No, he means “successfully”, just as he said. As in, they were able to reach a decision which accomplished the specified goal within the parameters of the applicable law.
The fact that you don’t like the result doesn’t mean the court wasn’t successful. :dubious:
And it would appear that this one may end up being a 7-2 or even 8-1 result in favor of the church. When you have both Justice Alito and Justice Kagan taking your side, you have a pretty strong chance of winning.
U.S. Justices Lean Towards Church in Key Religious Rights Case
What does this say about the lower courts? When one side loses at the circuit and appeals level but looks to have a chance at a not-so-close win at SCOTUS then it seems the lower courts are a bit out of touch.
The plain language of the Missouri Constitution seems so sweeping that it seems that it invites challenges.
That would seem to prohibit spending public funds fighting a fire at a religiously owned school or in investigating a murder at a religiously owned university. That is just off the deep end hostile.
Iggy, the lower court here specifically said that it was bound by what it viewed as the controlling precedent (Luetkemeyer), which in its view had not been changed by subsequent cases (including Locke). No doubt, the Supreme Court will establish that either a) Luetkemeyer no longer is valid, or b) it is valid, but not in this specific instance.
For understandable reasons, Circuit Courts of Appeal are hesitant to tell the Supremes they were wrong. 
Any benefit to the church will always free up church funds for religious purposes. Suppose a bridge is widened near the church (on a roadway that benefits a portion of the remaining community) that allows/results in more congregants attending. Can the state not erect that bridge because, if we follow the money, it allows the church to broadcast a greater volume of its religious message without spending more of its own money?
Church doesn’t own the bridge. Church can’t modify the bridge with its own money. In fact, the government owns the bridge, and is the only entity that can legally modify it.
That situation is not analogous.
Does this bridge cross the Charles River?
When you are talking about funding, the number of transactions involving the sale of a condom is irrelevant compared to how much money is involved.
So yes, the 3% statistic is correct but misleading.
The problem is the overly broad language in the state constitution. It bars a payment not on the basis of who gets the money but rather on the basis of who might benefit from that money. And the prohibition does not require that the monies aid solely the church or religious institution.
So it does not matter that the government owns the bridge. In this example the state is paying from a public fund monies for a secular purpose. But since that aids a church it is ostensibly prohibited. Indeed many general public expenses might have an issue with such limitation.
Take the example of a local water utility that is owned by the local government like the Water Division in St Charles, MO. Suppose, hypothetically, the local government builds a new school and wishes to run water and sewer service lines to the school. Certainly the local government could spend public funds to do that.
But when a church buys property along the route of the utility installation and plans to build a new church they would benefit by having a lower construction cost to connect to water and sewer service. So does the public expenditure to run utilities to the new school now become prohibited since the church benefits in some way? Or must the local government force the church to run utilities to a connection point as if the new water and sewer lines did not exist?
Or instead we could step back and realize that government cannot take a negative action against an organization or person solely on the basis of religious affiliation or lack thereof. Then we let the new church connect to the utilities on the same basis we would permit a commercial establishment to make that connection.
Where are you getting 3%? That is one of the most nonsense numbers in the entire abortion debate and it undermines the credibility of the pro-choice side of the debate when they fudge numbers like that.
AFAICT PP performed about 300K+ abortions. At an average cost of $500, it is pretty clear that the vast majority of PP non-Governmental revenue is from abortion and there is also reason to believe that the cost of these abortions might be even higher than $500 if PP didn’t get donations and provide government funded services. When the argument is that the church shouldn’t get a rubber playground because money is fungible, then i think you should be able to apply the same rationale to PP and abortion. I don’t think it should apply to either organization.
PP should be able to offer government funded services that other health services organizations offer without regard to the fact that they also provide services that cannot legally be funded with federal dollars.
Trinity Church should be able to avail itself of a grant for rubber playgrounds even though the government could not give them money for other purposes.
I did not bring up gay marriage.
See posts 81, 77, 76, 71, etc.
But the point remains that people seem to have different standards of review based on what outcome they want to see.
I think it is unfair for a Montesorri to get money for their playground while a parochial school cannot. How is this so different that the comparison cannot be made?
Can you unpack that a bit for me. it makes no sense. What does government recognition of polygamy have to do with funding a playground at a parochial school?
In what way if the parochial school here like a polygamist marriage? Are they not licensed to have a playground or something?
Lets say Kansas had a law that prohibited promoting gay marriage with government funds and Kansas gave every hetero couple $5000 but didn’t give money to the gay couples because of their law. How is that not a better analogy than your analogizing parochial schools with polygamists?
And why would they have to do that when the Montesorri doesn’t? Why place an additional burden of any sort on them?
Can we place additional burdens on unfavored groups before getting government services?
I don’t think this was ever a very close call except in the minds of those who were already predisposed to create a Mexican wall between church and state.
It does not work like this for Planned Parenthood. They keep very carefully separate accounts for their abortion services and the rest of their programs. They have to because they have many opponents who watch like a hawk hoping for a slip-up here.
So no, a $1 from the Feds is not fungible to PP when it comes to abortion services. It is not like my example for the church at all. It is not like PP takes a dollar from the Feds then very carefully follow that particular dollar around to make sure it does not go to abortion services while taking money not from the fed that they saved and send it to abortion services.
For the church to be equivalent it would need a completely separate set of books for their secular playground and be scrupulously careful that the monies between the religious and secular parts never mingle and have completely separate revenue streams.
Yes, the 8th Circuit seemed to signal quite strongly that they would have loved to ignore Luetkemeyer and get to the heart of the question. Fortunately, the Supreme Court isn’t so constrained where stare decisis is concerned. 
This is a good analogy. Having a Christian church is a constitutional right. Entering into a same sex marriage is likewise a constitutional right per Obergefell.
A law of general applicability like a recycling program for playgrounds, or direct subsidies for a marriage cannot be tailored so as to deny the thing to a person or people who are doing nothing but exercising their constitutional right.
Imagine if the law was the same, except it held that only Jewish Temples could not receive state funding. Is that okay?
No, because that would be giving different treatment to different religions. Giving nothing to any religion is equal treatment to all religions.
It is also discrimination solely because of religion. That is, and should be, a bad thing in a society that protects the freedom of religion.
But it’s not treating religion neutrally. Using religion as the criterion for no giving is not neutral; it’s disfavoring.
Not really wanting to hijack the thread, but what would happen if the Circuit Courts of Appeal did say exactly that? The Supremes are wrong in this case. Wouldn’t that almost ensure that the Supreme Court would revisit the case?