I was just rereading McCullough’s Harry Truman and came across the decisions made at the beginning of the Korean War, 55 years ago this June. In that account, Truman, acting on Acheson’s advice, founded his authority for sending in troops on the U.N. treaty and on his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, specifically rejecting the idea that he needed a resolution of authority from Congress before committing troops. And McCullough says that he did so, in Acheson’s words, specifically with an eye to what precedent he would be setting for what future presidents could and could not do.
As most people know, that was a watershed event. U.S. involvement in previous wars had been by Congressional declaration, with rare exceptions and discounting attacks on us and defenses taken against them prior to that declaration as being grounds for the declaration, not as us engaging in war without the declaration.
Since 1950 we have been engaged in Lebanon, Vietnam, Kuwait, Grenada, Somalia, the Yugoslav republics, Iraq, Afghanistan… All on Presidential authority, not Congressional declaration. Congress has in general passed resolutions confirming and supporting Presidential action, but as recognizing a fait accomplui, not authoritizing those actions.
I would be interested in seeing what Dopers make of this, its positives and negatives, its constitutional legitimacy and what limits there may be on that. I am specifically asking for broad assessments, not dealing exclusively and explicitly with the Iraq War and its legitimacy or lack thereof. I am sure people are still concerned about that, but I would be grateful if the broader picture of legality and practicality of situations generally might be addressed, rather than bogging down into another flamefest on the issue of Iraq.
Of considerable importance to this discussion is the War Powers Resolution passed in 1973.
Also, I think you have mischaracterized the authorization given by Congress in most of these conflicts. A fait accompli would imply something done AFTER the act, whereas Congressional Resolutions were passed well in advance of the act.
Personally, I think the WPR is a reasonable compromise allowing the Prez the act wtih speed when necessary, but limitting the action to a short period of time. What I find extremely troubling is the willingness with which Congress has given up its authority to declare war to the president. Vietnam and Iraq are clcear examples of wars that weren’t technically wars because Congress never declared them to be such.
Congress represents the people broadly (ie, the diversity of opinions that exist) in a way that the President simply can’t. There is a real value for the country to know if we’re actually at war or not, and to have each of our represtatives in Congress on record. During times of war, we as a people can understand certain sacrifices to our materal comfort that might need to be made. And having Congressmen on record can help diffuse the divisiveness that an undeclared war invites. The Congressional Resolution wrt Iraq is a perfect example-- I have to wonder how many Senators, for example. who voted FOR that resolution would have done so if they were explicitly declaring war on Iraq. The current situation makes it all to easy for them to vote “for” the resolution, but take a position opposed to the war as the political winds shift. It’s one thing for that to happen for something like milk subsidies, but war is serious, serious business.
It looks to me like the degradation of Congress’ war making powers is partly the result of having a large standing military force. The President thus has the means and the power to insert military force into various situations and this presents the Congress with a fait accompli which they are powerless to correct, as you note.
Without the large standing military, the Congress would have to authorize an increase in the military personnel, appropriate money for it, and for the equipment, bases and for the increase in command structure to manage the increase. As it is, there is plenty of authorized military strength to allow Congress to just go along, as they must, without any special actions.
I’ve lamented the fact that the war-making power has been transferred from the Congress to the President for a long time. I think it’s been very destructive to both American foriegn policy and democracy.
I also think it has roots far deeper than the Korean War, although that may be the greatest early example of its use. The repeated deployments of the military, especially the Marines, to Central America in the first half of the 20th century were precursors, as was the deployment of troops to Russia during the post-WWI era.
There is now much less opportunity for public debate and expression of opinion before a war starts, and we are far more likely to get ourselves involved in conflicts that are both unpopular and unrelated to the defense of the United States and its allies.
One of the main objections, about the speed of modern war, could have some exceptions (e.g. when the missiles start flying over the North Pole), but really hasn’t been that relevant in the wars we have been involved with since Korea. If the US or a NATO country were directly attacked, I think we’d have no trouble marshalling a quick Congressional vote.
I really don’t know much about the War Powers Resolution, but it’s very troubling to me that successive Presidents have refused to accept this compromise on war-making power.
I think the first example of that would be the wars against the Barbary pirates in the end of the 18th-beginning of the 19th centuries. I don’t believe war was ever declared against them, although in one case, there was a Congressional resolution authorizing the use of force.
Well, the Indian Wars were fought by only relatively small detachments of the Army, along with militia, as in whoever had a rifle at hand. The Barbary Pirates and the quasi-war with France was the Navy with the Marines, as I recall. The idea is that for a large war, like Korea, Vietnam, or either of the Gulf Wars, the job would be made considerably harder if there wasn’t a large standing army already in place, although for Korea and Vietnam there were drafts.
Hmm. How did the Feds get away with a draft without a declaration of war, anyway?
Seperate things. There was a peacetime draft starting in 1940, and the draft continued every year until 1973 (although it doesn’t look like anyone was inducted in 1947). Here’s a chart from the Selective Service:
I’m not sure that the Korean War is all that good an example. As I recall, the US called for a UN resolution for the purpose of defending South Korea against aggession by North Korea. The Soviets walked out so the resolution passed. Truman then sent troops to help the South with the justification that the US was obligated to defend South Korea by our acceptance of the UN’s Charter which calls upon members to go to the aid of a member that is attacked.
So I don’t think it was a case of Presidential overreaching since the US had authorized in advance such UN action via the UN Charter.
But the UN Charter, even if ratified by the Senate, cannot amend the Constitution. The Constitution requires the Congress make decisions on war, and that is one of the constitutional powers that cannot be delegated, especially to a foreign body.
Hadn’t Congress already waived that requirement when it ratified the UN Charter which contained a prescription for defending a member of the UN that had been attacked?
In other words, Congress had given advance permission for the President to rely on a UN resolution in such cases.
Congress cannot rewrite the Constitution by treaty or act, even if it wants to, because the Constitution, in empowering the Congress, also requires that Congress exercise those powers. Congress cannot give away nondeligable powers even if it wants to.
For example, the Constitution states that “All legislative powers” of the United States are vested in Congress. Congress couldn’t shift that power to, for example, the President’s Cabinet even if it wanted to in passing a law or approving a treaty that would have that effect. The same goes for the warmaking power. The Constitution makes no allowance for Congress handing off this power to another branch of government or to an international body.
A search on the subject affirms that Congress can and does have Supreme Court sanction to delegate such authority provided that the law delegating the authority clearly defines the limits of the delegation. I believe the UN Charter limits the ability of that body to call on members for military aid to cases of repelling armed invasion and would seem to me to fit the Supreme Court’s requirements.
Knowing that it’s annoying when someone does a “drive by OP” and never responds, I just want to say that I’ve been reading the responses here with great interest, but have seen nothing impelling me to jump in and debate. I find it a very interesting question indeed, and with arguments to be made in both directions. So I’m reading and monitoring. And I thought it appropriate to say so in order not to appear to be one of the “drive by OP” types.
I believe the US Navy actions against the Barbary pirates were seen as more of a large scale anti-pirate operation than a true war, and thus within the normal peacetime function of the navy.
I’m wondering if anyone thinks the passing of the war-making power onto the Presidency is a good thing in principle… so far most of the responses seem to be negative, or don’t mention that aspect of the debate.
BTW, thanks everyone who pointed out earlier examples and specifics about whether the Korean War is a good example of this or not!
