Maybe when it comes to quantum physics (so I admit the particle accelerator wasn’t the best example). But short of the ol’ Schroedinger’s cat problem, I don’t see the relevance of a conscious (meaning what, anyway?) mind to empiricism. Windows 95 can empirically tell me whether I have a bad sector on my hard drive, for cryin’ out loud—I never have to interpret a thing.
My Webster’s defines empiricism as “the practice of relying on observation and experiment esp. in the natural sciences.” How is this different from “gathering data”?
You seems to think that my perception of red light does not “count” as part of my conscious experience, but it does. And that’s the problem—we all spend all our time in our own consciousnesses, and don’t even stop to think about the inadequacy of science to describe WHY we experience ANY of the things we do at all.
You’ve basically hit upon Chalmers’ key point—that science is grievously lacking in its ability to “explain” consciousness if it isn’t going to even make an EFFORT to explain why/by what mechanism we actually EXPERIENCE things, especially seeing as how that those experiences fully comprise that which we consider “consciousness.”
This is precisely why we, as you point out, do not expect scientific explanations to somehow embody the character of events. We know it can’t. But seeing as how the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness is the awareness of the “character of events,” your argument seems to beg the question.
And (even assuming a science so advanced that it can trace the relationship between all neurons, etc. etc.) that is ALL you will know. You will have no idea why or by what mechanism I experienced X.
Let’s suppose we’re talking about “sadness,” and that science has advanced to where you can actually trigger a specific TYPE of sadness via neural stimulation (so you know exactly where in my brain to touch me to make my cry about the death of my childhood dog).
You, the scientist, proudly explain to the crowd that you’re going to wheel me out onto the stage and, without having ever discussed the issue with me before, make me remember and cry about something that happened many many years ago.
You wheel me out. The crowd waits. You flip the switch. The neural implant or whatever fires and I begin bawling and rending my clothes in grief. “Success!” the crowd cries. “Now we know why people get sad!”
But do we? Has this experiment proven ANYTHING about the nature of the conscious experience? In other words, if somehow nobody in the audience had ever experienced any kind of sadness in their own consciousnesses, would your experiment have demonstrated anything to them about what I was going through?
Of course not. A crowd uninitiated in psychic pain/sadness might even laugh at the strange response I demonstrated, though they would not have been deliberately cruel in doing so—they just wouldn’t have known any better.
Why would they have not known any better? Because empirical science on its own is useless as a tool to explain consciousness. It can expalin neurological function just fine. But that’s not the same thing.
Or maybe they just don’t know what teal is supposed to look like. When I first heard the word teal, I had NO idea that it was “blue-greenish” or “a light turquoise” until I saw pictures of the new Florida Marlins baseball uniforms for the first time, which were described as “white, teal and black”. (“Oh, so THAT’s teal,” I said.) I had seen the color many times before, but thought of it as turquoise and thought no more about it.
I once worked at an auto auction, checking in cars that were to be sold. The first time cars of a certain brassy hue came in, I wasn’t sure what the name of the color was until someone told me it was “champagne.”
I think everyone who is not color-blind sees the same colors. I think it’s also certain everyone sees the same thing when we see black, since that’s the absence of color, and pure white, since that’s the presence of all colors.
It is possible, but…we do not all have the exact same brain structure, rod and cone proportion and eye shape; under what rationale could we then perceive all colors as exactly the same?
http://www.presscolor.com/library/4ctheory.html
“Seeing color is a sensation, like hearing or taste. Sensations are not felt the same way by every person. Food tastes differently to each person. In the same way, there is no absolute color that is inherently seen the same way by every person. Nor is every person’s vision the same…Everyone will agree that ripe tomatoes are red (in season). However, a group of people probably won’t agree on which tomato is the reddest, or how a group of tomatoes should be ranked in terms of their redness.”
http://www.adobe.com/support/techguides/color/colortheory/variables.html
“Despite all the mathematical certainty inherent in the physics of light waves, color is ultimately a strongly subjective perception. No two people actually “see” the same color because the variables that affect our perception of color differ from person to person. Ultimately, it can be said that color only exists in the mind of the person viewing it.”
http://www.imation.com/products/printing/content/1,1011,879,00.html
“Because color perception is influenced by many variables including eye fatigue and viewing conditions and also varies from person to person, we cannot reliably use human perception to determine color differences.”
(As an aside, diamonds are graded based on color, and it was considered unsurprising to get a slightly different color grade assigned depending of who does the grading, or time of day and mood. And there are drugs and diseases that can cause color-blindess or shifts in color perception. I’ve seen an artist’s work where he painted one painting with full color vision, and one while red-green color-blind. Neat stuff.)
Even if we did find two people who agreed perfectly in every instance that Color A was darker than Color B and Yellow 1 was more yellow than Yellow 2, I believe it would not be impossible for their perception of color to be exatcly the same regarding hues and intensities, but for their color perception to be completely opposite (red==green, orange==blue, purple==yellow).
There are warm blacks and cool blacks, warm whites and cool whites. I do think it is possible that if someone showed two people “true black” one would perceive it as “warmer/cooler” than the other, even though both would correctly identify it as true black–it’s just that their true blacks look different. But they can’t really see what the other person is perceiving, since there is no objective referent.
Oh, and the Marlin’s color isn’t teal. It’s much too pale and is indeed much closer to a medium greenish turquiose. But teal is trendy and manly and turquoise is pansy.
