The concept of Freudian slips is not limited to sexual or familial content. Indeed I belive it’s very hard to prove.
SlowMind:
O, most noble physicist! My heart soars like a hawk at your return!
I am particularly heartened by your choice of “verifiable” in the paragraph above, rather than “falsifiable.” I certainly agree with you on all points. And as you seem to allow, many theories in physics are difficult (perhaps impossible) to falsify. But that difficulty in no way implies (at least to my way of thinking) that they aren’t scientific. Certainly, it might be a goal – a central goal, even – for physicists to develop theories that neatly predict a series of observable results. But sometimes the hellish abstractions involved make the derivation of falsifiable observation statements all but impossible, IMO (and even in the opinion of the vast majority of modern philosophers of science). This in no way impinges on their status as scientific, as far as I can tell.
If we employ falsification as a kind of goal, or guideline, or value, of scientific research, it immediately becomes a useful concept, even for us “quacky” psychotherapist types (as a practicing clinician, I attempt to falsify my “hypotheses” about my patients constantly. It’s the only way to make progress in the therapeutic process.) But its use a demarcation criterion – as a boundary between everything we call “science” and all the rest – is significantly more problematic. You may have been critical of string theory because it failed to produce testable predictions, but did your criticism imply that you felt it was “unscientific?” I would argue that were we to hold to a strict interpretation of Popper’s criterion, we would have to abandon a majority of the innovations produced by modern science. String theory might be difficult to defend as “scientific” if you’re Popperian, but otherwise, it’s a snap. (The theory might be wrong, of course, but that’s a different question.)
You are correct that I’m not at all up to date on the latest in physics. I’d be especially interested to read about falsifiable observations predicted by General Relativity. Thomas Kuhn, writing in the early 60’s, lamented the state GR because, he said, the complex equations that form its theoretical core are not easily reduced to observation predictions. As a result, he claimed, only 3 observational predictions had been derived from it: red-shift, light-bending around a large mass, and the glitch in Mercury’s orbit. Great minds, he wrote, have been thoroughly defeated at deriving other predictions.
I’ve read since then that Einstein and Freundlich’s calculations of Mercury’s orbit were predicated on the assumption of a perfectly spherical sun, and that in all probably the sun is not perfectly spherical; if one makes allowances for solar oblation (thus far estimated but not measured, if I’m not mistaken), their calculations fall off by as much as 10 degrees – enough to reasonably argue that the glitch actually falsifies GR. But I’m no specialist, and if I’m wrong, I would really appreciate it if you could set me right, or point me towards other examples of falsifiable predictions of GR.
Yes, I agree that Freud makes some very worrisome claims about the efficacy of psychoanalytic theory, and the reliability of its methods, at times. Those claims are in my mind difficult to justify, even given the fierce intellectual and academic competition under which he worked. But unlike Blake, I don’t see the issue in terms of black/white, or either/or. Rather, to me there exists a kind of gray zone between “totally quacky” and “totally non-quacky.” Freud floats around somewhere in that zone, actually more towards the “quacky” side of spectrum in my opinion. But what gets me is the tendency of Freud’s detractors to generalize so readily; to go from condemning some of his work to condemning all of it, and then to condemning those who have worked within the psychoanalytic tradition since then – immediately drawing an equal sign between psychoanalysis and voodoo, for example, when it is clear that they know little, perhaps nothing, about psychoanalysis, really.
But you see, there isn’t an in-between between “falsifiable” and “unfalsifiable.” Anything that isn’t falsifiable cannot be proven, under any set of circumstances. To avoid harm, any therapy that cannot be proven under any set of circumstances must be presumed to be quackery. That is the beginning, the middle, and the end of the discussion. Doesn’t matter how elegant the theory behind the therapy is, how much intellectual effort went into creating it, how intuitively attractive it may be or how many people who believe they might have benefited from it.
Read them. Now what? None of them seem to address what Freud did in any way so what is your point? We are discussing Freud here, not psychoanalytic therapy. This is akin to suggesting that homeopathy isn’t a crock because I can find literally hundreds of studies proving the efficacy of vaccination and even toxin acclimation.
Ahhh, I see. Having never dismissed any of them as inconclusive ever in my life you immediately conclude that I will do that. Good guess though since they don’t seem to even mention Freud.
