I’m not a materialist, nor a believer in a spiritual/material dichotomy (which I suspect puts me squarely primarily on the sidelines only here), but my own answers to the questions three:
“1. Do you deny the existence of anything and everything that cannot be (presently) measured (or evidenced by proxy), and if not, what is the metaphysical nature of what you will allow to exist?”
Of course I don’t deny existence that happens to be outside of present awareness. The second clause doesn’t make much sense to me–existence doesn’t depend on my permission. A good thing, there’s an awful lot of existence to go around, and if I had to okay all of it I wouldn’t have time to do anything else. That exists which exists; if I don’t see things that exist, that just means I don’t see them at the time. I walked home from work the other day with a different route than I had been taking, and got a close look at buildings I had never seen in all my previous four years living in this city–I don’t doubt those buildings existed before, though.
“2. Is man’s cognition the only cognition that apprehends reality? Is a monkey’s cognition, or a snail’s cognition invalid?”
Nope. It’s apprehension at a more complex level than that of a snail or monkey. Invalid? Not invalid for functioning as a snail or monkey. For functioning as a human, it’s not going to have much validity.
“3: Given that man might evolve such that his progeny will have an even more powerful brain, will reality then have changed if that creature is able to perceive more than his ancestors?”
It will have changed only inasmuch as that future cross-section of reality’s manifold will have local patterns of spacetime that instantiate more perceptive forms of consciousness, which patterns it didn’t contain at a different local cross-section of the whole shebang.
Polycarp, based on the definition given by Ambushed which I am going to quote:
Energy is a property of matter. It is related to mass by that famous equation. With regards to the particles you mentioned, it is important to note that they
cannot be detected by our current technology
This does not mean they do not exist. Just as we did not have the means to detect radiation until the 1800’s, doesn’t mean that radiation didn’t exist.
still interacts with matter
This does mean that it can be measured via the interaction.
The whole problem I see with the idea of a dichotomy between a material and spiritual world, is that if they are truly separate, then they can’t affect each other. If they can’t affect each other, then for all intents and purpose to each other they do not exist.
And I, sir or madam, had hoped for a real debate with someone who was more of an intellectually honest opponent; an oppopnent who was averse to mere verbal disputes and didn’t resort to empty linquistic sophistry in lieu of genuine debate. You seem to be following a cookbook strategy to merely seek out and attack the attributes of actors in your opponents’ position in some curious ploy (as evidenced by your statement: “And I think I’d like to begin here, the same place I always begin with a Materialist”)
Since you are keen on objecting to nothing more substantial than my mere choice of words, you force me (for no better reason than to try to bypass your empty verbal disputes) to rephrase my original post. You will see that nothing of any substance has changed.
Materialism is most of all the assertion that the primary constituents of reality are material entities. It is the view that anything that is real is either a material entity or as a form or function or action of a material entity. Materialism also posits that everything that happens in the universe does so without any recourse to any non-empirical or non-material entity as described above.
Many logical and philosophical consequences follow from a materialist worldview:
The first and arguably most important is that all materialists much be strict empiricists. In other words, no synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. In other, other words, no knowledge at all about the synthetic world is possible except that which is obtained through primary or secondary sensory experience of any actual or theoretical perceiver. One consequence of this is that no knowledge of the transcendent or the supernatural (e.g., God) is within the reach of any potential non-transcendent actual or theoretical perceiver. (Knowledge, according to the brief philosophical definition, is “justified, true belief”.)
Another important consequence is that materialism implies either hard or soft determinism. Philosophical libertarianism must be rejected by all materialists. Traditional free will (in a non-trivial sense) is completely contradictory to this worldview.
It is also quite arguable that materialists must also reject political views such as Natural Law and Social Contract theories. (I won’t get into this debate, however).
Then there is the mind/body problem. A materialist holds the view known as identity materialism which insists that “mind” is just another word for a part or function of the body, as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra taught. Any type of dualism or panpsychism is absolutely incompatible with materialism.
There are also consequences for ethical and metaethical views (which should be fairly obvious).