Margaret Wertheim’s book ‘The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace’ argues that medieval Christians did in fact perceive their god and heaven to exist in a physical space beyond and above our own. She draws her conclusions from art of the era and the works of Dante.
She suggests that a spiritual crisis occurred in western society when scientific discoveries that matter in space was the same as matter here on earth (and not made up of celestial spheres for e.g.) eliminated a ‘place’ for god.
No quantum spookiness required. I am not talking about collapsing wave forms. I am talking about drawing conclusions, an irrevocably conscious act (for the moment, anyway). Wondows cannot empiricaly tell you that you have a bad sector on your hard drive. It can record data which matches a pattern that a conscious mind has decided indiciate a bad sector on your hard drive.
That would be the word relying. Again, empiricism is a decision making tool employed by conscious beings.
You misunderstand my point. I am saying exactly that your perception of red light is a part of your conscious experience (or, at least your recollection of the perception is a part). So is every other experience of the natural world, whether direct or indirect. In other words, so is everything else that science deals with (and art, for that matter).
I agree. But this is a far cry from saying “science can never explain by what mechanism we experience things” which is what you have reported as Chalmer’s thesis. In fact, if that thesis is correct, then I cannot imagine why Chalmer’s would express your point above. What would be the point of trying to explain what he declares cannot be explained?
I disagree that the difference between consciousnes and unconsciousness is isolated in the specific character of individual experiences. Frankly, such a model would make the term “consciousness” useless, since we do not share identical individual experiences. You would have no justification, for instance, in saying anything about my consciousness even if you had absolute and infallible knowledge of your own. This is the language of solipsism. It is an irrefutable philosophy, but not a particularly useful one.
There is no reason, short of axiomatic belief, to make this assertion. If your perception is entirely encoded in the neurology of your brain, then I will indeed know the mechanism through which you experience X. We do not, at present, know whether this is the case. But we have certainly not demonstrated that it isn’t.
No. That conclusion would be unjustified. However, declaring that “these neural inputs will cause the subject to remember the grief od a dying pet” would be justified.
Yes, it will have proven that specific conscious experinces (more than just emotion, by your example – emotion triggered by specific triggers experienced indistinguishably from an objective reality) can be triggered solely by stimulating neurological elements.
No more than demonstrating the wavelength of light tells them what you see when seeing red. No more than an absolute understanding of what you see when seeing red will tell you what I see when seeing red.
This conlusion depends upon the assumption that neurological function is not the sole cause of consciousness. That, my friend, is begging the question.
I almost followed you there with my response, but then I realized that this thread was never about gnosticism. It just has a bad title. Issues of consciousness certainly seem germane to jmullaney’skoinos cosmos and to his assertion that consciousness cannot be a phenomenon with a purely material cause.
I suggest that the early Hebrews believed this as well: Genesis 11:4 “…let us build a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven…” meaning the Tower of Babel, of course.
okay, so maybe the thread was never about gnosticism… but arguing this in two simultaneous threads seems a little strange, don’t you think?
All right, Spiritus. The Windows/bad-sector thing has got me a bit puzzled here: just because a conscious being created the computer does not mean the computer uses a conscious process to reach its conclusions (and I’m guessing you’re aware of that).
Your point, then, seems to be that computers can only gather data, but cannot interpret data beyond the facilities programmed into them by humans. So where does consciousness come into play? What makes us different from the computer? If we built an incredibly sophisticated, HAL-like computer, would you still say “it’s not empirical because it’s not conscious”? And what justification would you have for claiming that it is not conscious?
I’m not sure what you’re getting at about Chalmers’ thesis—you and I seem to agree that science does not make an effort to explain why I see one color red and you see another (oh sure, it tells us about rods and cones, tiredness, mood, all the things Gaudere mentioned—but as to why/how we actually perceive anything, how those images enter this “mental space” of ours, there we’re out of luck).
So if science is not “about” trying to explain how we actually experience things (colors, flavors, emotions, whatever), why do you disagree with me that “science can never explain by what mechanism we experience things”? These are equivalent statements, aren’t they?
He’s not trying to use science to do that which science cannot do, no. He’s just opening up a new avenue of thought, pointing out that no matter how fine a map we draw of the brain, we can never say a thing about what it is or is not like to be inside one. And that’s the consciousness question, really.
And what do you consider the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness?
I already HAVE no justification in saying anything about your consciousness, quite frankly. Consciousness being the non-empirical phenonmenon that it is, we all simply rely on faith that we are surrounded by other conscious beings and not “just” neural machines (but we ARE neural machines! you say… then I argue that Windows 95 must also be conscious, albeit at a lower level of sophisitication).
Now I’m not saying that I’m the only conscious person and you all are automatons, but I honestly don’t have any reason other than logic (why would I be the only one?) to think otherwise. It’s a pain in the ass, and somehow it seems like faulty reasoning, but I sure can’t think of a way around it. If you’ve got one, let me know.
Again, why do we have a Turing test if this is the case? Clearly it is possible to conceive of a neural network that lacks consciousness. Given that, I can’t see how determining the specifics of a neural network has any bearing on whether or not a thing is conscious.
No argument there. But that says nothing about why I experience sadness, as opposed to my body turning on the waterworks without my mind ever “feeling emotion.”
That would be nothing new. We’re pretty much at that point right now. And we still don’t know jack about consciousness.
Okay, let me phrase that better. Neurological function may well be the sole cause of consciousness, just as wavelengths and photons are the sole cause of light. But neurological function does not equal consciousness any more than 430,000 GHz equals red.
