Huh, just last Friday I was aboard a go-around in Orlando but apparently it was not for any especially remarkable reason as I’ve seen nothing in the news.
I have not seen a report with passenger numbers aboard these specific units but NBC says the airliner was an E190, which in JetBlue’s configuration has 100 passenger seats. That requires at least 2 attendants, plus the 2 pilots. The Learjet 60 is configured for 1 or 2 pilots and up to 8 passengers.
From where the runway intersection was and the direction(s) the airport was operating in, had they come together it’s unlikely any other airplanes or the terminal building would have gotten involved. So the upper bound on deaths and injuries would have been everyone on the two airplanes. As @JRDelirious just said, that’s ~110 total. There are many accident scenarios at large airports where the people on the mistaken plane(s) are merely the down payment on the total death toll. The Air Canada taxiway almost-landing at SFO being the poster child for that.
Cross runway operations are always an additional risk, but understand it’s NOT like two railroad trains approaching a crossing where each of them will occupy the overlapping space for a long time, presenting a large and long-lasting target to hit the broad side of. Once one train starts to occupy the crossing it’ll be a minute or maybe even five before the other train could come through on the crossing track safely.
In airplanes, you need both airplanes to not only go through the intersection, but within a second or two of each other at most. And both at the same altitude (including on the ground) +/- a couple dozen feet. That’s a much smaller “mishap cross-section” in f**k-up space.
The issue that makes these “close calls” more common is that moment the Learjet began to move, from a regulatory & traffic management perspective, he “occupied” 100% of the 4 miles of both runways. Likewise, had JetBlue continued, from the moment he would have crossed his own runway threshold he’d have legally occupied 100% of the 4 mile length of both runways. And another moving airplane anywhere in that 4-mile cross-shaped span is a BIG regulatory deal.
It’s precisely because we set the margins so large that we have so few actual accidents. But that doesn’t mean we in the public or the news media should be shreaking “Hundreds narrowly avert DEATH!” every time 4 miles turns into 3.9.
The cited Guardian article said they got as close as 530 feet. So rather close. Whether that’s just altitude, just lateral, or both wasn’t detailed. I have to go get clean & go to work in a few minutes so I won’t have time to hunt up a YouTube / FlightAware reconstruction before probably Friday morning. I expect somebody will publish one soon and one of you will find it by then.
These events are certainly concerning. Both individually and collectively. Have we collectively slowly pushed the overall system harder and harder to the point that now we’re living on borrowed time enough that soon that debt will come due? An interesting question with no clear answer yet IMO. But for damn sure everybody in the business in any role ought to be looking real carefully at this whole situation and the data behind it.
On a lighter and happier note:
How do you like that landing zone!!!
In not-GA news:
And in other fun non-GA stuff …
Damn cheap batteries are going to take down a jet-load of people some day.
And
Not really AA, but one of their regional affiliate carriers. Nevertheless wacky people are out there.
Didn’t they harden the cockpit door (to deter from terrorist attack) after 9/11? If so the passenger wouldn’t have been able to get into the cockpit.
The door is much harder than it was pre-911. Nobody is going to brute-force it unless the latch happens to be defective or didn’t quite fully latch the last time it was closed or …
That doesn’t alter the fact that a person trying to get through the door is a person declaring by their actions that they intend to commit mass murder. Sorta like somebody waving an assault rifle around in a shopping mall, you have to address the problem as if they’ll succeed at their apparent intent, not just assume the gun is a toy or is unloaded or they’re just joking or …
Apparently was one of those bags with charger packs built in, with a phone plugged into it. Always been very suspicious about what level of quality control would go into sourcing the power pack.
I suppose there will just need to be a rule to the effect of “no charging aboard from anything but the plane’s own power ports”.
In my last trips I heard the gate agents announce that if, due to capacity issues, you must gate-check a “smartbag”, you have to take out the battery pack and just carry it on unplugged and unused.
Same story for checked “smart bags”.
When you check a bag they’re supposed to verify it doesn’t have a battery and if it does, either you put the battery in your carryon, carry the whole bag on, or it gets left behind.
With that list of possibilities you can see the incentive for the bag’s owner to be less than truthful.
Preliminary NTSB report on the Fedex/Southwest Austin incursion:
On our A320s the forward toilet door is immediately adjacent and perpendicular to the cockpit door. We have a camera in the forward galley and can put the video feed up on the system display (circled).
This is normally used to visually verify the flight attendant’s identity before letting them in but we occasionally hear some scrabbling at the door and turn the camera on to find some clueless passenger thinking they’re trying to get in the toilet.
Edit: link might not have worked.
I at least see your cockpit diagram.
I think some our newest airplanes of various makes & models have a similar feature. None of our 737s do, not even the shiny new MAXes. I have no idea if that’s an available option or not.
The forward lav arrangement on the 'bus and the 737 are the same. Lav’s on the left side, cockpit is straight ahead. Both doors open outward and are hinged side by side at the forward left corner of the alcove forward of the main entry door on the left and forward galley on the right.
