It’s both, clearly. It’s a syllogism that leads (however weakly you might think) to a conclusion that is logical but whose proof and breadth exceeds the grasp of science.
The best one could describe Dawkins here was sloppy.
No; it’s a horribly bad attempt to “prove” God’s existence that fails miserably. It doesn’t have any “breadth”, or depth for that matter; it’s all surface.
Sorry I was a bit brief, it was rather late when I wrote that. The problem is, both with this and your set analogy, that the definition of ‘natural world’ you attempt to give is fundamentally question-begging: you construct it so that it cannot include its own cause, and then conclude that it doesn’t include its own cause. There’s nothing to be won with that. If you truly want to give a meaningful definition, you should attempt to give a constructive description for your set A (like, for instance, ‘everything that obeys the laws of physics’, or even ‘everything that exists’), and then see if uncaused causes are part of that set or not, and whether or not they would have to be to explain the reality of what we observe. The problem then is that we don’t know the totality of entities fitting any somewhat sensible construction I could imagine, so the conclusion of the existence of ‘something beyond’ the natural world is, at best, premature.
What’s done with the ‘everything but god’ type of argument, though, is again somewhat subtly different. The first leg of this argument is that ‘nothing within the natural world can be its own cause’, ignoring definitional ambiguities (and again, outright question-begging) within that statement for the moment. I am very prepared to accept that at face value, if only for the sake of argument. Then, the second part is ‘god is its own cause’ (which is obviously tantamount to saying that god doesn’t exist within the natural world, at least as defined previously within the argument). However, I maintain that there’s a contradiction somewhat slyly hidden within those two premises, namely the one I have alluded to earlier – ‘everything must exist within the natural world’ and ‘god doesn’t exist within the natural world’. The second statement is a given; the first one is implicit, since else there might be a multiplicity of entities not within the natural world that hence are probable first causes; there’s no need to call one of them god and thus, none to make the argument at all.
Let’s look at this in the set analogy you have presented, only working from the general to the specific. First, we have a set that is the set of totality (though I’m not sure whether this construction is strictly possible, since we are uncomfortably close to a painful brush with Russel’s paradox, it seems to me). Then, we identify two disjunct subsets of it, the natural and the supernatural things, defined such that the supernatural things can be self-caused, while the natural ones can’t. Here, obviously the definition of what is and what isn’t natural is very arbitrary, however nobody can really keep us from drawing that line. Yet still, an Aquinas-like (Aquinesque?) argument is unnecessary: there are obviously entities that can serve as a first cause, and our definitional trick of putting them in the ‘supernatural’ set doesn’t bother them in the slightest, and in fact, the distinction between natural and supernatural seems rather meaningless – the core dilemma of Aquinas’ argument doesn’t in fact exist and is merely a consequence of our definitional hoopla (meaning that entities that are their own causes may be perfectly natural – in the sense of subject to physical laws, or merely existing, or whatever else you’d like to employ – despite our calling them supernatural).
Thus, what’s done when employing such an argument is a little different: first, a set is drawn up that contains everything that exists, of course again with the appropriate sacrifice of a pot of tea to Russell so that he may not forbid us from doing so. Then, the members of this set are said to be unable to be their own cause – fair enough, if not exactly proof of anything. Here is a genuine dilemma: nothing that exists can be its own cause, so nothing can exist; yet things exist. But then, something else is called upon to solve this dilemma; this something is now, obviously, not part of the set of things that exist, and yet, it is said to exist. That’s a contradiction, and again, everything can be proven from a contradiction. Again, without that contradiction, it would make no sense to even employ an Aquinas style argument; and with the contradiction, it is trivial.
Half Man Half Wit, I’m not following your objection, or even your explanation. Calculon described set A in a manner that you’ve accepted for argument’s sake. If you accept this, how can you not logically conclude that set B, whatever you call it, must logically exist? When you say:
…are you retracting your acceptance, stated?:
The supernatural cannot be subject to physical law, at least to the extent that physical law prohibits such an entity. The line is not arbitrary, it’s self-evident, assuming we accept the restriction that the physical universe does not contain entities that can be their own cause, I think. I’m not seeing the slyness at work. That’s what I get for being a business major, I guess.