There is no compelling reason, even upon the most hypothetically advanced study of neural maps, to conclude that the subject is conscious—in the end, as far as I can tell, it will always come down to assumption rather than conclusion.
And anyway, we’ve hardly established that just because you have neurological function, you must be conscious (or are you saying that all animals are conscious just like us? possible, but a bold statement).
Reality could be a shared subjective experience, rather than a common perception of one objective referent? I guess that is what I was getting at. Thus, an independant subjective experience could still be an actual experience of reality, rather than an error in perception. Rather like the set functions union and difference. Thus, depending on the degree of subjectivity lent to reality, your objective referent as something objective could be contained within this larger view.
It might be an illusion, as the gnostics believe, as there may not really be a deliniating factor where the “subjective” and “objective” begin and end other than our own opinions. Thus, reality could easily be all one or the other.
But at some layer, we do see a line of the correct length. Like any program with a compiler option, we’ve optimised to interpret a 3-dimensional world while anchored in a gravitational field. The other common illusion:
>----------<
<---------->
We’ve many of us seen on milk cartons. This trick works because we have a knee-jerk perceptional shortcut when it comes to objects with corners on them.
Most likely, a kid raised in a big sphere in outer space wouldn’t fall for the same illusions. But that doesn’t mean we don’t see correctly. We only fail when we are called upon to judge – which is a step beyond perception.
If atoms are not conscious, and atoms obey a set of unbreakable laws, a set of atoms obeying those laws can’t be conscious. As such these atoms would be perfectly ordinary, commonplace, i.e. mundane.
Of course. Nevertheless, a conscious mind produced the conclusion. The computer makes no decision it was not programmed fot. The computer does not practice empiricism. We seem to agree on that point. You follow with:
We are different because we exhibit consciousness (we think – definitions and opinions vary. But for the purpose of this discussion let us say that we are.) No computer yet designed shares that trait. Should we design a computer that shares all of the traits in our definition of consicousness, then we would have no justification for declaring it unconcsious. How could we?
No, we do not. I do not agree that science is not making an effort to understand consciousness.
Because I disagree with your premise, obviously. Science is very much about “trying to explain how we actually experience things”. HOW as in "the mechanisms - stimuli - conditions which result in specific experiences. The specification, of course, is limited by the phenomenological constraints which limit all experience: scientific or not.
No. That is the solipsistic axiom. As I said, if you and Chalmers wish to embrace solipsism, there is absolutely no refutation for the position. I suspect that if you apply it rigorously, though, you will find it unprofitable.
For myself, I prefer to remain open to the possibility that something meaningful might be said about the general phenomenon of consciousness. We might, despite your pronouncement, be able to say many things about what it is like to be “inside a brain”. For that matter, we might be able to say what it is like ot be inside a specific brain, if th eencoding of experience is fully reducable and transplantable. I do not say that it is, but I see no reason to conclude at this point in our explanation that it is not.
I think the question is open. A working definition is the best we can hope for so far, since we know it only by its effects. These include: the ability to perceive, awareness of self, the ability to determine actions, awareness of the passage time. I make no claims that this list is ehaustive.
What I resist, though is the solipsistic view that consciousness rests, as you said, in the specific character of one’s perceptions. I find neither beauty nor utility in the proposition that I alone am demonstrably conscious. I am unwilling to deny you the state because your perception of “red” might differ from my own.
Well, make your choice, then. Either embrace solipsism or embrace the idea that consciousness has a general characteristic which is present in more than just the individual character of your phenomenology.
If you choose the latter, then I submit that those general characteristics are as open to scientific study as any other phenomenon.
There is no way (rigorously) around solipsism. One can only reject it.[sup]1[/sup]
We have the Turing test because Alan Turing was brilliant and he devised it. Not everyone, however, accepts it as the deliniator of intelligence. Searles, for instance, attempts to counter it with his Chinese Room.
The question of whether TT really tests for consciousness, as opposed to intelligence, is certainly open.
If you like the Turing Test, then you should like my example. It mimics the experience of consciousness to a level indistinguishable by the subject.
I was not arguing that that a neural network of the appropriate specifications was conscious (though I would happily do so). I was stating that if your perceptions are entirely dependent upon material conditions, then by understanding those conditions we will have understood the mechanism of your conscious perceptions.
I disagree. We are nowhere near the point of being able to trigger through neurochemical manipulations the experience of specific phenomena in a manner indistinguishable from reality. What technologies do we possess that you think are close to this?
You might be right, but I cannot think of any way for it to be demonstrated given our present state of knowledge. Certainly it is not the only possibility.
Consciousness arises from neurology but has a distinct existence of its own.
Consciousness is nothing more than a description of certain organizational potentialities (neurological states).
Consciousness is an ilusion generated by neurological functions. It is therefore distinct but has no meaningful existence.
Consciousness does not arise solely from neurological function (or any other organizational potentiality that is materially constructable.)
*) No clue present. No clue possible.
I make neither claim.
jmullaney
Could be? I thought you said it was. How would a participant in this “mutualy created reality” distinguish it from a single objective reality?
This is true for the objective model as well. Are you saying that i your koinos cosmos subjective experience is always an accurate reflection of reality? (Or that reality becomes an accurate reflection of experience? If so, how does teh “shared” aspect enter into things. What if our expereinces differ, as they so manifestly do on the question of God’s existence.) I am afraid I can find no illumination on your simile of set functions. Can you elaborate?
