There is no supernatural.

[smiling_bandit]

by Hoodoo Ulove

Things happen precisely as they happen. Thus, they are the product of design.

The idea isn’t mine, and I’m not sure I believe it or not. Bu the ideal was quite plausible in a very weird way, and I ntoed that certain natural force (i.e., gravity) fit the bill perfectly. But if so, they might (might) still require that someone come up ith the idea and design. It’s also further not clear whether this can happen transtemporarily (i.e., whether we have gravity because Newton thought of it as a mathematical force or whether someone had to make it before it was).

It’s a strange idea, yet oddly compelling. I can’t come up with a good argument against it, really, except that it mgiht not be true.

[Liberal]

@Hoodoo Ulove

Liberal, no effect on the debate, but I can’t resist a cheap gotcha.Your *i.e.*sorta gets you out of the contradiction, though.

As we’ve discussed, something can manifest in one of two ways: (1) as itself, or (2) as evidence of itself. Still, for clarity, I should have said “manifests from nature”, rather than “manifests in nature”.

[SentientMeat]

@Gyan

A fundamental property. Not an emergent. Beyond that, I’m not sure what’s to explain.

I’ll try and be more specific with my questions. There are clearly facts to explain, such as that a live human is conscious while a dead one is, let’s say, differently conscious. I am asking about the proposed mechanism of this transition. Perhaps a full new OP on my part would be useful - I’ll see if I can find the time.

There’s no compunction for conscious activity to be translatable. It may be. Our consciousness reflects our context and heritage, the same for other entities.

So you are proposing consciousness for an enormous fusion reaction in space without proposing any way to test your hypothesis? Who’s being pseudoscientific now?

Right on all counts.

Really? We agree that consciousness is the behaviour of the brain, and thus we can observe consciousness (the behaviour of the brain) just as we can observe weather (the behaviour of water vapour) or life (the behaviour of DNA-based structures)?

Weather is the linguistic term for aggregate behaviour.

Why can’t consciousness be the linguistic term for different aggregate behaviour? You are simply asserting that it isn’t.

The medium of the weather and constituent H2O is the same.

But it isn’t, quite: weather requires more than water. It is a vastly complex process involving energy, surfaces, altitudes and even planetary motion. Looking at water in a medium is not necessarily “observing weather” any more than looking at a dead brain is “observing consciousness”, agreed?

Mind is a conscious phenomenon. Supposedly, pottasium effluxing during an action potential isn’t.

But you suppose it is, don’t you? Why should a fusion reaction be conscious but an electrochemical reaction not? Again, you’re confusing the computation with the computer: the chip, screen and memory are not the program itself, they run the program. The program is, ultimately, their behaviour.

What’s sonicness?

A hypothetical property of every entity in the universe, contingent on the premise that Sonic the Hedgehog does not emerge from, is not produced by, electronic elements. If computers don’t cause Sonic the Hedgehog, everything must have a fundamentally distinct Sonic-ness which cannot be observed.

Agreed.

Agreed that the brain produces consciousness? I though you proposed that consciousness had always been there? If the brain produces consciousness, why the need to propose that everything in the universe has it?

I hold that activity is a good correlate, so consciousness would be diminished.

Consciousness is diminished in a dead brain because brain activity is diminished. Read this again. It is the very heart of physicalism!

Cite (just a couple)?

Off the top of my head: Greenfield, Ramachandran, Dennett, Lakoff, Damasio, Chomsky, Varela, Pinker. And please, don’t pull the Creationist stunt of picking a particular detail on which any might somehow disagree and using it to argue that they are all hopelessly divided and the entire subject a sham. Dawkins was more gene-centric than Gould and his punctuated equilibrium, but both were evolutionists. Similarly, no cognitive scientist or neuropsychologist I know of seriously proposes your duality: they are all physicalists. (Heck, even David Chalmers gets very uncomfortable when pressed, preferring as he does to snipe from the sidelines - I don’t think I’ve ever seen him defend anything!)

I won’t pretend that I do.

And what would you say to someone who denied that meteorology explained the weather but was unable to offer any alternative whatsoever? Or the evolution-denier, or computer science-denier?

Yes, with the caveat that ‘produced’ buys into physicalism. ‘Reflected’ is better.

