Recently, and not-so-recently, and come to think of it the whole time I have been on the boards, I have heard people mention the atomic fact, the eternal truth, the American Way of saying that opinions are equal, or—if perhaps not so strong of a claim—that at least all opinions should be treated equally.
In an attempt to understand this undoubtedly philosophical premise I will ask those of you willing to answer the following question: why?
Ah, such a simple question, isn’t it? But let us look at this from a specific perspective.
Opinions can have value
Seems rather intuitive that certain opinions can be valuable. This raises the question of just what value is, which is fine, but rather than debate value itself, I am humbly requesting that we restrict it to the realm of the value of opinions. That is, since we accept that at least some opinions are valuable, from where does this value come from? And can you demonstrate that opinions, unlike other things of value, should be treated equally?
My Stand
Value is entirely based on context (note: it is not necessarily subjective!). A thing has value if and only if it is required to perform a function. I will ascribe it value if I think that function is “good.” But regardelss of my opinion, gold is a valuable conductor. If I want an efficient conductor that will last over time, I would want gold. But even if I didn’t, gold would still be an efficient and durable conductor. Thus, gold has value with respect to the context of the function.
Because of this, the fact that you have an opinion doesn’t automatically make it valuable. Two questions must always be answered: (1) How does your opinion fit into the context? and (2) How do I personally value the context, and thus your opinion?
This dual-use of “value” can be, for some people, very difficult to grasp, so I will propose a completely made-up word for subjective value in order to ease the conversation. When I subjectively value something, I like it. It is a regular verb, for those who wonder about construction in different tenses.
In this construct, then, I will state my stand as clearly as possible. Opinions do not have any inherent value, and I do not like or not-like opinions inherently. Opinions gain value from the context in which they are applied or contained, and I like or not-like opinions based on that context. And, most importantly in order to answer my own post, all opinions cannot be treated equally without treating all contexts equally. Because contexts are not equal, and are impossible to treat equally, opinions cannot and should not be treated equally.
Because I am not subject to all contexts I am also not obligated to listen to all opinions. If I hear an opinion and cannot conceive of a context in which I would like it I am under no obligation to consider the matter further. I do not have the capacity to analyze all contexts (if they are even finite) and I do not have the capicity to evaluate all opinions for any particular context (if they are even finite).
The call to treat all opinions equally, then, is not something I can justify within a theory of value. Can you (within your theory of value)?