Things that we can't "know" directly

Great Debates
41

Well, perhaps my phrasing of “First Mover” was a little more suggestive than I meant it to be. Instead, we say, “Every epistemology needs a beginning.” This would be the God Axiom, the First Epistemological Mover, and an unprovable assertion/assumption. It would state by implication that anything which undergoes infinite turtles/djinn/ceilings is not a proper epistemology.

The other side of the coin would be, “There can be no beginning to epistemology.” I find this to be even more distasteful than the God Axiom, but in fact, sort of “provable” or at least supportable as no beginning axiom can exist that can’t be reasoned about. This implication would not be that epistemological sets don’t exist; it would seem (to me) to imply that they are not completely renumerable. One could never “complete” an epistemology, or determine all the elements. As well, it is impossible to stop creating meta-epistemologies. Truly, this involves infinities in multiple “dimensions” of reasoning.

Now THAT’S a dichotomy. Didn’t I say that everything can be reduced to a dichotomy? :stuck_out_tongue:

Of course, both of these AGAIN assume that, as you’ve said, the universe is knowable in the first place. ::contemplates diving off cliff::

I’ve always pictured philosophical systems as a sort of Mobius Strip…every turtle stands on another turtle, but there are a finite number of them. So long as you live on this warped surface, everything fits together. What makes things tricky is that many different philosophies come to some similar conclusions, and therein lies the possibility of what I call puzzle-piece smashing (ie-if it doesn’t fit, we’ll MAKE it fit).

Ugh. People like this stuff?? HAHA. I do!

42

Looks like you’ve almost got it[sup]1[/sup]. I would just make a couple of quibbles:

should really be something like: The beginning point of an epistemology cannot be validated. It is quite possible to have a beginning; it is just not possible to demonstrate that said beginning is valid.

sed ‘s/renumerable/reliable/’ :wink:

The set of all possible epistemologies is infinite, but I do not see that as an implication of our inability to validate our first element for any given epistemology. The two are of different type.

Actually, it is quite possible to describe a fully enumerated epistemology. It might even be possible to do so for a useful epistemology. Certainly, many philosophers believe they have done so.
[sup]1[/sup][sub]By “got it” I mean achieved an epistemological understanding similar to my own. Common decency and federal regulations require me to now inform you that immediate and extensive psychological counseling is strongly recommended.[/sub]

43

Reading Sartre’s “Being and Nothingness” right now, I come across a jumbled (you know how the french are) paragraph not unlike my own, wherein he states his displeasure at infinite regress and a god-axiom. His solution? A tautology!! He, as well as I, and as well as Descartes, finds no problem with a turtle standing on his own back.

I dare say there’s more of them out there, too…

While you scan the horizon forever I run in circles.

My point in saying “There can be no beginning to epistemology” was to show the two sides of the coin. One is epistemology is BASED on infinite regress as unavoidable, and the other solves infinite regress by declaring a starting point, however arbitrary (and it seems necessary that it be completely so). One says epistemology has to have a start, and the other declares it is impossible for it to have one (so we can just start anywhere). I would have to say that I prefer the self-defining subject/predicate of a tautology over either of those options.

I still agree, though, that in either case (or mine, as well) the beginning cannot be validated without introduction of a meta-epistemology, which of course just goes up and up the meta-chain. I would say that any consistent epistemology is correct. That said, what are consistent epistemologies? I dare say I’ve heard of problems with all of them to date. While phenominalism seems to have eradicated the “problem” of universals, it still has its own problems as well (if Sartre’s taut. is any indication).

Anyway, if you are a fan of Godel you should check out “Godel Escher Bach: Eternal Golden Braid”. Fun fun, and some ad hoc number theory too. If you go for that sort of thing. :wink:

44

I can’t believe I let this one slip…the chance to nail Spiritus!

I’d have to go with Kant and (hume?) on this one…cause and effect is an artificial construct, especially so early in the epistemological game. It is clearly an application of a priori logic to observation, and we surely can’t use it until we’ve come to terms with logic in general. I dare say it can never be completely true even in our system because to prove its falsity would entail proving a negative, much like disproving God’s existence. That we have some evidence of it helps, but in the end we ony accept it because we’ve never seen the opposite. Heaven help us if the Big Crunch is true and we’re alive at the turn-around point :smiley:

45

Read the context again. In fact, read my statement again:

Not at all, unless by “First Mover” you mean something other than the idea that cause and effect implies a guiding consciousness to any observed phenomenon.

