So let's talk about the *a priori*

Great Debates
1

Sorry about the *, but no formatting in the title.

Reference the IEP.
Reference this paper

I am primarily an armchair philosopher, and by some accounts from some dopers a good one, and by other accounts from other dopers a shoddy one. And the lynchpin of philosophical systems of thought revolves around what I will call a class of claims (you may think of this is a formal class or not). The claim runs so: Every system requires certain assumptions which are taken as true.

In order to improve my own philosophical thought, then, I suppose if I were to start anywhere I should start with the motivation behind this claim, and claims like it.

Claims like it tend to discuss elements of knowledge that are named a priori, which is taken to represent a type of knowledge that, in principle, can be known before any experience. There are several accounts of a priori knowledge, though. Some consider math an element of the a priori by stating that, should all of my experiences be false (and I am merely a brain-in-a-vat subject to someone or something’s whim) I still know that, for example, 1+1=2.

In treading into a discussion of the a priori, we are also bound to discuss another topic, the analytic/synthetic distinction. I think this is best described as Hume’s Fork. Analytic truths are wholly analyzable by the structure of the propositions themselves. From tautologies only other tautologies are derivable. No new information is added. Mathematics could be seen to be analytic in this sense. Or predicate logic. Synthetic statements, on the other hand, are not analyzable solely by their constituents. The statements rely on information not strictly contained in the meaning of the proposition. In the terminology of Hume’s Fork, analytic statements are necessarily true and synthetic statements are contingently true (based on some information not contained solely within the proposition itself, but “out there” in the real world).

From these we gain the following four types of knowledge:


             analytic  synthetic
a priori
a posteriori

Consider that a table where the column headers go first, and the row headers go second.

Philosophers in some quarters have felt that two cases are impossible; to wit, the synthetic a priori and the analytic a posteriori. Others have disagreed for metaphysical reasons.

I reject any claim of the a priori as: a statement that is universally and necessarily true. A rejection of this involves the rejection of the axiomatic claim (which I consider to be the “one claim” around which all other axiomatic claims are sourced from) that all systems are founded on certain assumptions which are regarded as true.

My rejection runs thusly:
[list=1][li]Truth is a statement made from within a system; i.e.—this statement P is true iff it follows from {X} [some set of rules]. The truth of P normally comes from a rule-for-testing. in some cases the “system” is only a positive definition which allows for exlcusion based on the terms at hand.[/li][li]In order to examine {X} for truth we would need a system. But if we could have a system for {X} then this system would have its own {Y} rules which implies an endless heirarchy for truth-determination.[/li][li]We might be tempted to then assert the truth of {X} independently of a system; that is, we elevate them to the a priori state and assert them as elements of knowledge which we cannot test.[/li][li]This creates a system that has a foundation of truth which is not verifiable, and must be accepted or rejected on no basis whatsoever. To attempt to give it a basis then takes on the form of a system, already mentioned as a case of an infinite heirarchy above.[/li][li]So then we must create a method not found in a system per se which can distinguish unjustifiable/unverifiable axioms of the a priori from other unjusitifable/unverifiable claims.[/li][li]Any application of a method is an empirical investigation, and is thus subject to the uncertainty found from it.[/li][li]So then we cannot assert the truth of {X}.[/li][/list=1]
This forms one of my two reasons for rejecting axiomatic claims as true. And the emphasis there is crucial to my point. In another thread I am attempting to investigate, with some help from dopers, the phenomenological barrier which prevents anyone but ourselevs from “looking inside my head” or “seeing with my eyes” etc. In this I want to define and examine what I will term the transcendental barrier: this is the barrier that separates a metaphysical claim of truth from our understanding of it. In the other thread I shared the opinion of a philosopher (after much effort) that communication regarding “events” behind the phen. barrier were impossible. In this I would like to investigate a similar claim: that communication regarding “truth” on the other side of the transcendental barrier is also impossible, and thus nonsensical.

As a summary, I would like to say this: claims regarding truth independent of anyone that can say it is true are erroneous. Discussing that knowledge exists which is independent of any particular knower is nonsense. [please do not feel I am saying everything is subjective or some such: I am NOT]

As a summary of the summary: everything that is true is synthetically true, and only from a synthesis can the analytic truths be found.

I am prepared to defend or otherwise justify these statements as necessary. Discuss, anyone?

2

O.K., hope I’m getting this.

So you’re saying that communication about a truth is impossible, due to the transcendental barrier?

What I observe is not verifiably what you observe.

