The failure of Germany to develop a 4-engined, long range bomber with a large payload.
No big bomber = no victory for Germany in the Battle of Britain.
No big bomber = no way to attack Russian factories after they cross to the far side of the Urals.
The turning point happened before the shooting started, arguably.
Hmmm … taking Publius’ slight hijack into “alternative history” territory, what if the Japanese had decided to go after Russia (again) in 1941? Remember, at that point in time, Germany and Russia were still nominal allies, so what if this time around Japan allied itself with Britain and later with the US? The likely result is that the US would never have gotten near any sort of Pacific theater, instead committing all of its forces to Europe after Germany’s declaration of war …
I would argue that Kursk was the turning point on the EAstern Front, not Stalingrad. Stalingrad’s more famous, but it was Kursk that genuinely reversed the flow of the war on that front. It was Kursk that flattened Germany’s armor reserves and put the Soviets on the offensive permanently. As such, it’s more of a “turning point” than Stalingrad was.
“Turning point” suggests a moment where the fortune and success went from one direction to the other; the Germans were still primarily on the offensive after Stalingrad, so technically it’s not as great a turning point as Kursk, even if it was just as important. Same with Bosda’s suggesting of Germany’s lack of a 4-engined bomber - it might have been very important but that is not a “turning point.”
There are, to my mind, three clear turning points in WWII:
Kursk.
Midway. The Japanese were on the offensive in the Pacific until June 1942. The Americans were on the offensive afterwards, because of what happened at Midway. There are few clearer turning points in the history of warfare. Coral Sea clearly diverted the Japanese offensive, but they were still ON the offensive until the catastrophic defeat at Midway.
May 1943, North Atlantic; 43 U-boats destroyed in one month. The sudden appearance of Allied aircraft over all the Atlantic shipping lanes devastates the German U-boat force and essentially ends the U-boat threat. This is probably one of the most forgotten parts of the war, but in terms of a turning point, it’s the major one of the Western front. Prior to April 1943, Germany was still a significant threat to the UK. After May 1943 Germany had no effective way of attacking Britain.
The Battle of Britain is certainly important as well.
Actually,
Stalingrad lasted from end of August 1942 to end of January 1943. “900 days” relates to Leningrad battle.
Barbarossa engaged app. 60% of Nazi military power. Some mistake that was.
I have to agree with RickJay’s definition of ‘turning point.’
Otherwise, I might have said:
The Enigma machine and the breaking of the Japanese code at Midway.
Stalingrad killed Germany’s 6th army. That was the first time in WW2 that Germains lost so dearly and the first time that red army successfully executed a stretegic operation in WW2 (something that eventually led to destruction of nazi Germany). El.Alamain pushed Germains out of Africa which gave alies ground for attack on Italy. Germains lost about equal number of man in El.Alamain (surrendered) aas in Stalingrad (slaughtered). The biggest difference is in psychological effect Stalingrad had on german army.
The turning point in WW2 has to be Stalingrad. It is deffinitelly most savage battle in history. Casualty vise, it dwarfs whole of Pacific war and virtualy all other WW2 battles. Everything went wrong for Germans from then on.
Kursk happened after Stalingrad (1943) and far to the west from Stalingrad. Germains were allready withdrawing from soviet union.
Eastern Front: Battle of Stalingrad (yes, I accept the arguments about Kursk but this was the point when the German armies advance stopped)
Western Front: Battle of Britain (not D-Day as it wasn’t really a turning point as it wasn’t the first aliied ground attack on Nazi occupied Europe and was part of a wider pattern)
Pacific: Midway Island (US gains upper-hand)
North Africa: El-Alamein (German forces defeated and victory in the North African theatre virtually assured)
And the most important out of all of these is the Battle of Stalingrad.
I’ve always wondered what would have happened if Hitler had not attacked the Soviet Union and tried to invade Great Britain by sea…anyone have an opinon?
German advance stopped at Stalingrad. Stalingrad aftermath featured some operations where germans gained ground beyound river Don but the overall trend was to withdraw. Strategically Stalingrad didn’t hold great importance. The psychological effect on germans and russians is what I’m talking about. Germans stopped thinking that the war can be won. Rusians on the other hand started thinking that the hated hun is not unbeatable after all. That is why I think that Stalingrad was the most important turning point.
