There is no supernatural.

[II_Gyan_II]

@SentientMeat

And physicalism accounts for that something. It explains it. It provides a causative mechanism for it. I ask again: what is panpsychism’s equivalent? Coincidence?

Panpsychism doesn’t have a leg in it. Besides, as I’ve already said, physicalism accounts for it, but consistency and coherence is all that is maintained. How close is this accounting to the truth. No one knows.

[quote]

of course there’s a difference in behaviour, perceived or not. What explanation are you putting forward for the different behaviour of a live brain and a dead one, or a live brain and a fingernail or a photon?

If photons are conscious then surely lots and lots of photons will be very conscious, in which case, why doesn’t the sun have a conversation with us by encoding non-random data in its light (or, at least, doing something uncharacteristic of a non-conscious entity)?

This begs the question. It assumes the range of behavior expected of a conscious entity.

What is the point of drawing such an arbitrary distinction if you don’t know how or why it should be applied?

What’s arbitrary is physicalism’s demarcation of an unempirical phenomena i.e. consciousness.

Why could he not have appeared anywhere?

In dualistic panpsychism, because the right arrangement of matter might not have manifested.

Two elements is (largely) all that non-stellar nucleosynthesis produces. What is logically necessary or unnecessary about that nucleosynthesis? Appealing to logic here is as much a non sequitur as answering “non-stellar nucleosynthesis only produces elements beginning with the letter H”.

Why are you bringing physics into this? Panpsychism does not contradict physics. It just contradicts the claim of arising of consciousness, which physics doesn’t explain anyhow.

But there you are just tautologically describing what happens, rather than explaining it. Logic provides no explanatory mechanism and, as far as I can tell, neither does your particular version of panpsychism: what use is it?

Neither does physicalism. No one knows why, only how. Physicalism asserts that the hard problem of consciousness is suitable for the latter, panpsychism says, currently, it is less arbitrary to assume it isn’t.

Que savez-vous, exactement?

Rien. Just that the bridge between non-conscious and conscious realms is uncrossable.

[SentientMeat]

Besides, as I’ve already said, physicalism accounts for it, but consistency and coherence is all that is maintained. How close is this accounting to the truth. No one knows.

Err … what? An explanation must be consistent and coherent to count as an explanation. You seem to be saying “Oh, well, anyone could go ahead and come up with a consistent, coherent explanation of things like computation or nucleosynthesis”. My challenge is for you to go ahead and do it.

This begs the question. It assumes the range of behavior expected of a conscious entity.

Well, let’s start simple. Do you think a photon, or the sun, is a conscious entity? If not, why not?

What’s arbitrary is physicalism’s demarcation of an unempirical phenomena i.e. consciousness.

How is explaining consciousness in terms of computational elements “arbitrarily demarking” it? Does explaining the weather in terms of water vapour elements “arbitrarily demark” weather from non-weather? By explaining nucleosynthesis in stars am I “arbitrarily demarking” non-stars or higher elements?

In dualistic panpsychism, because the right arrangement of matter might not have manifested.

Ah, thank you. So computational entities like Sonic the Hedgehog do emerge from arrangements of matter. Now, what’s the difference between Sonic and me, in your opinion?

Why are you bringing physics into this? Panpsychism does not contradict physics. It just contradicts the claim of arising of consciousness, which physics doesn’t explain anyhow.

Well, that’s where we differ. I am providing physical explanations of things, from stars to higher elements to weather to life to Sonic the Hedgehog, in terms of simpler physical entities. I am showing that one needn’t be so lazy as to simply propose that everything in the universe is a little bit Sonic, or fundamentally humid, or has some inseparable star-ness about it. People used to make precisely the same argument about life - that it was distinct from the physical. Suffice it to say, if one followed all of these possible fundamental distinctions one would end up so mauled by Ockham’s Razor that you’d look like the fellow off Hellraiser.

Neither does physicalism. No one knows why, only how.

Agreed, because “why?” is so often a myopic category error of a question. But if physicalism explains how sensory input being processed into different kinds of memory could produce a “first person subjective experience” in the sensor, the “why” is surely unnecessary. What I am interested in here is where the panpsychic “how” differs from the physicalist “how”: How does a live brain produce a unitary consciousness while a dead one does not (or, at least, a far lesser consciousness)? How come a physical molecule like sevofluorane extinguishes (or massively inhibits) consciousness? How do some entities, like humans, attain such demonstrable consciousness while others of similar complexity, like stars or hurricanes, do not?

