CONVICTION WAS AFFIRMED. HELD:
- THE TEST OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EXEMPTION
IN SEC. 6(J) IS WHETHER IT IS A SINCERE AND MEANINGFUL BELIEF OCCUPYING
IN THE LIFE OF ITS POSSESSOR A PLACE PARALLEL TO THAT FILLED BY THE GOD
OF THOSE ADMITTEDLY QUALIFIED FOR THE EXEMPTION. PP. 173-180.
(A) THE EXEMPTION DOES NOT COVER THOSE WHO OPPOSE WAR FROM A MERELY
PERSONAL MORAL CODE NOR THOSE WHO DECIDE THAT WAR IS WRONG ON THE BASIS
OF ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL OR ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
RATHER THAN RELIGIOUS BELIEF. P. 173.
(B) THERE IS NO ISSUE HERE OF ATHEISTIC BELIEFS AND ACCORDINGLY THE
DECISION DOES NOT DEAL WITH THAT QUESTION. PP. 173-174.
© THIS TEST ACCORDS WITH LONG-ESTABLISHED LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF
EQUAL TREATMENT FOR THOSE WHOSE OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE IS BASED
ON RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. PP. 177-180.
-
LOCAL BOARDS AND COURTS ARE TO DECIDE WHETHER THE OBJECTOR’S
BELIEFS ARE SINCERELY HELD AND WHETHER THEY ARE, IN HIS OWN SCHEME OF
THINGS, RELIGIOUS; THEY ARE NOT TO REQUIRE PROOF OF THE RELIGIOUS
DOCTRINES NOR ARE THEY TO REJECT BELIEFS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT
COMPREHENSIBLE. PP. 184-185.
-
UNDER THE BROAD CONSTRUCTION APPLICABLE TO SEC. 6(J) THE
APPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN THESE CASES, NONE OF WHICH WAS BASED ON MERELY
PERSONAL MORAL CODES, QUALIFIED FOR EXEMPTION. PP. 185-188.
UNITED STATES V. SEEGER.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
THESE CASES INVOLVE CLAIMS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS UNDER SEC. 6(J)
OF THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT, 50 U.S.C. APP. SEC.
456(J) (1958 ED.), WHICH EXEMPTS FROM COMBATANT TRAINING AND SERVICE IN
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES THOSE PERSONS WHO BY REASON OF
THEIR RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF ARE CONSCIENTIOUSLY OPPOSED TO
PARTICIPATION IN WAR IN ANY FORM. THE CASES WERE CONSOLIDATED FOR
ARGUMENT AND WE CONSIDER THEM TOGETHER ALTHOUGH EACH INVOLVES DIFFERENT
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PARTIES RAISE THE BASIC QUESTION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SECTION WHICH DEFINES THE TERM “RELIGIOUS
TRAINING AND BELIEF,” AS USED IN THE ACT, AS “AN INDIVIDUAL’S BELIEF IN
A RELATION TO A SUPREME BEING INVOLVING DUTIES SUPERIOR TO THOSE
ARISING FROM ANY HUMAN RELATION BUT NOT INCLUDING ESSENTIALLY
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, OR PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS OR A MERELY PERSONAL
MORAL CODE.” THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK IS LAUNCHED UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT’S ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CLAUSES AND IS TWOFOLD:
(1) THE SECTION DOES NOT EXEMPT NONRELIGIOUS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS;
AND (2) IT DISCRIMINATES BETWEEN DIFFERENT FORMS OF RELIGIOUS
EXPRESSION IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT. JAKOBSON (NO. 51) AND PETER (NO. 29) ALSO CLAIM THAT THEIR
BELIEFS COME WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECTION. JAKOBSON CLAIMS THAT
HE MEETS THE STANDARDS OF SEC. 6(J) BECAUSE HIS OPPOSITION TO WAR IS
BASED ON BELIEF IN A SUPREME REALITY AND IS THEREFORE AN OBLIGATION
SUPERIOR TO ONE RESULTING FROM MAN’S RELATIONSHIP TO HIS FELLOW MAN.
PETER CONTENDS THAT HIS OPPOSITION TO WAR DERIVES FROM HIS ACCEPTANCE
OF THE EXISTENCE OF A UNIVERSAL POWER BEYOND THAT OF MAN AND THAT THIS
ACCEPTANCE IN FACT CONSTITUTES BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, QUALIFYING
HIM FOR EXEMPTION. WE GRANTED CERTIORARI IN EACH OF THE CASES BECAUSE
OF THEIR IMPORTANCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT. 377 U.S. 922.
WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT CONGRESS, IN USING THE EXPRESSION “SUPREME
BEING” RATHER THAN THE DESIGNATION “GOD,” WAS MERELY CLARIFYING THE
MEANING OF RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF SO AS TO EMBRACE ALL RELIGIONS
AND TO EXCLUDE ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, OR PHILOSOPHICAL
VIEWS. WE BELIEVE THAT UNDER THIS CONSTRUCTION, THE TEST OF BELIEF “IN
A RELATION TO A SUPREME BEING” IS WHETHER A GIVEN BELIEF THAT IS
SINCERE AND MEANINGFUL OCCUPIES A PLACE IN THE LIFE OF ITS POSSESSOR
PARALLEL TO THAT FILLED BY THE ORTHODOX BELIEF IN GOD OF ONE WHO
CLEARLY QUALIFIES FOR THE EXEMPTION. WHERE SUCH BELIEFS HAVE PARALLEL
POSITIONS IN THE LIVES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE HOLDERS WE CANNOT SAY THAT
ONE IS “IN A RELATION TO A SUPREME BEING” AND THE OTHER IS NOT. WE
HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE BELIEFS OF THE OBJECTORS IN THESE CASES MEET
THESE CRITERIA, AND, ACCORDINGLY, WE AFFIRM THE JUDGMENTS IN NOS. 50
AND 51 AND REVERSE THE JUDGMENT IN NO. 29.
THE FACTS IN THE CASES.
NO. 50: SEEGER WAS CONVICTED IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK OF HAVING REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO INDUCTION IN THE
ARMED FORCES. HE WAS ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED 1-A IN 1953 BY HIS LOCAL
BOARD, BUT THIS CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED IN 1955 TO 2-S (STUDENT) AND
HE REMAINED IN THIS STATUS UNTIL 1958 WHEN HE WAS RECLASSIFIED 1-A. HE
FIRST CLAIMED EXEMPTION AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR IN 1957 AFTER
SUCCESSIVE ANNUAL RENEWALS OF HIS STUDENT CLASSIFICATION. ALTHOUGH HE
DID NOT ADOPT VERBATIM THE PRINTED SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM FORM, HE
DECLARED THAT HE WAS CONSCIENTIOUSLY OPPOSED TO PARTICIPATION IN WAR IN
ANY FORM BY REASON OF HIS “RELIGIOUS” BELIEF; THAT HE PREFERRED TO
LEAVE THE QUESTION AS TO HIS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING OPEN, “RATHER
THAN ANSWER ‘YES’ OR ‘NO’”; THAT HIS “SKEPTICISM OR DISBELIEF IN THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD” DID “NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LACK OF FAITH IN ANYTHING
WHATSOEVER”; THAT HIS WAS A “BELIEF IN AND DEVOTION TO GOODNESS AND
VIRTUE FOR THEIR OWN SAKES, AND A RELIGIOUS FAITH IN A PURELY ETHICAL
CREED.” R. 69-70, 73. HE CITED SUCH PERSONAGES AS PLATO, ARISTOTLE
AND SPINOZA FOR SUPPORT OF HIS ETHICAL BELIEF IN INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL
INTEGRITY “WITHOUT BELIEF IN GOD, EXCEPT IN THE REMOTEST SENSE.” R.
73. HIS BELIEF WAS FOUND TO BE SINCERE, HONEST, AND MADE IN GOOD
FAITH; AND HIS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO BE BASED UPON INDIVIDUAL
TRAINING AND BELIEF, BOTH OF WHICH INCLUDED RESEARCH IN RELIGIOUS AND
CULTURAL FIELDS. SEEGER’S CLAIM, HOWEVER, WAS DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE IT
WAS NOT BASED UPON A “BELIEF IN A RELATION TO A SUPREME BEING” AS
REQUIRED BY SEC. 6(J) OF THE ACT. AT TRIAL SEEGER’S COUNSEL ADMITTED
THAT SEEGER’S BELIEF WAS NOT IN RELATION TO A SUPREME BEING AS COMMONLY
UNDERSTOOD, BUT CONTENDED THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO THE EXEMPTION BECAUSE
“UNDER THE PRESENT LAW MR. SEEGER’S POSITION WOULD ALSO INCLUDE
DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION WHICH HAVE BEEN STATED MORE RECENTLY,” R. 49,
AND COULD BE “ACCOMMODATED” UNDER THE DEFINITION OF RELIGIOUS TRAINING
AND BELIEF IN THE ACT, R. 53. HE WAS CONVICTED AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS REVERSED, HOLDING THAT THE SUPREME BEING REQUIREMENT
