George Thomas is an interesting study. A Southerner by birth he was not trusted by the political powers that called the shots for appointment of top commanders. At Chickamauga he pretty well saved the army after a fluke blunder allowed Hood’s division to rupture the Union line. At Missionary Ridge his piece of the Union Army pretty well saved the whole thing at Missionary Ridge (although the commanders on the ground pretty well forced the issue without regard to what Thomas wanted done or not done) after Sherman’s forces were staled at Tunnel Hill. At Nashville he broke the Confederate Army of Tennessee in what was as close to a Waterloo type collapse as the Civil War produced. However he was slow and would not move until every thing was ready, every pack strap buckled, every cartridge box filled, every man in position. He was not called “Old Slow Trot” for nothing. He never would have been a match for Bobby Lee – Lee was too aggressive, to audacious for Thomas to handle. Grant didn’t trust his aggressiveness, either.
If there was a personality among the Union Generals who compared favorably to Lee and Jackson in terms of willingness to fight it was Hancock, but he never really recovered from a serious wound at Gettysburg, at the height of Pickett’s Charge (which was meet and broken by Hancock’s troops).
On review I see that much of this has already been said by Captain A.
For starters it’s worth noting that the OP cites Meade as bad…possibly you meant McClellan?..when Meade is regarded as a good general even despite his caution with his battered army after Gettysburg (which, IMHO, was not unlike a man being cautious about putting his weight on a broken leg that’s just been set). And the OP cites Bragg as good, despite his presence on the SDMB’s own list of Worst Military Leaders of all time (along with several other figures from that war).
So much of what’s been said so far in this thread is on-target (size of armies, political interference, Southern hagiography, etc.), but I’d like to single this out
Word. Lee invaded the North twice and was promptly defeated both times, a short distance over the border. MClellan invaded the South once and went directly (albeit sloooooooowly) at the Confederate capital, got very close, was driven back, and then withdrawn against his will at the order of the president. lee is considered a tragic genius for his invasions and McClellan an irresolute bumbler for his. (And I’m not much of a McClellan fan, despite saying that.)
Consider: Grant is called a “butcher” for “simple-mindedly” hurling troops directly at Lee’s strong line. But Lee escapes that insult despite hurling Pickett against Cemetery Ridge (“The enemy is there, and I intend to strike him,” Lee said. “No 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position,” Longstreet famously judged) and Bragg was cited as a good general in the OP despite hurling his men into the inferno of Chickamauga and then retreating after apparently winning (“What does he fight battles for?” fumed Forrest). And Albert Sydney Johnston (the “other Johnston”) remains a romantic hero in the South despite getting more Southerners killed at Shiloh than anyone else had managed up to that point in the war, hurling his barely-trained troops against the Hornet’s Nest (“I would fight them if they were a million,” he said, when it was suggested he should decline battle because he’d lost the advantage of surprise and the supposed junction with Buell had given Grant a numerical advantage.
In all those cases the general ignored advice and frontally attacked strong positions. Grant won the war; the others lost, but Grant bears the stigma.
Let me suggest that George McClellan’s two campaigns more than adequately demonstrate his incapacity for war time command.
On the Virginia Peninsula in the spring and summer of 1862 he had an overwhelming numerical and logistical advantage which he proceeded to squander first at Williamsburg when he decided to besiege an inferior force rather than maneuvering and fighting. At the Seven Days he just gave up and fell back on his logistical base and sat there despite having soundly beaten the Rebels at Marvin Hill and seriously weakening them in the other non-conclusive fight that proceed it and despite holding a significant numerical advantage. Strike one
When Lincoln gave up on the Peninsular Campaign and pulled McClellan back to Washington McClellan was woefully slow in reinforcing Pope at Second Bull Run, arguably out of pique and the reluctance to see his rival succeed. Strike two.
In September Lee mounted his first raid into Maryland and for lack of anyone better (Pope having lost all credibility – what with keeping his headquarters where his backside ought to be) McClellan was put back in command of the consolidated Armies of Virginia and the Potomac. By dumb luck Little Mac was handed Lee’s tactical plan. This time he had not only a major numerical advantage but he positively knew Lee’s fatal tactical weakness. Again he failed to act decisively. McClellan pretended that he was at a tactical disadvantage, dawdled on the way to the Battle of Antietam, attacked piecemeal when he finally did attack, kept his strongest formations out of the fight and allowed himself to be stalemated. After the fight he still had the advantage but refused to attack a severely battered Lee. Strike three.
It was about this time that Halleck was conniving against Grant who was doing some pretty big things in the Mississippi Valley. When pressed to discharge Grant Lincoln’s reputed response was that he could not spare Grant because Grant was willing to fight. The contrast with McClellan was palpable.
Do not forget that leading large formations in war is a demanding job and that there is seldom a second chance. Pershing relieved commanders right and left during WWI. Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton and Hodges in Europe did the same during WWII and McArthur and the Navy and The Marines did the same in the Pacific. My old division commander didn’t last a month in Vietnam before he found himself kicked up stairs (a more polite form of being relieved of command).