I am confused. This seems a far cry from your assertions that the koinos cosmos exists and that the objective model does not. Has your position changed?
No, we don’t. We perceive a stimulus which our mind/brain/consciousness judges to be a line of X length.
Well, we are in dnager of a semantic confusion with the word perception. If you mean perception to be “receive stimuli to neurochemical transmitters”, yes. If you mean, “gain sensory information about an external reality”, no. Judgment is inseparable from the latter meaning of perception. If you mean the former, however, the word “see” is unjustified.
If atoms are not alive, and atoms obey a set of unbreakable laws, a set of atoms obeying those laws can’t be alive.
If atoms are not liquid, and atoms obey a set of unbreakable laws, a set of atoms obeying those laws can’t be liquid.
If atoms have no metabolism, and atoms obey a set of unbreakable laws, a set of atoms obeying those laws can’t have metabolism.
If an argument relies on structure, and that structure is invalid, then the argument is invalid.
Was the above meant to represent your application of logic and Ockham to the realm of matter?
Spiritus: I’m hesitant to respond before I’ve seen what you have to say to my posts on the other thread, but what the hell…
No, but if we are nothing more than the sum of our neural connections, I find it hard to see how we are any different.
If you reject solipsism, what ground do you have to claim that my computer does not possess an extremely rudimentary consciousness (ie species-wide solipsism)? Shall I assume you are of the opinion that consciousness suddenly “flashes in” at a certain level of neural complexity? Why would you hold such an opinion?
But, as I keep trying to point out, we’ll never be able to tell whether a computer actually DOES share all the traits in our definition of consciousness–not being the computer ourselves, how do we know whether the thing has a “sense of self” the same way we do? We may make a reasoned, logical assumption and say “if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, etc.”, but don’t pretend for a second that it isn’t an assumption. And that’s not too empirical.
But you said:
and
Never mind that the first of these two statements basically says “all conscious experience is non-empirical” (precisely Chalmers’ point). The second point drives home your belief that science should not be expected to account for the “character” of conscious experiences—and given that, what, precisely, is science is hoping to find out about conscious experience?
Precisely my point. Science has good intentions, but it’s simply incapable of breaking through these “phenomenological constraints.” And without an explanation of phenomenology, you’re not going to get a satisfactory explanation of conscious experience.
Wrong. Solipsism holds that the self is the only existent thing in the universe, which has nothing to do with what we’re talking about. Chalmers, in fact, holds that even a light switch may be conscious in an incredibly limited way–that’s a far cry from solipsism.
How on earth would that ever be possible? The instant I transferred into, say, your “consciousness program,” I would lose “my” personal consciousness, thus never be able to empirically compare my experience to yours.
It’s a nice start… anybody out there have any modifications/additions?
I’m not asking you to, nor is Chalmers. But you know as well as I do that the only reason we consider solipsism wrong is because it is illogical—you really can’t demonstrate that anyone is conscious except yourself-to-yourself.
You may not like that fact, but it is a fact, regardless of whether you actually are the only conscious one (which is true solipsism). How we deal with that fact (as opposed to just burying it and saying “of course! all things that seem to be conscious must be! how could it be otherwise!?!”) is what will lead to a greater understanding of consciousness.
Never for a second would I argue against that. The trouble is this: I only think that because it is a logical choice–the alternative is solipsism. There isn’t actually any compelling emprirical reason, though, as empirically the only evidence I have is my own conscious experience.
Right. And like any other phenomenon, science is useless to explain the character of the experience. If consciousness, on an individual basis, does not consist of the character of our experiences, then what’s the difference between us and zombies?
I’m not arguing for the Turing Test as some kind of consciousness cure-all. I just think it demonstrates that we humans instinctively know that there is a difference between seeming self-aware (part of consciousness, we agree) and being self-aware…
I’d tackle it more now but I must go soon… tonight’s the Fugazi concert! I will get to the rest of your post tomorrow…
well, I’ve got a little while before I have to leave, so here we go with part two of my reply to Spiritus’ last post…
The Turing Test. Now you raise a perfectly good objection: that the TT may only test for intelligence, not consciousness. So maybe we should throw it out. Your call, honestly.
In referene to the first part of your statement, I would be delighted to hear you argue that a neural network of the appropriate specifications would be conscious—you could start with what the “appropriate specifications” would be…
As for the second part, I just don’t think it follows. By understanding the material conditions, what knowledge do we gain about the relationship between those conditions and the ensuing conscious perception?
Do we not now have the ability to poke a man in the brain/spine and cause pain in a specific body part? Wasn’t there some “orgasmotron” device touted a few months back that could cause female orgasm via electrical charges to the spine? These aren’t as complex as the crying-about-the-dog example, to be sure, but I would say they count as “trigger[ing] through neurochemical manipulations the experience of specific phenomena in a manner indistinguishable from reality,” wouldn’t you?
What more would really be known about consciousness (as opposed to neurological function) if we were able to take such experiments to the extremes we considered? Not much, I still say.
Now let’s go over these possibilities:
This is what I’m saying, in case anybody out there missed that.
This would be the contrary opinion, I believe.
This is entirely possible under Chalmers’ theory, but it seems dubious under Darwin’s. Why would mankind evolve in a way so as to cultivate (to much apparent success) this meaningless illusion? Why would any animal have it? Consciousness may well be an illusion, but I’d posit that it’s a meaningful one.
