At this point, I’m don’t have a clue what yours is. You seem to be insisting the duplicate is different from the original, but you can’t seem to make clear why.
You won’t be able to tell the difference. In fact, if no one tells you how I arrived, you won’t be able to know I didn’t come over on a Shuttlecraft. There is no test you can apply to determine the difference. By the premise of the thread, there is no difference.
Perhaps not if the Word .doc can express itself adequately. I think a super intelligent extraterrestrial being could tell me what it’s like to be him, as long as he spoke a language I could understand. A bat could tell me what it’s like to be him, assuming he has self-consciousness and was smart enough to express himself symbolically.
If I’m reading you correctly, you’re saying that you and your clone would feel like the same person (i.e seeing through 4 eyes instead of two) while you were still in physical contact, but once separated you would feel separate and distinct? I don’t believe that, but it could be true. But, that’s not exactly the root of the thought experiment. It doesn’t, for example address the case of Star Trek transporter, or the case of two identical being that have never been in physical contact.
That’s why it’s more to the point to consider the infinite universe scenario, where no actual copying takes place, the other “you” simply develops on its own by chance light years away from you. Sure, it seems unlikely, but it doesn’t break any physical laws, so it can be hypothesized. And, let’s say the far away “you”’s constituent particles remain in complete synchronicity for both of your lives. Does the other “you” have any influence on your life whatsoever, more so than any other object in the universe? If not, then that should also apply to perfect clones of you made right here on earth through some copying mechanism.
If you do believe the far away “you” has some influence on your life, how do you explain that? Bell’s Theorem? Again, I just don’t buy that. It’s not the simplest solution, in fact, it’s pretty complicated and messy.
Yes, but I’m an outside observer, my opinion doesn’t count. Only your POV counts. Even the “you” who steps out of the transporter’s POV doesn’t count (he remembers being you before transport), only the “you” before transport’s POV matters.
No, it does not.
Correct. And yet - there you are.
As Spike Milligan, that great philosopher, once said - ‘Everybody’s got to be somewhere’.
If you exist - in any form- anywhere in the universe (or multiverse)* that is where you are.* All past versions of you are dead, or at least no longer in existence; that includes the original of which you are a copy. Only the present moment has significance when considering existential questions about consciousness.
You are stuck on the idea that a 3rd person not being able to tell the difference matters. We have never established that as the essential criterion. Most folks can’t tell their ass from a hole in the ground, so their discernment here scarcely matters,
This has some interesting consequences for the future of personal identity questions.
Long before we have functionally identical replication of personal identity (which may, of course, never happen) we may have ‘pretty good’ replication, that is, replication of a person’s identity which is sufficiently accurate to fool most of the people, most of the time.
We might not relish the prospect, but in the reasonably near future ‘pretty good replication’ may become available, and indeed, may become the norm.
As defined in the hypothetical, the two clones are intrinsically identical but necessarily have different extrinsic properties, such as location.
If you’re still having trouble with these terms, then I’m happy to explain in more detail. But up to this point, you haven’t used any of these terms, or engaged with this level of the discussion at all, you just keep saying (paraphrasing) “Are they the same or not?”
To some extent, I agree.
IOW, with the transporter problem, there are 3 apparent solutions (note that all are concerned with your first-person, subjective existence):
[ol]
[li]You die at the launch pad, and it’s irrelevant that a copy exists at the destination[/li][li]You successfully transport[/li][li]There is no “you”; you actually die at every instant[/li][/ol]
Of the 3 alternatives, the last is the hardest to find flaws with, so I’d have to say it’s our best guess at this time.
And yeah I’m using language like “best guess” because of how counter-intuitive that conclusion is. While normally saying something is counter-intuitive would rightly be dismissed as irrelevant, in this case it’s only our intuitions that led us to frame the problem in this way in the first place and think that there are these 3 alternatives.
My suspicion is that we’re looking at this all wrong, as the scientific study of consciousness (along with personal identity) is still in its infancy.
Then my post wasn’t addressed to you.
Although in post #46 you seem to believe in zooming when it comes to the teleportation problem, if the teleportees don’t come through reporting a “breakdown of selfhood.” Shrug.
It certainly isn’t the essential criterion…but it’s the only scientific criterion anyone has suggested. It’s the only testable question.
Very true. This begins to approach Plato’s question about humanity: how much of a person can you remove (surgically, etc.) and have him remain himself, or even a person at all.