But is there, according to you, still a form of ‘absolute’ truth?
The thing we are both observing.

3

Have you read Godel? He has a lot to say about systems and their limitations. “Godel, Escher, Bach” is a good popular treatment of the problems of conciousness and ‘knowing’.

4

Communication about, and statements about, things which are true independent of experience is nonsensical.

Toby, no need to mention Godel here, though his proof does in fact demonstrate something: that people are willing to separate a notion of trueness (or truth) independent of demonstration. I reject that. What separates truth from demonstratability is my “transcendental barrier”. Whether anything lies on the other side is interesting, but ultimately cannot be expressed by words or “felt”. And so is outside the realm of thought and speech (necessarily so, one might say).

5

Wait a minute…
…the bread doesn’t always land butter side down?
Seriously, I think I agree with your first rejection, but I’m not sure the transcendental barrier holds as well for conceptual information as it does for experiential information*. And I’d say that it could be argued (by someone far more skilled than myself at such things) that an “analytic truth” is information which fits a set of rules {X} for which the level of trust (the degree to which all results match any available synthetically derived information) approaches 1.

*Note: non-philosopher speaking. If I’ve used these terms too loosely, please thump me lightly and move on.

6

The reason I bring up Godel and Hofstadler (sp?) is that your query seems to me to hinge on the problem of consciousness, the fundamental a priori.

7

Hrmm… you’re asking a question that I’m trying to decide whether to answer! My only philosophical problem right now, is whether take this answer to the grave or not. My samplings have suggested that nobody wants to know. Your thread on PP and THIS one cut right to the heart of the question. Without providing enough specifics over-time to allow the decryption; I have articulated the problem encountered after wards =)
rolls around in the most hopeless humor, at the arrival of his Nobel! For anyone interested in the logical (moral) articulation (not trying to TS!!) — I explicitly wrote about it here (though I only toyed with the seriousness impact this topic has had on me for a couple years now):

http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=132353

(I feel like I’ve been floating in some sort of netherworld since all this stuff emerged. The applications for corrupting the method of demonstration chosen, are exceedingly advanced for detecting, isolating and articulating answers along the lines of will intent. Something tells me, that’s all people will be interested in. Not a very compelling reason to bother corrupting the process IMO. I’m still trying to figure out what the hell I’m going to do with this.)

-Justhink

8

xen, you’ve sort of presented me with a stumper without branching this thread into the “Wittgenstein’s Box” thread, on which the conceptual problems lie. This is an external problem: the transcendental barrier is what separates reality from the way we talk about it; for example: “Even if every single human on earth was dead, the law of identity would still be true.” This claim, to me, fails to impress on several counts. First is that I don’t agree that a tautology is true for the reasons given above (this is not the same as arbitrarily assigning it a truth-value for the purposes of a system). Second is that the claim separates humans from reality, but in a strange way. An assertion of truth independent of our understanding is a pure intermediary between the “out there” [reality] and the “up here” [my concepts]. And yet: how do we do this? “Out there” there is no me; what are you asking me to distinguish where I cannot distinguish anything?

Well, let me say, from my own readings I have found analytic truths to be necessarily true, which is to say, the trust IS 1.

But: approaches one? Does anything ever make it there? Then what good is this valuation, haven’t we just said “Nothing is perfect”?

Consider: if the law of identity (for example) is supposed to be true independent of me, then my inability to imagine a world without it is seen as a consequence of its underlying truth. But now: why aren’t all of our findings about the sun so as a consequence of the fact that the earth revolves around it?

My imagination is not an acceptable criterion for ultimate truth (or your limiting case, even). But I am told that my inability to imagine otherwise is consequential, not arbitrary. (we could replace the law of identity here with any number of “common” a priori claims)

9

This is why I my participation in the philosophy threads is limited; I’m start stepping on my own terms. :o

I gathered from your thesis, “everything that is true is synthetically true, and only from a synthesis can the analytic truths be found,” that you were saying that no a priori truths are possible because context (synthesis) is required; that is, untested knowledge cannot be said to be “true”. I agree with that thesis.

However, the test of any synthetic statement is an axiomatic exercise; iow, there are no a posteriori statements which are independent of a priori knowledge. The bind I see here is that this means no truths can be accepted if one rejects the truth of all tautologies. This is where trust becomes necessary, and in fact, when we say that analytic truths are “necessarily true”, we mean “our level of trust for this statement approaches 1”. It cannot reach 1 without synthesis (and this is where that transcendental barrier comes into play) and no synthesis is independent of an imagination.

