Except that they wouldn’t have been weightless if the non-aerodynamic cabin was A) at terminal velocity or B) tumbling. The forces that can build when a vehicle tumbled can be tremendous. There was an accident at the Reno Air Races last year where an unlimited race plan lost a wing during the race and crashed. Post-crash analysis showed that the pilot was probably killed instantly by the resulting force on the fuselage when it changed attitude very quickly, even though it hit the ground in one piece.
Also, if the cabin maintained some level of pressurization, it would have been impossible to get the door open. Even a difference of one PSI between the outside and inside of the cabin would make it impossible to budge the door. And even if there was no pressure differential (or if the door was equipped with explosive bolts and opened outwards), a slight deformation of the cabin might have lodged it firmly shut.
On a similar theme, the F111’s crew capsule detached, and the capsule returned to
earth as one unit. However it is only maybe 40 feet long, and 10 feet wide.
not trying to get to exact, but I worked the F-111 mod project for a few years, and the capsule is much smaller than that, maybe 7’-8’ x 10’-12’. One of the complaints from the flight crew was back injury/disc compression on landing. later, Tom
You are correct. It was more of a fireball. This "fireball" was caused by the LOX and LHY leaking from the ET after the "explosion" (I use that term loosely here). And if you look closely, the SRBs fly off toward the ocean RELATIVELY undamaged. It was the burning fuel from the ET that "Blew Apart" the orbiter.
Something else that may come in handy for those of you who may not know, the entire assembly (SRBs, ET, Orbiter, and SSMEs) is known as the shuttle. Note: The SSMEs (Space Shuttle Main Engines), though attached to the orbiter, is considered a completely different component.
-Ra
The “Green Vial” Stuff you’ve heard about was not a top secret material. It’s a rescue beacon. If you see pictures or video of the Mercury, Gemini, or Apollo splashdowns, you’ll notice a green smoke around them. This was used in case they splashed down farther downrange than expected. This would be a sort of flare to overhead aircraft saying “Here we are come and get us out of this old rickity capsule”
I have looked through all the blueprints for the orbiter I own and have found no evidence of a beacon substance yet prior or following the Challenger incident. It wouldn't be uncommon for them to use it though.
Something else useful, We've never lost a man in space. All our deaths were during a launch or during a launch test.
-Ra
Regarding the attempts to caution NASA about launching in cold weather, the engineers used very limited data to make their point and ended up agreeing that the evidence to back up their caution was inconclusive. There is a very elegant analysis of the presentations in Edward Tufte’s Visual Explanations including reproductions of the actual tables generated to show the danger: tables which, because of poor design and informational clutter, could lead to no certain correlation between O-ring failure and cold temperature. He quotes an aeticle by Richard Lighthall (“Launching the Space Shuttle Challanger: Disciplinary Deficiencies in the Analysis of Engineering Data” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 38, Feb. 1991) as concluding that:
In the face of (justifiable) skepticism of their concerns Morton Thiokol official Joe Kilminster made the following (unjustified) recommendation to NASA the night before the launch: “MTI recommends STS-51L launch proceed on 28 January 1986”
Since there WAS concern about temperature affecting the O-ring’s elasticity and since no previous shuttle had launched at less than 53 degrees F, it would, of course, have been prudent to delay the launch and shift the burden of evidence to demonstrate that no danger was present (rather than merely that no danger could be verified with thin evidence).
In the face of administrative, financial. public relations and political this caution was not deemed to have sufficient merit. In the real world those sorts of decisions must be made and this decision had a tragic aftermath that was, in simple terms, the consequence of trying something that had never been tried before (a cold-weather launch)
The shuttle has one parachute, known as a drag chute, that is used to slow it down after landing.
As for astronaut escape, they must exit the cockpit and run across the gantry to a few ‘baskets’ hanging on wires leading to a bunker a few hundred yards from the launch platform.
-SSB
Also, for those interested in Buran (You’d know what I’m talking about), see my thread in the IMHO area…probably the wrong forum…but it’s too late now…
-SSB
My father worked on the preliminary design phase of the shuttle. (His branch at NASA was Advanced Mission and Design.) The problem with shuttle escape systems was that there was an extreme amount of meddleing in the design phase. It was more than just cost involved. The Department of Defense was insistant on the shuttle being able to perform certain missions. It had to be able to lift a certain size satellite to a specific height orbit. With ejection seats for everyone, the added weight wouldn’t allow the shuttle to perform the tasks required by DOD. (The solid fuel boosters were added because of the extra requirents of the DOD. For NASA’s purpose, the shuttle didn’t need to be as big or fly as high.) DOD had big plans for the shuttle fleet. Remember the multi-billion dollar launch complex at Vandenberg in California? It was mothballed after the disaster. It was one of the reasons for the changes in design. DOD wanted to be able to launch from Vandenberg on a north/ south polar orbit. (The better for spy satellites.) Problem is that you lose the added boost of the rotation of the earth.
It was also decided that the safety gain would be minimal. Escape systems would be usefull for only a few seconds of launch time for missions that would last for days. Remember that the shuttle had already passed through “max-Q” which is the period of maximum dynamic pressure of the air on the spacecraft. If someone had tried to eject at that time they were moving so fast in relation to the air, it would have killed them.
Ironically, it was expected that they would lose one shuttle during the life of the program. However they expected it to happen on re-entry.
I don’t think there are green “smoke beacons” on the shuttle. It is likely, however, that it has sea dye markers. This is what you see floating in the water around capsules, and around Tom Cruise in Top Gun.
After an emergency (and this applies to lost campers as well as astronauts) you want to “make yourself big”. The best way to do this is with a radio, as it boradcasts in a wide area over all directions. A signal mirror also makes you “bigger”. Its flash can be seen for miles, but it is unidirectional. Military aviators also carry a combination smoke/flare. I don’t know what colour the smoke is, but I think it’s white. The downed aviator uses the smoke in the daytime or the flare at night. They also carry an arial “pencil” flare that they can launch that burns for a few seconds. A strobe is also in the survival vest, which can bee seen at a good distance at night. As you can see, all of these devices make the pilot “bigger”, but as you go down the list the effect is smaller.
The last thing an aviator in the water can use is the sea dye marker. This creates a “puddle” of green that (one hopes) will be seen by a rescue aircraft. Naval aviators also have reflective tape on their helmets, which also have a velcro patch to which they can attach the strobe.
There is a new product that is being issued to some aircrews that is a long, bouyant orange ribbon. It’s said to be more effective than a sea dye marker.
As much as NASA wishes to give the impression that space flight is “safe”, it is really only “relatively safe”. This relative safety has come at a high price. Who knows how many pilots have been lost testing new technology? Go to Edwards Air Force Base (the premier flight test facility for the air force). It seems that almost every street is named for someone who died in the effort to go higher and faster. The base itself is named for a test pilot who crashed testing a flying wing. Accidents happen and people die; but we learn from those accidents and apply the lessons to future machines.
The parachutes on the Apollo capsules were part of the design for re-entry. The shuttles are designed to be flown/glide to a landing. The reasons that some kind of escape pod was not provided in shuttles are (1) cost (2) the management’s view that the odds of a catastrophic shuttle failure were incredibly low. Now, management is more careful, but the shuttle design is already established.
