There’s no concern for the gapping around the door/plug, at least not in a general sense. It’s the structural gapping all doors have, there’s almost certainly a flexible weather seal all around it.
From a design perspective, it appears that Boeing did what I’d have done; designed and certified a fully functional door, then modify the door structure to make a “plug”. Externally this would mean removing the external handle and markings, internally the goal would have been to prevent access and use of an interior handle and cover it up with aesthetic sidewall.
Based on the photo it looks like this was done by removing the interior handle, which is reasonable and a weight saving advantage. I’m unsure (because I don’t know the Door design and actuation) whether additional actuation parts have been removed but it looks like they may have been. It would make a certain level of design sense to “decouple” the physical door from the mechanisms to move the locks and latches into place, so that the mechanisms are now a manufacturing jig and are no longer installed on the plane. Then, since the latches and locks are already certified for a functional closed door, it would make sense to say this is the same as it’s permanently closed. Any typical visual markings to verify the door has been closed or cockpit annunciation are ikely also removed (weight savings and no need to have a cockpit light warning the door is open, as it no longer can open). So, in many ways, the Plug is still a Door and relies on that certification but is not, itself, analyzed as a Door.
To be clear, this is all speculation on my part, I’m not making any claims of what actually happened or how we got to this point, I just see a possible design and certification decision process and therefore possible errors.
I can imagine a scenario- again, speculatively - that removing the actuation parts could have inadvertently diminished the function of the latches and locks. Perhaps reduced the strength of a backstop, thereby allowing the latches and locks to gradually vibrate over time and move out of position until they can no longer resist the loads and the Plug departed from the airframe.
It’s very possible that this scenario was obscure, or the failure mode was identified but not at an appropriate criticality, or other analytical errors or unfortunate omissions were done either due to lack of experience, lack of recognition of aircraft level safety effects (looking beyond the specific part changes), management and company pressure, etc. This field of engineering is incredibly difficult and under a lot of scrutiny (especially since the last Max groundings) as these types of dormant failures take real skill to identify and mitigate.
I’m really looking forward to the facts and investigation publications from the NTSB and the subsequent fallout in terms of regulatory actions for certification processes.