Dig? There are a priori statements which we are not compelled to accept (trust < 1), and there are those which we must accept because nothing else makes sense if they are not true (trust approaches 1).
[sub]And I’m way over my head, here I think.[/sub]

10

xeno

Actually, I think that you’ve got it just right. Your summary helps to cut through the philosophic jargonings to the real meat of the issues. And “trust” is a good word to use. Levels of trust in axioms that may asymptopically approach 1 (… and only are at 1 in a system of religious faith.)

erl care to clarify the differences between a priori/a postori, synthetic/analytic, and inductive/deductive?

I have rather immodestly reached a point in my life where I generally conclude that if I read something as gobbelygook it probably is because it is pretentious claptrap more than because I’m too stupid to understand.

Is the question whether or not any system of knowledge ultimately rests on some unprovable (deductively/analytically, anyway) axioms (that are either declared “true” a priori or are accepted with a high degree of trust - which is an inductive/synthetic process of “proof”)? Or whether there are truths independent of perception?

Isn’t that really the core (and unprovable) postulate - that there is a reality that is the basis of our perceptions, that our perceptions in some way correlate with, and that our systems of knowledge are attempts to deal with? THAT “synthetic truth” we accept with a high degree of trust, because without it nothing else is worth pursuing. (As Xeno says.) From there other synthetic truths and analytic truths (inductive and deductive proofs?) may follow.

11

Ah, then xen, you and I probably agree more than you may think. However, if I may…

Here is the battering ram I present: there is no a priori knowledge. There are some rules we go by, but they can’t be tested, so they can’t be true: nothing could say they are so. They cannot be tested, so they cannot be knowledge.

Well, truth is something that follows from […] [whatever method we use]. “This is true because […].” And for the a priori, the ultimate of certainties, I see no method to distinguish them flawlessly from other types of knowledge of which I am absolutely sure. [Don’t let the ‘absolutely’ lead you astray there] Not only that, I see no way to distinguish them from statements that I cannot justify. So what makes us even say they are there?

I want to understand the a priori as someone can conceive of them as true (if they are just statements then I have no quarrel).

Secondly, I am asking you personally to consider this notion of “trust-assignment”. I know you don’t intend to put it into a formal system so I won’t even go there, but I will say: and what of the knowledge of the propositions of the form: “P has a trust-assignment of x”? Don’t you find that in response to this question you are literally creating a notion of “truth” that is itself independent of testing?

What right do we have to call this creation “true”?

DSeid

Is it a core assumption? “There is a reality that is independent of your perceptions.” Very well: let us suppose I doubt this. What are you going to show me to demonstrate it? Am I supposed to just accept it as true for no reason whatsover? What sort of notion of truth is that?

Nonsense. I pursued all manner of things before I even could conceive of the concept of “the external world”. I still do so today: there is no “underlying thought” of “and I am doing this in a world that could exist without me”. It is not some clause I can postfix to every proposition. Why should it be said that I must assume it to be true?

12

Hello again, erislover

We’ve debated in the past, but each time we’ve had trouble communicating clearly with each other. But if you don’t mind, I’d like to try again…

Let me begin by saying that I must confess I am not quite sure I follow precisely what you are finally arguing.

By way of introduction, you tell us you wish to address what you consider a “claim”, specifically: “Every system requires certain assumptions which are taken as true.”

Now, I feel that I must interject right there: In my opinion, that sentence is not a “claim” at all, but is instead a definitional tautology. For without at least one “assumption” (which I take to generally refer to definitions and rules of the system which are assigned to be true by fiat), you don’t have a system! Isn’t that the more sensible way of looking at it? In other words, by definition, a “system” (in the way you are using the word) is constructed from nothing but assumptions; i.e., definitions, axioms, and rules which are the system! What else IS a system but a set of definitions, rules, and axioms which are true merely and arbitrarily by definition?

You write: “I reject any claim of the a priori as: a statement that is universally and necessarily true.”

I must confess that I’ve never seen anyone define an a priori statement as one that is “universally and necessarily true”! Since I am aware from past debates with you that you are too intelligent to knowingly present a straw man argument, I must conclude that either there is some obscure philosophical school of thought that defines a priori statements that way, or else I cannot make out your the direction and purpose of your arguments.

