The historical contigency of the Argument from Design

I agree with **Voyager ** on this. Secular science has proven a very fruitful research project when it comes to explaining the natural world; theistic explanations of the naturalistic world represent at best what Lakatos would call a “degenerating research program.” At worse, theism is a complete and total failure when it comes to explaining natural phenomena. So it is more likely that answers about the fine-tuning of the universe will come from science, not theology.

As you seem to acknowledge, there is rational bias and there is irrational bias. As an example of rational bias, contemporary scientists are rationally biased against the notion of luminiferous ether. It has been abandoned as a hypothesis, and for very good reasons. So if someone comes up with an elegant explanation for some phenomenon, but this explanation makes use of the notion of the luminiferous ether, then scientists are prima facie justified in rejecting this explanation, even (I would argue) without knowing the specific details of the proposal. Similarly, since I have what I take are compelling reasons for believing God doesn’t exist, then I have a rational bias against God, and a rational expectation that whatever explanation is eventually forthcoming for the nature of the universe will be a naturalistic explanation, provided by science.

Ah, but the ether was rejected due to the fact they found a way to test it- the Michaelson-Morley inferometer.

God is not testable. Raindog is quite correct to call you out on that one. Any claim of proof against God is irrefutably personal bias and non-objective, and not fit for rationalistic assumptions, no matter how dressed.

In fact, I’m generally with raindog- as a physicist and a theist. To my mind, much of the problem comes from people’s primitive, childlike beliefs about what the nature of God must be, and when they discover those beliefs don’t fit an adult, rational world, reject God instead of investigating those beliefs critically.

Problem is, atheism is currently “hip” among intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals.

To the debate: The multiverse theorem- which, by the way, is on the wane broadly in the physics community in popularity- does not, even if proven, necessitate disproving God.

I’m not aware of any instance where scientists have actually tried to publish a ‘proof against God’.

Oh, good, then if the God hypothesis is not falsifiable and beyond the realm of reason, rationality and testing, then you’ve basically admitted that you cannot possibly have any good reason for believing it. (I am using ‘reason’ in the epistemic/evidential sense. Maybe you have another reason–e.g., it makes you happy. That’s not a good reason.) And you’ve also admitted the argument from design fails. So I guess our work in this thread is done.

Or maybe they examine those beliefs closely and find that they are associated with childhood because they are childish, and like belief in Santa, not necessary in an adult’s life. I have absolutely no need to ‘know’ that the universe was created by an impossibly complex being that wasn’t itself created, I am perfectly ok with ‘I don’t know’. I also have no need to have an authority figure watching over me constantly with threat of eternal fire for me to behave correctly. They might have helped when I was a child, but now that I have seen the basis of these beliefs for what it is I have no need of them any more.

Since you are new here, you probably aren’t aware that your strawman has been refuted a couple of hundred times. Atheists don’t claim to have disproven god, or even that this is possible. For one thing, God is poorly defined. An omniscient and omnipotent God can be shown to be logically contradictory, but many Gods aren’t, and this has nothing to do with science anyway. I don’t believe in God due to the lack of evidence for a god, because our world seems to fit one you’d expect to see if there was no god, because of the many contradictory but equally plausible god beliefs throughout the world,. and because theism has had not predictive value.

If you, as a physicist, came up with a hypothesis for which the evidence from the past has been shown to be false, and which consistently makes predictions that don’t come true, would you still hold it? (I hope not.) Then why still hold the god hypothesis?

I did not argue a strawman, to say so is dismissive without investigation.

I was posting in response to Sophistry, who is taking the de facto attitude that God is disprovable, and even listed what he would consider said disproof- proof of the multi-universe theorem. That’s as bad as interpreting statistics beyond what they assess.

You commit the fallacy in the last line- there is no evidence that proves God false. To claim so is frankly logically disingenuous, reeking of imposed bias.

And as to believing in theism without evidence, there is always Pascal’s Wager. For myself, as a physicist, I cannot accept infinite recursion of time and energy. That would effectively throw physics out the window.

Pascal’s Wager is riddled with fallacy. Even trying to offer it up at all shows a certain level of philosphical naivete.

Also, God is not a solution to infinite regression. The multiverse is.

Depends on your version of the multiverse, it’s not a single unified theory.

And Pascal’s Wager was offered as a logical reason for theism in general. As I recall the philosophy, the fallacies involved revolve around the fact it is theism-blind with respect to specific theistic schools of thought, and applies equally to all. This does not invalidate as an example of a logical argument for theism in general, but rather for using it to pick any specific theistic faith.

Accusations of philosophical naivete are thinly-veiled ad hominems, as well, in my estimation. Raindog seems to have stopped, so I stepped in. If someone elects to be atheist, I have no qualms with that- I do have a serious sense of offense at abuses of logic stemming thereof. Specifically, refusing to believe due to lack of specific evidence? Not a problem. Further arguing about disproofs of God that are actual disproofs of ancient canon/dogma that are not, nor have ever been, more than prior philosophic interpretations of God- or claiming that there is an alternative that disproves God- is not using logic, it’s imposing or at worst assuming atheism as fact and then using logic.

I disagree, because the Wager automatically assumes certain characteristics of the putative divine being (namely, that this divine being actually cares whether or not it receives worship or belief, and that the presence or absence of such a belief actually affects the eventual outcome of an individual’s putative soul), which by definition limits its applicability to a subset of all possible theistic perspectives.

In other words, it would be pointless to apply Pascal’s Wager if you were considering whether or not to worship Azathoth.

I’d argue that fell under my “specific theistic tenets” clause, but I’m willing to concede things need not necessarily be arranged in that manner.

