I think one can define victory for one’s self, as long as there is clarity about it. For example, if someone wants to say, “Yes, we’ve won in Afghanistan because I’ll say any damn thing that anyone wants to make sure the war ends as soon as possible,” that’s great, just say it. If someone wants to say, “We are on the verge of winning because we have broken the will of the Taliban to fight, and they have been rendered a militarily and politically ineffective organization for the foreseeable future,” well, they should just say so and let the laughing commence.
Definitely agree on the first point at least. We also shouldn’t be talking about victory, since assuming we could even define what that means we aren’t any where in the ball park for that to happen. Even if the Taliban gave up tomorrow, something completely unlikely to happen, it wouldn’t be victory, since the country is a total basket case, and I, for one, don’t see any path or possibility of that changing even without the ongoing civil war.
The NATO coalition is on a timetable to achieve what President Obama said would be achieved in his address to the nation in December of 2009.
I do not see any likelyhood that the Taliban will ever take back control of the territories they lost or make a comeback that has the support of the majority of the Afghan People.
If the top US and NATO Commander chooses to recognize the major feat of all documented transitioning from coalition to Afghan forces the past two years, and the Taliban as what “Victory Looks Like”, I have no problem with that because the proof of the putting, is in the lower combat death rate for our valiant men and women in uniform.
Obama was never going to do what the strong antiwar, Kucinich Democrats and pacifist, wanted him to do when he first came into office. Pulling the plug on our NATO allies and the Afghan Government in 2009 did not have the remotest chance of seeing a glimpse of daylight, let alone a chance if implementation.
The only viable alternative to General McCrystal’s revised COIN plan was the Biden/General Cartwright hybrid plan that also called for adding I believe 20,000 additional troops.
My perspective tends to be more of that as a realist.
NATO’s creed is, ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’ and our NATo friends came into this struggle in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attack on US soil.
There was going to be no US driven surrender to the Taliban just because a Democrat took control of the Commander in Chief position.
Can you cite the source of your contention that, “we achieved our objectives in a few weeks originally”?
I recall going in to topple the Taliban government so they could never play host to al Qaeda ever again.
I’d like to see the basis for what you believe the original objectives were, if we may?
If we can just get this man in charge, I think Afghanistan will be okay.
I am a pessemist…but suppose everything “goes right” for Afghanistan (mining companies come in and extract the huge mineral wealth-Afghanistan has 12 trillion $$ in mineral deposits). Natural gas fields get developed, and more money comes in. Does the country stand a chance of becoming something like Dubai or Quatar? Or is it doomed by its past?
The point was that there were two governments in Vietnam that were divided by the DMZ. And the US was attempting to enforce the Establishment of two separate nations where the nationalistic drive of the government in Hanoi was fighting for unification if the historical nation of Vietnam prior to the encroachment if French imperialism.
Will you please tell the readers how you were able to translate this, “Afpak is not being waged a jungle” to “So successful insurgency can’t happen in Afghanistan”?
My reference to ‘jungle’ was under the heading of differences between Afghanistan and Vietnam. I never said a thing about there was no possibility of an insurgency succeeding that was not in a jungle.
I think jungle conditions would be more to the insurgent’s advantage when up against a highly mechanized military of a foreign occupying force.
Desert and open ground gives no advantages against a super power with heavy armor and control of the skies.
The mountains of Afghanistan do provide cover for its insurgents, but that keeps them out of the populated areas when forced to retreat to them.
During the Soviet war in Afghanistan the mountains were much more strategic for the Mujahadin mostly because they were able to take the Red Army’s air advantage away by virtue of the Stinger’s that were supplied by the CIA.
Today’s Taliban do not have the luxury if any Super Power Support.
And what of the kind point tha John Mace pointed out to you?
Do you agree that US Special Forces at around ten thousand of them will be able to have the back of the Afghan military and police to keep a deteriorated Taliban from doing a replay if the fall of Saigon, some time in Kabul.
You seem to have breezed by a very significant point that was not made by me, but I certainly endorse.
Yepp, China is on the move, even the Russians are investing in development in the northern areas. The Russians have contracts to provide helicopters to the Afghan Army and Police. Iran is opposed to the Taliban and have an interest in peace in that area when NATO troops are gone.
It’s not all sour as the naysayers keep saying it is.
What is with the colored text to highlight a section? I was aware it was standard to simply bold the passage one wished to call attention to. The colors are a bit obnoxious.
He’s busy closing for the SF Giants this season, but after that, maybe!
For the love of god learn how to quote. And how to properly use capitalization, “Establishment” should not be capitalized in this sentence. Now, do you imagine that there are not two governments in Afghanistan? The Taliban may not be in power in Kabul, but don’t imagine that their government has disappeared. It still functions in areas they control, and to a lesser extent as a shadow government in areas that they don’t control but are still active in.