I would like to get your feedback on the following, both generally and as they relate specifically to your issue…

(1) True analytic statements (i.e., analytic statements which are true) are no more and no less than the implicitly tautological products of the definitions and rules of a formal system and are only meaningful within the specific system described by those definitions and rules. For example, the analytic statement “2 + 2 = 4” is meaningful within the formal system of mathematics, but has no meaning within the formal system of logic or the game of Chess. Therefore, there is no such thing as a “universally and necessarily true analytic statement”. Analytic statements are all context-relative.

(2) Not all analytic statements are necessarily true. For example, the statement “2 + 2 = 3” is a false analytic statement within the formal system of mathematics. I suppose one might argue that a false analytic statement is not an analytic statement at all and is instead meaningless, but that seems to me to be mere logic-chopping and tends to ignore the fact that people often do proffer what are intended to be and appears to be analytic statements which happen not to be true according to the definitions and rules of the system. Therefore, it does not strike me that there are compelling grounds to assert that all analytic statements are necessarily true even within the context in which they have meaning.

To summarize:

a) Analytic statements CANNOT be universal since they can only be meaningful within a specific, “local” system.

b) True analytic statements are true by definition; either directly or by obeying the arbitrary rules of the formal system within which those definitions and rules are given.

c) Not all statements which have the prima facie appearance of analytic statements – even within the context of the system in which they are might otherwise make sense – are necessarily “true”; in other words, if an apparently analytic statement does not conform to the definitions and rules of the system in which they are asserted, it is either a “false” analytic statement or it is without meaning (your choice).

Do you differ with any of the above?

If not, then your assertion that everything that is true is synthetically true, and only from a synthesis can the analytic truths be found is, from my perspective, wildly incorrect. Analytic statements that conform to the arbitrary definitions and rules of a system are true by definition, which is why they can ONLY be known a priori and have absolutely no synthetic meaning or truth status at all!

13

[formatting corrected and other textual changes - I pressed the wrong button; sorry]

Hello again, erislover

We’ve debated in the past, but each time we’ve had trouble communicating clearly with each other. But if you don’t mind, I’d like to try again…

Let me begin by saying that I must confess I am not quite sure I follow precisely what you are finally arguing.

By way of introduction, you tell us you wish to address what you consider a “claim”, specifically: “Every system requires certain assumptions which are taken as true.”

Now, I feel that I must interject right there: In my opinion, that sentence is not a “claim” at all, but is instead a definition or definitional tautology. For without at least one “assumption” (which I take to generally refer to definitions and rules of the system which are assigned to be true by fiat), you don’t have a system! Isn’t that the more sensible way of looking at it? In other words, by definition, a “system” is constructed from nothing but assumptions; i.e., definitions, axioms, and rules which are the system! What else IS a system but a set of definitions, rules, and axioms which are true merely and arbitrarily by definition?

You write: “I reject any claim of the a priori as: a statement that is universally and necessarily true.”

I must confess that I’ve never seen anyone define an a priori statement as one that is “universally and necessarily true”! Since I am aware from past debates with you that you are too intelligent to knowingly present a straw man argument, I must conclude that either there is some obscure philosophical school of thought that defines a priori statements that way, or else I cannot make out the underlying assumptions of your statement.

I would like to get your feedback on the following, both generally and as they relate specifically to your issue…

(1) True analytic statements (i.e., analytic statements which are true) are no more and no less than the implicitly tautological products of the definitions and rules of a formal system and are only meaningful within the specific system described by those definitions and rules. For example, the analytic statement “2 + 2 = 4” is meaningful within the formal system of mathematics, but has no meaning within the formal system of logic or the game of Chess. Therefore, there is no such thing as a “universally and necessarily true analytic statement”. Analytic statements are all context-relative.

(2) While there indeed are a vast number of true analytic statements, not all analytic statements are necessarily true. For example, the statement “2 + 2 = 3” is a false analytic statement within the formal system of mathematics. I suppose one might argue that a false analytic statement is not an analytic statement at all and is instead meaningless, but that seems to me to be mere logic-chopping and tends to ignore the fact that people often do proffer what are intended to be and appears to be analytic statements which happen not to be true according to the definitions and rules of the system. Therefore, it does not strike me that there are compelling grounds to assert that all analytic statements are necessarily true even within the context in which they have meaning.

To summarize:

a) Analytic statements CANNOT be universal since they can only be meaningful within a specific, “local” system.

b) True analytic statements are true by definition; either directly or by obeying the arbitrary rules of the formal system within which those definitions and rules are given.

c) Not all statements which have the prima facie appearance of analytic statements – even within the context of the system in which they are might otherwise make sense – are necessarily “true”; in other words, if an apparently analytic statement does not conform to the definitions and rules of the system in which they are asserted, it is either a “false” analytic statement or it is without meaning (your choice).