The last consequence I’ll mention is that materialism requires a rejection of the ontological view known as direct realism, which is the view that the physical world is exactly as it is perceived. This is because it is known empirically that our perceptions can be inaccurate (e.g., the appearance of solidity is something of an illusion, as matter is largely empty space. Our perception of solidity is a consequence of the electroweak force).
Let me once again address Libertarian’s questions three (which are all implicitly answered by the preceding):
**1) ** Nothing is real except for that which is either a material entity or as a form or function or action of a material entity.
**2) ** Cognition, experience, and explication are utterly irrelevant. The universe would be precisely the same without them.
**3) ** See question 2.
It should be abundantly clear that matter and energy are both fully material in accordance with question 1. “Material” is NOT a synonym for “matter”. To answer one specific objection, matter is known to be equivalent to energy, and energy, matter. They are both material in strict accordance of the terms of question 1, above. (see telechus’ response on this point.)
Also, it should be clear that as yet undiscovered information about the Universe is entirely irrelevant. We are not having a debate about what might be, we are debating what is.
Now, to address Libertarian’s most recent question, which was to ask: “the primary or secondary sensory experience of what or whom, and why is the what or whom that you select both significant and nonarbitrary?”
Of anyone or no one; of an actual entity, or a potential entity. It makes no difference whatsoever, because perception and experience are utterly irrelevent to materialism.
It makes no difference whatsoever, because perception and experience and explication are utterly irrelevent to materialism.
It is a direct logical attribute of the materialist worldview that personalities, percievers, experiencers, knowers, actors, etc., have no bearing whatsoever to the materialist universe. That is part of the very definition of materialism!
Other worldviews require personalities, percievers, experiencers, knowers, actors, and whatnot. Materialism emphatically does NOT!
Some questions, ambushed, because I seem to be missing something.
You say: “The first and arguably most important is that all materialists much be strict empiricists. In other words, no synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. In other, other words, we can know nothing at all about the real world that is not obtained through primary or secondary sensory experience.”
Huh? Can you elaborate on this, please. It would seem that every single worldview must have at least one a priori element: namely, the foundation of itself. In materialsm we would find is the statement you give, “primary constituents of reality are material entities” (though I would say “all” instead of “primary”). This has to be a priori knowledge because it is not a conclusion that may be derived from experience. It is not testable, and its opposite would require proving a negative, which leads again to untestability.
Not only that, but then you say, “Many logical and philosophical consequences follow from a materialist worldview…” which is a statement of synthetic a priori knowledge.
Otherwise, I agree that perception is not a factor of the form reality takes to the materialist.
I am most grateful to you for bringing up an argument of real substance! And I am quite impressed that you realized yourself where you had gone slightly wrong. This speaks very highly indeed of your solid intellectual honesty!
I have engaged in a few debates on this matter elsewhere and have seen few comments that have reached your level of insight. With your contributions elsewhere, I have come to see you as an exceptional poster.
But then I think a different question comes to mind on why synthetic a priori knowledge could be seen as necessary. Any materialist who knows that materialism is correct is doing so on the basis of synthetic a priori knowledge. No?
My ability to ignore the “preview” button is legendary (to myself!) and so I missed that compliment. Thank you very much! (they need a blushing smiley)
I must say that your posts to this thread have made me read a whole lot of assorted web pages. I would consider myself a materialist, but I remain unconvinced (as of yet) that a super-being must be rejected, unless it is done so axiomatically.
I suppose I should flesh out why I said that to avoid any confusion.
Any statement which asserts its own truth is either tautological, definitional, or strictly analytic. Truth statements about reality are either analytic * a priori* or synthetic a posteriori. However, we cannot experience the worldview itself, and if it asserted its own truth it would not need syntetic knowledge.
Thus, in order to know that materialism is correct is to have at least one piece of synthetic a priori knowledge.
[hitting preview this time]
Ah, but I do NOT claim to know that materialism is correct! It is simply my worldview, and all I claim to be able to do is defend it philosophically (if not always easily).
To know that materialism is correct would require transcendent or meta-knowledge, which is unavailable to anyone in the natural universe. Thus, I make no such claims of knowledge. This is completely consistent with my strict empiricism.