I’d have thought this was obvious. You were listing reasons “AfPak” (or is it Afpak now? At least try to be consistent in your improper capitalization) is going to be a victory while Vietnam (or CamLaNam) wasn’t. If you don’t think being a jungle is something that prevents victory over insurgency, you shouldn’t have included it in said list. Jungles don’t prevent insurgencies from being defeated by the way, see the Malayan Emergency and the general fizzling out of the Shining Path in Peru.
Ah, so this must be why there was no insurgency in Iraq. I mean it’s mostly desert and open terrain and we had heavy armor and control of the skies. I guess everyone was imagining things after “mission accomplished” was announced.
You might want to look into how many planes and helos were actually shot down by Stingers. Their role in driving the Soviets from Afghanistan is greatly exaggerated, the USSR was going to be unable to win and eventually give up and quit with or without Stingers.
Well gosh, I guess that’s why they’re not still around conducting insurgency 11 years on, they don’t have any super power support (again with the caps). Oh wait.
Funny, I don’t see John Mace having pointed anything out to me. Care to elaborate? You might want to pay closer attention to the things he’s said; he’s clearly not seeing a victory here either.
If you are going to argue that the Taliban’s shadow government is comparable to North Vietnam’s government in Hanoi then I guess all punctuation typos made on an iPhone (hope that is proper) won’t matter much. I’d rather see some decent logic that absolute perfect grammar.
Perhaps it will help if I repost my post #013. Dissonance appears to have read into it things that I did not write. There were no colors there
My point is that there are way too many differences between Vietnam and Afghanistan to draw any safe and genuine conclusions that Afghanistan is doomed to fail or end in victory based upon our bad experience in Vietnam. So it is absurd to suggest from any of what I listed, that I have struck out a principle that insurgency can’t succeed outside of a jungle or that jungle environment was the lone or most significant factor that caused the U.S. to lose that war.
John Mace here has pointed out a huge difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan, while not being surprised, he says, if Kabul were to end up being another fallen City like Saigon.
It should not be so difficult to be optimistic for the future of Afghanistan if the long range planning means the Taliban would have to get past and defeat 300,000 Afghan army and police, that were backed up by say 3,000 US Special Forces, ready to respond to any Taliban gathering and planned offensive.
Points like this die a fast death for some reason. Where’s the to and fro of what great debates should be?
That’s expensive and must go on for many decades. If we ever stop sending money to Afghanistan, those Afghan troops don’t get paid and then they desert/military equipment is grounded and useless. And then the major cities can be easily taken and the propped up Afghan Gov’t is gone. I don’t see the insurgency ever going away, just minimized. You can never truly leave Afghanistan, you can only bring most of the troops home and keep shelling out money($200 billion/year once we leave? - I’m guessing, so correct that if it’s not ballpark). That’s literally best case scenario here. That is something people find difficult to be optimistic about.
However, I actually consider that a victory - just a very ugly one (you didn’t leave it better than you found it). But the Taliban won’t retake the Gov’t and won’t rise above Mexican drug lord status (I’d wager Mexican drug cartels kill more people per year than the Taliban do - not sure if that’s a good point, though). And Afghanistan won’t be a place to devise and launch international terrorist operations.
We still don’t understand what the heck you want to debate. There are plenty of threads in GD with lots of “to and fro”. If this one has none, look inward first.
Whether the quoted departing General Allen’s assessment of victory/winning in Afghanistan (Afghans defending Afghans) was correct. Agree/disagree, why or why not? Ect.
With that, NotfooledbyW, you’re posting style detracts from a healthy debate. Maybe some people just don’t want to debate and posting 3,4,5 times in a row won’t change that. In fact, that actually confuses what the debate is even about as people start to skim at that point.
For starters you could explain how you don’t expect that several thousand US Special
Forces after 2014, backing several hundred thousand Afghan security forces won’t keep the currently debilitated Taliban from retaking Kabul and the populated areas of Afghanistan.
How do you reply to different posters and questions at lunch time when there is no time to wait for a response in order? I think that is a fair question.
For instance I am replying to you right now, but there are at least a dozen or so other answers or requests I’d like to make. So after this, must I wait until some one else replies before I go next?
For example today at 12:19 PM I asked Tagos a question about a claim he made on post #057 Today, at 11:07 AM. What I asked is very pertinent to the debate. I have not recieved a reply but that is fine. People must respond at their own pace and schedule.
Just before that, I wrote a couple paragraphs Today 12:06 PM explaining the background for my perspective as a realist on the war.
This was somewhat in response to several hear who keep saying they do not understand what I am trying to say. I also received no reply to that as far as I know, but I believe I got more messages that people here are confused.
And Thirdly, Ravenman had asked me a question on Post #045 this morning at , 09:13 AM; This is it:
And at around 11:45 am I responded, as I think I should to questions that are asked of me when I can.
So, what am I missing or really doing wrong here?