We all pretty much agree (I hope!) that if you cut a man’s arm off, he’s still “the same man.” At the other extreme, if you’ve cut away everything of him except for the left kidney…he’s a goner. A kidney cannot constitute a man.
So…somewhere in between those two bracketing points…
True. So what? We can compensate for that by identical environments, to whatever degree necessary.
I’m not interested in those terms. They don’t add anything to the debate.
“Are they the same or not” is essential to the debate. It is what is being debated.
If you believe otherwise, then we are definitely talking past each other.
You misunderstand my post, then. I do not believe in “zooming.” (I don’t even know how the term is supposed to be defined, although I’m pretty sure I don’t agree with it in the way you used it in your post, when you first introduced the term.)
Exactly. The alien-you on planet Zerb on the other side of the universe who just happens to have the same configuration as you is already another you - however, it’s not going to experience the sensation of having zoomed across the Galaxy from Earth to Zerb, because that’s not part of its history.
I guess if we posit that it is not only a duplicate of you, but has lived a life identical to yours, on a planet identical to ours, etc, then in a sense, it will continue to be you if you die here, or continue to be itself, which is the same thing. The universe will still have an instance of ‘you’ running in it.
So yes, I die at every instant (how can it be otherwise? The ‘me’ of a second ago is not here now) - but luckily, at every following instant, a new ‘me’ is born with the full memories of the old me, along with a compelling illusion that this continuity is something more than just that.
This sounds like a bleak conclusion, but actually, it sort of redefines death (and life).
So you think that the transporter problem, and the OP, basically boil down to:
Given two entities that are intrinsically identical, are they intrinsically identical?
Well, no, that trivial question is not what’s being debated. It is a question of subjective experience and personal identity, qualitatively vs numerically identical entities, and the significance of differences in extrinsic properties. All these things that you are saying don’t add anything to the debate, are the debate.
“Kill both of us, it’s the only way to be certain!”
What is scientific about it? The scientist who finishes the test isn’t the same one who started it, right? Why should I trust his/their perception over my own?
Yes. And you’d be amazed at how many people have said, “No, they aren’t.”
If you accept that the two entities are identical – that the other “you” is really “you” – then we aren’t in debate at all, but agreement.
If you believe the other “you” isn’t really the other “you” but somehow different, then that’s what’s being debated.
I hold that both versions of “you” have the same subjective experience, personal identity, and other individual attributes. They are both the “real you.”
So far, you have seemed to disagree, but you’ve never made clear why.
Grin! After all, the subject of the test is different, at the end of it, from what he was at the beginning. Heck, I’m different from the person who started writing this post!
(“You can step into the same stream twice if you run downhill really fast and find the same stretch of water…”)
The essence of the debate, as I see it, is simply a comparison between “you and your perfect clone” and “you and the you in your original body, sometime in the future (even a nanosecond into the future).”
You1 vs. You2 compared to You1 vs. You1 +Time. The question is posed only to you (because yours is the only point of view that matters), the you in your original body, sitting in front of your computer at this very moment (You1): is there a difference between You2 and You1+Time with regard to your specific PI?
I and a few others believe there is a difference and that difference is that You1 has a future in You1+Time, whereas, You1 has no future in You2.
Some others believe You1 has a future in both You2 and You1+Time.
Still others believe You1 has no future in either You2 or You1+Time.
It boils down to an interpretation of materialism/physicalism.
The strict materialist viewpoint implies that there is no difference between You2 and You1+Time because all constituent particles are exactly alike, with nothing added, so there can be no difference.
I, and maybe some others, believe there is a difference between You2 and You1+Time for a couple of reasons: 1) PI is a chemo-biological process, not a sub-atomic process. 2) Most CNS neurons remain intact (and also a critical % of sub-atomic particles) throughout the lifespan of a conscious being.
I take the *feeling *of self-awareness continuity at face value (i.e. it is as it feels to be). I don’t believe I die every plank unit of time only to be reborn the following plank unit of time as someone who believes he’s me because he inherited my memories. And, I don’t believe this contradicts the materialist viewpoint, because there is a very real continuity of physical contact between You1 and You1+Time, whereas there was never (critical) physical contact between You1and You2.
That’s the argument in a nutshell. Others may disagree.
Missed the edit. I should have said electro-chemical, not chemo-biological process. And also to add: You2 of course has his own PI (it’s local to him as yours is to you), but to all outside observers, there is no measurable difference between them.