Just that the bridge between non-conscious and conscious realms is uncrossable.

Do you say the same of the non-Sonic/Sonic, nonstellar/stellar, nonweather/weather, nonlife/life realms also? It sounds as though you just don’t want it crossed.

[Liberal]

@Hoodoo Ulove

The manifestation of a thing is not the thing itself, but it does not follow that by manifesting itself the thing itself becomes not the thing itself.

Well, yes, but that’s my point. You seemed to be saying that if a supernatural thing manifested, it became, by virtue of its manifestation, a natural thing. But that is not the case. The manifestation is itself a new thing, but the original thing is still the original thing. Perhaps it would help to abstract it:

Let A = thing

Let B = manifestation of thing

A != B

Since there is no contradiction, both A and B may exist.

We can also look at analogies. For example, I can manifest myself as a two-dimensional image using a camera as a tool. But although I now have a picture of myself, I still exist independently of both the picture and the camera. Manifesting as some other thing did not alter me as an original thing.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

Liberal, we’re arguing over a trivial ambiguity in the meaning of “manifest”. As you define it, and your definition is not “wrong”, you are of course correct. Let’s stop.

[II_Gyan_II]

@SentientMeat

You seem to be saying “Oh, well, anyone could go ahead and come up with a consistent, coherent explanation of things like computation or nucleosynthesis”.

No. Given the Problem of induction, an explanation is just a coherent/consistent narrative.

Do you think a photon, or the sun, is a conscious entity? If not, why not?

I don’t know. I would guess that if the sun is a distinct entity, it does.

How is explaining consciousness in terms of computational elements “arbitrarily demarking” it?

Because you aren’t explaining consciousness, you’re explaining behavior.

Does explaining the weather in terms of water vapour elements “arbitrarily demark” weather from non-weather?

Weather’s an empirical phenomenon.

By explaining nucleosynthesis in stars am I “arbitrarily demarking” non-stars or higher elements?

Same as above.

So computational entities like Sonic the Hedgehog do emerge from arrangements of matter. Now, what’s the difference between Sonic and me, in your opinion?

Behavioral properties.

I am providing physical explanations of things, from stars to higher elements to weather to life to Sonic the Hedgehog, in terms of simpler physical entities.

You’re correlating one set of empirical phenomena to another.

But if physicalism explains how sensory input being processed into different kinds of memory could produce a “first person subjective experience” in the sensor, the “why” is surely unnecessary.

But it doesn’t. Physicalism looks at brain activity & observed behaviour and attempts to pair them up. Consciousness doesn’t enter the picture, unless you accept on good faith self-reported behaviour by the test subject.

What I am interested in here is where the panpsychic “how” differs from the physicalist “how”

Panpsychism asserts that consciousness is somewhat as fundamental as mass. An entity by virtue of its existence possesses it. This not equating their nature.

How does a live brain produce a unitary consciousness while a dead one does not (or, at least, a far lesser consciousness)?

Do not know.

How come a physical molecule like sevofluorane extinguishes (or massively inhibits) consciousness? How do some entities, like humans, attain such demonstrable consciousness while others of similar complexity, like stars or hurricanes, do not?

Complexity is a catch-all term. Don’t know what parameters of physical arrangement and function would correlate to form of consciousness.

Do you say the same of the non-Sonic/Sonic, nonstellar/stellar, nonweather/weather, nonlife/life realms also?

Inapplicable, as explained. If panpsychism shows how to observe consciousness, panpsychism shall be proved right or wrong.

[II_Gyan_II]

Correction: If physicalism shows how to observe…

[SentientMeat]

No. Given the Problem of induction, an explanation is just a coherent/consistent narrative.

Well, I disagree but won’t push the point. I will only ask what your explanation of consciousness is.

I would guess that if the sun is a distinct entity, it does.

There’s a whole load of vacuum all around it - I’d say it’s as “distinct” as entities get. Now, why do you think it is? How is a fusion reaction conscious? What does it think about?

Because you aren’t explaining consciousness, you’re explaining behavior.