Note the structure. Independent clause: No, we have not introduced “First Mover” arguments into meta-epistemology. Subordinate clause: unless by first mover you mean something other than . . .

I was not positing c&e as a valid epistmological element. In fact, I was specifically stating that a “First Mover” argument reliant upon c&e was not a part of our class construction.

[sub]Keep those nails handy, though. I make plenty of mistakes, and I wouldn’t want to miss my shot at martyrdom. I’m certainly never going to make sainthood any other way. :eek:[/sub]

46

I read Godel, Escher, Bach long ago. While I don’t know enough of musical theory/history to know whether he treated Bach well, I think he took liberties with the implications/explications of Godel’s work and overstated the importance/revolutionariness of Escher. I say that as someone who likes Escher’s artwork and loves Godel’s theorems.

I did like the book. I just thought the author allowed enthusiasm for his thesis to carry him a little of course.

Dancing Wu Li Masters is a similar work dealing with the implications of quantum mechanics. It has, to my mind, the same strengths and the same weaknesses, but it is well worth the read if you have an interest in such things.

47

After I posted I realized that you were only saying that because of my implication. Ah, well. Anyway, I wrote something about the “tautology”, hoping to provide som rationale behind it. If you will, pick it apart.

I’ve had to of made some errors somewhere because I like the way it sounds. Defeat it if you will.
Many thanks…

48

But you did ask

But you see – that is the only error in the original construction, too. The error has not changed. It is not the identification of “I” that causes the problem, it is the assumption of the existence of a subject. Calling it Glorb makes no difference.

Later, it is true (IMO), Descartes allows furhter errors to creep in through identification of the undefined subject “I” with his own mind/body duality, but at this stage the only error is the acceptance of an implied subject. Russell’s critique, IIRC, was along the lines: All Descartes was justified in saying is that thought exists. I do not necessarily agree with the phrasing, but it does nicely outline the issue of implied subject.

The rest of teh construction essentially gains nothing, since it has already fallen prey to the error it was designed to illuminate. Even the question used to introduce the study: what is this doubting thing? has presumed that the subject (I/Glorb/Whatever) exists.

49

To put it bluntly…where the hell does a subject come from? I don’t think anything we’ve discussed here as accomplished that at all!

::dons orange robe and sets self on fire::

50

Grabs marshmallows.

Excellent question. I have never seen a good answer.

Or, in the framework of our ongoing discussion, either as our Ur proposition or as a consequence of our Ur proposition. Often, however, philosophers do not make that step explicit. Descartes certainly did not. His “starting point” included a determinable internal universe, an implicit subject for thought, and the application of cause and effect. In fact, Descartes also assumed a specific causal relationship between thought and subject. After all, if Francis Crick is correct it might be more accurate to say: I am; therefore, I think.

Really, this is not so revolutionary. There has never been a logical refutation for nihilism.

51

That really should read: I have never seen an epistemologically rigorous answer.

There are plenty of good answers.

52

It won’t.

It will make your brain implode.

:stuck_out_tongue:

53

Reality, as well as “I”, is ubiquitous. How can you prove the existence of something that there can be no lack of? It seems the tautology was imposed on us at birth. Now THAT’S an implicit contract.

54

Do we need to “start” epistemologically? It would seem like we need to, but if we are truly “starting at the beginning” there is no “reason” to start epistemologically, is there?

55

I jumped into this a little late in the game, but aynrandlover has kept me posted on newest developments, so I am going to add my $.02 - As far as the subject of “Cogito ergo sum” goes, the answer is “I”. We must first remember that the actual translation of the aforemention quote is I think -I am. There is no therefore. The therefore comes when someone sloppily translates, and the incorrect statement becomes a well known classroom and society phrase. What Descartes was trying to imply is that he was thinking. That is it. The subject is a given , as he knew that he was, because he was thinking. This tautology is a great place to begin, as there is no possible way that it can be false, for what else is a tautology than an absoltuely true premise? Next, when we examine what he means by “I”, we can find no definite answer. He might mean selfhood, personhood, consciousness of being…any number of given things, all which are quite different. But ultimately, it really does not matter, for he knew only that his “identity” consisted of being, due to his thoughts on the subject. This is seen later when he doubts his own existence, for to doubt something one must have enough consciousness in reality to doubt. So: subject is given as “I”

56

just a note…

57

aynrandlover

How do you know?