I’ll leave that one for jmullaney if you don’t mind…
Hey, that wasn’t supposed to be a slight! Just a prompt. I figure we ought to define and refine our terms a bit more if this is to be a productive discussion. Any thoughts? I could really go either way on this…
BickByro
I am not at all sure why, but I seem unable to convey what I think are straightforward statements in a way that you understand as I intend. Forgive me if the following seems like “talking down”, but I think taking things to a very basic level is required if we are to communicate effectively.
Several assumptions are required for the equivalence you imply to hold: Neural connections are incapable of non-deterministic functionality.
Neural networks are incapable of self-modifying behavior.
An external consciousness designed teh neural networks which (under the conditional in your statement) form the sum of our consciousness.
If you uhold all of those to be true, then it will be helpful if you specify whether you are using the comparison to show that computers can be conscious or that humans (under the stated condition) are not. Then I can ask you to develop an argument beyond simple assertion to defend that position.
I was reasonably clear in listing several observed effects from which we extrapolate consciousness. Does your computer exhibit those effects?
A better question, I think, is why would you make such an assumption. Does declaring your computer non-conscious imply such a position? Do you hold your computer to be conscious? Do you hold the “flash” position?
How do I know that you share the same “sense of self” that I do? The alternative to solipsism is the decision that my individual perceptions are not the only valid measure of reality. You (and Chalmers, if you are summarizing him correctly) return again and again to the position that “we cannot know X is conscious because X is not verifiably identical to my individual perception of consciousness”. Solipsism. You have denied it before. Perhaps you will deny it again. But the heart of this position is the fundamental belief that only your individual perception of consciousness is a valid measure of consciousness.
If that were not the case, you would have no reason to object to meassures of consciousness which were not grounded necessarily in the individual character of your phenomenology.
I have readily stated, more than once, that there is no logical escape from solipsism. I see that I forgot to include the note on my last post. Perhaps that is the problem, since it was an explication of how solipsism is rejected. Well, let me be explicit, then. The rejection of solipsism can only be made at the level of axiom, a priori assumption, or initial epistemological assertion. So, rest assured your admonition to “not pretend it isn’t an assumption” is well heeded.
Your last statement, however, is incorrect. It is absolutely empirical to base conclusions upon an assumption that solipsism in untrue. In fact, one cannot have empiricism without it.
Now, as for the specific assumption that if it “looks like a consciousness, quacks like a consciousness, etc.” Well, what other test do you use to decide that other human beings are conscious? We have no means of directly detecting the state. We can judge it only by the observed effects. Thus, if all of the observed effects point to consciousness, then I feel secure in saying, “it’s probably conscious”. If we reach a point of understanding where the effects are more specifically and finely understood, then I will even feel comfortable dropping the “probably”. And, if you will review the definition of empiricism which you quoted on the last page, I think you will find that this position accords with it quite well.
You misread my first statement. It does not say that all conscious experience is non-empirical. It says that all experience is equally subject to the arguments of solipsistic reduction. It says that if you want to use the individual character of consciousness to disqualify the study of consciousness from the millieu of empiricism, then you would also have to disqualify everything else perceived or measured by mind from the millieu of empiricism. The association of “red” with a light frequency or “heat” with molecular motion or “attraction” with the force of gravity are all equally dependent, eventually, upon one’s individual phenomenology.
Your second sentence puzzles me. Later in this very post you quote me as saying: consciousness has a general characteristic which is present in more than just the individual character of your phenomenology. Again, let me be explicit. I think that empirical examination can shed light upon the general characteristics of consciousness. If the position that beings/objects outside of my self can be conscious is correct, then it must be true that the necessary requirements for that state do not include the individual character of my phenomenology.
The alternative to this is the position that only the individual character of my phenomenology is a valid measure of consciousness. solipsism:The theory that the self is the only thing that can be known and verified. Generally, solipsism falls into three subsets: moral/ethical, metaphysical, epistemological (egoism, “reality solipsism”, and “knowledge solipsism”). The restrictions upon our ability to meaningfully discuss any consciousness distinct from one’s individual phenomenology falls clearly into the third. It is epistemological solipsism.
Your final point is correct, but your reasoning is reversed. There is nothing at all logical about the decision to reject solipsism. Logic cannot pierce the phenomenological veil. Perhaps this is the problem. If you believe that logic will let you escape the trap of solipsism, then it is little wonder your logic keeps leading you right back into it.
I think that what might best lead to greater understanding between us is if we avoided casting the other’s position in an absurdist light. Solipsism is not a fact, though it is irrefutable. I am quite clear upon whether or not I accept epistemological solipsism, and upon what grounds I do so. I have no idea what words of mine gave you the impression that I was “burying it”, but I am certain your impression is incorrect. What I am less certain of is whether you wish to reject epistemological solipsism or embrace it. You seem to be playing both sides of the street, though perhaps that is my mistaken impression.
You are correct, but it is a misleading statement. Science does not exist until after we have already decided to set aside our phenomenological constraints and examine an external reality. this is not an argument that science cannot address consciousness. It is an observation that the validity of science is dependent upon the epistemological bases from which we develop an external worldview.
Consciousness is not a special case of this, simply a direct one. (aesthetics is another, ontology a third, etc.)