I will repeat Mr Svinlesaha. Please show us these studies that have specifically attempted to falsify the work of Freud. The studies must state clearly that they are working with Freudian models and hypotheses, otherwise they are irrelevant. You claimed that you could do that. Now can you?
In other words the therapist decides ad hoc whether a false result falsifies the hypotheisis.
I never claimed I had. Why is originality necessary I am trotting out the same standards that have often been applied to other quack treatments such as homeopathy and voodoo. There is no need to be original because thy fit so well to Freudian analysis. That they do fit so well and fail to elicit any sensible counter should tell us something.
No, because others have done it for me already in this thread and in Cecil’s column. Why do we need more examples when the ones already presented haven’t been addressed at all.
Do you know what an argument form authority actually is? Care to explain how the utilisation of a dictionary is an argument form authority?
I have several time stated that I do not se it in black and white either, so please stop misrepresenting me. What I have said is that when everyone acknowledges that 70% of what Freud produced is quackery it is only sensible to conclude that the rest is quackery until it is established otherwise. That is not black and white.
I will conclude with what Oxymoron said so well, “ any therapy that cannot be proven under any set of circumstances must be presumed to be quackery”.
:o
The ultimate goal in developing the theories is to produce falsifiable predictions, but until such a state is reached, verification must be employed to justify continued funding, and respect if nothing else. String theories are an interesting example. They are logical edifices built on top of quantum field theories - in particular QCD and electroweak. Proving that they reduce to those theories, and supersymmetry allows one to state if those theories are proven incorrect by experiment, then string theories are proven incorrect. Hence, string theory is falsifiable. But, I’ve never seen a proof that no other logical edifice can be built atop those theories. In that sense, string theories are falsifiable, but not verifiable!
I believe Bacon was the first to point out that there are two types of experiments. Data gathering experiments, which he considered the “common” kind, and falsification experiments, which he considered the best kind. Make no mistake, Many experimental physicists live for falsifying sacred cows. One can, however, still get Noble prizes for verification experiments. Finding the top quark comes to mind.
The goal is to achieve many falsifiable predictions apart from underlying theories. So, I am sympathetic to:
Hijack:
Modern technology has indeed changed things. To achieve its accuracy, GPS relies on GR corrections. Deep space probes have allowed for other tests, and ruled out alternative theories. A man named Clifford Will basically made a career out of formalism for comparing various GR type theories. And yes, the sun is oblate, and modern observations in line with GR predictions. The discovery of pulsars allowed for experimental verification of gravitational wave predictions (energy loss). Further out, observations of galaxies indicates that large black holes live in the centers of galaxies - including ours. The mere existence of black holes is a prediction of GR.
OxyMoron:
Oh yeah?
Well, that’s just, like…your opinion, man.
Blake:
You slippery as a fish, dude.
First off, please note that my last response to you began with a list of published surveys that review much of the experimental work conducted on Freudian theory and therapy during the last during the last 50 years. Sorry that I don’t have fingertip access to online studies that meet your exacting standards, but I can’t just pop down to the local library for you – if you’re really interested, rather than just blowing smoke, you’re going to have to run that particular errand for yourself. I’m also curious as to why you’ve ignored that first paragraph in your reply, and continue to assert that I have not supplied you with studies that “specifically attempt to falsify the work of Freud”. I mean, I did already.
You have gone on to claim, further, that since Freud was a “quack,” psychoanalysis must therefore necessarily be a “quack’s field.” The online outcome studies I referenced were meant to address that question. For what its worth, I found the MMPI study to be particularly interesting, myself. The author states specifically that he works with “psychoanalytic psychotherapy” (bolded for the reading impaired), and that the MMPI test was “fairly stable” over periods as long as 30 years. Hopping over the discussion of the controversial ESTs (Empirically Supported Treatments) identified by the APA, as well as the role of MMPI testing in the assessment of therapy effectiveness, Gordon goes on to state two falsifiable hypotheses: 1) “The MMPI/MMPI-2 should be significantly reactive to personality changes in long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The scales assessing psychopathology, (F, Hs, D, Hy, Pd, Pa, Pt, Sc, Ma, Si, and A), should decrease after years of treatment;” and 2) “The MMPI/MMPI-2 is not expected to react reliably to short-term treatment.” Both of these hypotheses – easily derived from psychoanalytic theory as observation statements regarding the efficacy of treatment – survive his falsification test (and rather impressively, I might add):
The long-stability of the MMPI in other tests (especially over periods of five years, and for the two scales A and E) functions as a kind baseline control group, which lends further strength to Gordon’s study, in my opinion (since the study reveals significant changes in those scales under periods of 3 to 5 years of psychoanalytic therapy). The summary is particularly worth reading, and I would like to highlight the following passage:
I submit the above as a very “non-quacky” observation made by old Sigismund. So, now that I stop to think about it, even your glib “Read them. Now what? None of them seem to address what Freud did in any way so what is your point?” is wrong. This study directly addresses Freud’s claim that psychoanalysis is an effective long-term treatment for people suffering from neurotic difficulties. This question – of whether or not Freud has misrepresented the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment – is precisely what the accusation of “quackiness” on his part revolves upon. Or, as you put it, Freud’s “boast” that he had “* a knowledge of wonderful remedies*.”
