eponymous: I’ve searched high and low and can’t find a free online source, but rest assured the Japanese have generously promised to finance our entire current account deficit for the rest of the year, out of the kindness of their hearts. Coincidentally, it also allows them to report a surging current account surplus, too.
Anyways, this is a complicated case to make, and I’ve debated all day whether to try, but what the hey, I’ve got nothing to lose but time, and all you need to forget time is a couple of glasses of wine, and I’m halfway through the second one.
Here we go:
The biggest factor in all this is the mess that has been made of the international trading system. After WWII, the world settled on Bretton Woods. This agreement was scuttled by Nixon, who broke the link between the dollar and gold on Aug 15, 1971. On cue, inflation took off along with unemployment. Looking at the above-cited NBER data, between November 1973 and November 1982 the US economy spent 38 out of a possible 108 months in recession, or 35% of the time. The galloping inflation/unemployment situation was brought to a halt only by draconian measures instigated by Paul Volcker at the Fed, who forced interest rates into the double digits and kept them there until inflation was effectively squelched. That policy is still paying dividends today.
The last three recoveries we’ve had took place under the same fiscal conditions: massive deficits. Looking at employment in the three recoveries prior to 1982, and then the three recoveries that have taken place from 1982 to today, these are the results:
1 - Recession that ended in November 1970: first year employment growth: 1,647,000 jobs.
2 - Recession that ended in March 1975: first year employment growth: 2,798,000 jobs.
3 - Recession that ended in July 1980: first year employment growth: 1,897,000 jobs.
I once heard from some economist or other that the idea that employment was a lagging indicator was simply wrong. The above I think proves his thesis. Indeed, moving on to the next three recoveries, all of which occurred under conditions of large fiscal deficits, the results are as follows:
1 - Recession that ended in November, 1982: first year employment growth: 3,617,000 jobs. Not a misprint.
2 - Recession that ended in March 1991: first year employment growth: 492,000 jobs. A record low among this sample. So far. Look below. Or, maybe, look out below.
3 - Recession that ended in November 2001: first year employment loss: 566,000 jobs.
Source: Economagic Payrolls Data
So, first of all, the idea that employment is a lagging indicator is flat out wrong. In every normal recovery, that is, all four of the ones preceding the last two, employment grew quite nicely in the first year of recovery. That’s a coincident indicator, not a lagging indicator.
So then the question becomes: what’s different about these last two?
The answer lies in the current account deficit.
As this chart illustrates, prior to 1982, the CAD was more or less in balance. It’s been in deficit since then, with the exception of a short flirtation with balance during the brief recession of 1990-1991.
Basically, the plumbing’s sprung a leak. What this chart shows is the increasing leakage of money out of the US. This hole is plugged by foreign investment in the US of one form or another. But it causes major friction when attempting to create jobs, as the above employment stats I hope illustrate. As the friction has increased, the pace of employment growth has slowed.
The reason for this is structural: given a de facto dollar standard, the dollar is chronically overvalued, because the international demand for dollars exceeds what is needed to finance US trade at all times. Everyone, from drug dealers to insolvent Latin governments, use the dollar as a kind of currency franca with which to do business. Today’s Financial Times, in an article I unfortunately can’t cite to, pointed out that the reserves of the IMF are dwarfed by the dollar reserves of the Asian central banks, meaning that the IMF is powerless to rescue any of the Asian nations from a future currency crisis because it simply doesn’t have the resources. Dollar reserves in Asia are so huge that the IMF could never raise the kind of funds it would need to stabilize any of the major economies of Asia. What the article was describing is an international trading system that has completely broken down under the pressure of trying to maintain a standard international currency that is also merely a national currency, issued by a government. Under that condition, the government in question - the US in this case - is given carte blanche to spend as much as it feels like, because the rest of the world is obliged to pick up the tab. As the Financial Times put it in a headline earlier this year, it’s the US’s currency, but the world’s problem.
I’d point out the solution, but somebody would accuse me of being a crank, so I’ll leave it as an exercise to the reader.
Fearless predictions:
1 - Once this recovery really gets under way, it’ll produce a boom like no other. The last one will look downright tame next to the one that’s coming, and if it follows the pattern of the last two expansions, it’ll last a very long time. Those lumpenproles might even manage to find a job. Really. I’m willing to bet that in four years, those that are still alive (in the long run we’re all dead anyway, remember?) will have real jobs. No health insurance, of course, but jobs. This is because the US economy is very highly leveraged because of its low savings rate, and the rest of the world is expanding the global money supply at a tremendous rate by sopping up the excess dollars thrown off by the US at ever lower US interest rates. Those lower rates, by putting downward pressure on the dollar, have already forced Canada’s rates lower, and will do the same very soon to Euro interest rates.
2 - The bust that follows will be a doozy, and it too will last a very long time. The bigger they are, the harder they fall.
In the meantime, enjoy it while you can. Some of us who are older might even manage to drop dead before the Piper has to be paid. Where’s that wine, anyway?