The behaviour of clouds is the weather. The behaviour of stars is nucleosynthesis. The behaviour of the screen, chips and memory is computation. The behaviour of DNA-based structures is life. The behaviour of my brain is my mind.

Weather’s[/stars are]an empirical phenomenon.

But I could declare that they weren’t: I could say that all I was explaining was the behaviour of water vapour or hydrogen, not weather or stars themselves. If I did so, how would you rebut me?

Behavioral properties.

The only difference between my “self” and Sonic the Hedgehog is “behavioural properties”? I actually agree with that wholeheartedly, but I’m surprised you say so. Do you propose that every entity has a fundamentally distinct Sonicness? If not, you just admitted that Sonic and me emerged from physical hardware, and differ only in our behaviour.

You’re correlating one set of empirical phenomena to another.

And the results of decades of experiments in cognitive science and neuropsychology are empirical phenomena. The behaviour of the brain which produces consciousness is not fundamentally different to the behaviour of the computer which produced Sonic.

But it doesn’t.

We disagree.

Panpsychism asserts that consciousness is somewhat as fundamental as mass. An entity by virtue of its existence possesses it. This not equating their nature.

A dead body weighs as much as a live one. Is it just as conscious? If not, why not?

Do not know.

Well, see, here’s the problem. On one hand I have all of these respected cognitive scientists, psychologists and neurologists who provide an admittedly incomplete but nevertheless powerful and predictive model of how a biological computer can have subjective experience by means of sensory input, memory and chemical emotion moderators.

On the other hand, I have “I don’t know”.

Don’t know what parameters of physical arrangement and function would correlate to form of consciousness.

How about sensory and memory apparatus? Would you be willing to entertain the possibility that they were the physical arrangements and functions which produced an “elevated” form of consciousness (or whatever terminology you guys use to distinguish “forms”)?

Inapplicable, as explained.

As evaded, I’d suggest, but understand that I’m genuinely curious about panpsychism here, Gyan. Feel free to open a new thread in which you can dictate the terms of the debate yourself, if you like.

If [physicalism] shows how to observe consciousness, panpsychism shall be proved right or wrong

Ah, but physicalism does not necessarily show how to observe life or weather or computer programs. Again, such a challenge might be a simple category error. All it can do is provide an explanation for life, weather, Sonic or sensory cognition. It is up to you to decide whether that is the explanation for any of them. Cognitive science is all about falsifiable hypotheses and experimental results.

[Liberal]

@Hoodoo Ulove

Liberal, we’re arguing over a trivial ambiguity in the meaning of “manifest”. As you define it, and your definition is not “wrong”, you are of course correct. Let’s stop.

Although that may be what you are doing, speaking for myself, I’m not. I’m using the same definition that you are, in fact. The definition is not something that I’m quibbling over, or even talking about.

Meanwhile, what I’ve said remains unrefuted:

1. It is possible that we are encased in the universe, but that God is not.

2. It is possible that God influences nature without Himself being natural.

3. It is possible that God manifests Himself to man while still being supernatural.

I welcome debating the substance of any of those.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

Liberal, re the definition. As I was using it, this would be a proper sentence: “Having been invited to a party at your home, I manifested myself at your front door.” Me, not a hologram. You may argue that this is a misuse of the word. As I said, it’s trivial.

As to your three propositions, I grant their logical possibility. I was wrong. Perhaps someone else doesn’t think so and it’s not over.

As to their physical possibility, or their truth, that is beyond the scope of the debate as I framed it. I would be happy to for this thread to continue as a debate over their truth.

[smiling_bandit]

I was thinking today that Gravity might be supernatural in some respects. In ancient Greece there was the idea of a perfect machine. It would be unbreakable, flawless, would not require fuel or work, and would not have to be built (it was perfect). It strikes me that all possible such machines may already exist. Gravity, Time, Electrons - all cannot be made, exactly; they perform a function at least from our perspective, and do so flawlessly as far as we can tell. It may not always do what we want, but they work nonetheless.

If they exist, then someone following the original philosphy might logically conclude they had to be designed. It would not be ironclad proff, but it is as close to proof as anything.

[RaftPeople]

Gyan what is your definition of conscious?

I’m just enjoying following this thread, but without that definition it seems like it’s going nowhere.