My hypothesis is that, contrary to your claims, your mind is closed with regard to the potential “non-quackery” of Freud and psychoanalysis. As such, I boldly predict that you will ignore or disavow contrary evidence. You have thus far been presented with a list of surveys, that you have chosen to ignore, as well as online material you claim to have read, but apparently did not. (As you see, the MMPI study specifically mentions Freud, contrary to your claims.) You’ve simply repeated your assertions, without citing the slightest evidence to support them, for about three posts in row now.
My hypothesis has thus survived a couple of pretty severe falsification tests. You see? Science in action. Beautiful, ain’t it?
Ah, and there it is. The argument from authority again. Cecil said, I believe it, that settles it.
The delightful sound of one mind closing.
You’ve chosen, arbitrarily and without any clear reason (other than the opinion of Cecil, apparently), to equate psychoanalysis with voodoo. I have provided clear and compelling evidence that such an equation is willfully misleading and has no basis in fact.
You’ve claimed that if a patient agrees with an analytic interpretation, the analyst will take that as a confirmation of his/her hypothesis. I’ve provided clear evidence, including statements taken directly from Freud’s own work, that this statement is false.
You’ve claimed that if a patient disagrees with an analytic interpretation, the analyst will label it an example of “resistance” and also claim it as a confirmation of his/her hypothesis. I’ve provided clear evidence, including statements taken directly from Freud’s own work, that this statement is also false.
These two false statements, above, are the basis of Cecil’s accusation that Freud is a quack, and that psychoanalysis is unscientific “quackery.” They are incorrect, and therefore, unless you or Cecil have some other grounds for your accusations, those accusations are also false.
P.S. Simply repeating, again, that psychoanalysis is “like voodoo,” without evidence to support the claim, is not a valid argument. As far as I can tell, such a claim ranks as little more than an argument from ignorance – of which, at least with regard to this topic, you appear to possess in abundance.
I am not simnply repeating that psychoanlysis is like voodoo. I am saying that so far there has been no logical reason given to distinguish it from voodoo.
Now you are claiming that I’m “going to have to run that particular errand for yourself” I won’t do that for Freudian psych any more thna I will for homeopathy. Given that both are acknowledged to be 70% garbage and both completely unscientific and unfalsifiable the burden of proof remains with the supporters of these quack remedies.
You have stated that you have no ability o get such prooof but that the skeptics must get it themselves.
You will be waiting along time for that to happen.
Quatschkopf. Heh. Denken Sie als ich, weil ich ein dumme falschdeutsch Akzent benutzt, dass ich kein Deutsch kennt?
Ihr Vaterskomplex ueber Freud liegt wirklich auf der Hand!
As for the criterion of falsifiability compared with the criterion of verifiability, how are the two any different? The way one verifies a theory is one performs a test which could potentially falsify it. If it doesn’t falsify it, that’s a verification. But if I perform a test which cannot falsify my theory, then it’s not verification when my theory passes the test. If it were, then I could forgoe the test entirely, since I would already know the outcome.
By the way, could we keep the discussion here English, please?
I beg your pardon, sir! Saying that homeopathy is 70% garbage implies that 30% of homeopathy isn’t garbage, which is way way too high to be an accurate percentage.
Very interesting. How were you able to diagnose my “Father complex” over the net? Given the fact that you don’t belive in Freud…
(I guess you mean an Oedipus complex which I belive is an outdated theory anyhow.)
And for the record: I didn’t have any doubts that you understand german. And I don’t like to be insulted in any language.