McClellan was beyond doubt a brilliant organizer, logician and builder of morale, but he was no combat general. Grant on the other hand was all that and a military realist to boot.
Personally, I’d say McClellan’s first strike was in West Virginia. He was already displaying all of the military flaws that he would show again in the Peninsula.
Lee was incredibly lucky at the Battle of Seven Days. He would have lost that battle against any general other than McClellan. The Confederate plan was just a series of uncoordinated attacks (in Lee’s defense he wasn’t fully responsible for the lack of coordination) that were beaten back by the Union defenses with high Confederate casualties. The only reason Lee won the overall battle was because McClellan kept retreating after every attack even though he had no real need to.
Malvern Hill. Wasn’t that the place where Stonewall Jackson said…yeah, Wikipedia gives the quote:
Any defensive position that deterred Jackson from pursuing retreating Yankees must have been strong.
Pope had headline dispatches from the field “Headquarters in the Saddle” instead of the traditional naming of the nearest town or feature. I think this was part of his shtick of appearing active and dynamic in contrast with the Eastern generals (Specifically his rival, McClellan). The quote is funnier if you use the original witticism: he had his “headquarters where his hindquarters ought to be.”
On a general note (heh) I wonder if enough attention has been paid to the role of reconnaissance in the making of the reputations of these generals.
Lee appeared daring and aggressive whenever he had good scouting reports on his foes; when he did not, most famously at Gettysburg, he was a head-down slugger and declined to maneuver the Union force out of its strong defensive position because he was operating blind. After Gettysburg Lee never attacked again (until the desperation attack at Fort Stedman); he was weaker, but being weaker per se had never stopped Lee from attacking before. But Stuart was dead and the vastly improved Federal cavalry dominated the scouting.
After several bold attempts to maneuver against detachments of Rosecrans’ army that were thwarted by bad coordination and balky subordinates, Bragg won Chickamauga, but quarreled with Forrest, his best cavalryman, and Forrest vowed never to serve under him again…at which point Bragg literally dug in on Missionary Ridge and remained in a static position until defeated.
Would McClellan’s dependence on Pinkerton’s grossly inflated estimates of Confederate numbers have been broken if he’d had good cavalry scouting that could have brought him much more reliable estimates? It wouldn’t have made Little Mac aggressive, but it might have removed some of the paralyzing fear of failure.
Late in the war, Grant and especially Sherman were able to maneuver at will because of Confederate numerical weakness, moreso than good scouting (although they finally did have it). But it was Sheridan’s use of dominating cavalry that finally cleared the Valley and set the stage for the Forty Days.
It seems to me when reading Foote and Catton and McPherson, et. al., that I’m constantly seeing timidity, immobility, or “lack of imagination” whenever a general has poor scouting or his cavalry has been badly outnumbered, driven off, or led astray. Conversely, generals with good scouting seem confident taking the initiative and maneuvering their opponents into positions of disadvantage.
And grand the pattern of the war – initial Union bumbling against dazzling Confederate maneuver, then later relentless, aggressive Union movement against Confederate passivity and incapacity, coincides with the transfer of cavalry dominance from the flair of Stuart, Morgan, Shelby, and Forrest to the grim efficiency of Sheridan, et. al.
I watched some documentary a few weeks back which tended to agree with a few of the views above. That is Lee was a very good defensive general, but not great at attack. He also had difficulty controlling subordinates.
I think the big factor was that the Union finally figured out how to use their numerical advantage strategically as well as operationally. Early in the war, each army commander acted independently based on the situation in his theatre. This allowed the Confederates to move troops to wherever they were needed.
But the Confederates didn’t have enough men to defend everywhere. The Union finally figured out that it wasn’t necessary to win in every theatre. Just stage simultaneous offenses in every theatre. Some of them would have to be under-defended.
I’m not sure that is entirely fair. From the beginning there was an effort to conduct coordinated operations in the East (Virginia and the Carolinas) the West (Tennessee) and Beyond the Mississippi – just because some of those were beyond the knowledge of the big news papers, e.g., Harpers Weekly, they didn’t get much attention. For instance, Grant was campaigning in the Lower Tennessee and Cumberland at Fort Henry and Fort Donnellson at the same time that Sturgis was campaigning into Arkansas (Pea Ridge) and McClellan was cranking up the Peninsular Campaign. In the spring of 1863 Hooker in the East was confronting Lee at Chancellorsville, Rosencrantz was maneuvering toward Chattanooga and Grant was closing in on Vicksburg. Vicksburg and Chattanooga fell to Union forces the same week as the Battle of Gettysburg. The situation was tough enough in the fall of 1863 that Lee consented to sending a fair portion of Longstreet’s Corps to Bragg where it fought and was decisive at Chickamauga.
The problem was coordinating over so vast a territory with commanders of mixed ability. The Sherman, Sheridan, Steele and Grant combo resolved the quality of commanders problem but the coordination problem remained.