Yikes. On balance I think it’s a good thing the airplane taking off was a 737. Had it been any of the other jets that have more sprightly takeoff performance they’d have ended up even closer together before FedEx began to turn left away from the conflict.
On Monday night this week I flew a bad weather approach into LGA. It wasn’t as foggy as it was in AUS the day FedEx was surprised by SWA and vice versa, but at least it was night and snowing lightly out of an equally low ceiling.
We came out of the clouds about as far out / high as FedEx did. But with better visibility below the clouds than Fedex had had. Had we seen a jet accelerating for takeoff as close to the start of the runway as FedEx had, that would have been alarming to say the least. Happily, my runway was empty and we landed normally.
Despite concerns about a possibly slippery runway the braking was fine. Although they did close the runway right behind me to run plows & brooms over it and spray their de-ice fluid after some earlier landings had complained about slippery conditions. The temps were just at/ slightly above freezing which is ideal for forming slippery slush floating on top of puddles of water. That combination can be slick as all get out.
Although in a funny coincidence the airplane ahead of me was an SWA who we encountered at the other end of the runway when I had to delay my exit so he could pass by in the opposite direction on the parallel taxiway leading back to the terminal complex. Once he was past I turned off and followed him towards the terminal.
And in a nod to the JetBlue / Learjet event in BOS a couple days ago, between each shit-weather landing at LGA they were launching a shit-weather takeoff on the crossing runway. At no time could any of the landing airplanes see the one taking off in front of them, nor could the airplane taking off see the landing airplane bearing down on them. We can all see our traffic displays, but no chance for actual eyeballs on the targets.
Just another day in the big leagues. All day every day and most of every night.
Ref @PastTense’s good reporting, the NTSB has now released prelims on the three recent big runway incursion screw-ups at JFK, HNL, and AUS. So far the latest miscue at BOS on 02/27/2023 hasn’t generated an NTSB prelim yet. Here are refs to the three preliminary reports in one place to facilitate a compare-and-contrast.
NTSB Prelim - JFK 01/13/2023, NTSB Prelim - HNL 01/23/2023,
NTSB Prelim - AUS 02/04/2023.
What I find interesting is we have three (or at least 2-1/2) different types of errors here:
At JFK, the AA crew was told by ATC to do something completely reasonable and ordinary and instead did something completely reasonable and ordinary but also completely the wrong thing. 100% on the pilots.
At HNL, the UAL crew was told by ATC to do something unreasonable / illogical in a non-standard way at a bad time, instead they did what was typical, and were in the shit a couple seconds later before there was time to react. A combo of bad controlling and an airport layout tailor-made to create runway incursions. Plus lack of sufficient pilot SA to have predicted what might happen soon enough to have developed a plan to counteract the eventuality that eventually occurred (about which more later). Although that level of pilot SA is not quite Yeagertastic, but it is arguably beyond a reasonable expectation for routine ops.
At AUS, the two airplanes (but mostly SWA) were told by ATC to do something that was (barely) doable on a sunny day, but almost certainly not doable in the conditions present. SWA did not recognize the incompatibility of their takeoff plan and the controller’s inappropriate expectations. Or if they did recognize the problem they didn’t say anything on the radio about it. FedEx realized this was 90% probably not going to work, and asked about it, but the controller missed the cue. FedEx then waited until they were 100% sure it wasn’t going to work before going around. Not wildly unreasonable, but not as aggressively avoidant of a deteriorating situation as it might have been. Once FedEx did confirm the problem was imminent and irrepairable, they did totally the right thing to salvage the situation to a least-bad configuration. So although ATC started the mishap sequence, everybody involved had their part to play in permitting it to get so critical.
Part of modern airline aviation is trying to identify in advance the possible / probable miscues ahead and discuss what to do about each of them at a calm time, ideally in cruise. So you’re mentally primed to spot them beginning to emerge from the “fog of war” before they get so critical you’re screwed. For many problems in taxiing, taking off, approaching, and landing, there simply isn’t time, distance, or mental bandwidth to a) be surprised, and b) ad lib and execute a good plan. It’s the aviation version of the proverbial “forewarned is forearmed”. This is termed:
although that’s not the finest article in wiki’s repertoire.
The UAL crew appears to have discussed a lot of different potential problems related to which runway and which approach. And nicely handled the fact their primary plan was overridden later by ATC so they went to their briefed secondary plan. Which ATC clearance was given early enough that the crew wasn’t rushed. Good work on both ends of the radio there.
But in all that discussion of plans and counterplans, threats and mitigations, this one possibility was skipped over. Namely that the logical place to vacate that secondary runway can’t be used if anyone is landing or taking off on either of two of the other three runways. So they weren’t primed that the runway exit was unusable if other planes were landing on those runways. Nor is there any established standard ATC terminology or procedure to call that fact out ahead of time.
Then as they still are slowing down post-landing the controller in effect encouraged them to turn off at the one place where that was impossible without interfering with the Cessna. Which was also where they were planning to turn off anyhow. Cue instant f***-up.