Chronos:
Well, yes and no. From a strictly falsificationist (“Popperian”) vantage, verifications of a theory are really meaningless. You could say that Popper proposed the falsification criterion, in fact, as a means of controlling for spurious verifications and the “irrational” belief in their validity.
In other words, if you perform a test that potentially falsifies a hypothesis/theory, and your test fails to falsify the theory in question, that does not count as a verification, according to Popper. All it means is that your theory remains in the running as a possible explanation for the phenomena in question. It could still be seriously flawed.
Without delving too deeply into history and philosophy, we can say that Popper’s falsification criterion was specifically designed as a remedy for Hume’s critique of inductive reasoning. At the end of the 18th century Hume argued that beliefs based on inductive logic (in which one generalizes from a series of specific examples to a single, fundamental law [or conclusion]) are really illogical, and basically irrational. That’s because, as Hume would have it, no matter how many times an object of perception behaves in a certain way, we can never prove by logic alone that in the next instance the object will act that way again. In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume inspects this question rigorously, from numerous angles, and concludes, “…even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those past instances, of which we have had experience.” Hume’s position has been labeled as “Radical Skepticism,” and implies that verifications of a theory – which require inductive logic to have any weight – are essentially a chimera of our habitual processes of thought. However, if one accepts Hume’s argument, Popper observes, science “…is unmasked as being not only of the nature of belief, but of rationally indefensible belief – of an irrational faith.” Empirical research explicitly relies on induction, after all – or did, anyway, prior to Popper’s work.
Unfortunately, until Popper, no one had produced a satisfactory response to Hume’s argument. His logic seemed ironclad. The implications of Hume’s skepticism are, to my mind, more philosophical than practical, but I suppose it irked many people to be forced by his critique of induction into the admission that science was not a field set apart from all others, but really just an irrational belief system akin to a religion. Popper hoped to change that. He essentially turned the question on its head; agreeing that we cannot use induction as a basis for making logically defensible statements about the world around us, he argued that we are left to the expedient of falsifying non-truths as our only possible means of coming close to truth. From such a position, it is never possible to know any truth in a “positive” sense. We can only know that certain theories are false. In essence, Popper develops a kind of empirical via negativa; unable to approach truth by means of inductive reasoning, we can only come to know her by gradually discovering what she is not.
In other words, Popper agrees with Hume. In his paper “* Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction*,” he explains exactly how his criterion enables us to maintain science on a rational epistemological basis, despite the problems inherent in inductive reasoning. Here he reduces Hume’s critique to what he calls “objective language”:
**His answer is to this question is the same as Hume’s: No. No number of observational verifications of a theory will allow us to conclude, logically, that theory is true. However, he then goes on to consider a slightly different version of the question:
And here, on the other hand, the answer is “yes;” one falsifying observation can lead us to rationally conclude that our theory is wrong. We can never logically verify theories, but by means of empirical testing we can reject obviously untrue theories through the process of falsification.
Given these considerations, Popper proposes that science can be understood as a rational progression from conjecture, to refutation, to fresh conjecture, etc. He argues that we human beings are psychologically “predisposed” to produce inductive guesses about the world in which we live, but to discover the truth of those guesses we must formulate them in such a manner that they can be falsified, and then test them against the backdrop of Nature. Untestable/unfalsifiable statements may very well be true, Popper argues, but we cannot determine their truth content until we have reformulated them; “true/meaningful” and “scientific” are not, therefore, necessarily synonymous. (Admittedly it sometimes difficult to discern whether Popper’s description is positive or normative, but it seems to be both. I also disagree with both the positive and normative dimensions of his arguments.)
By the way, it might be worth pointing out that Popper explicitly states that the falsification criterion does not concern itself with questions of meaning. Rather, he attempts to deploy it as a means of separating the subclass of scientific statements from the class of all possible knowledge statements. So, when Popper saddled psychoanalysis with the moniker “pseudo-science,” he explicitly did so to draw a line between science and non-science, not a line between truth and “quackery,” as Cecil’s column appears to imply. Popper argues that psychoanalysis is in a “metaphysical stage,” one that precedes true scientific inquiry; for Popper, the fact that Freud’s theories are irrefutable “…does not mean that Freud and Adler were not seeing certain things correctly: I personally do not doubt that much of what they say is of considerable importance, and may well play its part one day in a psychological science which is testable.”
