They’re getting in the water no matter what at that point. The safety card is just telling them to get in the part of the water that isn’t surrounded by a sinking aluminum tube.
From the Joke thread: A plane is flying over the Mediterranean
A pilot’s voice comes on and says, A terrible thing has happened.
We’ve lost both engines and we’re gonna have to land in the Mediterranean.
The plane will stay afloat for a very short time and we’ll be able to open the door just long enough that everyone can get out.
We have to do this in an orderly fashion.
Everyone that can swim just go to the right wing and stand there.
Everyone who can’t swim just go to the left wing and just stand there.
Those of you on the right wing you’ll find a little island it’s in the direction of the Sun about two miles off, and as the plane goes under just swim in an orderly fashion out and you’ll be fine.
I prefer rafts that don’t immerse me in water, personally.
The planes are designed to float long enough to get everyone onto a raft (assuming a perfect, controlled ditching scenario).
My experience is with smaller planes; no slides, just rafts, but my understanding is these slides are also life rafts that are required to comply with 14 CFR 25.1415. I haven’t had time to dig deeper into these designs and methods of compliance though.
Hypothermia sets in really quickly in cold water, even if it’s well above freezing.
There is no apparent noncompliance to what I saw on the safety card; all pertinent regulations are being met. I’m not sure there’s many -
or any, really - alternatives to how it’s done on these big planes to get everyone out of the cabin.
Fortunately ditching is exceedingly rare. It’s not much different than dealing with a crash into freezing climates, or sweltering deserts - the aircraft cannot reasonably provide survival gear for all extremes. It’s more a case of being “curiously amused” than “appalled”.
Staying completely dry is nice, but is unrealistic for most people in most rafts in most sea states. Especially if there’s any hurry to debark. Which there will be.
The first time a widebody ditches well out to sea the evac will be an epic shambles.
I lived in the Antelope Valley at the time of the Voyager flight. I went to his brother’s Rutan Aircraft Factory for a sales presentation for the Long-EZ when RAF was just in a small hangar. I saw his brother and his brother’s then-girlfriend flying a kite in a park in Lancaster.
I met him and Jenna at the National Air and Space Museum (where I worked) when they presented Voyager (the round-the-world plane) to the museum. I got their autographs on a copy of the book they wrote about the flight.
This new attitude and apparent openness is a positive change, but at what point will these Boeing executives be forced to confront the fact that the primary reason this shoddy work is happening is the undue pressure being placed on the workforce by cost-obsessed management combined with the systematic suppression and punishment of whistleblower reports?
They noted it wasn’t an immediate safety risk and from what I know of the subject matter, it likely isn’t. So they’ll issue a Service Bulletin within an amount of time agreed to with the FAA and/or as dictated by their (FAA approved) continuing airworthiness process and the SB will instruct the fleet as to how to access the affected area and what the recommend compliance time is to complete that. The FAA will issue an airworthiness directive to make incorporating the SB legally mandatory.
We’re talking about electrical bonding here, not any sort of structural issue. The biggest headache is likely how to access the zone, as there’s a good chance it’s an area that doesn’t really see the light of day after the aircraft is assembled.
In the '70s I used to hear jokes along the lines of ‘Never buy a car that was built on a Monday or a Friday.’ If it was built on Friday, the workers were in a hurry to start the weekend. If it was built on a Monday, the workers were hung over from the weekend. Either car would likely have flaws. The quality-control problems happening with the Boeings reminds me of that joke.
Yep. It’s important but the plane won’t drop out of the sky or suffer a catastrophic failure from it. Standard assembly practice should generally amount to reliably passing resistance values, the issue here seems to be (I am guessing if course) that no one checked the values because they “know” it’ll be fine. If 1265 identical planes passed, the 1266th should too, right? That’s the complacency that leads to skipping tests like this.
There may be more to it; a zone affecting SFAR88 regulations on fuel tanks or something.
The checks must be done. Corrective action must be taken. But not all non-compliances are safety related, or if they are, there may be mitigating factors that lower the risk and therefore doesn’t require an immediate response/grounding/panic.