Do you differ with any of the above?

If not, then your assertion that everything that is true is synthetically true, and only from a synthesis can the analytic truths be found is, from my perspective, wildly incorrect! Analytic statements that conform to the arbitrary definitions and rules of a system are true by definition, which is why they can ONLY be known a priori and have absolutely no synthetic meaning or truth status at all!

14

ambushed,

I just gotta applaud your ability to put it into some clear language.

Your summary is great … and all systems of knowledge production are “local” systems, subsystems of reality itself. To acknowledge erl’s points, they produce “truths” but not necesarily “Truths”. Our confidence that those truths represent Truths is, before anything else, a function of the trust we have in the system’s basic postulates. (That trust is usually based on induction.) From there more analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, follows.

::DSeid sits down from standing ovation::
erl says

Now document that claim for me! A newborn percieves/concieves the external world … they don’t quite know where it starts and stops yet … but they percieve it. By nine months they know that it exists whether or not they still/feel it (object permanence), and that is a realization that drives the development of symbolic representation of that world and of our place in it (a symbolic concept of “self”) and from there the rest of knowledge production follows.

15

Ambushed!

I think that we can state with confidence:

Any system that is acting upon itself through a logical device plays by slightly different ‘rules’ than the ones you submitted.

We can state that all living beings must percieve the concept of ‘difference’ for ANYTHING to make any sense. The statement IS conditional, however, that ‘conditiality’ chuckle (love making up those things) closes the loop on OUR very own capacity to have the conversation, or for anything to have the possibility of making any sense to the ability that humans will EVER know.
I think it is fruitless for someone to postulate a hypothetical person that survives without being observed to aknowledge difference in some capacity (even if that observation of difference is their cells metabolizing food fed to them interveineously in a coma state).

As a human being, we can assume that the concept of difference acts in ALL, whether the capacity to mentally abstract that conception is active or not. That is ‘a priori’ that is universally and necessarily true. It is a truth which, once abstracted; in order to be denied, one must exit the reality in order to remain behaviorally and logically consistant.

I’m interested in hearing about the hypothetical reality where difference is not an active underlying agent permeating through all of its existence! That sounds an awful lot like absolute oblivion / absolute stasis, which are states exceedingly incongruent with any form of sense; as their mere presence suggests that we shouldn’t even be here.

That is why the conclusion of simulation makes exceptional sense.

-Justhink

16

I don’t think that it generally occurs to people how amazing it is that we acn conceptualize terms like:

Nothing
Absolute Oblivion
Absolute Stasis

These terms, by definition, assert that we should not even EXIST, are we to be in a reality where they can be articulated! While you argue that all of these terms are context relative; I challenge you to submit a context from which these terms are derived!

Eris, others and I have articulated that self-feedback terms have a means of suggesting ‘a priori’ truths as universally necessary; by showing that their dismissal is as silly as the belief that they exist. These situations are the very situations that articulate a necessary state of simulation underlying the very nexus of our reality perception.

Another term that was kicked around was:

CHANGE

Change is a term that MUST be held from ideal form in order to exist. It is aknowledged that change is necessary for perception, and that absolute change (idealized) will inevitably change into stasis (as stasis is a possibility of change!)! This in effect collapses our entire reality at all points into another ideal form that never changes back! If change never changes into stasis, we can assert that change is not ideal, or that stasis doesn’t exist. Either way; either change OR stasis is being virtualized above and beyond an ideal form of positive existential validation. Either we are all deluded, or these states are being fundamentally virtualized in our reality. It stands to reason that this virtualization is an ‘a priori’ truth, as Eris has been suggesting in this thread.

-Justhink

17

Well, I think we have no quarrel, then; I’ve got no problem with calling a priori statements “assumptions” rather than “knowledge”.

I don’t know that it’s truly independent of testing. Certainly, a level of trust must be qualified by some system, mustn’t it? When I consider the trust I place, say, in Lib’s favorite “A = A”, I know that my trust in this approaches 1 because the alternative is a self-negating tautology which I must reject. This is what I thought you meant by “all truths are synthetically true”.

18

added a fix

I’ll state, for the amusement of the readers; an ‘a priori’ LAW of nature.

