Hitler probably didn’t think he was repeating Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. He thought he was repeated the successful German invasion of Russia in World War I.
That’s a mighty big scale :).
Howabout a smaller one. Several classical and medieval battles were repeatedly lost in essentially the same way. In this case by a calvary attack being completely or largely successful on one wing, but then continuing to pursue the routed forces before them for too long. Meanwhile the rest of the army gets chopped up behind them. So a brief-lived tactical success that could have turned the tide of battle is thrown away because horsemen and their commanders lack discipline and get too caught up in the heat of the moment.
This happened to Demetrios Poliorcetes at Ipsus in 301 B.C… It happened again to Antiochus Megas in 190 B. C… It happend to Edward I at Lewes in 1264. And umm…others I’m not recalling at the moment ;). Maybe Conradin at Tagliacozzo in 1266 can be lumped in the same category, though that one was a bit different ( more an ambush on a surprised and dispersed army that presumed victory too quickly ).
But at any rate it happened more than once and in this case we have a very simple example of nearly identical mistakes that could have been avoided.
Oh at Edgehill and Marston Moor in the English Civil War you can find two more partial examples. Really this sort of thing tended to happen a lot. Stupid, impetuous calvary ;).
ETA: Oh, shoot and the worst example - AM lost in the same way at Raphia in 217 as he did at Magnesia in 190. What a maroon :D.
Quite. Not as many as some glurge emails suggest: Are These 'Coincidences' Linking Lincoln to Kennedy Real? | Snopes.com
Regarding Vietnam, there were a few very clear specific lessons from Korea that went unlearned before Vietnam, even though they had been explicitly pointed out as errors during the Korean War.
For example, S.L.A. Marshall made a big point of noting that the change from unit rotation to individual rotation had created both morale problems and unit cohesion problems in Korea. He included his observations in reports that the Army commissioned him to prepare. I believe he repeated the observation in Congressioal hearings, and he certainly published them to the world in his study of Korean War combat, Pork Chop Hill. Yet the Army persisted in individual rotation, (at the expense of unit cohesion), throughout the Vietnam period. (They seem to have learned that lesson by the time that they were embroiled in the current Iraq conflict.)
Turkey needs to take over the invasion, excercise some World Power, a new Ottoman muscle. They could redeem Afghanistan in half the time.
Here’s one they don’t mention, from John Hodgeman’s More Information Than You Require.
Seems definitive to me.
More on subject, you don’t need to go back to Korea for lessons on Viet Nam. The French experience in the country was right there staring everybody in the face, although we seemingly deliberately ignored it.
And you don’t need to go back to the nineteenth century to learn about Afghanistan. The Russians had a pretty tough time there recently.
The wars were not that similar, but the buildup, the press, the talking points were eerily alike.
Spanish - American War. Huge buildup in the press (newspapers at the time) with all sorts of lies and innuendos about the evil of the Spanish empire. Then the Maine incident - which of course, was sabotage (still unresolved to this day). This was the last straw.
Vietnam - Evil commies and their budding empire, destruction of democracy, domino effect, and the Gulf of Tonkin incident which may or may not have actually happened. This was ticket to greater involvement.
Gulf War II - Press release drumbeat about WMD, Nuclear programs, and the big lie where talking heads would say Al-Queida, Saddam Hussein, and Iraq in the same speech with 9-11 but never “exactly” claim a relationship. The kickoff was a combo of Powell’s dramatic speech and supposed kick-out of UN inspectors. And, of course, the US getting nuked if we didn’t get to the WMD first.
We, the US, had no specific interest in these areas:
Spanish American War - Cuba was focal point - Spanish were doing all sorts of despicable deeds, messing in OUR hemisphere.
Vietnam had no pressing national interest - shortly before, we had left the French hanging there rather than reinforce.
Iraq had a bad guy as leader but so did fifty other countries. Was there some sort of parental revenge/boost in polls/ oil strategy? We may never know after the shredding is done with.
Let’s oversimplify drastically:
The “lesson” usually drawn from World War 1 is that small conflicts can escalate into huge ones, with horrible consequences that no one foresaw. So… it’s best to avoid conflict at all costs, because the results could be devastating to your society.
The “lesson” typically drawn from Munich/WW2 is that expansionist tyrants must be stopped early. They’ll interpret gestures of peace as weakness and try to steamroller you. If you wait too long to stand up to them, it will be too late.
So, which of these lessons is more important? How do you know which lesson is most applicable in any given circumstance?
It’s NOT as obvious as you think.
I heard that Bush screened The Battle of Algiers, which is eerily predictive (sorry, tired, brain won’t supply right word; not prescient . . . ?) of the exact problems faced in the current Iraq war. Anyway, I heard that the White House requested a print of this film before the Iraq War was launched, and then quite obviously proceeded to ignore the lessons it imparts.
thanks for brightening up my day!
(and why are you only a guest here? Join us,—and bring some pie, too)
How about weather-related history?
Not all warfare/political precedents are clear-cut.
But hurrricane and earthquake zones are clearly defined and statistically doomed to repeat .
The U.S. Navy reexamined the loss of the USS Maine in the 1970s (I believe Adm. Rickover was involved) and concluded it was due to an accidental coal-bunker explosion, most likely due to an electrical short causing a spark that ignited coal dust. That still seems to be the consensus among historians today, according to a U.S. Naval Institute Naval History magazine article I read a few years ago.