I’m feeling somewhat underappreciated here – I didn’t merely claim that science can tell us things about god all unsubstantiated like that. My specific claim is that the observable universe is identical to the interacting universe, since every interaction is also an observation; thus, you can either have a god that isn’t observable, and thus isn’t interacting with you, or an interacting god that is observable and thus in principle and to some extent subject to scientific inquiry. The concept of an interacting, yet non-observable god is simply inconsistent. God doesn’t get to have his cake and eat it just 'cause he’s god, see. And even when science can’t tell me anything about god’s existence, it can tell me something about the necessity for one: if it all works out perfectly well without him (i.e. if a consistent theory of everything can be found), parsimony suggests to pay the god hypothesis no mind until you run into something you can’t otherwise explain.
…Also, has Aquinas connected the prime mover to the Christian god yet?
No, I think the proof says that. There is a mathematical proof to demonstrate the theorem. The proof may only discuss questions like, ‘this statement is false,’ but, real mathematicians saw the implications as far greater. To such an extent that they will go to the trouble of making formal proofs that a series of questions actually have answers, even if we can’t find them yet. To such an extent that they seriously debated whether Fermat’s last theorem might be true but unprovable. (Before the current proof was proposed.) And Fermat’s last theorem has NO RELATION to a ‘this statement is false’ type statement. the
[Continuum hypothesis - Wikipedia](continuum hypothesis) is not a ‘this statement is false’ type statement and it too has been proven undecidable.
Like I said, the language trick was only the proof of concept that consistent formal systems could not be complete.
No, just like with all other logic statements, a single negative example invalidates the entire claim. The claim was that a formal system could be consistent and complete. Invalidating the completeness of a consistent system means that you can no longer tell what questions will have answers without either the answer, or a proof that the answer exists. You’re just guaranteed that when you get an answer, it’s correct.
And yet, something outside the observable universe and independent of it may interact with it on its on terms. If I interact with it, it is an observation, but it doesn’t constitute proof. It is evidence, but some people will ignore my claim of observation.
By those terms, interacting yet non-observable is inconsistent. Yes. But it doesn’t rise to the standard of ‘subject to scientific inquiry’ in any *objective *way. If I am having the interaction, then I can use that observation along with other evidence to come to a personal conclusion that is rational and consistent. And completely at odds with your conclusions having not had the same observation.
If something is observable, it is by definition open to scientific inquiry. That inquiry may be difficult, given the limited ability to make observations (see, for example, the top quark (which was only observed in 1995), or the higgs boson (theorized, but not yet observed)). Just because something is hard to observe doesn’t scare scientists away–as long as they can predict where they expect to make such observations (and don’t have observations inconsistent with those predictions)
If, on the other hand, something is not objectively observable, one might reasonably ask if it exists at all—since objective observation removes all of the potential biases and influences that may lead people to see what they want to see, not what exists.
When you say “some people will ignore my claim of observation”, I presume you mean “observation of God”–please correct me if I’m wrong. If you really have evidence of the supernatural, you’re in line for a whole bunch of prizes. What evidence? Evidence is nothing more than repeatable observations–it makes no sense to say “If I interact with it, it is an observation, but it doesn’t constitute proof”–observations, if repeatable, by definition constitute proof.
You see, scientists would love to find proof of observation of something supernatural–a clear nobel prize for whoever succeeds (as it’ll revolutionize the current model of the physical world). The reason they don’t is that most “observers” describe something akin to Russell’s teapot, or Sagan’s invisible dragon in the garage—observations that are by their very nature unverifyable. Something that might as well not exist, given how it’s described-and which cannot be described in a way that leads to verifiable predictions of future observations.
Holy Cow, I never got back to my original point. Which is, (as someone pointed out,) sort of tangential to the thread. Although my belief is along the lines of “There is no objective proof of God.” Which if true, would invalidate Thomas Aquinas’ claims.
From the hypothesis: The Sun did not form for any purpose. It does not have the purpose to shine. The Earth did not form for any purpose. It did not have the purpose to exist in a habitable zone. Life did not form for any purpose. Absolutely incidental.
