Two Round Elections in Multimember Districts

[shablabar]

Hello guys and gals.

I have a rather obscure question to ask you – but one that nonetheless
has been driving me insane. In his book Comparative Constitutional
Engineering, Sartori argues that a two-round electoral system can
produce semi-proportional results, but only when several candidates are
permitted into the second round, and when more than one candidate is to
be elected (i.e. the election takes place in a multi-member district).
How can this work? Sartori does not go in to great detail, and I can
find no one else who elaborates on this point, despite painfully
searching through hundreds of academic journals. Would parties field
multiple candidates? If so, then how does this eliminate the very
problem of strategic voting and nominating that Sartori’s two-round
system purports to eliminate? And if parties only field one candidate,
then how can the results claim to be even semi proportional – a
party can only ever win one seat!!! Gah!!! Sartori gives the impression
that a two-round vote in a multi-member district marries the best of
the proportional and majoritarian systems, but for me it seems to be
inexplicable. Please help! Somebody! Anybody!

Justin Luddington

Saskatoon, SK, Canada

[hawthorne]

I’m not familiar with the book and you may need to post additional information. I’m not even quite sure whether you’re talking about elections with a second runoff round or once-off elections with two stages. But you must be right in saying that parties must submit lists.

My guess is that what we’re talking about is some variant of mixed member proportional voting as pioneered in New Zealand. That does not eliminate the possibility of tactical voting, but as far as I’m aware, neither does anything else.

OK, after a quick google found this, perhaps what you’re asking is whether

The double ballot system allowing to vote twice after one or two weeks between the first and the second voting, round seems to combine majoritarian and proportional arrangements. At the first round the three or four most preferred candidates will be selected. At the second round the election of the winner takes place. While the first round calls for ‘sincere voting’ of the truly preferred candidates without any restriction, it displays elements of proportional representation. The second round comes close to a majoritarian election, where voters concentrate their votes strategically on the likely winners. In favouring the double ballot system Sartori tries to combine the idea of fair representation with the quest for clear solutions liable to provide responsible governments. It remains unclear, however, to what extent the proportional selection of the most preferred candidates in the first round is undermined by the final majority rule in the second round.

is naieve as a solution to the tension between decisiveness and representation in electoral systems. It certainly sounds like it.

[shablabar]

So when Sartori says that it is semi-proportional, he means in effect, and not in result? Because it sounds like basically the same system as they have in France for legislative elections (which are by no means proportional), i.e. two rounds of voting for single-member districts. I wonder if you could even orchestrate a two round election for a multimember district. Would it be even worth it?