Eh? I can’t parse that sentence.
I give you the “other” shirt on the table. Prove it isn’t yours.
Do you really not comprehend the meaning of the word “identical?” Because you keep doing this. “They’re identical…but one is really real and the other is just a cheap copy.” Yet you can’t tell which is which: so where is the difference? And if there is a difference…then they aren’t identical. Your entire argument is self-contradictory.
As far as I can tell, the counterargument here is for some kind of aura of authenticity that derives and persists from the spatial continuity of the particles composing the object. If we had been able to tag them, or if God had been watching them closely and was in a talkative mood, we’d still be able to tell which one is ‘real’ and which is the copy.
It’s a banal assertion though. Continuity of this or that atom of carbon is a bit of trivia. The universe doesn’t have a centralised index of where all its atoms are and what they are doing and atoms don’t tattoo their own life histories into their forearms.
A copy of a thing that performs the identical function to the original, is doing the same thing. It is the same thing. Once a thing can be duplicated in every detail, authenticity becomes an imaginary property.
Of course I’m still emotionally offended if I buy the Mona Lisa only to discover that it’s a precise and completely faithful replicator copy, but that’s just another example of how we have built an imaginary framework of the world, and how badly it would fit a different world, where replication is possible.
Either that, or, as I suspect, we’re not using words in quite the same way. This is always a difficulty in threads that have abstract concepts involved. What I mean by “identical” might not be the same as what someone else means by “identical.”
There’s also a hint of “qualia” involved, and that’s often a show-stopper.
Anyway, it sure could be worse… Is 1.9999… = 2? 
That’s irony, that is.
The original has memories of things directly physically experienced, if it remembers eating an apple 6 years ago that is because it physically ate the apple.
The duplicate remembers it and has the memory, but did not physically eat the apple.
If the process of duplication or circumstances or the set up leaves neither with a clue about who is the original and which the duplicate, and even an observer can’t tell there was still one who lived the physical circumstances that created the memory chemically.
In all cases they are both the same “person” at the moment after duplication but will start diverging soon enough.
If you duplicate me there are now two grudes, both are “me”. Very soon however we will diverge and both will consider themselves me but there will still be one who physically existed in the past and one who did not until the dupe point.
This seems like one of those issues where people are getting tripped up on semantics and thinking in words, think of it without language and it seems fairly simple.
I would be angry if the resale value of the object was of importance to me, I would not be able to resell it for market rate of an original and would feel defrauded if I purchased it under false pretenses.
But if I buy a bag of chips and am told hah got you that is a replicated bag of chips, I would not be angry because I purchased it to consume it. And the price is presumably so low the fact that replicated chips are cheaper than originals is trivial, in fact I might notice they are identical in taste and nutrition and from then on frequent the seller of replicated chips.
Or that it fantasised about eating an apple, and created a false memory. Our memories are plastic and unreliable; that makes it even harder to distinguish between a person with a real past and none with implanted false memories.
Then the fantasy or false memory was still created by the mind of the original at a certain point in time, at which the dupe did not even exist yet.
Whether this matter is up to the value system of whoever is making the determination, the fact remains the memory came from a point at which the duplicate did not exist yet.
Nor did the future body of the original.
The future body of the original contains some of the atoms and molecules contained in the past body of the original, but not all of them. In fact the future body of the copy probably contains some of the atoms that were included in the past body of the original, unless you manufacture the copy in a sufficiently separate and distant location.
Here, I’ll add an ellipsis:
The ability of me to tell in a given situation which is which…is irrelevant.
I brought up this hypothetical to ask you a question, which you never bothered to answer.
But sure, if I’m not aware of the history of the two shirts (i.e. I didn’t actually see the shirts being placed there), then I cannot tell the difference. What’s your point?
This is particularly low debating style. Because not only have I not said the quoted sentence, I’ve said the very opposite 3 times already in anticipation of someone introducing that strawman. No, I don’t think one is really real and one is just a cheap copy.
As for the meaning of identical, I’ve been more specific than you: qualitatively identical, as in having identical intrinsic qualities is implicitly what we mean by identical in this hypothetical.
No, a difference in extrinsic qualities is not contradictory to the terms of the hypothetical, indeed it’s explicitly stated.
The other perspective; that I live on whenever my consciousness is duplicated elsewhere, could also be accused of being magical thinking.