But, once life comes into being, it exists for the purpose of reproducing itself. It acts to do this. It seeks fuel to continue. It attempts to continue. It changes itself to suit its environment, and it changes the environment to suit it. The Sun does not seek fuel to continue shining. The Earth does not act to maintain a livable environment. Life is unique in this. The DNA in a cell exists to reproduce the cell and to maintain its life functions. Without this, it isn’t what we call a cell. Cells, whether singly, (like bacteria,) or in groups, (like animals,) exist to create an organism that will survive to promote the survival of organisms like itself, (not always its own survival; sometimes its the survival of organisms with like genes.) Without this ‘purpose’ we wouldn’t call it life. This is the only natural purpose in the universe. (that I know of.)
Every other purpose that can be conceived is a pure invention of the mind. There is no way to judge them against one another, there is no moral implication of choosing any single one of them. The only way to judge whether someone is good or bad is in relation to the purpose they have and whether or not they are fulfilling it.
It’s not a religious belief when I conclude it from the assertion that God does not exist. And I don’t claim life **must **exist for a purpose. I simply state that it **does **exist for this purpose. Although this purpose is inherent to the concept of life as we know it. It’s possible for life to exist without this purpose; for instance, not containing the DNA to reproduce. It won’t last long, and we don’t see examples of it.
Mitochondria did not form to be the power station of the cell, but once they migrated into a cell, the cell used them for this purpose. Purpose can come into being. If it can’t, then all those things we conceive/invent aren’t purposes either.
No it doesn’t. It reproduces itself only incidentally. There is no “purpose” in it whatsoever.
It does none of these things. This is like saying that a river’s “purpose” is to form a a canyon and that it “seeks” to form canyons.
Only incidentally, the same way a river does, not because of any purpose or intention.
Ecosystems do not “seek” jack shit. Individual living things do, but this is an incidental charactersistic, not a result of any overriding purpose.
No it doesn’t. Cells reproduce incidentally because of DNA. DNA doesn’t give a shit and does not exist “for” any reason at all.
So what?
Nope. Cells don’t exist for any “purpose” and don’t give a shit promoting the survival of their own kind. Life is just one giant chemical fire. It has no more purpose or reason or goal than a forest fire started by lightning.
Just get rid of the word “other” in the above paragraph. Life has no discernable purpose whatsoever. Any purpose you assign to it is completely arbitrary.
No, moral judgements are a question of personal aesthetics. You judge whether somebody is “goo” or “bad,” the same way you judge if they’re good looking or if they smell good. It’s a mixture of hardwired physiological responses and enculturated ones. Morality doesn’t actually have any objective meaning. It just describes human emotional responses to human behavior.
Yes it is. Religion does not require a God, and any belief that life has a “purpose,” whether that purpose includes theistic belief or not, is religious.
So what if it doesn’t last long? What does lasting long have to do with purpose? A forest fire won’t last if it runs out of trees. That doesn’t mean that the purpose of the trees is to fuel the fire or that the fire has a purpose to burn down the forest.
That’s not “purpose,” it’s just incident.
Sure they are. You’re allowed to invent a purpose fr your own life. Life as a whole does not exist for any discernable reason, though, nor is there any demonstrable reason why it needs to be perpetuated. Like I said, life on earth is just a gigantic, bizarre chemical fire. It didn’t start for any reason. It doesn’t matter if it keeps going. It doesn’t matter if it stops. The universe doesn’t care. There isn’t any purpose in any of it.
You have no description that leads to verifiable predictions of future observations of me on this board. I choose which threads interest me, and which posts in those threads that I will respond to. Unless you have a theory of ch4rl3s, you won’t be able to predict it.
If a God exists outside our universe and interacts with it on His schedule and for His purposes, then you may not have repeatable observations. Why does he need to wait around for your experiments?
If you’re a witness in a murder trial and you say, “I saw the defendant shoot the victim,” is that evidence? Is it repeatable? Does the defense say, “I don’t see him shooting anyone now.”
I agree. I’ve said so more than once in this thread already. But, just because you can’t repeat it, doesn’t mean the defendant is innocent. Criminals don’t always submit themselves to repeatable observations. They often have their own agendas that are opposed to being observed. Of course, when they do submit themselves to repeatable observations, it really lends to the credibility of the testimony.