Solipsism, as I hope I stated clearly above, has more than one face. Your arguments thus far have repeatedly relied upon epistemological solipsism. I have not read Chalmers’ work, so I have only your presentation upon which to judge it. However, I am very curious to see how he justifies a statement that a light bulb might be conscious if he argues that the individual phenomenology is the essential element of consciousness. How does he determine that this light bulb possesses some measure of consciousness, after he has declared consciousness to be outside the realm of empiricism?
It is a far cry from solipsism. It is also a far cry from the position that consciousness is immune to external verification/observation.
I said nothing about transfering your consciousness. I simply mused that it might be possible to replicate the exact phenomenological experience of an event from one person to another. As to how we would “verify” the identity: we can’t obviously. We can only measure teh experience indirectly and find whatever degree of confidence that measurement allows. This is not categorically distinct from other examples of empiricism. Measurement is often precise, but it is never “exact”.
Are you sure? I believe you have said: the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness is the awareness of the “character of events,” and if consciousness, on an individual basis, does not consist of the character of our experiences, then what’s the difference between us and zombies? those seem like explicit arguments that consciousness has no characteristic other than the individual character of one’s phenomenology?
I don’t think we need to throw it out. I just don’t pretend that it has “solved” the question of how we recognize consciousness. It is just one more piece that might fit in the puzzle (which would be much easier to put together if we could see the picture on the fromt of the box.)
If I knew the specifications, then the argument would be trivial (or perhaps trivially incorrect). The argument in teh abstract is fairly easy to construct, but ultimately unsatisfying since it amounts to little more than a series of conditional conclusions. If consciousness . . . If a neural net . . . If these specifications . . .
I’ll do it if you really want, but I don’t see it as a particularly helpful exercise given our present state of knowledge.
Causality. I am not sure what other relationship you are looking for. If all observable and reportable effects of conscious state X can be reliably produced by material conditions ###, then we could say with confidence that conditions ### cause conscious state X. That is a very standard empirical method.
No, I wouldn’t. These examples are analagous to triggering the emotional response, “sadness”, not to recreating a specific and detailed phenomenological event such as the moment of your dog’s death. If the pain matched in every respect the sensation of a knife being driven through your flesh or the orgasm was accompanied by the perception of a sensual encounter – that would be the triggering of a specific phenomena in a manner indistinguishable from direct perception.
Darwin? I believe you are reading “meaningful” in an unjustified context. I was making no claim for the relative reproductive advantage of the illusion. I meant “meaningful” in the philosophical sense. If consciousness is an after-the-fact illusion created by an unconscious brain, then there is no “meaning” to be found in studying it (except, perhaps, as an element of competetive advantage. “The Selfish Brain” anyone?)
I’m gonna take one more crack at the perception of color.
Maybe the ones who are not color-blind all see the same colors, but some are more sensitive. I think I’m more sensitive to color than most. Quite often, I will find that someone else’s TV color is set too high and it hurts my eyes to look at it, and he or she will tell me my TV is set too low for them. (For that matter, I find the factory setting to be too high.)
Perhaps I have more cones per square millimeter of retina than average? (I’ve never been tested for color sensitivity, but I do know I am not color-blind.)
This brings up the issue of color combinations. Why are certain color combinations more popular, more aesthetically pleasing to so many people than other combinations? If color-sighted people don’t see the same colors, then it seems to me that no combination would be more popular than another.
I once took a cave tour and in the deepest part of the cave, the guide turned out all the lights. I’m sure we all saw the same shade of black!
If a color is too intense for you, yet too dim for another person, aren’t you perceiveing the color differently? They see X wavelength as dull red, you perceive it as intense red. Therefore, you are perceiving the same color differently. Yes, we are all perceiving the same presumed-to-be-objectively-real light wavelength, but it is filtered through our inherently different capacities, so by the time it reaches our awareness it may be perceived to one person as quite different than what another would perceive. There is a quite possible difference between the color “out there” and the color after it has been passed though our perceptions and displayed in our head. That is why objective measurements are used to produce uniform color, rather than just “eyeballing” it; because people’s perceptions of a color are not always uniform and reliable, unlike objective measures. (And human subjective judgment is used when determining how colors “work” together, since that is dependent of the vagaries of human color perception.)
But at any rate, I don’t think it’s always simply a difference in the perception of intensity of a color, given that different people will rate different selections of a series of color as being more intense. If they were viewing the exact same color but some simply saw the whole range as brighter, they should all still invariably be able to pick the most intense color. It is possible that these differences in judgment of colors is wholly due to differently taught definitions of what each color name is “supposed” to be/poor judgment abilities/faulty ability to mentally classify colors seen, but I don’t think either the current evidence nor our knowledge of each person’s unique eye/brain structure and the effects of environment/mood on color perception makes it a very likely possibility.
I’m not saying they’re all radically different, just that it’s a possibility and cannot disprove it, SFAICT. My guess is that given that we’re all put together pretty similarly, we have pretty similar color perceptions. As to certain color combos being more popular, I think certain color wavelengths have association hardwired into us; the “red” wavelength is “danger/attention” (likely due to association with blood/edible fruit/poisonous fruit, IMHO–all things that should be paid attention to if you want to survive), whether what you actually see in that wavelength is what I perceive as “purple”. (And again, I think it more likely that the differerent color perceptions are mild but apparent, and seem to be measurable by certain tests). As well, I suspect many color associations are more cultural than inherent; we do not see white as a mourning color, yet the Chinese do. Do you think they see black as somber and funereal, as we often do? And at in the 1970s avocado green/harvest gold/orange was thought a beautiful color combination, and now we likely find it rather repulsive. And this just in the space of thirty years! There are people who do not appear to have color vision problems who find “popular” color combinations to be distasteful. I’m sure you’ve looked at some avant-garde fashion once or twice and thought the colors used were just hideous (and then maybe after it’s been around for a couple years, you decide it’s not so bad after all).