Well, OK, whatever words are necessary for you to pretend you’re not really a physicalist. For me, the consciousness in a dead body, star or thermostat is “absent”. If it is merely “diminished” for you, all that means is that I have a higher threshold of what I call consciousness. How does that sound?

Replace with ‘If consiousness can be observed, panpsychism can be proved right/wrong’.

A cognitive scientist observes consciousness just as a particle physicist observes electrons.

@Lib

Science has quantified gravity, but hasn’t explained how it works (nor will it).

Hmm, I think it’s the other way around, actually: Quantum gravity is not a finished product, but the various formulations thereof do provide detailed mechanisms of exactly how objects have mass and how they experience a force (proportional to their masses and inversely etc.) via the exchange of virtual particles.

All we know is what gravitational effects objects ought to have on each other based on their masses, distances, and velocities. But it may well be the case that angels are doing the work.

Or, indeed, fairies or invisible unicorns. It is our personal choice whether or not we decide to shave away these entities.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

Liberal, as I said, I thought at first that what was in nature was, perforce, natural. I knew I was wrong when it occurred to me that I could be in Spain without being spanish. :smack:

I think I was right on such cases as the argument over the the reality of ESP. The detractors say there is nothing supernatural there be cause it ain’t happening. The supporters say it’s real and that there are as yet undiscovered natural laws which will some day explain it.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

@smiling bandit

I can’t come up with a good argument against it, really, except that it mgiht not be true.

That something might not be true is actually an argument in its favor, in my book.

[smiling_bandit]

That something might not be true is actually an argument in its favor, in my book.

Barring time travel, however, I can’t think of a good idea to test it. We face three challenges:

1. In all probability, all such perfect machines possible are already extant.

2. We therefore cannot make another to test th hypethesis

3. If we had a time machine with dimensional tunneling we might be able to go back before the big bang, observe the course of the unvierse, and/or ask God. But then, this asnwer is cheating.

4. A really good physicist can do it. But then, really good physicists can think of another four explanations for what gravity is and figure out eight theoretical ways to day anything before lunch.

[Liberal]

@SentientMeat

Hmm, I think it’s the other way around, actually: Quantum gravity is not a finished product, but the various formulations thereof do provide detailed mechanisms of exactly how objects have mass and how they experience a force (proportional to their masses and inversely etc.) via the exchange of virtual particles.

That’s not what I mean. Note how metaphorical your whole description is — objects in possession of properties, having experiences, conducting economic transactions. Remove the anthropomorphisms and all that remains is a description of what is happening, not how it is getting done. We don’t know why things happen, and this is something science can’t tell us. We know from observation that exactly X occurs with regularity depending on exactly Y. But we do not know how it works. Perhaps it is angels or fairies or invisible unicorns who dutifully follow their rules, tossing out virtual particles when the metaphysical rules call for it.

Or, indeed, fairies or invisible unicorns. It is our personal choice whether or not we decide to shave away these entities.

Or the metaphors. They’re entities too. Assigning to the universe such things as desires or goals or rules merely introduces alternate entities. That’s not shaving off the veneer; it’s replacing one veneer with another.

[Liberal]

@Hoodoo Ulove

Liberal, as I said, I thought at first that what was in nature was, perforce, natural. I knew I was wrong when it occurred to me that I could be in Spain without being spanish. :smack:

I think I was right on such cases as the argument over the the reality of ESP. The detractors say there is nothing supernatural there be cause it ain’t happening. The supporters say it’s real and that there are as yet undiscovered natural laws which will some day explain it.

That all makes sense. Thanks for clarifying.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

@Liberal

We don’t know why things happen, and this is something science can’t tell us.

This goes against normal usage, of course. Explanations as to why hydrogen and oxygen combine as they do involving valances, numbers of electrons in the outer shells of atoms, etc. are counted as explanations of why water is a stable compound. Your point, I take it, is that at some layer of the onion, we can only point, and say “that’s what happens”.

Physics has not reached that point, and I wonder if it ever will.

[SentientMeat]

Note how metaphorical your whole description is —— objects in possession of properties, having experiences, conducting economic transactions.

This, of course, being true of all human language - any sentence in any textbook (or even this very sentence) will contain possessives and spatial or temporal locators or processes.

Remove the anthropomorphisms and all that remains is a description of what is happening, not how it is getting done.