That was in response to someone else’s definitions of interactions and observations. Trying to define observation so broadly as to include everything anyone ever saw, and then claim that submits it to ‘scientific’ inquiry. I took exception to the implication. Your beef is with them. I said that that broad a definition didn’t always include repeatable observations.
Repeatable observations constitute proof? Don’t you need a theory, predictions from that theory that are falsifiable, and then, don’t the observations actually have to be about those predictions?
“Oh, look. There’s a yellow disk in the sky.”
“Hmmm, I see it too.”
Next day, “There it is again.”
“I also see it again.”
Repeatable observation. Proves nothing. Without a theory, you don’t know what the disk is or why it keeps coming back. (Turns out, the neighbours were playing frisbee. )
You seem to be conflating theory with mere observation. You don’t need to be able to explain or predict something (i.e. have a “theory” of it) in order to verify that it exists.
I’m not sure I grasp the point of this question. If your god exists outside the universe and does not interact with it in any observable way, then there is no reason for us to believe it exists. It’s not a question of your god “waiting” for anything. The question is why should WE give its existence the slightest credence. If your god thinks it’s import for us to believe it exists, then IT has the obligation to show itself. It has no moral right to demand belief without proof.
Actually, no it isn’t. Not scientific evidence anyway. Legal evidence and scientific evidence have two different meanings.
That’s why unsupported testimony is never accepted as scientific evidence for anything. Science is all about forensics, not testimony. Nobody’s word means anything.
The scientific definition does.
Sometimes.
No. A theory is an explanation for WHY something happens or exists. You don’t need one simplify to verify THAT it happens or exists.
You don’t need to EXPLAIN a phenomenon in order to simply observ that it’s happening. In the case of the God Hypothesis, there’s nothing to observe in the first place, much less explain.
To second this: The great Richard Feynman once tried to define science’s core by saying “if it disagrees with experiment, then it is wrong.” This is, to my mind, a good description of what science is at its heart.
Theory is all well and good, and is an important part of science–but only so far as it’s useful to explain or predict experimental observations. A theory is worth nothing if it disagrees with experiment-- (except, perhaps, as a simplification useful to teach students)–it is wrong by definition, as the only use of a theory is to understand the real world.
Repeatable observations are the very core of scientific proof. It doesn’t matter how good a theoretician you are–if a properly controlled experiment says something else, then you are wrong and it is right.
Further,
As Diogenes the Cynic notes, neither he nor I need to wait for anything–nor do we need to accept any “proof” that is inconsistent with the real world as we perceive it. We’re quite happy as we are.
And furthermore, the example of a criminal case is wrong–there is the chance to review and to confirm prior observations–both to increase confidence in the tools that made prior observations, and to confirm those observations directly.
Again, legal evidence isn’t science, and none of these are rigorous from an experimental perspective–but the principle is the same. To give some simple examples:
There might be two eye-witnesses–and if their stories coincide when properly interviewed, that would increase the likelihood that they accurately observed the event.
You could also test their vision, to determine if they were capable of seeing the things they claimed to see, and test their memory (for example, the old defense-lawyer trick of cross-examining a witness, turning away, and then asking about the tie the lawyer was wearing—to argue “you couldn’t remember my tie when I spent an hour talking to you–how could you hope to recall what the mugger looked like”?)
There might be a camera that recorded the crime–and you could certainly test the camera, to see if it accurately recorded a known image–and if it did, you’d have more confidence that its recording of the crime was also accurate.
There might be physical evidence–which would, in effect, be a “repeat” of eyewitness observations–it’d confirm it. Similarly, you can certainly re-test a blood sample (in fact, when athletes are being given drug tests, the sample is split in half-so that if the first sample tests positive, the second can then be independently tested–to confirm the result of the first test).
This is the kind of inquiry we’re doing when repeating an experiment–it’s clearer in science, where there are controls, and one of the main goals of repeating an experiment is to show that the results can be replicated–that the experimenter’s manipulation caused the result, not some uncontrolled variable. But in the criminal example, there are plenty of examples of tests you can do to try to show (say) that a witness’ observation (or a piece of physical evidence) was caused by the criminal, and not by some third-party cause, or some error of observation.