Calculon, your natural/unnatural distinction is a red herring. Aquinas made no such distinction, and even if you accept his proofs, it is entirely irrelevant. All he showed was that far enough back in time, some things must not have been caused. He doesn’t even rule out multiple “first causes”, let alone show that they are supernatural. The universe itself could have been the first cause. Or indeed, something entirely mundane, like a quark or dark energy. Are you prepared to worship that?
I’m not sure what you’re saying here; the existence of the supernatural doesn’t follow from the existence of the natural, at least not that I could see.
No, I am merely arguing that given the acceptance of the statement that ‘no natural entity can be its own cause’, either the supernatural entities are trivially defined into existence (as ‘entities that can be their own cause’), or, if this question-begging is to be circumvented, we end up with a statement of the form ‘A and not A’, i.e. ‘nothing exists that is its own cause’ and ‘something exists that is its own cause’, and from the resulting explosion, everything follows.
Let’s transfer this a little to another property of things – greenness. We start out defining natural things as things that are not green, therefore green things are supernatural. Perfectly valid, but also completely meaningless – you don’t need a god-like prime green thing to explain the greenness of things, since all your problems merely arise from your definition. Thus, in order to need the argument, we must make a somewhat stronger assumption: Things which are green do not exist. But things which are green do exists. Therefore, god. This is also perfectly valid, and also perfectly uninteresting, and I’m trying to make the case that this is what Aquinas’ argument (and all of what I’ve previously called ‘everything but god’ arguments) does. The ‘greenness’ is merely ‘split up’ a little in the original argument, into the property of moving, and the ability of causing movement – one could extend the analogy to the property of being green, and the ability of painting other things green.
That assumption is the arbitrariness – you might as well assume that no natural things are green. It’s one of the reasons I reject the notion of the supernatural all together: if I give you two things, one which is natural, and one which is not, how would you tell the one from the other? If you have defined your distinction between the natural and the supernatural such that the natural cannot be its own cause, then it’s the thing that is its own cause; if you have defined it such that the natural cannot be green, it’s the green one. And as for ‘being subject to physical law’, how would you test for that? If you let it drop, and it flies upwards instead of falling down, well, it might be an exotic kind of matter, or whatever else – our understanding of physics may always be completely inadequate. Thus, the supernatural either only has existence as being on the wrong side of some arbitrary dividing line; or, its existence is a contradiction.
Empiricism is a philosophical school, and inference a logical tool. Saying, “You can gain knowledge about the world through observation” is an epistomological claim.
This point is still lost on me. It’s not trivially defined if I’m understanding the proof: it’s the only possible conclusion. If you accept that our universe–everything in the physical world–cannot be its own cause, then the inexorable conclusion is that there must be a cause that exists outside these boundaries, an entity or entities that can be its own cause (or required no cause).
But there are green things. The premise that no thing can cause itself (quantum explanations aside–though I’m interested in someone expanding on that) is right or it’s not. “Nothing is green” is false, but I agree, as a syllogism it is identical to Aquinas’s in the sense you mean, if we accept it, and it is uninteresting (because it is nothing more than a thought experiment, since I can see green things in the room right now). In some hypothetical universe where “nothing natural is green,” perhaps it will have greater application.
But it’s been offered that the universe I actually live in does not contain anything that is its own cause. If that’s true, then our universe cannot exist without an external explanation. It does exist. I still don’t see anything sly or illogical in the proof.
There is nothing in this room that could have started a fire. The room is aflame. Something outside the room must have started the fire. If I accept the first sentence in this paragraph, the third one is not trivial or arbitrary. It’s the only possible conclusion.
But Aquinas had no idea what the properties of set A actually are. Any line drawn between the two sets is completely arbitrary and meaningless. Hence Dawkin’s objection.
Uncaused causes exist with the totality of existence. Subdividing the totality of existence into arbitrary sets is not a proof of God.