Necessarily anthropocentric human language can still be used to propose a causative mechanism. Of numerous possible consequences, it can be used to communicate the reason for one consequence occurring instead of others. I agree that to simply state that that consequence happened is merely describing rather than explaining, but science is not that circular: it predicts consequences which are, a priori, absurdly unlikely.

We know from observation that exactly X occurs with regularity depending on exactly Y. But we do not know how it works. Perhaps it is angels or fairies or invisible unicorns who dutifully follow their rules, tossing out virtual particles when the metaphysical rules call for it.

Then there is no such thing as explanation, and we must expunge the word from our dictionaries or append every sentence in every science book with an infinity of fantastical beings.

Or the metaphors. They’re entities too. Assigning to the universe such things as desires or goals or rules merely introduces alternate entities. That’s not shaving off the veneer; it’s replacing one veneer with another.

Agreed, which is why cognitive science seeks to explain supposed “mental” or “metaphysical” entities solely by reference to physical processes. That only “introduces entities” in the sense the sense that building a typewriter suddenly introduces an infinite multitude of books. Indeed, if 3 atoms exist in spacetime then they have an infinity of possible configurations. I would suggest that the only entities here are still the 3 atoms in spacetime, rather than the Razor-blunting infinity of configurations.

The universe is how it is, with or without the cognitive apparatus inside our simian crania. If there is such a thing as explanation, there is one for the emergence of metaphors and rules where none existed for those 13 Bn years beforehand. (And whether or not a given individual simian apparatus attains the state called “accepting that explanation” is itself statistical!)

[II_Gyan_II]

@SentientMeat

I am asking about the proposed mechanism of this transition.

Not observable, since consciousness is epiphenomenal. But physical activity is a correlate.

So you are proposing consciousness for an enormous fusion reaction in space without proposing any way to test your hypothesis? Who’s being pseudoscientific now?

Well, if consciousness were observable, we wouldn’t be having this discussion.

Really? We agree that consciousness is the behaviour of the brain, and thus we can observe consciousness (the behaviour of the brain) just as we can observe weather (the behaviour of water vapour) or life (the behaviour of DNA-based structures)?

No!!! The mind is the brain simply translates to that their activity is isomorphic with respect to some translation function. Consciousness is the canvas on which mind occurs, physical realm where the brain occurs, but the brain doesn’t create the canvas.

Why can’t consciousness be the linguistic term for different aggregate behaviour?

Because it’s the canvas, not the sum of behaviour. I can feel/see the weather, not your consciousness.

You are simply asserting that it isn’t.

You’re doing the opposite.

But it isn’t, quite: weather requires more than water. It is a vastly complex process involving energy, surfaces, altitudes and even planetary motion. Looking at water in a medium is not necessarily “observing weather” any more than looking at a dead brain is “observing consciousness”, agreed?

Weather itself is empirical, even if its analytic components aren’t.

If computers don’t cause Sonic the Hedgehog, everything must have a fundamentally distinct Sonic-ness which cannot be observed.

No, Sonic correlates to a certain activity. If Sonic is conscious, as I believe, that’s not a product of the electronics.

Agreed that the brain produces consciousness? I though you proposed that consciousness had always been there? If the brain produces consciousness, why the need to propose that everything in the universe has it?

Consciousness is the canvas, not produced by the brain. What happens in the cortex reflects, in a manner, what happens on the canvas.

Consciousness is diminished in a dead brain because brain activity is diminished. Read this again. It is the very heart of physicalism!

Replace ‘because’. The strict answer is ‘I don’t know’, but I would guess so.

Off the top of my head: Greenfield, Ramachandran, Dennett, Lakoff, Damasio, Chomsky, Varela, Pinker.

These are names, I asked for cites. Just 2 or 3 representative papers, showing that “respected cognitive scientists, psychologists and neurologists who provide an admittedly incomplete but nevertheless powerful and predictive model of how a biological computer can have subjective experience by means of sensory input, memory and chemical emotion moderators.”

And what would you say to someone who denied that meteorology explained the weather but was unable to offer any alternative whatsoever?

Your equivocating doesn’t make it so, as I’ve said repeatedly.

A cognitive scientist observes consciousness just as a particle physicist observes electrons.

Actually, this is closer to the mark, yet different.
I’m sure you’ve heard of the zombie problem in philosophy. What’s your take and why?

[II_Gyan_II]

SentientMeat, I’m a bit busy nowadays. I, or you, could start a thread in the 2nd week of May, when I’ll have more time.

