US General uses "V" word in Afghan War - Only 4 US Combat Deaths since Jan 1.

[Ravenman]

First, the earth cooled. Then the dinosaurs came, but they got to big and fat…

(What’s the deal with the reference numbers on our quoted posts? You think all of this exchange is going in Access or Excel or something?)

[John_Mace]

@Ravenman

(What’s the deal with the reference numbers on our quoted posts? You think all of this exchange is going in Access or Excel or something?)

It has become part your permanent record.

[NotfooledbyW]

@John_Mace

Hey, NFBW: We don’t need you to recap our posts. Just tell us what your position is.-#40 Yesterday, 11:57 PM.

I recap to keep track of semantical deviations from the debate such as inserting your limited definition of ‘victory’ into what John Allen said and the demanding that I tell you that I agree with that.

So I would prefer to get that straight before going on.

And the recap shows that you do not wish to acknowledge that you posted a misleading statistic to emphasize there is no progress in the war at all.

There’s more.

[NotfooledbyW]

“Afghan forces (are) defending Afghan people and enabling the government of this country to serve its citizens,” …-General John Allen

Are we in agreement that this part of General Allen’s statement is true?

I just heard that two Americans were killed in a green on blue incident, involving an Afghan Police Officer, and the first incident in quite some time.

I am sure General Allen was aware of all the previous incidents of green on blue attacks, but having 400,000 Afghans armed working alongside our coalition of foreign troops but taking the lead in most kill and arrest missions, has reduced coalition troop casualties significantly over the past year.

If I am wrong about this, I wish someone would explain why.

[Ravenman]

So, to ask yet again, you think the US is on the verge of victory in Afghanistan?

[Ryan_Liam]

It’s all well and good saying that there are 400,000 Afghans armed and working alongside the Coalition forces, but I bet good money less than a 1/5th of them are even remotely well trained.

When you can say the Afghan army can operate independently of US/Coalition control and advisers for important things such as, paying wages on time, maintenance of vehicles, a coherent command structure, competent officers etc, only then will we have ‘won’ in any sense of the word.

But I’ll give you this, it does seem that the Afghan army recruits join for two things, decent pay, and an ability to learn how to read and write.

[XT]

Who here might agree with what General Allen is quoted saying below?

I’d say he’s a bit premature to be throwing around terms like victory at this point. An insurgency like this can drag on for years or even decades after any hope that the insurgents have of winning is gone. Hell, when we invaded the Taliban was in control of a large part of Afghanistan and had been fighting the remnants of various warlord groups for years (Norther Alliance) and still hadn’t managed to crush them.

That said, according to this the trend lines for total coalition (not just the US…this includes Afghan troops as well afaict) causalities per month do seem to be down, and as noted the Taliban currently have lost a lot of territory they were holding, say, 2 years ago.

[Dissonance]

@NotfooledbyW

First let me ask, because of your tone, If you are willing to participate in a reasonable discussion on the topic of the War in Afghanistan on its own merits and charactoristics many of which that are not at all similar to the US Experience in Vietnam and the Soviet Experience in the 1980s.

I’ll tell you what, as soon as you present reasonable points to discuss and decide to post in a single font and color rather than in a Technicolor disaster and to make proper use of capitalization, you’ll be able to have a reasonable discussion.

[tagos]

@XT

I’d say he’s a bit premature to be throwing around terms like victory at this point. An insurgency like this can drag on for years or even decades after any hope that the insurgents have of winning is gone. Hell, when we invaded the Taliban was in control of a large part of Afghanistan and had been fighting the remnants of various warlord groups for years (Norther Alliance) and still hadn’t managed to crush them.

That said, according to this the trend lines for total coalition (not just the US…this includes Afghan troops as well afaict) causalities per month do seem to be down, and as noted the Taliban currently have lost a lot of territory they were holding, say, 2 years ago.

This is Afghanistan. Twelve months after the pull out half the pigs that have been elbowed from the trough by Karzai and his clan of looters will have switched sides (again). Taking their clan and tribal allies in the police and army with them.

[XT]

[QUOTE=tagos]
This is Afghanistan.
[/QUOTE]

He says while standing there shirtless, poised to kick me down into the pit of doom…

[Dissonance]

ETA:

@NotfooledbyW

In AfPAKwe are not fighting on one side of a divided nation as we did in NAM.

We aren’t? Seriously? Unless you mean that there is more than one side in Afghanistan, which is certainly true with the heavy tribalism, it looks like a rather divided country to me. And AfPAK?

In NAM we faced not only a non-uniformed guerilla insurgenc, but we opposed a Regualy Army (ARVN ) that maintained its supplies and and direction and authority from the North Vietnamese Government.