Prove it. Have you ever really looked at “no-light-black”, anyhow? For one thing, you probably saw all sorts of floaty colors occluding the black due to your eyes freaking out and trying to provide some sort of visual stimulus. (At least that’s the explanation I heard for that effect. When I see no light, I see a lot of orange-red and brilliant blue green. It’s sometimes hard to notice, though, since your mind tends to ignore this effect somewhat.) Perception of absolute absence of light does not really have any bearing on whether our visual perceptions are all exactly the same, anyhow–when there is no light, there is no visual perception, so all you see is your eye’s attempt to compensate for lack of any stimuli. Pretty similar color vision, that seems likely; exactly the same…that seems a needless assumption.
Seriously, if you want to argue that people all perceive colors exactly the same, you have to come up with an explanation why people do not appear to see the same color–you yourself do not–and how a unique and highly complex brain/eye that we cannot calibrate to match uniform objective standards would invariably perceive colors exactly the same.
Spiritus: It doesn’t seem like “talking down,” and it wouldn’t really bother me anyway. It’s better than yelling!
From my Webster’s, again: “determinism: a theory or doctrine that acts of the will… or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws.”
This is precisely what you are claiming when you argue to me that “if we can understand the network of neurons, we can understand consciounsness.” If such a statement were correct, no event could occur in the consciousness that was not contingent upon “preceding events or natural laws”—ie neurons firing. So what’s the problem?
This is a much better point. But I’ve seen Alan Alda Scientific American specials with robots that can modify their behavior (to a limited extent, of course) so I’m not sure this one’s going to work either (though, admittedly, I’d have to change my example from Windows 95 to “that one robot”).
Also consider that many of the constituents of our conscious experience are hardwired—our sensory inputs are more or less fixed for life (the hardware does degrade with age, of course), and our ability to “experience” their signals is a huge part of our consciousness. On a speculative note, lower orders of animals may well be conscious only of their sensory signals. So first we need to establish whether the “self-modifying behavior” you refer to is actually a prerequisite of consciousness—have you evidence that it is?
So a neural network created by a conscious being is unconscious, but a neural network not created by a conscious being is conscious?
Seriously, though, I certainly don’t want to get into arguing for an intelligent Creator here, but I feel that, in a way, your statement above is quite true.
First of all, humans aren’t exactly pulling themselves up by their bootstraps when it comes to the brain—we really don’t design our OWN neural networks. DNA is certainly the single most important determiner of our brain structure. Now I wouldn’t say DNA is necessarily conscious, but it is both responsive and external, so I at least have to question the necessity of the condition you propose above.
One could pursue a different argument and say that, to the extent that a hominid that was not quite human (but was probably conscious) contributed the “platform” (to extend the computer analogy) upon which human consciousness is based, yes, an external consciousness “designed” our neural networks.
Furthermore, our more sophisticated neural networks would not exist had we not been “programmed” by our parents and our society. That’s basic developmental psych.
And if we take the inverse possibility (an internal consciousness designed the neural networks which form the sum of our consciousness) we reach a paradox: consciousness makes consciousness. Well, then, what happened to the neural networks that allegedly “make” consciousness?
As far as whether I actually believe computers are conscious—well, they might well be. Comparing them strictly to the mind of man seems weak to me, as we have not ascertained whether man is indeed the only conscious being on earth. Does Windows 95 have the neural sophistication of a flatworm? I’d wager yes. Is a flatworm conscious, in the most basic sense of “aware”? I see no reason why not. So why not Windows?
Your list of “ways we extrapolate consciousness” is fine and dandy for describing some of the apparent effects of consciousness. But it is hardly a litmus test, and I don’t think you should use it as such.
Declaring your computer to be non-conscious implies that you are resorting to the old “the system must be sufficiently complex” argument (for presumably you agree that if we could make a silicon replica of the human brain down to the finest detail, it would be conscious just like us)—and that implies a “flashpoint” for consciousness.
Either that, or you are assuming that there is a character to the electrical pulses between neurons that is not present in the electrical pulses between silicon chips. And do you have any grounds for that assumption?
(1) Never have I said that my individual perceptions are the only valid measure of reality. They are simply my only measure of reality.
(2) You and I both know that “X is not verifiably identical to my individual perception of consciousness”–the question is what you do with that knowledge. Given Chalmers’ theory that consciousness is a distinct phenomenon that rises out of the interaction of neurons (as well as the logical assumption that it is highly unlikely I am the only conscious human ever born), we can amend the statement as follows: “For any X with a neurological structure identical to my own, X’s conscious experience will be identical to my own.”
Considering that the actual differences in neurological structure between you and me probably amount to less than 5% (a WAG, to be sure, but I think I’m being conservative), I would say that, though not identical, your neurological structure is sufficiently similar to my own for me to have at least a decent idea of what you’re going through. In the end, no, I can’t verify it, I can’t know it, but I can deduce it.
