‘Ethnic cleansing’ is a loaded term…so, right there I’d say this discussion is off to a bad start. However, going with that, I’d have to say that it’s probably a bit of both. I don’t see what’s happening in Iraq as being all one thing or the other, but a combination of factors. Anyone who says that the surge had no effect is full of shit…just as anyone who says that it is the only factor. Bringing in the various Sunni tribes, getting the Shi’a militias to sign on (or at least agree to cease fires)…those were huge factors.
As to ‘ethnic cleansing’…yeah, it’s happened. These folk were on the verge of civil war after all and they were regularly engaged in some extremely brutal attacks and counter attacks. I can see how multi-religious neighborhoods in the past may have become leveled to one dominant religion through force or just the threat of force…or simply through prudence.
Bear_Nenno, thanks for taking a closer look at this. My first reaction to your posts was that you really need to read the actual study, not the summary nor the responses here. It’s too easy to misinterpret…and I say that because I hadn’t read it until I was writing my response to you. Also, I think that looking at the results of the study are a precondition to the broader question of “Did the surge work”; without empirical and quantitative analyses, we’re reduced to a “Uh-huh”, “Nuh-uh” situation. So, no matter what BrainGlutton’s broader debate intent is/was, I hope you’ll stick around.
With that said, here’s the executive summary of my (long) response:
[ol][li]To be succinct while risking offense, again, anecdotes are not data. In no way, shape, or form am I questioning your personal experiences. As I say, I’m drawing from zero concerning the situation on the ground there; OTOH, I do have experience analyzing (and writing) science papers.[/li][li]The authors of the study did not generate the data concerning neighborhood ethnic concentrations; rather, it comes from the report made to Congress in 2007 (the Jones report). For instance, from what I can tell, the terms “ethno-centric violence” and “ethnic cleansing” are taken directly from the Jones report. These conclusions are taken as sacrosanct; after all, they are the government’s own.[/li][li]The UCLA study does nothing more than correlate nighttime light signatures with data from the Jones report. It’s important to note that “nighttime light signatures” are nothing more than a proxy for “relative quality and stability of everyday life”, which I’ll simply refer to as “stability”.[/li][/ol]Now, more in-depth (you might want to skip down to Summing up near the bottom, which I bolded for ease):
That’s not quite right; they assume that observable nighttime light indicates “access to electricity, providing an indicator of relative quality and stability of everyday life.” (p. 2288) I point this out because the degree of inhabitation doesn’t matter here. The data need to be considered as relative measurements of neighborhood stability over time. If the light signature increases, it indicates access to electricity; if it decreases, it indicates loss of access. Furthermore, unstable areas will suffer from disruptions of electricity supply, no matter what the cause.
Again, it’s about stability over an extended time. A negative change indicates instability; in fact, they explicitly acknowledge that without analysis they cannot tell why there was change, only that there was one. However, the reason is gotten at indirectly via their analysis (that is, correlating light data with the Jones report). Also, as far as this objection goes, special consideration should be given to their qualifier “little discrimination across neighborhoods” (p. 2286), as it makes all the difference in their analysis.
If you look at your objections, none of them actually work. It doesn’t matter what the source of light is; if it’s bright enough to show up on satellite readings, it counts. (Although I suspect that lanterns and such can be generally discounted, as I doubt they produce enough lumens to even register.) Furthermore, the size of the areas involved play a large role in rendering your objection moot. An individual house, street light, or what have you is negligible on that scale. Analogizing, one cannot determine temperature by examining the energy of a single molecule, only the aggregate of many.
They don’t say the trend cannot be caused by military operations; they say “the period of the surge coincides with a decline in the nighttime light of the city after an increase following the invasion and before the onset of the surge.” (p. 2289) Clearly, at any time after the invasion, there were military operations in Baghdad. Again, they’re taking changes in nighttime light as a proxy for stability. And this is a city-wide result that covers 15x15 pixels, which yields an area of 42 km^2. As to the December 2007 date, you’ve quoted why they use it (again, applied city-wide). This is their “first result”: in Baghdad as a whole, stability improved between the invasion and the surge, but there was a decrease after the surge.
Only then do they delve into more specific neighborhoods, which they call their “second result”. The stability decrease was not uniform across all of Baghdad. When correlating the light data with the Jones report, they find that only neighborhoods that are consistently ethnically homogenous over time do not suffer a light decline (i.e., are stable). It’s important to note that some homogenous areas also suffer a decline – as they are already homogenous, it can’t be due to ethnic violence, and so is likely due to military operations. But areas that were initially heterogeneous and become homogenous during the surge consistently suffer a decline.
The “third result” is that the decline of nighttime lights is more likely to be due to ethno-sectarian violence than the surge. That’s the money shot: “typical” Iraqi cities, already ethnically separated, do not show decreased stability. Baghdad is an anomolous situation.
Summing up those results (note that “stable” is shorthand for “increased nighttime light”):
(1) Baghdad, as a whole, was stable before the surge, but suffered instability afterwards.
(2) Instability in Baghdad post-surge was not uniform; it correlates highly with ethnic homogenization.
(3) Other cities, which were ethnically homogenous and stable before the surge, continued their level of stability.
The conclusion is that both the surge and ethnic violence were occurring in Baghdad simultaneously. To tease these factors apart, they compared Baghdad as a whole to other cities and found that Baghdad was anamolous in its stability decline. Was the surge or the ethnic violence responsible? Looking at neighborhoods within Baghdad, stability level is highly correlated with ethnic diversity. Not the military operations of the surge.
Q.E.D., as it were.
But you can conclude something. In fact, you reach exactly the same initial conclusion they do: a neighborhood where lights are not fixed has suffered instability.
Three more things: first, closing out your post, you again conflate anecdote for data by talking about specific houses. That’s not the level of analysis here. Second, and more importantly, any objections about ethnic cleansing and such can be dismissed as irrelevant. If one does raise such objections, they have to be aimed at the Jones report, not this study. Finally, the authors say that yes, there may be a correlation between the surge and stability – but only insofar as the surge promoted ethnic separation.