I think you people may be giving too much credence to the accuracy of scientific data - more than scientists give. Observations may be incorrect. Reproducibility helps, but not all events are reproducible. Consider someone who says he say a supernova explode. That isn’t reproducible, but that he did see it would be supported by observations of its remains. Now the data he took is also suspect, and would be supported if others observed the same event, took data, and got similar results.
Well - Feynman also mentioned that an early result on the mass of the electron was incorrect, and experiments made right after the announcement of it clustered around the incorrect value, and drifted to the correct value slowly over time. Never discount experimental error!
Now for God, all cases where lots of people had similar sightings are historically suspect, to say the least, and all modern “sightings” are personal and inconsistent. Not all legal evidence is trustworthy either, and I trust no one would ever get convicted with the quality of evidence that we have for god (except in Texas.) A jury is instructed to balance the quality of evidence. and is not told to believe everything they have heard.
You can also construct and test hypotheses based on legal evidence. I was on the jury for a case where a man was charged with stomping on his wife. He testified that this was done to some extent in self defense, because just prior to the act she had kicked him in the balls. We can predict that someone kicked in the balls would cry out, but none of the witnesses testified to this, even when giving details about the fight, so we concluded (rightly it turned out) that the defendant was lying.
Well, I was actually trying to address the principle (notwithstanding experimental error, badly designed experiments, etc, etc.). As anyone who’s worked with data knows, you need to understand what the error is inherent in any measurement. That doesn’t discount the point that scientists look to empirical verification of phenomena to confirm or refute theoretical results, and carefully design experiments to give results even with flawed tools for measurement.
And as my second post notes, independent observations of a irreproducible event can be treated as “replications” to a certain extent–namely, for the purposes of confirming data.
But legal evidence (in the broad sense) is at least several grades below ‘scientific evidence’ at its best–not for any flaw with the legal system, but just because the two have different goals.
For one thing, the rules of evidence law are designed to make certain things inadmissible when they might seem probative (for example, hearsay-which one might think in the abstract might be very probative, and which therefore presents a question of how much weight to give a statement, rather than whether to admit it), often in order to achieve the ‘proper’ result in the context of the system (for example, the exclusionary rule, which excludes relevant and probative evidence in order to serve a greater goal–protecting constitutional rights).
For another thing, the law is an adversarial process (With two sides interested in offering their preferred answer, not some “right” answer-scientists can be biased too (look no further than Eddington and Chandrasekhar), but in law, it’s inherent in the process.
Further, legal evidence usually looks for a qualitative result–who is guilty/liable, rather than any exact quantification (except in the context of damages)–I don’t disagree that scientific evidence has its issues, but it’s a lot better than legal evidence.
To my mind, none of this discounts from the conclusions I was offering:
first, that theory may be instructive, but that in principle at least, it must bow to properly performed experiment. The feynman example you give is just a good example of how all experiments must be carefully reviewed for sources of error.
Second, that the plural of observations are data–that it’s senseless to suggest that a phenomenon might affect the material world, and not be susceptible to some kind of empirical verification (Even if that takes the form of the supernova–something that cannot be produced on cue)–and that might even include something as simple as detecting a pattern (say, of a supernova’s development), which can then be used to confirm whether an unknown signature matches or not.
I think we agree at the very least that regardless of any conclusion we choose to make, the evidence acquinas offers of the existence of God is riddled with holes, and I at least think Dawkins does a fairly reasonable job of pointing them out.
I do not think “real” mathematicians are, as a class, immune to the same mistaken philosophical tendencies as everyone else.
Sure. But that some particular formal system might be incapable of proving (or disproving) some particular statement is not very surprising, in itself; this happens all the time. E.g., one can’t prove or disprove the existence of a square root of 2 from the field axioms (since, clearly, there are fields going either way). The possibility of this phenomenon was surely recognized well before Goedel and is not at all troubling in itself.