It depends on when he did it, of course, but if he’d done it right after Dunkirk, the Germans probably would’ve won, though it would’ve taken several years to get Britian to anything resembling pacified. If he lost the Battle of Britian and tried anyway, the RAF probably would’ve inflicted horrendous damage on the invasion fleet.
Why would the Japanese be interested in Russia? British and American colonies in the Pacific were in the way of the Japanese, not to mention the US opposition to the invasion of China. Anyhow, if your scenario happened there never would have been a German declaration of war, since Hitler was way too smart to want to get the US involved. Germany only declared war under treaty obligation after the US declared war on the Japanese. Even so, Roosevelt decided early that the major thrust of the US war effort was in Europe.
Winston Churchill believed the real turning point was Pearl Harbor, because he wrote that after that, he knew the British would emerge victorious.
You almost need to clarify turning point as a battle or failed military campaign such as failure of Germany to seize oil fields, insteqad of the poor decisions made by leaders/strategists.
I think focusing on battles, campaigns and what not might be less of a great deabte.
Once could argue the Pacific turning point was a specific moment within a specific battle…such as Midway and catching Jap fighters on deck at the right time - so you could really nail down a specific point in a specific battle.
In Europe, the Eastern front being stalled as winter approached is the turning point there.
Sure, the bulge, d-day, Iwo Jima, were all worth bold print in history books, but they were almost easy prohecy after the turning points.
Turning points = the whole thing was lost for the Allies until this happened.
Good point, Philster. At Midway, the TBFs were getting slaughtered, the island base itself was still under real threat of invasion, Zeros were “on the deck” taking care of the TBFs, partly cloudy skies partially obscured high level visibilty, …
then, imagine being on deck of one of the Japanese carriers, hearing the screeching noise of SBD divebrakes, and looking up just in time to see the bomb being released from the USN dive bomber.
All the planning, counter planning, second guessing, taking a gamble, etc… culminates in a window a few minutes long.
The Pacific has a pretty well defined turning point, it seems.
In Europe, it seems it has to be Russia, but just what in the Russian campaign?
I’m heavily leaning towards Kursk, because of the well defined intent and outcome. It turned out to be the last German offensive of the war.
Actually, in regards to the Eastern Front it would have to be the Battle of Moscow, 1941 that was more of a psychological and material turning point. The the winter weather and the Russian counteroffensive that started in December made it a losing proposition for the Germans after that.
So many well thought out answers. Voyager is correct in Churchill felt Pearl Harbor was a turning point in the European theater. Finally brought the arsenal of democracy into the conflict full bore. Rickjay has pointed out how the Battle of the Atlantic is often not recognized as perhaps it should be.
Still, I would have to go with Midway in the PAcific theater. Japan simply was not capable of replacing its lost aircraft carriers. In the European theater, the German invasion of the USSR was the beginning of the end, although it was not recognized at the time due to doubts of the Allies about the Soviet regime.
Parapharsing Churchill. “It’s not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.”
Well, back in 1962, I had a 7th grade teacher who was just young enough to not be eligible to fight in WWII and was a HUGE WWII buff. Though you can follow chains of causality for a great length, he picked the assasination of Reinhard Heydrich in 1942 in Prague as the key point. According to him, Hitler delayed the onset of the attack on Russia to punish the Czechs and thus fell afoul of the dread Russian winter which was a significant factor in slowing the blitzkrieg to the point where the soviets could rally at Stalingrad, etc.
He also liked the point at which the Luftwaffe switched from primarily bombing radar stations and airfields in favor of bombing civilian populations as a key mistake in the Battle of Britain. He opined that if the Germans had been able to complete the knockout of radar stations, they could have attacked before fighters could be deployed and might have eventually gained air superiority necessary for the invasion of Britain.
I’m not so sure of the second, but the first has a seductive subtlety about it. I’d love to hear from more knowlegeable SDMB WWII experts.
Well, back in 1962, I had a 7th grade teacher who was just young enough to not be eligible to fight in WWII and was a HUGE WWII buff. Though you can follow chains of causality for a great length, he picked the assasination of Reinhard Heydrich in 1942 in Prague as the key point. According to him, Hitler delayed the onset of the attack on Russia to punish the Czechs and thus fell afoul of the dread Russian winter which was a significant factor in slowing the blitzkrieg to the point where the soviets could rally at Stalingrad, etc.
