Thanks for that cite.
Notably, the speaker, clearly a man with relevant direct experience, does not say “the airplane won’t climb out single engine with gear up and flaps full down”. He says “the airplane won’t climb out with gear up and flaps full down”, period. I find that fully believable for an airplane of that era with low power, high drag, and the relatively primitive split flap design.
Which suggests to me that the problem was not an engine failure. Or at least not necessarily an engine failure. But rather a takeoff with unplanned partial flaps, or a control error which led to deploying the flaps in flight inadvertently and unnoticed (perhaps while trying to retract the gear as is normally done after takeoff). Then the airspeed decayed past the critical value while they were focused on that performance decay with no understanding of why performance sucked.
As always, when your mental model is internally consistent but doesn’t match reality, that’s where shit gets real dangerous. The time required to realize your model is wrong, figure out what’s right, and rebuild your model can exceed the time available until loss of control or ground impact is inevitable.
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In big jet airline ops, go-arounds are rehearsed a lot in the sim and performed only rarely out on the line. The record for textbook-perfect takeoffs and approaches and landings is quite good; well over 98% are procedurally flawless and the others are close. For go-arounds the corresponding number is in the low 30s and some are downright shambles.
There are about 10 steps to do in about 20 seconds involving both pilots. If you succeed in sticking to the script and not hurrying it’s easy enough. If somebody muffs a step, the whole situation is so dynamic that dumb shit is almost guaranteed to follow. Not necessarily fatal dumb shit, but unstylish dumb shit. Plus the occasional close call saved by the automation, the stall warning system, or the non-flying pilot while the other guy is tunnel-visioned on the wrong thing.
[/aside]
I suggest a similar scenario here. They did not understand what was wrong and ran out of time trying to reassemble an accurate model of aircraft config and state.
Does anyone have a link to a vid of the actual stall/spin? The reason I ask is that a two engines running stall from lack of airspeed and excess drag look very different from a Vmc roll with an engine out even if the outcome (nose first impact with the ground) is identical.
I’d replace “would” with “should”. Accidents happen when shoulds are skipped.
I expect they can see the ailerons from the cockpit. Some people just check that they move, not that both of them move in the correct direction both ways. Big difference.
Based on the cockpit design IMO it is/was impossible for them to have seen the rudders and elevators moving, be that right wrong, or not at all. Surface position indicators are almost certainly not fitted, being 50 years and 150K lbs in the future versus when that airplane was built.
Absent evidence of immediately prior maintenance, I’d be inclined to discount control surface rigging screwups completely, and control surface failures to a low probability. As you say, engine failures are more likely by a big margin.
But what of control lock still engaged? Back in the day the ergonomics of many of those was equally a trap, where the lock control is well out of sight and out of mind. And often rudder and yoke locks were separate.
Unlike a nosegear airplane, a taildragger with locked yoke controls will take off at more or less the normal speed in a normal manner that attracts no alarm early on. Only after liftoff does the plane go apeshit. I’m not pushing this theory, but it has yet to be discounted either.