And Popper even appears to have believed in the Oedipus Complex: he pauses in complicated critique of Carnap, for example, to insert the following footnote: “One need not believe in the ‘scientific’ character of psycho-analysis (which, I think, is in a metaphysical stage) in order to diagnose the anti-metaphysical fervour of positivism as a form of Father-killing.”
Anyway, then, to get back to your original question: basically, no, verification is not the opposite side of the falsification coin. Theories cannot, from a strictly falsificationist view, be verified, ever; they can only be falsified.
Svinlesha,
I can follow this and knew some of it, in part because of grad school discussion in the 80’s with an officemate. (He can now refer to some GreatWhiteNortherners as southern neighbors, but I digress.) Also, dispite being an ex I apply to my physicist title, I still get the AIP rag Physics Today. For awhile, physicists and certain philosophers were more or less at war.
But, I have some questions and you’ll have to allow me to ramble a bit since I am at work and do not have time to formulate my thoughts. You have referred to Popper pretty often. I seem to recall that Popper’s influence was waning. Is there more recent work that those who study such things rely on? (Not that I am a believer in believing due to authority!) It seems to me that whether Freud’s work constitutes science depends on one’s definitions. From the quotes you give, I would tend to side with Popper, but I also think the answer does not lie in philosophical hair splitting. Science is what scientists do. There are historical theories that can be falsified, but they are not scientific theories. They are historical theories. E.g., If I formulate a theory that Rome fell because of lead pipes, my theory can be falsified. But, I am still doing history. (I would lump History into the hermeneutical disciplines discussed earlier.) The primary difference being that one can be a respected historian without being a scientist, but not a physicist without being a scientist.
What is the latest thought on what is science?
SlowMind:
Well, I can only give you a few of my random impressions as a non-specialist.
The major controversies in the sociology and philosophy of science, those that concern theory choice, historical development, and consensus within science, are still basically unresolved. Over the last 40 years or so the conflict has primarily found its expression between two mutually incompatible explanatory paradigms. “Internalists” attempt to articulate choice, development, and consensus as a function of science’s own “internal logic,” and view science as a basically rational project. “Externalists” tend to see choice, development, and consensus as a function of social or psychological factors “external” to the rationales employed by scientists themselves – that is to say, they see scientific “truth” as negotiated, and decided upon, at a social level. Naturally, most sociologists fall into the latter category, and reject internalist models of science.
Neither internalist nor externalist models can explain, by themselves, the issues they attempt to address. Internalist models tend to be polemic, revisionist histories of science, written most often by those who are convinced already of the project’s fundamental rationality (like postcards from positivists, to paraphrase Kuhn), or at least by those who wish to promote that rationality (in this vein one can say that Popper was arguably the last great “internalist”). Externalist models tend to be abstract, to fail to fully appreciate the rationality of science (and its evidential basis), and tend towards a problematic epistemological relativism (although, to certain extent, epistemological absolutism is also problematic). Most experts would probably agree these days that the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes, but as far as I know no one has succeeded in developing a good model that incorporates both.
With regard to your question about “more recent work,” the simple answer, of course, is Thomas Kuhn, whose influence was revolutionary. But a lot of work from his perspective has been done since then, and many of his ideas have gradually fallen by the wayside as well.
As far as I know, the attempt to locate a demarcation criterion between science and non-science has foundered once again. Most specialists have simply decided, at least for the time being, that the debate over what may be properly considered “science,” and what may not, is simply unresolvable. The polemics have proven rather sterile. I suspect that a most would simply agree with your assertion that “Science is what scientists do.” Personally, being something of a pragmatist myself, I can’t really see what all the fuss is about: we are curious animals, interested in producing knowledge about the world around us, and how we chose to label that knowledge seems rather irrelevant to me.
Social Studies of Science, the primary journal devoted to these issues, has in my opinion gone down hill over the last decade since their heyday in the 70s and 80s. They’ve fallen victim to post-modernism; perhaps it was inevitable, since really constructivism and post-modernism are the bastard step-children of the sociology of science. In one of their last issues I read a short article about the need for sociologists to begin the process of “interrogating representation,” for example. Such attenuated abstraction doesn’t really appeal to me.
