The Falklands crisis

Thank you very much.

I do back that up.

Thank you very much.

One of the first actions the Reagan Administration took after assuming power was to invite Junta leader Roberto Viola to Washington. Viola was an architect of Argentina’s “Dirty War” which tortured and killed as many as 30,000 Argentinians (Viola was later sentenced to 17 years in prison for human rights violations). Under Reagan, the US also voted in favor of Argentina in the UN Human Rights Commission in opposition to almost all of its European allies.

I was always under the impression that although the UK is our friend and ally and that we would help them in almost any other fight they were in, we didn’t help them in the Falklands conflict because of the Monroe Doctrine.

We have always had a rather unpleasant feeling about European powers having a colonial presence in our hemisphere.

Between the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, the USA has always struggled to speak with a single coherent voice. Congress also loves to give a couple dozen independent voices to the chorus. In times of novel = unplanned-for crises the cacophony gets especially schizophrenic. Unknown unknowns and all that.

This particular crisis really caught the US establishment by surprise. With lots of competing laundry lists of priorities.

IMO the net effect was the US government pretty well screwed each pooch in turn, always counter-reacting to yesterday’s news, never getting to making tomorrow’s news. We were always going to be mostly spectators here, but one who could yell loud enough to influence the play on the field and definitely loud enough and rich enough to influence the referees as needed.

This is rather dramatically not at all what the OP suggested had happened. “Strike a deal to end the war” isn’t the same as “give up everything.” @cannonkuo you seem to have gotten this significantly wrong.

It is perfectly okay for Reagan to have extended feelers in terms of finding a way for the war to end swiftly with a negotiated peace. I do not for an instant believe Reagan would actually have come out and suggested Britain just give the islands up. That would be an appalling request, would have been totally out of character for Reagan, and May 31 would be a weird time to suggest that, given that the war had been raging for some time, British troops were already ashore, and Britain was clearly winning the war. Clearly some events have been mixed up here.

The Monroe Doctrine was never applied to pre-existing colonial dependencies, i.e. the U.S. didn’t care what France did in French Guiana.

Right. We aren’t going to go to war to throw them out, but when a local population overthrows a European colonial power, it would seem more consistent with the Monroe Doctrine to support the local people and definitely not assist the colonial power.

The locals were citizens of the colonial power. IIRC there were no Argentinian residents of the islands before the invasion. It’s difficult to see Britain’s continuing control of these islands as a colonial threat to the Americas.

Possibly so, though I rather suspect situational geopolitics looms far larger than any archaic 19th century political philosophy stance. But regardless that certainly wasn’t the situation in the Falklands conflict. Even though Thatcher had considering just giving the islands to Argentina a few years earlier (budget cuts, something Thatcher was always keen on), the overwhelmingly UK-descended colonists were never thrilled with the idea of Argentine rule. Quite the contrary, really.

Well, yes, you are correct, but the dispute was that Argentina quoted some treaty that said that they owned the islands and the UK had a different interpretation. Argentina used force in an attempt to enforce its interpretation.

I agree with you that it is not on all fours with the Monroe Doctrine as the Falklands were an existing colony. But the spirit of the doctrine would suggest that we wouldn’t help the UK to continue to keep a colony in that situation.

I also agree that these colonies are not a “threat” to the United States, but it is consistent with the idea that European colonies in our hemisphere were put on death watch such that once each fell, there would be no more.

It is also a little bit like how you help your friends, but only to an extent. I’ll help my buddy paint his house. If he has a house in the Hamptons that I can’t afford and wants me to help him paint that house, well, he should probably hire a painter.

As a Salvadoran-American I also do remember how the dictators in El Salvador and other Latin American nations were expecting Reagan to continue propping up their regimes regardless of their human rights abuses. The rulers of Argentina counted on that too.

One side effect of Britain kicking the Argentine dictators in the arse (British spelling :slight_smile: ), was to tell the dictators in the region that it was also the beginning of the end of their usefulness for the US too.

The gig was up.

But the US did help them, albeit only indirectly. First there was a lot of intelligence sharing. Second, the US assumed a number of the UK’s NATO commitments for the duration. That freed up troops, ships, and planes for the war.

Sure, but had a country invaded the UK proper, we would have sent troops, materiel, and cash. Our unofficial, half-assed “support” during the Falklands crisis shows how conflicted we were.

Would the UK have done more if someone had invaded Guam?

The US did not want to aid so much that it would become an obvious cobelligerent with the UK against Argentina, so as to retain the option of intervening diplomatically at some point.

Bur very early on it was kind of evident, if not blatantly stated, that if push came to shove, in US eyes the Junta Boys were mere thugs-of-convenience while the Brits were bona fide allies in the real Big Show, so it would be a pretty easy guess who’d get thrown under the bus.

(Had someone invaded “the UK proper”, NATO obligations would have kicked in. Didn’t apply here)

The NATO Treaty specifies that the obligation of collective self-defense among member states only applies to attacks on territory north of the Tropic of Cancer. So there was no obligation for NATO states to assist in the defense of the Falklands.

Yes, you’re right. I got it wrong.
Reagan made the phone call to ask Thatcher to show some mercy for the Argentines not to give up the Falklands.
This website helps correct fallacy.
Thank you.

Good question, but I think U.S. troops stationed in the Philippines and Japan will come to its rescue in a jiffy.