(3) When we’re not talking about humans, though, all bets are off. Otherwise, you imply that every animal, space alien and HAL9000 would have a consciousness “verifiably identical to my individual perception of consciousness.” And that’s a very bold statement. For example, dolphins use sonar. You don’t. If dolphins are conscious, I’d have to say that the statement “we cannot know X is conscious [in the way that we are] because X is not verifiably identical to my individual perception of consciousness” would hold true. It’s hard to know where to draw the line on the “sufficiently similar” clause, but I’d say that adding a sense should count as a significant change.
Tricky! But not true. First of all, “individual perception of consciousness” is a strange term—how is it distinguishable from “individual consciousness”? Why add the extra verbiage?
And again, I’m sure your individual “perception of” consciousness in valid. I’m sure everyone’s is. Any consciousness is valid. I don’t know where you’re getting the idea I think otherwise.
Ah! But therefore, you conclude, I have no reason to object to someone telling me that the reason I experience consciousness is because neurons are firing in my head. And yet clearly I do. So, what gives?
It’s this: I object to measures of consciousness that are not grounded necessarily in the character of phenomenology. Doesn’t have to be my own, I’ll say it again. But if you’re not talking phenomenology, you’re really not talking consciousness. You’re just talking around it.
That’s circular reasoning if ever I’ve heard it—you reject solipsism by assuming empiricism, but you can’t make the assumption of empiricism until you reject solipsism. But I think I’ve already established that I’m not being solipsistic anyway. me
The extent to which consciousness is a non-empirical phenomenon applies equally to all measurements and perception which are made/recorded by a conscious mind.
And those arguments exist because… conscious experience is non-empirical. I don’t see your distinction at all. But maybe you’ll get to it here:
Yes, and I don’t see any problem with this. First of all, you are drawing a distinction where there is none: our perception of color, heat, whatnot is all part of the “character of consciousness.”
Furthermore, earlier in this thread, Gaudere cited plenty of presumably non-solipsistic thinkers (though you never know with Adobe Tech Guide writers…) who agree that “color only exists in the mind of the person viewing it.”
Somehow, despite that knowledge, science has not come crashing to a complete halt. Do you know why? Because science doesn’t care what you or I see in our own private worlds–it’s concerned about the things we can verifiably agree upon. But by that same token, it can’t explain consciousness to us, because consciousness, for each of us, only exists in our own private worlds.
Characteristics that a conscious person notes in another conscious person, yes. Characteristics that a conscious person can notice in his/her self, no. And aren’t those the things we want to know about when we ask about consciousness?
Kinda. That’s like saying that just because a car can be either blue, green, red or white, your blue car actually has no color. For indeed the necessary requirements for your conscious state are the individual characters of your phenomenology—but they are not necessarily required for a conscious state. This kind of falls in with the “sufficiently similar” category I was proposing earlier.
Agreed. But in the absence of any logical reason to reject solipsism, what reason do we have to reject it? (not that I embrace it!)
My point was this: solipsism is the deduction of a conclusion (only my consciousness counts) from an observable fact (only my consciousness is verifiable to myself). Feel free to reject the conclusion (I certainly do). But don’t throw out the observable fact.
Perhaps the above statement, if nothing else, will clarify how there is, in fact, a consistent way to “play both sides.”
I cannot stress it enough: if you discard phenomenology in your explanation of consciousness, you cannot explain consciousness in anything approaching a satisfactory manner (at least, I’m not satisfied). For consciousness consists solely in phenomenology. You say science “examines an external reality”—then it doesn’t examine consciousness, does it?
Well, he’s decided that you are conscious, even though your consciousness falls outside the realm of any empiricism he could practice. Why not the light switch too? (His starting premise there, by the way, is the possibility that any system that can switch between two states has consciousness [ie each on-and-off-switching neuron has a tiny consciousness, and when you add them all up you get our tremendously complex consciousness]). But he makes no determination that a light switch is indeed conscious; he’s just speculating as to the possibilities. But if he were really solipsistic, he’d reject it out of hand, as you point out.
Again, explain how you separate “phenomenological experience” from “consciousness.”
For any given conscious person, consciousness has no characteristics other than the character of that individual’s phenomenology. That’s just how I define consciousness at the basic level we’re discussing: it is the sum of one’s phenomenology. If you have phenomenology, you have consciousness, and vice versa. That does not by any means imply that the characteristics of that phenomenology do not occur in others–just that you’ll never know it for sure.
It just conveniently leaves out all the non-observable, non-reportable effects of conscious state X that we all (in our individual heads) know are there but that science is helpless to explain. Aren’t those the ones that we’re interested in when we ask “the consciousness question”?
It’s all a matter of how “specific” you feel the phenomenon must be, I guess. Presumably, the woman having the induced orgasm feels a fairly specific phenomenon (ie orgasm) in a manner indistinguishable from direct perception (ie no genital contact). To me, that counts. But I can see your point.
Why not? “Why is it there?” seems like a valid question.
Whew. Well, 4 hours later, I’m done. Time to actually do some work…
Have you ever really looked at “no-light-black”, anyhow? For one thing, you probably saw all sorts of floaty colors occluding the black due to your eyes freaking out and trying to provide some sort of visual stimulus. (At least that’s the explanation I heard for that effect. When I see no light, I see a lot of orange-red and brilliant blue green. It’s sometimes hard to notice, though, since your mind tends to ignore this effect somewhat.) Perception of absolute absence of light does not really have any bearing on whether our visual perceptions are all exactly the same, anyhow–when there is no light, there is no visual perception, so all you see is your eye’s attempt to compensate for lack of any stimuli. Pretty similar color vision, that seems likely; exactly the same…that seems a needless assumption.