Aquinas didn’t make this argument though. His argument was more along the lines of, “Nothing can start fires. There is a fire. Therefore something started the fire.”
His conclusion refutes the premise outright. The only way to wriggle out of that is to make this distinction between everything we know of (which can’t start fires) and things we’re unfamiliar with (those that can). He is essentially predicting that there are things which can start fires, and that is it. He doesn’t show that it must have been a single thing which started the fires, nor that it has any properties at all. You can call the capacity to start fires “supernatural” all you want, but it is fairly disingenuous, considering all the baggage associated with that word.
Edit: To translate back: If you accept the premise that infinite regress is impossible, and add the words “Nothing that we know of can be uncaused…”, then the only thing Aquinas shows is that there are things we don’t know of that don’t need to be caused. Call that “God” or “supernatural” all you want, but it seems pretty silly to base a religion on it.
Exactly. And if it’s right, saying ‘there is something that can cause itself’ is a contradiction. We should probably keep the natural/supernatural question entirely out of it if it’s causing such problems.
For one thing, the question is again that of the definition of universe – if you mean it to say ‘the totality of existence’, then, again, if it is true that nothing within the universe can cause itself, assuming that something exists that can cause itself is a contradiction. If you, however, merely intend for universe to mean ‘the set of things that can not be their own causes’, then you have only subdivided a greater set into two parts along an arbitrary line.
That’s just it – the problem only arises if you a priori exempt the things that are outside of your room and can start a fire within it from the set of ‘natural things’, to conflate the analogies a little. If you don’t impose such arbitrary limitations, the question doesn’t even present itself; thus, in order for the question to even be asked, the assumption must be that ‘there exist no things that start fires’ (which then, obviously, is in contradiction with the statement ‘there are things that start fires’).
What part of it exceeds science?
What does he missstate or misunderstand?
If that’s the case, then Richard Dawkins has a PhD in philosophy, and the argument that he “doesn’t know philosphy” is a fail. If empiricism is “philosphy,” them Dawkins is an expert. Nothing in Aquinas’ 5 proofs requires knowledge of anything outside empiricism and logic.
This premise is false in two wasy, one, it isn’t true that nothing can be the cause of itself, and two, it isn’t true that a hypothetical, external cause of this unoverse has to be an “entity.” This universe doesn’t have to be everything that exists. There can be a multiplicity or infinity of universes, and the underlying quantum matrix can be eternal and uncaused.
It’s NOT true.
Even if this were true, it’s false to say that the only thing that could possibly exist outside the room is God or magic. There could, in fact, be other rooms – even an infinity of rooms – and that none of them contain any sorcerors.
No they don’t. Quantum fluctuations allow for a measure of randomness in the outcome (at least, according to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics), but this does not mean that the events are uncaused. A particle can be spontaneously created from borrowed energy, for example, but only if the prerequisit conditions allow its creation; thus, it cannot be properly said to be uncaused. Quantum fluctuations certainly do not allow for creation ex nihilo, contrary to what many layman skeptics claim!
Heck, I’d still like someone to call the Prime Mover “Dave” and admit Dave is not known to be described accurately in the Bible or any other human scripture.
There isn’t any nihilo. That’s a mistaken presumption.
Can you show that there are no such prerequisite conditions at the time of the big bang? If the quantum vacuum is eternal, then they should be.
Again, it’s just a god of the gaps argument. I don’t know of an uncaused thing, therefore God exists.
Would this be a variation of “The more I don’t know, the more proof there is of God”?
Oh, no you don’t. You don’t get to shift the burden of proof here. If you’re going to claim that the Big Bang is an uncaused event without any prerequisite conditions, then the burden of proof is on your shoulders, not mine.
Remember, you specifically claimed that quantum fluctuations amount to uncaused events. That’s just false, plain and simple.
“But you still haven’t proven that God created the universe!” one might say. True – but that’s not the issue I’m addressing. Rather, I’m addressing the specific claim that quantum fluctuations amount to uncaused events. They aren’t, regardless of whether God exists or not.