If one aspect of nature abstracts and maps another aspect of nature; the abstraction is granted the dominion of will over the the other, by virtue of the predictive power implied in collapsing a resource by metabolizing it through transcendance.

It is to say:

If I abstract a metabolic system from what you believe you are; I am the only one making descisions that constitute will in a relative sense; I am granted absolute dominion (whether I choose to excersize it or not).

This can be observed in every aspect of nature.

-Justhink

19

ambushed, I do recall, and had in fact wondered where you might have been lately. Whether or not we agree, comments are always welcome.

Let me say: when I speak of truth, I speak of the world as we find it. We find this statement in our world: “For without at least one “assumption” (which I take to generally refer to definitions and rules of the system which are assigned to be true by fiat), you don’t have a system!” And you knew this before you investigated systems, or you induced this from all the various systems you’ve encountered, or this is the definition of “system”?

I just find no way to assert the truth of these “assumptions” [I don’t like the word assumption, which implies a truth-value to me]. Every system needs some rules: ok. What is the status of these rules? Nil. What is the truth-value of these rules? Impossible to assign.

Um…

So, then… what is the context of epistemology if not “everything we know or can know”? And then am I to understand: a priori knowledge is not true without us, then? If so, then I must really have stumbled everywhere. I had always understood that the law of identity held before humans were around, that it founded all of our understanding, and in fact must hold everywhere. Hence: a priori; and, since it is boldly tautological, analytic.

Your (2) is still analytic: it is just false, by common parlance. I’m not of the “school” of thought that thinks that tautologies and contradictions say nothing (are nonsense) about “the real world”.

Your summary:
a) Analytic statements CANNOT be universal since they can only be meaningful within a specific, “local” system.

Well, when the system is epistemology, the foundations of all knowledge, I know of no other meaningful definition of universal. Hence: where I am.

b) True analytic statements are true by definition; either directly or by obeying the arbitrary rules of the formal system within which those definitions and rules are given.

That’s great. Now: what does true mean here? I know what “It is true that the derivative of 4x[sup]3[/sup]-2x is 12x[sup]2[/sup]-2” means as I can show you the steps I took to get there, and refer you to these statements here […] and here […]. I do not know what is true about assumptions epistemologically speaking. I may assume that an external world exists [a world that is independent of my perceptions, perhaps, though this needn’t be the case, really]. You would have me say it is now “true”. Why? What meaning does truth have here?

The rules of chess are not moves in chess, so why would we break the conceptual barrier outward into some fabled realm where propositions are true (i.e.—“real reality” or somesuch)? I make moves in math to prove statements: these statements are true. What move in chess can I make to show that a rule is true?

A great many things underlie my concepts, I can find threads that seem to be everywhere in my thought. What would make me say that these underlying threads are true? I know what the truth or falsity of “water boils at 99 degrees celcius” means as I know how to boil water and read a thermometer. I feel I have learned something about the world I live in (whether it exists independent of me or not, who cares?), and so I find it to be true that water acts in such-and-such a way. But for the threads that would run through all of my concepts as I find them in introspection… what can I do here? How can I separate myself from my knowledge to test just these threads and then declare them true? Me: “You cannot. They are not true.” And of course that doesn’t mean ~(true)=(false).

c) nothing to say there

Necesarily true statements are tautologies which form the foundation of an epistemology iff we allow the foundation of a system to be true in the first place. If the a priori exist outside of epistemologies then I have gone so far astray I don’t even know how I could get back. I reject truth-assignment to any system’s foundation: there is no sense (means: it is nonsense!) in which rules are true. Nothing, as I say, can test them.

DSeid, I see you have punched through the transcendental barrier.

And how, pray-tell, do you know that? This is my point of contention: “reality itself”— there is no such thing. We destroy the notion of epistemological truth when we do so. You set forth a definition, a distinction, and suddenly it is universally true! You’ve punched through the barrier when you talk about “reality itself”, a notion I find nonsensical. And the a priori is lurking there, trying to get us to talk about things like this and declare our—our—assumptions as true for “reality itself”!

xen

Must? What, pray tell, would compel you to do this?

20

Ah! I just checked my contract, and since I’m not a dues-paying member of the Philosophy Guild, turns out I don’t have to reject A != A. But I still don’t think it’s a true statement, because everytime I check, A = A. I’ve never found A not to = A, and I can’t think of any case where it wouldn’t. So although I’m not compelled to reject the statement, I refuse to flirt with it, and I will absolutely not take it to dinner.

And I’m gonna get out of this thread before you union guys start taking my lunch money.