[SentientMeat]

Indeed, bandit: Ironically enough, William of Ockham’s protege Jean Buridan (of the famously indecisive ass) proposed that angels pushed the planets around the Earth. 250-300 years later, Copernicus, Galileo and Newton shaved the planet-pushing angels away with his tutor’s philosophical tool.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

Bandit, I would summarise your view as follows:
Things happen precisely as they happen. Thus, they are the product of design.Am I being unfair?

[Liberal]

@SentientMeat

Indeed, bandit: Ironically enough, William of Ockham’s protege Jean Buridan (of the famously indecisive ass) proposed that angels pushed the planets around the Earth. 250-300 years later, Copernicus, Galileo and Newton shaved the planet-pushing angels away with his tutor’s philosophical tool.

Not exactly. Science has quantified gravity, but hasn’t explained how it works (nor will it). All we know is what gravitational effects objects ought to have on each other based on their masses, distances, and velocities. But it may well be the case that angels are doing the work.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

Liberal, no effect on the debate, but I can’t resist a cheap gotcha.

@Liberal

Something is natural if it manifests in nature; i.e., the ultimate source of its existence is the material from the Big Bang.

(in another post)
It is possible that God manifests Himself to man while still being supernatural.

Your *i.e.*sorta gets you out of the contradiction, though.

[II_Gyan_II]

@SentientMeat

I will only ask what your explanation of consciousness is.

A fundamental property. Not an emergent. Beyond that, I’m not sure what’s to explain.

How is a fusion reaction conscious? What does it think about?

There’s no compunction for conscious activity to be translatable. It may be. Our consciousness reflects our context and heritage, the same for other entities.

The behaviour of clouds is the weather. The behaviour of stars is nucleosynthesis. The behaviour of the screen, chips and memory is computation. The behaviour of DNA-based structures is life. The behaviour of my brain is my mind.

Right on all counts. This doesn’t affect panpsychism/physicalism. I never denied that neurology doesn’t reflect psychology.

But I could declare that they weren’t: I could say that all I was explaining was the behaviour of water vapour or hydrogen, not weather or stars themselves. If I did so, how would you rebut me?

Weather is the linguistic term for aggregate behaviour. The medium of the weather and constituent H2O is the same. Mind is a conscious phenomenon. Supposedly, pottasium effluxing during an action potential isn’t.

The only difference between my “self” and Sonic the Hedgehog is “behavioural properties”? I actually agree with that wholeheartedly, but I’m surprised you say so. Do you propose that every entity has a fundamentally distinct Sonicness?

What’s sonicness?

And the results of decades of experiments in cognitive science and neuropsychology are empirical phenomena. The behaviour of the brain which produces consciousness is not fundamentally different to the behaviour of the computer which produced Sonic.

Agreed.

A dead body weighs as much as a live one. Is it just as conscious? If not, why not?

I hold that activity is a good correlate, so consciousness would be diminished.

Well, see, here’s the problem. On one hand I have all of these respected cognitive scientists, psychologists and neurologists who provide an admittedly incomplete but nevertheless powerful and predictive model of how a biological computer can have subjective experience by means of sensory input, memory and chemical emotion moderators.

Cite (just a couple :)) ?

On the other hand, I have “I don’t know”.

I won’t pretend that I do.

Would you be willing to entertain the possibility that they were the physical arrangements and functions which produced an “elevated” form of consciousness (or whatever terminology you guys use to distinguish “forms”)?

Yes, with the caveat that ‘produced’ buys into physicalism. ‘Reflected’ is better.

Ah, but physicalism does not necessarily show how to observe life or weather or computer programs.

My mistake. My original was worded wrong.

Replace with ‘If consiousness can be observed, panpsychism can be proved right/wrong’.

RaftPeople, consciousness is the phenomenon of experience.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

@II Gyan II

Replace with ‘If consiousness can be observed, panpsychism can be proved right/wrong’.

So, can consciousness be observed?

[II_Gyan_II]

@Hoodoo Ulove

So, can consciousness be observed?

Umm, no. Else solipsism would be instantly shown to be true or false.

[RaftPeople]

@II Gyan II

RaftPeople, consciousness is the phenomenon of experience.

Does the term “experience” mean anything beyond simply being a participating in (choose the best word here: reality, the universe, existence, etc.)?

[RaftPeople]

That should have said “participant”