I think you are getting two different events mixed up. Heydrich’s assasination was in May, 1942. Operation Barbarossa was launched on June 23, 1941.
Heydrich’s assasination did provoke horrific reprisals – entire towns were slaughtered. It was, however not connected with delaying the Russian invasion.
You are probably thinking about Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav king had bowed to an “alliance” with Germany in early 1941. The terms were so humilitating that officers staged a coup and repudiated the treaty. Hitler was enraged, and delayed Barbarossa to invade Yugoslavia. The Twelfth Army carried out the operation in April, 1941. Organized resistance was quiickly overcome, but the continuing partisan and sabotage efforts required large occupation forces and was a drain on the Germans throughout the war. In addition, the Twelfth Army and supporting Luftwaffe units had to be re-deployed and the material build-up necessary for Barbarossa was disrupted.
Ringo, what you seem to be saying is that any German effort into Russia would have been doomed by the winter. Perhaps, but remember that the Winter of 1941-1942 was a historically bad winter. And also, the plan was to have the German (and allied) troops in Winter quarters in the Russian cities by then. I think what Hometownboy’s teacher and others have suggested, is that if the original plans of starting in April had been followed, the German Army would have done exactly that. They came very close even starting two months late.
What I’d like to see is someone demonstrating how a diversion of forces in either the case of 1) pursuing the SS Chief’s assasination squad (which I doubt) or 2) assisting Italy (which I kinda sorta doubt) truly delayed the debut of Barbarossa.
My own, ever so humble, opinion is that the unplanned delay preventing German victory in the East argument is hollow, and that Germany never adequately planned or equipped for what it would really take.
Same as with knocking out Britain.
I see on preview that Little Nemohas posted that Yugoslavian travails did delay Barbarossa.
Hmmm…, whadya think, pal? Can that be singled out as the reason Hitler failed in the East?
Whilst not being a great WWII scholar, might I tentatively suggest that perhaps a small “assist” might be credited to Col. Dolittle’s raid on Tokyo. My understanding is, that although the direct impact of the raid was at best slight, the morale effects, and perhaps the effects on some Japanese strategic and tactical decisions out-weighted this. After the raid the Japanese pulled some ships and planes back to the Home Islands to defend them – forces that would have been more effective on the offensive.
The raid may also have had an effect on the Japanese decision to try and eliminate the US carriers (to prevent another such attack on the Home Islands), and may have spurred Japanese Admiral Yamamoto’s move on Midway in an effort to draw out and destroy the US Pacific Fleet carriers.
It could be argued that the breaking of the Japanese code was the turning point in the Pacific theatre. This lead not only to the success at Midway but through out the rest of the war as the Japanese never figured out that the US had broken their code.
So when we decoded that the “Midway is running out of fresh water” transmission, the tide started to turn.
In my humble opinion, Hitler’s failure was due to Hitler. I can’t recall the source but someone once said that Hitler only made plans for events that would occur in the next ninety days or twenty years in the future. He had no mid-game.
All of Hitler’s campaigns were based on achieving immediate victories. He never thought of a plan based on a series of comparitive advantages. To reuse the chess analogy I made above, Hitler tried to put his opponent in check on every move. The disadvantages of this mindset were numerous: the Germans were habitually unprepared for campaigns that went longer than they had planned on; the constant changing of goals diluted the force that could be brought against any specific goal; the Germans did far too little of the necessary R&D on developing new weapon systems; and the focus of complete victory caused other lesser but valuable possiblities to be ignored.
Burghalter: “What do you prefer, Klink - an engagement with a beautiful Fräulein or a chess game with a general who can transfer you to the Russian front?”
The turning point was the sucess of the Allied codebrakers- which directly led to the sucess of Midway, and was a massive advantage for the Allies in Europe.
The biggest blunder/turning point was Operation Barbarossa. Hitler started a second war he coudn’t win, even with the massive blunders of the Soviets in the first 4 months-- the Soviet winters and long supply lines doomed the efforts. Those who forget history. . .
For Japan it was Pearl Harbor. Even Yamamoto knew that long-term they did not have a chance. Tellingly, it was Ultra decripts which led to his plane being hunted and shot down by P-38’s. Japanese military leadership started to believe their own press clippings and ignored too many rational voices explaing the patent disparity between the countries.