How have you decided that there can be no lack of reality? For that matter – how are you defining reality?
Why do you suppose it is impossible for a universe to exist in which the receptor/interpreter of thoughts is not the originator/subject of thoughts? Why is “subject” implicitly identified with “object” for thought?

It is imposed upon us by convenience. Convenience does not equal truth.

I am not at all certain what you are trying to say, here. We have no need to start, continue, or finish epistemology. Philosophy is rarely, if ever, a question of need. If we want to speak about “what is true”, though, then intellectual honesty should drive us to study how we determine the same.

delinquince
What is the meaning of the Latin word “ergo”?

Imply? Descartes made it a plain assertion and used it to develop what he felt was a rational epistemology. What he failed to do was understand the unspoken assumptions he was making to allow him to state his tautology.

“The subject is a given”, for instance, is a nice clue.
“As he knew that he was”, which leads us, inevitably, to the question ‘how?’
“Because he was thinking”, ah – because. Causality. Sequence. He was because he was thinking. But how can we say "he was thinking’ before establishing that “he” existed? Reversing the terms of a tautology gains nothing. It is still a circle. The conclusion is still assumed in the premise.

There is no possible way that any tautology can be false. That is why tautologies are useless in formal logic.

Well – you state it somewhat misleadingly. The truth value of a tautology is always positive, regardless of the truth of its constituate parts. In other words, it is not possible for “I think therfore I am not” to have a positive truth value. That fact carries no implications for the existence of “I” or of “thought”.

As to whether the tautlogy is a “fine place to begin”. It might well be, but that does not make it a valid place to begin.

Does not matter? In fact, all of his later developments hinge upon the assignment of “I”. From the very beginning, “I” is presumed to be the originator of the thoughts that “I” perceives. Phrases like “his identity consisted of being” are essentially empty when being and identity are undefined except in relationship to each other.

Therefore, it is not reasonable to doubt that said consciousness in reality exists. Therefore, descartes “doubting of his own existence” was an empty bit of rhetoric from someone unable to recognize the implicit consequences of his assumptions.

Alternatively, consiousness in reality might not be required to doubt. Therfore, consciousness in reality is not required to think. Therefore, subject is not implied by the existence of thought and our fine tautology becomes not so fine after all.

shrug Take your pick.

[sub]BTW – don’t you know better than to place our trust in Mephistopholes? ;)[/sub]

58

Just a note . . .

Welcome to the SDMB. It’s always nice to greet a new inmate in the asylum.

59

hahaha, NOW we’ve got a debate. But are we debating Descartes or tautologies? sigh Well, we’ve got something here, anyway. :wink: I can’t argue Cartesian crap, but I can put forth my opinions on how I see it.

The questionable validity of starting from a tautology is, in itself, questionable. As you and I agree, the starting point’s validity can never be determined, no matter how many meta-epistemologies we create. It is no less valid to start from a tautology than it is to start from a God Axiom or a set of infinite regression. In fact, the term “valid” doesn’t even apply at all, these are neither invalid or valid.

To start from “I think, therefore, I am” is to imply (IMO)

  1. Thought exists.
  2. I exists as the cause of thought; without thought I could not be.

Now, (1) is a God Axiom and (2) is a definition. No more tautology but we’ve still got the God Axiom. Only when we come to terms with an external reality of some sort and other consciousnesses (after consciousness has been defined) does “I” take on a “personal” meaning, and “I” means what “I” normally means to us. This is what I was trying to say in my “Glorb” paragraph, and I’ll rewrite it later (after you tear this post up)

However, I would even hazard that (1) isn’t a true God Axiom but a downright valid axiom in itself; as in, in order to deny 1 one would use 1. (?!?)
uhhh…
[sub]runs away[/sub]

60

I hate to jump in late during the middle of a raging philosophical discussion, but I just wanted to second matt_mcl’s earlier response to the OP. 100% confidence in the OP’s 2nd condition is impossible. This is why Science (the best method for understanding reality, IMHO) does not offer Truth, but instead works toward finding the best explanations (i.e., Theories) that fit the facts.

sorry for the distraction, please resume your discussion…