I personally have never flown through HNL. But reviewing the information in our nav pubs (which are common to all carriers) there is a caution that the runways are close together there at Taxiway K, but nothing that explicitly says: “It is physically impossible to vacate runway 4R and also hold short of 4L or 8L.” Which is IMO exactly what the verbiage should say. And which fact should also be top-of-mind common knowledge to all HNL controllers. Is it? I sure don’t know.
Each carrier typically publishes a page or several of company-specific procedures for each airport they service. Which includes everything from administrative stuff like which frequency to use for catering assistance to airfield-specific operating gotchas like this one. The report outlines the UAL crew’s prep which included reviewing at least some of their company info. Exactly what is in those pages and exactly what of that content they talked about will have to await the final report.
The controller could have prevented the whole thing a minute or two earlier by clearing the Cessna to land and hold short of taxiway K. Which is well within the Cessna’s normal performance capability and would have given UAL clearance to freely use taxiway K to exit the runway. If this isn’t in the HNL tower’s standard playbook to be used almost every time I’m surprised. IMO it sure should be in their playbook.
So IMO this one is down to bad bordering on dangerous taxiway layout creating a trap, less-than-good published warnings about the trap, the UAL pilots aiming unwittingly into the unnoticed trap, the controller not anticipating the trap & eliminating it by altering the Cessna’s landing clearance in advance, the controller encouraging UAL at the last moment to enter the trap, then the trap duly springing. Oops.
A bottom line, sorta:
A very common problem in the ATC system everywhere is tower controllers giving runway vacating and subsequent taxi instructions while we’re still slowing down. If I was Emperor, that would be prohibited. Except in an emergency, give any restrictive instructions at least 30 seconds before touchdown then let us find our own way off the runway, then start talking. A lot happens in the cockpit during slowing a jet and there is no good time in there to a) talk on a radio, or b) alter how you’re maneuvering in response to that. Plus c) often the instructions delivered are 1) for actions you’ll take too far in the future to be relevant right then, and 2) excessively complicated.
Controllers get used to rattling off their standard litany at high speed. Which unless you fly there every day, is unfamiliar and potentially surprising. Doing 100 knots while deciding where it’s physically possible to exit the runway and enter the maze of taxiways is a real bad time to be distracted or surprised. This goes on every day almost everywhere and we’re all used to putting up with it. But IMO it is definitely a set-up to screw-up that should be eliminated.
100%?
There may be inadequate signage, traffic signals.
Good point. Nothing is 100%.
Those AA pilots were almost certainly based at JFK. And if so should have had enough familiarity that any glitch like a missing or unlit sign ought not have caused a gross error. Ought. There’s that fateful word again.
At the same time, the UAL 777 pilots has probably flown to HNL a lot of times as well. The gotcha on Taxiway K (can’t exit there and also hold short of the other runways) would probably be known to someone who’s flown into there enough times. I only say “probably” because I don’t know from experience whether landing on 4R is common or rare for the big jets. Nor whether stopping short enough to even consider existing the runway at taxiway K is common or rare.
Some of these airfield design traps are obvious at a glance. Others can be pretty subtle: obvious enough once your attention is called to it, but easy to not expect or not notice until it’s too late. The thought in your head is “They did WHAT?” as you’re passing through the point of no return into error-ville.
while nothing is 100% this was almost certainly a case of the PIC acting on expected instructions and not actual instructions. It’s human nature and a good reason to have 2 people in the cockpit. We all are guilty of this. I started to run a left turn light a couple of months ago because I thought it was going to be the first light sequence to change. The light turned green but not my lane.
But one of problems of 2 people in the cockpit (as a safety overlap) is a natural division of labor to make things easier. In this case the FO ran the radio stack and dutifully read back the taxi instructions correctly while the PIC steered the plane based on expected routing. It was a huge mistake and an easy one to make.
Here’s the HNL map for a refresher.
98 days out of 100 due to wind the commercial and military aircraft land on 8L (Jumbos/freighters land on 8R - the reef runway). They brake and turn left to the terminals and ramps. The part of the airport where the incursion happened might as well be on another planet - they never see it. All the jet takeoffs are on 8R with a right turn for noise abatement over Honolulu/Waikiki. Except now. 8L has been closed for repair for months now so most landings have shifted to 4R, a crosswind runway (not cheesy, it’s still 9000’x150’). Ii’s fine, the tradewind is stronger in winter and tracks 4R pretty closely. That brings the cramped conjunction at 4L/4R/8L and taxiway K into play. The bigger planes don’t fit on the taxiway between runways or it’s real close. Runways 4L and 4R are normally the hangout of the interisland turboprops/general aviation, aircraft and helicopter tours, air ambulances, military helos, etc… They’re mostly pushed onto 4L and the crowd is picking up. Also the commercial aircraft landing on 4R approach over 8R so you have clearance between landing and taking off aircraft to consider - usually a no brainer with 8L working but now things are more complex. The 8L closure really brings that conjunction into play.
Arrgh, I guess you’ll have to open the map in another window.
The Associated Press reported on the passenger tampering with a door. It said, “A door in an airplane cannot be opened once in flight due to cabin pressure.”
Please explain this. I thought with pressure higher in the cabin than outside, the door would be easy to “blow out” if you could unlock and push. Well, not easy, but dangerously possible.