A very interesting article appeared in the Washington Post’s headlines this morning about US-Iraqi relations during the 1980s. I’d like to start with a couple of quotes from the first part of the article:
and this one:
So this is the greater picture - supporting Iraq enough to win the war against Iran will keep Kuwait and the surrounding Gulf states, and the oil they possess, firmly within the sphere of US influence.
Of course, there is plenty of backpedaling from officials within the Reagan and first Bush administration, such as
and
and
But it wasn’t about dealing with Saddam, was it? It was about keeping the rest of the Gulf “safe for democracy”. If it had really been about dealing with Saddam, then Reagan’s Presidental Directive 114, which stated the US would do “whatever was necessary and legal” to aid Iraq in the war (as stated in the article), should not have been issued given the
Nor should the US have sent Donald Rumsfeld to Baghdad in order to resume full diplomatic relations, especially since only a month previously
How did the US respond? According to Howard Teicher, a former National Security Council official who helped develop Iraqi policy under Reagan,
and that
As a result, in 1991,
But it didn’t stop there. In 1987, Saddam began attacking rebel Kurds with nerve gas, and US intelligence officers found evidence of widespread use of chemical weapons where the last battles of the Iran-Iraq war were fought. And yet the US increased the supply of military intelligence to Iraq and failed to close loopholes in export controls so that Dow Chemical was able to sell $1.5 million worth of pesticides to Iraq, regardless of US concerns that those chemicals could be used against human targets.
The point at which Saddam Hussein became the next grave threat to civilization was in 1990, literally at the moment he invaded Kuwait.
All’s well that ends well - until Saddam did the same thing the US feared Iran would have tried had it won the war. Then, and only then, did he become Public Enemy Number One.
My point, then, is to argue that this article clearly demonstrates that the prime motivating factor in US relations with the Middle East has been concern for keeping oil-rich countries within the sphere of US influence, and that it has pursued that aim through the support of vicious dictators when they appear willing to play ball. US support of Iraq in the 1980s was not a “mistake” or a faulty assessment of Saddam’s character, but a deliberate policy, as demonstrated by two administrations’ continued supply of military intelligence and weaponry to Baghdad despite mountains of proof that all it was doing was making him more vicious and bloodthirsty.
Therefore, I submit that the current administration’s justification for the war drive against Iraq as “standing up to dictators and threats to civilization” is nothing less than an absolute fraud - a cover for the real intent to make sure Iraq stays on a US-made leash, no matter who happens to be running the show from Baghdad. I also submit that the people who have paid the price both for the US’ support of Saddam and the US’ decade-long war against him are the Iraqi people themselves. This next war will mean more of the same for them. And no amount of self-righteous howling about how “Saddam gassed his own people” can ever completely obliterate the fact that the US helped him do it.