Again, Nam isn’t an acronym, so it does not need to be spelled out in all caps. You should also try to understand what acronyms stand for before using them, and know what you are talking about. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam wasn’t maintaining its supplies and direction and authority from the North Vietnamese Government, it was taking these things from the Republic of Vietnam, the South. It would hardly make sense for us to have been handing the war over to the ARVN if the ARVN was the PAVN.

Afpak is not being waged a jungle.

No way, you don’t say. So successful insurgency can’t happen in Afghanistan, it’s not a jungle. Never happened before, isn’t happening now. I guess the lenghty history of failed efforts against insurgency in Afghanistan is one long fluke.

If you just wish to scream that you are right and anybody else is wrong because everybody knows that Adghanistan is Vietnam Redux, then let me know up front, so I wont accused of "one trick ponyism’ because I am quite informed and deeply interested in the subject.

This is what is known as a straw man, try not to use them if you intend to get anywhere in a debate. I’ll also add that you have made quite a number of mistakes for claiming to be “quite well informed”.

[John_Mace]

@Ryan_Liam

It’s all well and good saying that there are 400,000 Afghans armed and working alongside the Coalition forces, but I bet good money less than a 1/5th of them are even remotely well trained.

That’s about the number that are literate.

[tagos]

Afghan army readiness

The U.S. military has nearly met its growth target for the Afghan forces, but they are nowhere near ready to assume control of the country.

No Afghan army battalion is capable of operating without U.S. advisers. Many policemen spend more time shaking down people for bribes than patrolling. Front-line units often do not receive the fuel, food and spare parts they need to function. Intelligence, aviation and medical services remain embryonic.

<snip>

High rates of desertion and low rates of reenlistment mean the army needs to replace about a third of its force each year.

Grudges investigated

Last year a team of US Army psychologists investigated the nature of these grudges and quarrels, conducting interviews with dozens of American and Afghan focus groups. Their report, “A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility”, concluded that the Afghan troops see the American soldiers as “a bunch of violent, reckless, intrusive, arrogant, self-serving, profane infidel bullies hiding behind high technology.”

The US troops, in return, generally view their Afghan allies as “a bunch of cowardly, incompetent, obtuse, thieving, complacent, lazy, pot-smoking, treacherous and murderous radicals.” This does not constitute the foundation for a successful collaboration.

Vanda Felbab-Brown testifies at a House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing on the critical issues surrounding the development of Afghan National Security Forces (ASNF) and corruption in Afghanistan.

Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan Corruption and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force

Worse yet, Afghans have become disconnected and alienated from the national government and the country’s other power arrangements. They are profoundly dissatisfied with Kabul’s inability and unwillingness to provide basic public services and with the widespread corruption of the power elites. Afghan citizens intensely resent the abuse of power, impunity, and lack of justice that have become entrenched over the past decade. During that period of the initial post-Taliban hope and promise, governance in Afghanistan became defined by weakly functioning state institutions unable and unwilling to uniformly enforce laws and policies. Official and unofficial powerbrokers have issued exceptions from law enforcement to their networks of clients, who have thus been able to reap high economic benefits, and can get away even with major crimes. Murder, extortion, and land theft have gone unpunished, often perpetrated by those in the government. At the same time, access to jobs, promotions, and economic rents has depended on being on good terms with the local strongman, instead of merit and hard work.

Yet as the decade comes to a close, the political patronage networks too have been shrinking and becoming more exclusionary. Local government officials have had only a limited capacity and motivation to redress the broader governance deficiencies. The level of inter-elite infighting, much of it along ethnic and regional lines, is at a peak. The result is pervasive hedging on the part of key powerbrokers, including their resurrection of semi-clandestine or officially-sanctioned militias. Hedging against a precariously uncertain future is equally pervasive on the part of ordinary Afghans. Especially in the Pashtun areas that constitute the Taliban heartland, they will often send one son to join the ANA, and another to join the Taliban, and possibly a third son to join the local strongman’s militia, to maximize the chances of being on the winning side, whoever will control the area where they live after 2014.

Yea. That smells like Victory all right.

[John_Mace]

Once we leave, this isn’t going to be about Islam, crusaders or Koran burning. It’s going to be about corruption and governing. The insurgency can count on the Karzai government being great at the former and lousy at the latter. The US continues to be deluded into thinking we can prop up these highly unpopular regimes as long as they have a big enough army. Well, Egypt had a nice army, and Afghanistan will be lucky if it has one even 1/10 as capable.

[Little_Nemo]

@Dissonance

And AfPAK?