[Liberal]

@Hoodoo Ulove

Your point, I take it, is that at some layer of the onion, we can only point, and say “that’s what happens”.

Yes, that’s right.

Physics has not reached that point, and I wonder if it ever will.

No, because it is empirical, and empirical is about what we see (hear, smell, taste, and feel). We can’t see (etc.) “how” or “why” — only “what”.

[Liberal]

@SentientMeat

This, of course, being true of all human language - any sentence in any textbook (or even this very sentence) will contain possessives and spatial or temporal locators or processes.

I agree. Therefore, why couch science in linguistic language? Logic and math are the languages of science.

Necessarily anthropocentric human language can still be used to propose a causative mechanism. Of numerous possible consequences, it can be used to communicate the reason for one consequence occurring instead of others. I agree that to simply state that that consequence happened is merely describing rather than explaining, but science is not that circular: it predicts consequences which are, a priori, absurdly unlikely.

Science can’t determine cause because cause is a logical relation, not an empirical one. And science doesn’t predict; rather, it tests predictions.

Then there is no such thing as explanation, and we must expunge the word from our dictionaries or append every sentence in every science book with an infinity of fantastical beings.

Well, no, nothing that dramatic. We may still explain the how and why of things — just not with science. The popular notion that science is source of all knowledge is incorrect.

Agreed, which is why cognitive science seeks to explain supposed “mental” or “metaphysical” entities solely by reference to physical processes. That only “introduces entities” in the sense the sense that building a typewriter suddenly introduces an infinite multitude of books. Indeed, if 3 atoms exist in spacetime then they have an infinity of possible configurations. I would suggest that the only entities here are still the 3 atoms in spacetime, rather than the Razor-blunting infinity of configurations.

On this, we agree. But again, science is not a black hole epistemology. It may not appropriate every tool that happens by and declare, “this has been made by science”. Ockham’s Razor not only is not limited to scientific application, it was not even conceived with science in mind. Quite often, the very presence of science in some controversy or other is itself a violation of Ockham’s Razor. Science is unnecessary, for example, with respect to questions of how or why.

The universe is how it is, with or without the cognitive apparatus inside our simian crania. If there is such a thing as explanation, there is one for the emergence of metaphors and rules where none existed for those 13 Bn years beforehand. (And whether or not a given individual simian apparatus attains the state called “accepting that explanation” is itself statistical!)

No disagreement there.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

@Liberal

No, because it is empirical, and empirical is about what we see (hear, smell, taste, and feel). We can’t see (etc.) “how” or “why” — only “what”.

I was asking about the empirical questions. That is, though the final layer of the onion is that to which we can only point, and say “It is so”, will we ever peel off the layer above that? Not a philosophical question, maybe.

[Liberal]

Maybe I misunderstood your question. But “how” and “why” are not empirical questions at all. As I said, those are things we cannot sense. We can only sense “what”.

[SentientMeat]

@Gyan

Not observable, since consciousness is epiphenomenal. But physical activity is a correlate.

You yourself contend that there is a transition between levels of consciousness (dead=diminished). What is the mechanism for this transition, observable or not? What is it about a dead brain which means that it is not as conscious as a live one, if not that the transition had a physical cause?

Well, if consciousness were observable, we wouldn’t be having this discussion.

My side of the discussion is that consciousness is as observable as electrons, weather, life or computer programs.

No!!!

I thought not.

The mind is the brain simply translates to that their activity is isomorphic with respect to some translation function.

Errm, could you please apply a translation function to this sentence?

Consciousness is the canvas on which mind occurs, physical realm where the brain occurs, but the brain doesn’t create the canvas.

Why can’t it, just as the computer hardware creates the canvas of Photoshop?

Because it’s the canvas, not the sum of behaviour. I can feel/see the weather, not your consciousness.

I’d say you are seeing my consciousness right now by reading the shapes I cause to appear on a screen, just as the particle phsyicist sees the electron’s path on a screen.

You’re doing the opposite.

I would hope not: I am providing an explanation (or at least, a mode of explanation) of how biological computer hardware could produce a subjective “perceiver”. No matter how inadequate you clearly think it is, I am not simply saying “I don’t know. But it’s not that”.

Weather itself is empirical, even if its analytic components aren’t.

It is no less empirical: we only see the behaviour of clouds. Again, someone following your approach could say that that isn’t the weather itself.

