There are only two hard problems in software: cache invalidation, naming things, and off-by-one errors.
problem probably compounded by the fact that “nothing happened” when you did it the first time … or the second … or the 98th time …
this is exactly the entrance to a place called “sliding slope” … you start out with the grip handle of the lavatory and then end up screwing up a plug…
what is remarkable (to me at least) … i strongly assume the Boeings of this planet have complete and utter tracability and can easily determine who screwed up (or didn’t screw down) something 3 years ago …
I came,
I saw and
I snickered
… all two of them
Regardless of their procedures for working on the door there should be a general procedure for “where do these left-over parts go?”
Something I learned as a teenager when I put a transmission back on and had everything tightened and connected only to glance over and see the spacer leaning up against the wall.
Exclusive: Boeing presses suppliers on tightening bolts after loose parts found in 737 MAX 9 checks
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Boeing issued a bulletin to its suppliers late last week that laid out practices to ensure bolts are properly torqued after multiple airlines reported loose hardware during inspections of the grounded 737 MAX 9, according to a memo seen by Reuters.
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The U.S. planemaker said that it is “imperative” that suppliers meet quality requirements, according to a Jan. 17 memo seen by Reuters, issued weeks after an accident when a panel ripped off of a 737 MAX 9 jet while in mid-air.
The pictures in the news show what look like regular bolts/nuts without any pinning to prevent them from backing out. I would think this is a good time to modify the assembly with a secured assembly and not rely on torque settings.
Safety wire? Duct tape would be cheaper.
Sounds like a line on a resume for Boeing executives.
They should seriously go back to promoting engineers from within and keeping them in Seattle.
I agree.
But that would mean the executives can afford only three yachts each, instead of four, so obviously that’s not an acceptable solution.
Left unsaid in the article was what kind of bolts were found loose? Bolts in the spar or door attachments? Huge problem. Bolts holding up the trays in a galley cart? Not so much. There are a gazillion bolts in a large jet that are not structural or flight critical. Of course loose bolts anywhere is symptomatic of a poor safety culture and poor QC,
Interesting article…
Dominic Gates of the Seattle Times apparently has spoken with the whistleblower that posted the long comments about the specific 737 in question and the processes leading to records in the CMES and SAT trackers. He’s also spoken on the record with Ed Pierson, a former MAX production line manager, who confirms that the anonymous commenter clearly has inside knowledge of the work and systems, and that the comment raises safety issues that Pierson himself raised when he worked at Boeing.
Perhaps most interesting, the reporter spoke with a different anonymous source that was also aware that the plug was removed and replaced without creating the appropriate logs and subsequent QA efforts, and that the undocumented removal and replacement was not done by workers from Spirit, but by Boeing itself. Ouch.
The Seattle Times article that the story in the previous link was drawn from is here:
The published whistleblower account does not explicitly state who removed and reinstalled the door plug in Renton.
The information that it was Boeing mechanics who removed the plug is from a different source with knowledge of the repair, the person who cannot be identified because of the sensitivity of the ongoing investigation.
Nevermind. This post contained a debunked claim.
The news said the FAA had finalized the procedure to follow to get the planes certified. They also plan on reviewing Boeing’s assembly process. Multiple airlines are rethinking future purchases and somewhere in the US it’s raining.
Life goes on.
That can’t be good for Boeing. It’s not a cancellation of the order, but it’s a signal that they’re willing to if that turns out to be the right move.
I wonder whether any of them will be sufficiently frustrated to speak up and say to management “we aren’t the problem here, bucko.”
Genuine question: Does the top layer of Boeing management survive this?
Of course! Boeing will solve the problem by firing a few low level repair and quality assurance people–as well as that whistleblower who divulged Boeing trade secrets. And Boeing will help some deserving Congress critters with increased political contributions.
The FAA has just ordered that Boeing may not increase the production rate of 737s, nor open a planned new assembly line in greater Seattle until they get their shit together.
If I was the BoD I’d be expecting to see root and branch firings throughout the production management team at every level. Pour encourager les autres.
The FAA just published a new notice of proposed rulemaking titled “Disclosure of Safety Critical Information” and it’s 100% in response to the Boeing problems (and their own oversight failures, let’s be honest, they trusted their delegates too much).
The background material is a decently accessible primer on the process to obtain a type certificate and manufacturing certificate. It also discusses the safety assessment process and other safety related regulations.
I haven’t finished reading it, with an eye on whether my employer wishes to provide comments, but I find it super fascinating to watch the regulatory landscape change (yes, I’m a nerd). My company works on projects designed to simultaneously meet FAA, EASA and Transport Canada requirements so changes in one country can affect others.
A stunning article (the first in a series):
One mind-blowing point is buried about halfway through:
So not only did they learn nothing from the grounding after the crashes, they actually tried to play catch-up on what they lost during the down time, and ended up making their problems worse.
Astonishing.
No…