It’s a portmanteau of Afghanistan and Pakistan. I’ve seen it used a few other places and it does make some sense. The situation in Afghanistan is closely related to events in Pakistan.

Of course, for consistency, I guess we should be making comparisons to historical events in CamLaNam.

[XT]

[QUOTE=John Mace]
The insurgency can count on the Karzai government being great at the former and lousy at the latter.
[/QUOTE]

True…so they ought to all feel right at home, since that’s what they had under the Taliban, and what they would get if the Taliban managed to take control again.

The US continues to be deluded into thinking we can prop up these highly unpopular regimes as long as they have a big enough army.

You have to work with what is available, instead of what you’d rather have. In the case of Afghanistan, the current regime is the lesser of the bad options available, assuming you think we should have done anything at all when the Taliban turned us down for turning over the AQ leadership and tossing them out of the country.

[tagos]

@XT

True…so they ought to all feel right at home, since that’s what they had under the Taliban, and what they would get if the Taliban managed to take control again.

You have to work with what is available, instead of what you’d rather have. In the case of Afghanistan, the current regime is the lesser of the bad options available, assuming you think we should have done anything at all when the Taliban turned us down for turning over the AQ leadership and tossing them out of the country.

Why the Taliban are so strong

People have little choice but to support the Taliban in many areas, given the power of the militants.

But widespread corruption in the government and a culture of impunity - where senior bureaucrats or those with connections to them easily escape punishment even for serious crimes like murder - are seen as reasons for people moving closer to the Taliban.

In Kunduz in the north, for instance, several militia commanders working for the government have been accused of extortion, robbery and rape, but not one has ever been tried.

Locals say corruption is rampant even in the judiciary and they have no option but to turn to shadowy Taliban judges to resolve disputes.

To consider the core Taliban as just another corrupt faction is to make a big mistake. The Northern Alliance, who we put back in power, were the worst sort of scum and Afghans were glad to see the back of them.

The Taliban are way more concerned with taking Afghanistan back to the Middle Ages than looting it. Afghans want justice and security and if the Taliban offer it then they will get real support.

As i’m always saying - I don’t care who rules Afghanistan. It’s going to be some combination of brutal evil warlordism and brutal evil religious loons. Just leave them to kill each other and we can just bomb the shit out of any two bricks on top of each other we don’t like the look of.

We achieved our objectives in a few weeks originally. The rest of it has been a complete waste of blood and treasure.

[CoolHandCox]

@Ravenman

So, to ask yet again, you think the US is on the verge of victory in Afghanistan?

I think the term victory can mean a lot of things. There’s removing the Taliban from Gov’t (done over a decade ago). And there’s occupation/reconstruction into what the US wants to replace the previous regime/type of Gov’t. Does it take completing both to claim victory? Or something completely different. I think there’s needs to be an agreed upon use of the term.

[John_Mace]

@XT

You have to work with what is available, instead of what you’d rather have. In the case of Afghanistan, the current regime is the lesser of the bad options available, assuming you think we should have done anything at all when the Taliban turned us down for turning over the AQ leadership and tossing them out of the country.

No, I just don’t think we should delude ourselves into thinking the Karzai government is legitimate in the eyes of the Afghans. Also, we should make sure we’re NotFooledByOabam the way some of us were FooledByW.

[XT]

[QUOTE=tagos]
To consider the core Taliban as just another corrupt faction is to make a big mistake. The Northern Alliance, who we put back in power, were the worst sort of scum and Afghans were glad to see the back of them.

The Taliban are way more concerned with taking Afghanistan back to the Middle Ages than looting it. Afghans want justice and security and if the Taliban offer it then they will get real support.

As i’m always saying - I don’t care who rules Afghanistan. It’s going to be some combination of brutal evil warlordism and brutal evil religious loons. Just leave them to kill each other and we can just bomb the shit out of any two bricks on top of each other we don’t like the look of.

We achieved our objectives in a few weeks originally. The rest of it has been a complete waste of blood and treasure.
[/QUOTE]

Yet corruption was pretty rife when the Taliban were in power as well…it was just a different type of corruption. And, ironically, one of the big things the old Taliban was opposed too (namely the drug trade) the new version has embraced. Granted, they are doing it because they are strapped for cash, but having let that genie out of the bottle there is no way they will get it back in any time soon, even if they manage to win back into power quickly (which is unlikely, to say the least). People always look back on former, out of power regimes with a bit of rose coloring their glasses and some nostalgia about golden ages (well, probably overstating things wrt Afghanistan and the previous Taliban rule :p), so it’s not surprising that there are a lot of folks who are thinking rather wistfully of how much better everything was before, etc etc.