It’s been proven undecidable from some particular formal systems, (e.g., Zermelo-Fraenkel-Choice (ZFC), or Morse-Kelley). It is perfectly decidable from other formal systems (e.g., ZFC + Continuum Hypothesis, trivially, or ZFC + Axiom of Constructibility, less trivially). Such is the way with everything; undecidable from some systems, decidable from others. Again, that some particular formal system might leave some particular statement undecided is not very surprising, in itself. Furthermore, Goedel’s Incompleteness Theorem in general has just about nothing to do with the undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis from ZFC in particular, any more than it has to do with the undecidability of “Does 2 have a square root?” from the field axioms. (Granted, this conflation of the implications of GIT and the undecidability of CH from ZFC is very common, but much in the way of misguided discussion about GIT is very uncommon)
Yes, but the general result is shown to be not particularly jaw-dropping when exposed as such a language trick; it’s true that no system of a certain sort can be complete, but it’s true for what, in this context, is a trivial reason: nobody, and no system, no matter how formal or trans-formal, can correctly answer a particular question about themselves. If among a sound system’s language of questions can be found such a question about the negated behavior of that system itself, then of course it will fail to be complete, for exactly the same reasons that God himself could not correctly answer certain questions about himself. The theorem has nothing to do with formality, as such; it applies much, much more generally. Formality is a red herring.
(Technically, you’re not even guaranteed that much if you’ve only assumed consistency; indeed, Goedel’s Incompleteness Theorem itself guarantees the existence of consistent systems which prove incorrect things. But what of it?)
If the restrictions given by GIT for formal systems are the same as the restrictions given by it for trans-formal systems, and even for God himself in all his wisdom, and so on and so on, then it becomes rather difficult, I think, to conclude anything much significant in the way of philosophical importance from it, whatever else its mathematical merit.
I wanted to change and augment some of my wording, and so I have, above.
(I know the whole thing is a hijack that’s going nowhere, but I really, really want to see all this popular mystical cruft around GIT shed off; once people stop appreciating it so much for what it isn’t, they can better appreciate it for what it is)
This doesn’t actually matter that much; if your evidence rules out all other more parsimonious explanations (deception, own mental state etc.), then your belief in god afterwards is entirely rational, if only to yourself. This means, however, that god is a hypothesis decidable by evidence, and should thus be approached with disbelief in absence of evidence.
There’s also the question of how god acts on the universe, if his acts are manifest within it – do they occur according to rules? Then they are describable by and indistinguishable from physical law. Do they occur randomly? Then he is not an intentionally acting god. Is there something in between? Well, that’s the question of (libertarian) free will, which I believe to be logically inconsistent as a concept.
As for Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, as far as I know, Indistinguishable is exactly right with what he says (he can usually be trusted on these matters). For the way I think it is most intuitive, think about a consistent (i.e. non-contradictory) theory (formal system, etc…) ‘sophisticated’ enough to formalize, in its own language, the sentence ‘I can’t be deduced’ (‘I’ referring to the sentence, of course, not to yours truly). There’s then two possibilities: the sentence is true, and actually cannot be deduced from within your theory – then your theory isn’t complete, i.e. it contains true statements that can’t be deduced. Or, the sentence is false, meaning that it can be deduced, contradictory to its own claim – but then, your theory isn’t consistent, contradictory to the assumption that, well, your theory is consistent. Thus, no theory can ever be both complete and consistent. (For the converse, an inconsistent theory is always complete, since everything follows from a contradiction.)
As far as I understand the implications of this, however, it’s not the case that there are mathematical statements that are true, yet fundamentally unprovable within all of mathematics, but rather the opposite, namely that there is no single axiomatic formalization of all of mathematics.
You realize that you’re sweeping every single possible human action and decision into “describable by and indistinguishable from physical law”, right? The fact that human beings are meat machines doesn’t change the fact that we’re sufficiently complicated that our output behaviors do not resemble natural laws. (To a large degree it’s the internal state that does it, I think - there are few natural laws like “gravity pulls objects together - if it’s in the mood to.”)
Surely there’s a middle ground for “acts like a rational sentient being”?
Which of course doesn’t change the fact that God always fails tests of interaction, when they’re not conducted entirely in the mental state of the very credulous.
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