No, Sonic correlates to a certain activity. If Sonic is conscious, as I believe, that’s not a product of the electronics.

Both Sonic and consciousness correlate to certain computational activity: you’ve already admitted so. You have not described any fundamental difference between Sonic and consciousness here, other than simply saying there is one.

Consciousness is the canvas, not produced by the brain. What happens in the cortex reflects, in a manner, what happens on the canvas.

Why should there be a correlation between physical brain processes and differences in consciousness if everything is conscious anyway? Oh, I forgot. You don’t know.

Replace ‘because’.

With what?

The strict answer is ‘I don’t know’, but I would guess so.

ie. maybe consciousness emerges from physical hardware like Sonic the Hedgehog?

These are names, I asked for cites.

OK, their books.

Your equivocating doesn’t make it so, as I’ve said repeatedly.

I apologise if you think I’m equivocating. I assure you I’m genuinely trying to establish what your position is and what it isn’t, and I’ll do my best to set forth my own as clearly as possible.

I’m sure you’ve heard of the zombie problem in philosophy. What’s your take and why?

Worthy of a thread itself. The zombie is conscious. The problem asks me to think of water without the wetness, or playing Sonic the Hedgehog without a computer.

I, or you, could start a thread in the 2nd week of May, when I’ll have more time.

Great idea, Gyan. I’m happy to let you have the last word here if you like.

@Lib

Therefore, why couch science in linguistic language? Logic and math are the languages of science.

If your brain is able to do this, you are a differently evolved monkey than I. I need words as well as formulae and syllogisms to understand things.

Science can’t determine cause because cause is a logical relation, not an empirical one.

I said that anthropocentric human language can still be used to propose a causative mechanism. “Science” is nowhere in that sentence.

And science doesn’t predict; rather, it tests predictions.

Well, if we are to become this precise, science doesn’t do anything: scientists do.

Well, no, nothing that dramatic. We may still explain the how and why of things — just not with science.

Ah, I see what you mean. Do you consider that “scientific explanation” is a contradiction? Can we not speak of a causative mechanism whose falsifiable details have survived rigorous testing?

Science is unnecessary, for example, with respect to questions of how or why.

Two logically conflicting answers to a ‘how’ question might be eliminated or retained via testing. I, personally, would not object to the slight inaccuracy in interpreting this as “science answering a how question”, but that’s just my brain obeying a kind of conservation of energy principle it made up.

[Hoodoo_Ulove]

@SM

The zombie is conscious.

I am currently puzzling my way through Dennett’s Quining Qualia. Are there any other papers on the net you might suggest to prepare myself to follow this discussion?

[SentientMeat]

As usual, the Stanford essay is excellent. Personally, I’m with Dennett: anyone who says they can conceive of a philosophical zombie, or water which isn’t wet, or playing Sonic without any hardware, isn’t imagining hard enough.

[Liberal]

@SentientMeat

If your brain is able to do this, you are a differently evolved monkey than I. I need words as well as formulae and syllogisms to understand things.

So do I, but I do not attribute that understanding to science.

I said that anthropocentric human language can still be used to propose a causative mechanism. “Science” is nowhere in that sentence.

Well, there were three sentences, and “science” was in the third one. I took the paragraph as a whole.

Well, if we are to become this precise, science doesn’t do anything: scientists do.

Agreed. But I’m not demanding we be that precise. I have nothing against using metaphors to describe things. My only request is that we acknowledge what we’re doing — that we don’t invoke Ockham’s Razor to mock angels and fairies on the one hand while introducing goals and rules on the other.

Ah, I see what you mean. Do you consider that “scientific explanation” is a contradiction? Can we not speak of a causative mechanism whose falsifiable details have survived rigorous testing?

Certainly. Lots of them. But only in terms of what they are, not how or why they work.

Two logically conflicting answers to a ‘how’ question might be eliminated or retained via testing. I, personally, would not object to the slight inaccuracy in interpreting this as “science answering a how question”, but that’s just my brain obeying a kind of conservation of energy principle it made up.

No, science cannot reveal “how” and still be science. Look at it this way: suppose you were able to have dinner with William of Ockham, and suppose you explained to him modern electromagnetic theory. “We have discovered,” you might say, “that photons carry light.” And then William might exclaim, “Ah! We had always hoped to discover those, but we used to call them ‘angels’.”