Summary for those who can’t be bothered:
Dr. Sal Mercogliano is a history professor at Campbell U in NC and an adjunct professor at the US Merchant Marine Academy. He’s well-credentialed in this space.
From SecNavy, who released a bullshit “everything is fine, our troops are tough” statement – 266 days deployed, 200 days in a combat zone. Logistics network in the region works for “peacetime” but is not set up for extended combat posture.
Currently more than 1/3 of combat vessels are deployed – ideal is 1/4 in combat ops so you can rotate effectively for maintenance and supply management. More than 2 dozen combat ships operating in the area, all at combat ops tempo, meaning higher resupply needs.
Previous extended combat missions (Korea, Vietnam, Iraq/Afghanistan) have relied on forward operating bases (Japan, Philippines, and Bahrain, respectively). Losing Bahrain was a big deal (in another source I saw the estimated repair costs for Bahrain were over half a billion dollars, the damage was extensive).
Dr. Sal cites with ship counts that the Logistics fleet has been atrophying since the end of the cold war. Specifically, Naval-crewed ships that used to provide supplies used to be backed up by civilian-crewed ships that would bring supplies to the forward ports. The Navy eliminated a lot of the Naval-crewed ships, meaning all that’s left are civilian-crewed ships that can only operate close to forward ports – a problem if your forward port is destroyed.
He also points out that having to resupply from Diego Garcia is exponentially harder than it looks like just based on distance – “The Tyranny of Distance,” he calls it. The distance is a problem in terms of getting supplies there, yes, but perishable items begin aging out as soon as they leave port, exacerbating any loss issues. Its isolation is also a factor because getting supplies to Diego Garcia in the first place is much harder than getting them to a major forward operating base like Bahrain. (It took the US 3 years to solve supply chain issues in the Pacific Theater, and that’s with the USA already being engaged in a mindset of “total war.”)
He closes briefly by touching on morale, but what he doesn’t say is what other posters here have already said – combat operations are just different. Hours are longer, maintenance gets deferred because crews are manning combat stations instead of cleaning or repairing things, supplies get used up faster, etc.
I agree with whoever said upthread that blaming the Navy is to ignore how big of a hole the administration dug themselves into in a shockingly short amount of time. Burning bridges with mid-East allies, allowing our forward bases to get destroyed, pushing ships and crews well beyond what they’ve been postured for over the last 30-35 years. SecNavy is obviously a MAGA piece of shit, but the other Admirals I’ve looked up have been normal career naval officers who were probably content to kiss the ring. Further down, the MAGA rot gets less and less pronounced.
So I think the actual commanders dealing with these resupply issues are competent and doing the best they can in an impossible situation that the dumbest people on the planet have put them in – partly a result of poor governance over the last 40 years, but mostly as a result of Israel conning Trump and his idiot friends into starting a war they can’t win in the dumbest way possible.