He also liked the point at which the Luftwaffe switched from primarily bombing radar stations and airfields in favor of bombing civilian populations as a key mistake in the Battle of Britain. He opined that if the Germans had been able to complete the knockout of radar stations, they could have attacked before fighters could be deployed and might have eventually gained air superiority necessary for the invasion of Britain.
I’m not so sure of the second, but the first has a seductive subtlety about it. I’d love to hear from more knowlegeable SDMB WWII experts.
I’ve heard others opine a similar proposition as regards the launching of Barbarossa being delayed and thus leading to the ultimately fatal failure to achieve primary objectives before the (any way you look at it, logistically unprepared for) first winter in Russia bogged it down, with pulliiing Il Duce’s fat out of the fire in Greece one named cause.
I don’t think so. I doubt whether it was ever within Hitler’s grasp to topple the Soviet Unon when he already had the western war going.
British Air Marshal Hugh Dowding’s strategy was to conserve the limited tactical fighter power available in order to prevent the Germans being able to draw it all out in force for a decisive slaughter. While radar was a huge help, additional warning means were in place and, given the strategic view of the command, I’m not sure an effort to deprive Britain of radar stations would have helped the Luftwaffe all that much.
I’ve heard others opine a similar proposition as regards the launching of Barbarossa being delayed and thus leading to the ultimately fatal failure to achieve primary objectives before the (any way you look at it, logistically unprepared for) first winter in Russia bogged it down, with pulliiing Il Duce’s fat out of the fire in Greece one named cause.
I don’t think so. I doubt whether it was ever within Hitler’s grasp to topple the Soviet Unon when he already had the western war going.
British Air Marshal Hugh Dowding’s strategy was to conserve the limited tactical fighter power available in order to prevent the Germans being able to draw it all out in force for a decisive slaughter. While radar was a huge help, additional warning means were in place and, given the strategic view of the command, I’m not sure an effort to deprive Britain of radar stations would have helped the Luftwaffe all that much.
The Battle of Stalingrad was the climax of Operation Blue (the German 1942 offensive) and Operation Uranus (the Soviet counter-offensive). Both operations had plans that ranged far beyond the city of Stalingrad.
The Germans obviously lost the Battle of Stalingrad. They also lost the overall operations that surrounded that battle. But the Soviets did not regard the outcome as a total victory. The plan of Operation Uranus was not to destroy a single German army in Stalingrad; they planned on cutting off all of the Axis forces in Southern Russia and destroying several Army Groups. But while they failed locally at Stalingrad, overall the Germans wer able to pull the majority of the troops back out before they were surrounded by the Red Army. The Germans lived to fight another day.
The 1943 German offensive was aimed at eliminating the Kursk pocket. But by this time, German resources were spread too thin and it took them too long to concentrate the forces they needed. The Soviets spotted their preparations and brought their own reserves into the area. The Stalingrad offensive, while ultimately a defeat, resulted in German advances across hundreds of miles. The Kursk offensive in contrast was a total failure; the Germans made no significant headway against the Soviet defenses. Even more ominously for the Germans, they were forced to commit all of the forces they had to their offensive. The Red Army throughout the campaign was able to maintain a sizable reserve that was available for the counterattack.
The bloodiest battle of the Eastern front however was not Stalingrad or Kursk. It was Operation Bagration which the Red Army launched on June 22, 1944. This battle was commonly known as the Destruction of Army Group Center. The Germans essentially lost the entire middle of their frontline (the casualty rate was over twice as high as Operation Blue). The Germans were able to throw in enough troops from other areas to rebuild a frontline, but from that point on the Red Army never stopped advancing towards Germany.
It was Yugoslavia, not Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavian government had reluctantly allied itself with Germany. The Yugoslavian people however were violently opposed to this alliance and overthrew the government and installed a new regime which reputiated the alliance. Hitler was pissed and ordered the immediate conquest of Yugoslavia. In the face of overwhelming force, Yugoslavia fell in a matter of weeks, but it did delay the palnned starting date of Operation Barbarossa.
It would have been a comedy of errors if so many people hadn’t been killed as a result. In the early days of the war, both sides followed an unoffical policy of not targeting enemy cities for bombings. However, aerial bombing was not an exact science. A German plane accidentally dropped a load of bomb on a British city one night. In the face of British propaganda, the Germans denied the event had occured. The British then bombed Berlin in retaliation. The Germans then declared they would begin bombing British cities in retaliation for the “unprovoked” bombing of Berlin.