The biggest allied blunders:
Stalin shredding his Army’s leadership in the 30’s on his insane purges. Stalin ignoring numerous explict and detailed warnings of Operation Barbarossa and nearly getting his butt handed to him for it.
UK’s sending unescorted battleships and heavy cruisers to the slaughter against japanese air power. Not to mention the inept defense by the allies of their territories in the opening stages of the war.
War equipment debacles:
early US submarine torpedos (Navy brass stikes once again).
German Me110,210,410 varients- easy pickings for rival fighters.
Close. True, the bloody sacrifice of the TBFs brought the Zeros down to the deck, but they had several minutes before the dive bombers attacked, time in which they could conceivably have climed to altitude and disrupted the dive bombers. The reason they didn’t is simple. Yorktown’s torpedo bombers were the only group that went in escorted, Waldron and Lindsey ( Hornet and Enterprise ) attacked solo and were slaughtered. Jimmy Thatch, inventor of the famous “Thatch Weave”, was able to keep his Wildcats with Massey’s torpedo bombers and it was the furball that resulted that kept the Zeros at surface level so that the SBDs could attack unhindered. It didn’t help Massey much, Yorktown’s TBFs were splashed just like Hornet’s and Enterprise’s, but it did allow Leslie and McClusky to get into position to attack. Leslie led Yorktown’s SBDs against Kaga ( without a bomb, of all things! Faulty wiring had caused Leslie’s plane to jetison it’s bomb shortly after takeoff, Leslie straffed Kaga, but the rest of his men turned the Japanese carrier into a pyre.) and McClusky attacked Akagi and Soryu two minutes later( another thing that most history books get backwards ). Shortly thereafter, Japanese carrier strength off Midway was limited to only Hiryu. Yorktown’s planes, flying off Enterprise, finished her off late that afternoon.
None of this is meant in any way to lessen the tremendous sacrifice made by the torpedo pilots. 41 planes attacked the Japanese fleet and only 6 returned. However, Thatch’s vital contribution to the battle is too often forgotten.
Another supporter for Kursk as the turning point on the Russian front. My reasoning is this, Moscow 1941 showed that the Germans could be beat (in winter, at the end of their logisitical tether). Stalingrad confirmed it. But Kursk… not only the Germans were beaten in summer (when they usually were at their best), at the place of their own choosing, BUT they were stopped dead cold and the Russians were able to counterattack successfully and didn’t stop 'til Berlin. And Ringo, starting Barbarossa early wouldn’t have make a difference. They still would have had to wait until the mud dried (usually in May). elf6c, the Me 110 family were not mistakes. Their initial use was. They more than redeemed themselves as bomber killers. And for all the Midway fans out there, the biggest loss at Midway for the Japanese was not the carriers. It was the pilots. And most of the torpedo bombers lost were not TBFs, they were TBDs
This is not the first I’ve heard of this theory. I once read a book - long ago, and I’ve forgotten the details. It was written, IIRC, by a WWII British Ace (Jimmy Johnson?) who went on to become a General in the RAF, and the author clearly believed that the RAF Fighter Command was within days of being destroyed as an effective force when the Luftwaffe switched its targets from airfields and radar stations to London. I’ll do a few searches to see if I can verify author name and title of the book, but it’s long enough ago that I might not remember enough details to come up with anything.
No, Torpedo Squadron 8 was flying [TBDs Devastator](http://www.centurytel.net/midway/Carrier_Squadrons/Torpedo_Eight/in_color.html#T-16 (BuNo 1506) 4 June 1942) as seen on this page (scroll down for pictures). The TBF/TBM Avenger received its baptism of fire at Midway (all TBFs at Midway were land-based). And yes, it was a very effective plane. Some of them are still flying, I believe, as water-bombers.
Torpedo 8 flew Douglas Devastators(TBDs), as did the pilots off Yorktown and Enterprise. The Avenger(TBF) squadron on Midway was the first operational unit with the new planes, IIRC. Shortly thereafter, the Avenger would replace the obsolete Devastators throughout the fleet.
James Edgar “Johnnie” (not Jimmy…oops) Johnson, top allied ace in WWII, and later Air Vice Marshal. [bio] It seems he missed the Battle of Britain with a broken collarbone, of all things. But I’d have to guess his views on WWII aviation are as authoritative as anyones.