Like I said earlier, according to this thinking, I could live out the end of my days millions of light years away, in one hell of a “spooky action at a distance”. Or what about travelling backwards in time? If the only requirement is an identical brain state, then it would seem nothing is off the table.
And we also might question “who” decides whether a consciousness is identical to mine. Let’s say I transport you, but the machine is not perfect and has an error rate. At what point do we say it created a fresh entity that you do not live on in, versus simply you living on in a “damaged” state?
That’s exactly what the other Mijin said.
Sure, and we’re both right.
It’s the same situation as with you and me right now. Two entities with two separate consciousnesses.
Authenticity has no real bearing on the argument.
In the case of the Mona Lisa, its perfect “clone” can be both authentic or inauthentic depending on the criteria you use to describe “authentic.”
If the two paintings are exactly alike then there is no measurable difference between the two—the new one would even have all the particles involved with the correct aging appearance and smell of the original. Therefore, to all outside observers who don’t know the history of each painting, they are identical and there is no difference between them.
But, just because you don’t know the difference between them doesn’t mean there isn’t a difference. They are indeed identical, but there is, at minimum, two important differences: 1) they inhabit two separate coordinates in space and they always have; 2) one was touched by da Vinci and the other was not. Two identical objects, with 2 differences.
If “touched by da Vinci” is the criteria that makes the painting authentic in your mind, then one is authentic and the other is not. But, remember, you are an outside observer; you’re not the Mona Lisa.
The Mona Lisa has no brain, so she doesn’t have self-awareness. Self-awareness is the only important criteria in this discussion.
Why can’t we apply the same logic to you and your perfect clone? You are both identical in every possible way to all outside observers, with no measurable difference (both are authentic depending on the criteria used). And we should all agree that there is one certain difference: you both occupy different coordinates in space and always have (assume the infinite universe scenario with no physical contact between you and your clone if that makes the point clearer).
If you’re willing to accept that two identical objects have one difference, why the resistance to accepting that there may be more than one difference?
In this case, the other difference is the PI/POV/qualia of you and your clone. I’m in the camp that believes the PI is not only different past the point of divergence (which we all agree on), but also at the point of convergence. Why? Two reasons: 1) it is how we perceive the world and our place in it. 2) It’s the simplest explanation. It feels right and it’s simple. Why complicate things?
What’s the second relevant difference between you and your clone? Just like only one Mona Lisa having a real history of physical contact with da Vinci, only one of you has a real history of continuous physical contact with the original you.
We all agree that you and your diverged clone have two separate PI’s. Why do some of you insist that you have only one PI when you were perfectly symmetrical, at or before the point of bifurcation? I believe you were always separate people (you never shared the same coordinates in space, did you?); some of you believe you were one person who became two. That’s illogical—it’s a paradox.
It may be more apparent if you reverse the arrow of time (it doesn’t break physical law to posit that). In this case, your conclusion is that two people became one? That’s even more bizarre.
Or, let’s take it to the extreme: two almost perfect clones become perfectly symmetrical for a period of time, then become asymmetrical once again. Two people become one, and then become two again. Where did that second guy go? Is the first second guy the same one that pops back out again? That’s beyond science fiction—it’s almost beyond fantasy.
My perfect clone doesn’t agree with me, but he sustained head trauma after divergence, so I don’t put much merit in his hypotheses.
But, Trinopus, there’s not a hint of qualia involved, qualia, and how it relates to self-awareness, is all that’s involved. It’s not the show-stopper, it is the show—the main event.
I say this as someone who cares about your well-being. If you happen to stumble upon a functional Star Trek transporter while out and about, I’m warning you to not get in the departure pod willy-nilly and start poking buttons. I like you as you are; I may not like the guy who steps out of the arrival pod.
Some Word documents might think they were one document that became two. That is illogical- it is a paradox.
The magical thinking is the notion that we retain some kind of link to our past selves, other than that we happen to remember being that person. We’re all guilty of it already.
Really? Can you present them to us for interview so we can see if they believe they are their copies? I’d like to know what it feels like to be a Word .doc.
You have to be one to know what it is like.
Similarly you have to be a human to know what it feels like; when you are cloned (using the therm ‘cloned’ as shorthand for ‘being exactly copied’) you would feel like one person at all times, but after the cloning you would exist as two separate instances.
This does assume that the ‘cloning’ process is instantaneous; if it were not, you might have much more intriguing sensations during the copying process - the curious sensation of existing in two places at one time.