I believe the unit cost of a TLAM launched from a VLS, including the Mk 14 canister, was $1,604,257 for FY17. I doubt that difference of $0.27M materially affects the concerns about cost, but anyways, I thought people might like to know.
That’s the brand new price. Many missile systems are designed to be modular so particular portions can be upgraded to the latest standard. New motors, portions of the guidance and control section, new/improved/different warhead, etc… These upgrades are significantly cheaper and work “as new”.
An ancient example is the TOW 2A used extensively in the Original Desert Storm. I can think of at least 6 versions we issued that differed slightly but had the same effect. New production with the latest digital control and enhanced MOIC (missile ordnance inhibit circuit), same with analog guidance and analog MOIC. TOW 2 upgraded to 2A with addition of precursor warhead with analog, or digital MOIC ,or e-MOIC.
New production missiles that made use of old uncoated launch motors that the contractor was supposed to have destroyed but later employees who had no idea that the motors were defective re-introduced to production:smack:. A real cost saving until they blew up costing some lives:eek:. Not to mention the idiots in the project office and higher-ups in DOD who instead of suspending them for a proper fix; insisted we could still use them with a restriction to enclosed launch platforms like Bradleys or ITVs (Improved TOW Vehicle). Of course a launch motor explosion would take out the launch capability for more missiles until repair but no one asked me or my program if they should do this (actually they did - we said it was bullshit - they did it anyway).
Whoa Steve, lots of anger in that last paragraph. Yep, still burns 27 years after the fact and years after my retirement.
”Rememeber, kid, that thar weapon was build by the lowest bidder. You might jezz wanna step a bit farther than the minimum safe distance jus ta be safe, uh-huh.”
Stranger
You’re about 15 years out of date with respect to at least ground forces. The post 9-11 use of the Reserve Components (especially the Army RCs) as an operational rather than a strategic reserve was a major driver to change. The old equipment fielding plan created RC units with big training and logistics challenges during pre-mobilization. Updating equipment right before deploying was a major complication to the process. Not updating equipment would have left interoperability and logistics challenges in theater. It also would have left a potentially ugly talking point for senior leadership to explain to the press.
As we settle back into lower OPTEMPO for the RCs, budgetary bickering and inter-component rivalry certainly has the potential to push us back towards the old norm. Some of that might be balanced by the 2009 change that makes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) a General (aka four-star) rather than a Lieutenant General and gives them a seat on the Joint Chiefs. The force structure cuts from the end of the Obama administration also affected the AC far more than the RCs. Skimping on RC equipment now has a bigger effect on total force readiness than it used to. We’ll see how the competing effects balance out with time.
I know it’s just Wikipedia, but there’s a claim I don’t understand in the article about the European Storm Shadow / SCALP missiles used in this attack (bolding mine):
Say what? If the missile cannot be controlled, it by definition must be entirely autonomous. Semi-autonomous implies there’s some degree of external control – doesn’t it?
The sequence as a whole is partly dependent on humans (detecting, identifying, inputting target info and firing) and partly done by the weapon itself. If the weapon system detected, identified, targeted, launched and intercepted the target without any human input, it would be autonomous.
The fact that, once fired, you can’t control it anymore and it’ll go where you aimed it doesn’t make it anymore autonomous than a bullet.
It doesn’t say (nor did I say) the weapon is autonomous. It says the weapon “follows a path semi-autonomously,” which implies humans have input into that path. But it also says “Once launched, the missile cannot be controlled…” These claims appear to be mutually incompatible.
As someone who also struggles with English grammar from time to time, could it be they were clumsily trying to describe how the missile relies on in-flight GPS signals—an outside source of information—to tell it where to go? Compared with a missile relying purely upon an internal reference like an Inertial Guidance System?
But I agree with your puzzlement about how they chose to describe it.
FWIW, this reference describes the current Storm Shadow/SCALP guidance as, “fully autonomous.” Though there is a move to upgrade the missile to incorporate a data link, either one way, a la the EO GBU footage from Gulf War 1, or two-way, which would allow for re-targeting.
When I heard the Syrians claim a 70% kill ratio, I laughed too. I thought that they had SAMs like US pilots faced in the Vietnam War, effective against planes, but not cruise missiles. Then high ranking Russian generals and foreign minister Lavrov said the same thing, and I figured they would not put their shit out in the street on something so obviously ridiculous, so I dug deeper. The US line is that the targets were these three installations with a few buildings each, but a few missiles hitting each would take care of those. The Syrians claim that these installations were not heavily defended. Over a hundred missiles were fired. Where did the others go? The Syrians claim that their airfields were targeted, which makes sense, but claim that most were shot down by the Pantsir-S1 system, which is a state-of-the-art point defense system.