It’s interesting you should say that, because I would argue the exact opposite: that Pascal’s Wager might be a logical argument to espouse certain specific forms of theistic belief (those that are congruent with the Wager’s assumptions about the divine), but not theism as a general concept.

He never said that this was a disproof of God. He said this was an alternate explanation, meaning that God was not required. We’re usually pretty careful about this, since atheists around here agree that it is impossible to disprove the existence of all possible deities.

Gee. I specifically wrote:

so you really will need to learn how to read.

You clearly have never read a non-theistic examination of the Wager. The Wager assumes that not believing will cause some harm, which is not true for most religions - I suspect only Christianity and Islam. I’m Jewish, and not believing for a non-Jew has no penalty that my teachers ever told me. I doubt very much Buddhism believes in a penalty either. Plus. the Wager ignores the possibility that some deities would punish a believer in a rival god more than the non-believer.

As for your opinion that infinite recursion of time and energy throws physics out the window - I assume you have published this in a peer-reviewed scientific journal. If not, excuse me for not giving it much credence.

That’s only one of the fallacies. The main fallacies are thus:

  1. It presumes that belief is voluntary – that one may simply choose to believe in gods (or fairies or elves) by force of will.

  2. It presents a false dichotomy. The only two choices are believe in God or don’t believe in God. As you alluded to above, these are not the only two choices. Not only as to the question of which God (there are literally an infinite number of choices) but how many gods.

  3. It loads risk/reward values into the choices as though they are axiomatic when they are not. How do we know that God (or Zeus or Baal or the ancestors) punishes atheism? How do we know that any given entity rewards theism. How do we know that God would not prefer an honest atheist to a CYA theist? Pascal makes faith based assumptions about what God will do without any basis in evidence or logic.

Basically, the Wager fails to convince not only because belief is not an act of volition but because there isn’t really any safe choice. Choosing Christianity could very easily make you an idolator. Be careful.

Call it what you want. It was an educated observation about Pascal’s Wager as a rhetorical device. Most people (even theists) who have any experience with EOG debates no better than to bring up the Wager. It’s most useful application is as a teaching example for spotting logical fallacies.

And yet you offer up one of the most infamously fallacy rich arguments in western theological history.

Who has tried to “disprove God?” It’s far more accurate to simply say that God as an explanatory hypothesis for the universe has never been shown to be necessary and that all attempts to do so have always easily been met by better alternatives.

Diongenes-Have you read the thread, or are you sufficiently in agreement with the arguments posted that you do not look critically at them? I consider all those fallacies to lie under specific theistic interpretations- ie, given a specific understanding/image of God, the wager works thusly and argues for this. Do not mistake that for not understanding the argument.

Voyager- the “need to learn to read” argument is a very poor ad hominem. More, you will note I said “in the last line”- which is where you say “If you, as a physicist, came up with a hypothesis for which the evidence from the past has been shown to be false, and which consistently makes predictions that don’t come true, would you still hold it? (I hope not.) Then why still hold the god hypothesis?” This is far different than “Atheists don’t claim to have disproven god, or even that this is possible.” In fact, it’s rather contradictory.
Which is why I pointed it out as a fallacy.

Yes, I’ve read the thread and it’s safe to say I agree with the other atheists all though I don’t know which specific arguments you think I’m not looking at critically.

The presumption of volitional belief is a fallacy regardless of any specific theistic interpretation, and stating that the Wager only works if a specific theological paradigm is true is the same thing as conceding it to be a failure. If you have to pre-load the argument with specific a priori beliefs about God then it’s just circular nonsense. It does not present an argument to a non-believer as to why he should believe.

There is a distinction between “disproving God” in any absolute sense and in showing a lack of necessity for God as an explanatory hypothesis for the universe/life, etc…

I did not say the Wager only works if a specific paradigm is true.

And I agree, Diogenes, there is a huge difference. Which is what I was angling to point out. Showing God is not necessary to explain any thing does not in any way address disproving God or rendering religion invalid. Thus, it does not in any way reinforce atheism, since it does not say anything about an alternative, either. Not logically, anyway. An interpretive reason for belief falling does not make an entire system of belief collapse unless said belief is a priori contingent on said interpretive reason.

You seem familiar with philosophy, so I will present my issue with this thread thusly: If we are restricting ourselves to logical discourse, most of the same fallacies contingent in Pascal’s Wager are inherently imbedded in the arguments of many atheists.

I am most comfortable- always have been- in using examples to demonstrate arguments. So, as a simplified form of another hot religious issue, there is the problem of evil. To whit, an all-good God could not create a world where evil exists.

There are two possible conclusions to draw from this argument. One is that therefore, there is no God. Many atheists take this as given.

The other is to re-examine “what is good?”

The conclusion I draw from the “problem of evil” is that you cannot combine two primitive, childlike interpretations and try to ram them together. In physics, there is the immovable object and the unstoppable force. The trick is, both cannot exist simultaneously in the same reference frame, and hence cannot come into contact.

In this instance, greatly simplifying, I would argue both free will and assumption of risk are morally good principles, in that good only has value if freely elected, and for good to be freely elected and have value, there must be temptation. This is an equally valid, logically, reaction to the argument of the problem of evil, yet it seems to be disingenuously dismisse by many who have already decided on atheism and impose it on their reason.

I have no quarrel with any of your assertions Diogenes- and I’m even willing to admit that it may be a simple matter of abbreviated semantics leading to imprecisions that are bothering me and causing me to speak up- as of this time.

Can you please explain to me how Pascal’s Wager applies as a positive argument for all possible forms of theistic belief, then?

I would state the argument as “given X specific theistic belief”.

Any theistic belief involving an indifferent and/or completely arbitrary deity- one that cares not about belief or action- are outside its scope.

However, I cannot see how such a belief would be structured and would be very interested in seeing such an arrangement.

Read Greek mythology.