Also, there is no unequivocal basis in materialism that I’m aware of to reject all super-beings or gods, provided only that the god in question is either entirely independent of the universe (which is the view of many deists, for example), -or- completely contained within the material universe and thus conforms to and obeys all physical laws (similar to what a very small subset of Mormons and people of other faiths appear to believe).
The only tenets of materialism that I’m aware of that relates specifically to gods are:
Any transcendent or supernatural being, by epistemological definition, is unknowable (i.e., philosophical agnosticism). This does not necessarily imply non-existence.
There can be no absolute morality in the universe provided by such gods.
Such gods cannot or do not influence the universe in any non-material way.
I don’t want to get too caught up in the god issue, for I contend it is not strictly relevant to the worldview of materialism; in other words, other worldviews may well have similar problems with god.
Pursuing spiritual questions with rational cogitation is like chasing butterflies with a hammer: you might succeed, but it would be better if you didn’t.
All this dualtistic thinking has its place, but when misapplied, it can lead to theology, which at its best is amusing absurdity and at its worst…well, that is quite clear enough already, I am sure.
Does the spiritual impinge upon the material? I suppose, if you consider that one might run across one of those sweet little epiphanies that change one’s thinking, and thereby alter one’s impact upon the world, however slight that may be. A rather crude analogy: a ghost, being immaterial, cannot affect the material, so a ghost can’t hurt you. Unless you’re afraid of ghosts. In which case the immaterial does affect the material, if the illusion affects reality, then the illusion is real. (Uh-oh, sliding into dialectic monkey-think, must be time to shut up…)
We know that wv are the source of truth and falsity; that is, a wv consists of an epistemology.
If we reject direct realism, as you mentioned is necessary from a posteriori induction (and I agree), we see that this leads us to see that truth is relative to the wv one possesses. (though this isn’t strictly a suprise, even to a materialist)
Now, though truth is relative, the materialist would still assert (as you have) that our assessment of reality has no impact on reality itself.
The question I pose is: what sort of statement is “Our assessment of reality has no impact on reality itself,” then?
If we accept any form of hard determinism then this statement is false (because our assessment of reality is both the result of and a cause for other events). If we accept soft determinism then the statement is false (because, again, it serves to be the cause of events). If we accept free will then we have destroyed, seemingly, the entire premise of strict materialism.
Forgive me, elucidator, but I’m afraid I don’t know to whom you are speaking (but I loved your opening sentence – and your tag lines!)
If you are addressing your remarks to me, I don’t accept that “spirit” even exists; there are no questions which are not subject to rational cogitation.
And as I said above, materialism rejects dualism and dualistic thinking.
Might it be that you were addressing someone else?
In any case, I am delighted to have you with us! I encourage you to share more of your thoughts with us. Nothing quite like some clear elucidations!
This frankly puzzles me. I have never before encountered such a claim. Could you elaborate on why you consider this to be the case?
While a worldview limits one’s choice of epistemological philosophies, and also that a particular advocate of a specific worldview implies some choice of epistemology, I don’t see that a worldview consists of a specific epistemology.
If we limit ourselves for economy’s sake to either Rationalism or Empiricism (which I find mutually exclusive anyway), it is true that materialism rejects Rationalism. But if these two positions were not mutually exclusive, I don’t see why some third alternative would necessarily be excluded by materialism.
Also, I’m afraid that I cannot agree that an epistemology has anything explicitly to do with identifying “truth” and “falsity” themselves, but rather is strictly about the source and nature of knowledge. While it is entirely correct to say that truth is a prerequisite for knowledge (i.e., untrue knowledge is not actually knowledge), epistemology is not itself directly involved with separating truth from falsehood.
It is certain, however, that empiricism denies any claim of being able to determine absolute Truth. Science is of course strictly empirical, but science has no claims to be able to reveal absolute Truth. As Popper correctly taught, science is all about falsifying claims and hypotheses rather than establishing their truth.
I deny – or perhaps I should say I certainly do not claim – that truth is relative. Such a view is inconsistent with materialism. The idea of relative Truth is one that implicitly requires that different experiencers can legitimately hold physically or logically incompatible truth claims and yet both be correct. While materialism and empiricism cannot establish absolutely which of the two contradictory claims are True, there is no question at all that at least ONE of them must be False, according to the tenets of materialism.