On the other hand, I did recently read through a big chunk of Steven Shapin’s very interesting work A Social History of Truth. (Shapin is probably the most influential name in this field today.) In this book Shapin explores the intersection between 17th century “gentleness,” science, and truth-telling. Shapin argues that “gentleness” – in the sense of being a “gentleman” – was fundamentally predicated on, and justified by, truth-telling. The presupposition of truth-telling was transferred from “gentleness” to science, Shapin argues, by virtue of the fact that most early scientists were also “gentlemen” (almost by definition, since they were the only members of society at that time who had the wherewithal, free time, etc., to pursue “scientific” research). I believe Shapin focuses on Robert Boyle as an example of this kind of early “gentleman scientist.” Anyway, although I thought there were some conceptual problems with some of his ideas, I nevertheless found the first couple of chapters – in which Shapin explores the implications of truth for the social fabric, and the ways in which scientists are socially constructed as “truth-tellers” – to be particularly thought-provoking.
Thank you. I guess this has wandered a field from the topic, but it is interesting nonetheless. I suppose it is obvious that it is the extreme “externalists” that roused so much ire from physicists. The fact is, I never heard tell from any that seemed to have any kind of understanding of physics. Unless one imagines the world is such that the physically real is invented by mankind as we go along, their models just had nothing to do with physics. That plus the fact that no one who thought that physics was inventing the universe would go into physics - only those who think they are discovering aspects of the universe.
Still doesn’t really resolve the debate about Freud, though, now does it? I personally think it is quite possible to create a new field without being a “proper” practioner of it. Astronomy was founded by astrologers. Kepler certainly quacked like a duck to modern ears. But, that doesn’t lessen his contribution. Newton spent most of his life quacking, but his physics and mathematics may be unsurpassed in the history of mankind. (After reading Chandrashakar’s, a nobel prize winning astrophysicist, translation of Principia, I realized just how far beyond “normal” geniuses he was.) Freud, however, appears to the outsider to have been quacking within a field of his own creation. I guess I am content to agree with the experts that he wasn’t practicing science, even though he thought he was. Since it took so long for the experts to reach such a conclusion, I am willing not to apply “crackpot” to his science, but I will apply “quack” to his medicinal practice, although the medical ignorance of the time can excuse much of it, just as the scientific ignorance of their times excuses Newton and Kepler.
Freud was a quack. All of his so called discoveries were either “poetic inventions” from his wild inferences or in the zeitgeist of his times, inevitable. In the late 1800s of Europe, several dozen books were written about the “unconscious.” Yet native readers credit Freud with discovering this. Freud deserves credit for popularizing cocaine, which he prescribed to treat opiate addiction, and that the first few years of life change us for the rest of our lives (DUH!). Oh he and Jung were also the first psychotherapists to have sex with their clients. Wow, what a legacy!:smack:
Why do these social-science yobbos keep feeling the need to re-invent the wheel? The term is “gentility”. A gentleman is expected to possess gentility. However, the importance of truthfulness is probably spot-on. In the manuals of honor from the day, it was said that a man could apologize for making an accusation of adultery, of treason, of incest, possibly even of adulterous incestual treason, but an accusation of dishonesty could only be satisfied by a duel. A gentleman’s trustworthiness was the only basis upon which he could make his life.
Even today, it is presumed within the sciences that we are honest in our dealings. This is partially why a scientific fraud and hoaxsters can get so far. Randi pointed out years ago that scientists are remarkably easy for “paranormal” frauds to fool because we simply expect people to be truthful.
Yobbo or not, the term Shapin actually uses is “gentility”.
Well, if I recall correctly, Shapin used the term ”gentleness” to describe the qualities that characterize the true “gentleman.” He claims that much of the literature of the time promoted the idea that class membership was only one aspect of the concept of “gentility.” In other words, at least in the literature, it was considered possible that someone might be a “gentleman” even if he came from a lower class, while membership in an upper class, taken by itself, was no guarantee that one possessed the qualities of a “gentleman.”
There was a certain confusion over this issue, the practice (that is, the actual social forms surrounding “gentleness”), and how “gentleness” might be conceptualized, but almost all the various conceptualizations stressed “truth-telling” as being the core of the gentle disposition. (By the way, Dogface, Shapin devotes a chapter to the practice of dueling, and makes essentially the same point you do, above).
Anyway, when I read the word “gentility,” I almost automatically associate it with a social class – the “gentility” – rather than with any specific characteristics that class possesses.
I don’t have a copy of A Social Theory to hand - and you’re correct that its discussion of the matter can’t be reduced to a single word - but, for instance, the references to the topic in The Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 1996) are all indexed as “Gentility, and science”. Shapin’s indeed entirely familiar with the term and its nuances and has used it in this context.