All I can claim is that absolute Truth is not knowable in this universe, for to know absolute Truth requires transcendence or some kind of meta-existence that is beyond the reach of anyone in this universe.
So, moving on to your question, which may or may not be relevant after the above comments: "what sort of statement is “Our assessment of reality has no impact on reality itself,” then?"
I must admit that I do not understand the question. You seem to mean “science” or “measurement” of reality in your phrase “assessment of reality”, but I can see no compelling reason for you to claim such a formulation.
Forgive me, but I think you need to elaborate with greater detail why you find that question apropos and relevant here. Please believe me when I tell you I am not trying to evade your question! I just don’t quite see the logical or philosophical foundation for your question.
As for free will, it would be a fascinating discussion to see how attacking perceived flaws in determinism might be employed in this discussion! You are, to the best of my understanding, on point in your view that the fall of determinism spells the fall of materialism (although I think it may be more effectively argued instead that the reverse is true).
As you have done so consistently before, my friend, you have succeeded in greatly stimulating my thoughts! Thank you for the fine pleasure of your company and your keen intellect!
Heh. It certainly can be. It can also be more akin to chasing fireflies with an empty jar; “success” merely being to briefly bottle up a small piece of light, admire it, then let it go again.
I suppose some folks might rather shut it up tight with ether-soaked cotton, kill it, and impale it in a display drawer. But I don’t see that happening here.
An individual’s worlview consists of an epistemology. I suppose we failed to sufficiently define “worldview” previously, but I think one would be in a sorry state if one didn’t have an epistemology in their worldview. Certianly the ability to claim to know what something is is the result of an epistemic analysis; whether or not we have made our epistemology explicit is irrelevant.
Well, we could have an epistemolgy which described the nature of knowledge and then provided no way to match up anything we thing with anything the epistemology lays out (that is, there is no way to know anything); if the epistemology allows you to know something, then it becomes a source of truth. I think an important distinction about Truth and truth should be kept, where Truth is what a person would have if they experienced a privileged reference frame, and truth is simply what they have without it.
I think we could trivially say that something is true if it is an element of knowledge. That is, in this example, our implicit or explicit empistemology goes about the process of determining hat knowledge is and how we collect it. If the answer to any question fulfills all the conditions for “knowledge” then we can say that such a piece of informatio is “true” with repsect to the epistemology. We woul then hope that our epistemology provided us a link between true statements and statements that are True.
Else what does an epistemology do? You say, “While it is entirely correct to say that truth is a prerequisite for knowledge (i.e., untrue knowledge is not actually knowledge), epistemology is not itself directly involved with separating truth from falsehood.” Cerainly it is. Analytical logic, what we use for our a priori statements, are derived from an epistemology. Perhaps if you explained where truth comes from if not the study of knoweldge.
Sticky. Following my convention above, I would think Truth is not relaitve, but there is no absolute method of assigning true statements to statements of Truth. As such, wherever you get your “truth” assignment from, truth is relative to a person’s construct. As an extremely degenerate case, consider two people. Persona A determines truth in the following manner: “All sentences which end in vowels are true.” Persona B states: “All statements are true if and only if they end in a consonant.” Two methods for determining truth, and the statement “everything is false” is evaluated differently in both of their constructs.
The statement, “Our assessment of reality has no effect on reality,” then, is meant as “regardless of whether or not something is true has no impact on Truth.”
Suppose I build an instrument of electromagnets. I place them in a geometric arrangement I find pleasing, for entirely personal reasons. I add rheostats, and actuators, and a paper tape reader to alter the magnetic field density of the individual magnets according to my desire, over a time period I find satisfactory, and punch holes in my paper tape loop according to a design I feel is appropriate. I add a large capacity battery, hook it all up, and enclose it in a sealed, opaque, plastic box.
I let it play.
I cannot perceive the results. Neither can you, or any human being, or any other extant life form I know of.
Is it possible that my “Concerto for Gausophemem No. 1” could be beautiful? If it could be beautiful, is it beautiful now?
(they need a blushing smiley)