And I think that many have forgotten that separation of state powers from the church serves to protect the rights of the church. “It’s a good thing.”
Yes, unintended. That’s true.
Actually, just one member of the baord expressed that thought, and it’s irrelevant in any event: the choice to name the holiday “Christmas” is undoubtedly LEGAL. Is it not?
So what do you call an effort to prevent that, through the threat of ACLU involvement?
No. The Plano story was a suit by Christians to force the school board to permit the sort of religious activity that the CONSTITUTION authorizes. The fact that the board was imposing more restrictive regulations than the Constitution requires is EXACTLY what I’m discussing: a chilling effect on Constitutional activities.
Why is this so hard for you to grasp? In those cases, the ultimate activity sought was Constitutionally permissible. Yes, or no?
Um.
Only one member was quoted, but it appears to have been the intent of the board. I am not persuaded that taking an action for the purpose of promoting a specific religion is legal. It is certainly legal to name the holidays “Christmas” holdays and it was the statement of the ACLU that they would not have taken any action had it been a simple name change, only intervening because the board made it a point to publicly declare the “Christian” nature of the holiday.
Until such time as we discover exactly what the policy in Plano happened to be, it still appears to me to be an attempt by a religious group to impose religion on a public facility. And there is no evidence that the actions (disputed as to fact) taken by the school board (that clearly does allow “Christmas” themes in the school) were taken out of any sense of a fear of lawsuits. Why ban colored tableware in fear of the ACLU while permitting actual Christmas decorations, including trees?
No. Wrong. Absolutely, positively, 100% wrong. There is not one word in the CONSTITUTION that says “Students shall possess the freedom to proselytise on public school grounds, during school session, in their classrooms,” which is what the Plano student(s) want to be able to do, and why they’re proceeding with their lawsuit in spite of Dr. Otto already implementing more a more flexible distribution policy that is 100% in keeping with the ruling already set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the case I previously cited. Here it is again for you. . .
Your religious zealots are continuing their suit, in an effort to go above and beyond the scope of what should be, and what has been found to be, the legal restrictions on religious proselytising in public schools, which I find personally chilling. Your rights end where they trample on mine.
Why is this so hard for you to grasp? In this case the ultimate activity being sought is not Constitutionally permissible, no.
This doesn’t make sense. The decision by the Plano School Board, assuming your description of the events is accurate (which it isn’t), is contrary to the Supreme Court’s rulings on the matter and the ACLU’s position on the matter. The SCOTUS has consistently ruled that schools can not quelch religious expression of students and the ACLU has consistently agreed with that. The cause of the decision by the school in this case was certainly not caused by any jurisprudence or any legal action by anyone.
Your link goes to something about a case in NJ not the one about Plano, Texas.
I know that. I’m merely reminding Bricker of it again, after having previously posted it in post #401, wherein I acknowledged that it’s a different Circuit than the one that Texas falls under, but to show that there is legal precedent in at least one jurisdiction, on this exact issue – distribution of religious material by grade-school aged children during class time. As was found by the Court in that case, such a restriction does not violate children’s First Amendment rights. Ergo, Bricker is wrong.
The appeals court is not the final arbiter on the matter. The SCOTUS has consistently ruled that schools can not abridge student’s religious expression. If a student is allowed to hand out pencils as gifts then that student must be allowed to hand out pencils with religious messages on them. I believe that the schools are in error in both this NJ case and the one in Plano, Tx. Furthermore, my understanding is that these restrictions are contrary to both SCOTUS jurisprudence and the ACLU’s position on the matter. Bricker is right that these actions are unconstitional prohibitions of students freedom of religion.
However, he is still wrong in his position that this is evidence of a “chilling effect” on Christmas by litigation becuase these decisions go against SCOTUS jurisprudence and the ACLU’s position. The school could not have been motivated to restrict a public display of Christmas by a threat of an ACLU lawsuit becuase their actions bring them closer to, not further from, that threat.
Here is a cite for the ACLU’s position:
I didn’t say it was the final arbiter of all time, but unless or until they are overruled by the Supreme Court, their rulings are the binding law (in that jurisdiction, of course). Nor is religious “expression” the same thing as “distribution.” Wearing a t-shirt with a religious message is expression. Handing out materials with religious messages is proselytising.
And as I said in post #401, the parent in the NJ case appealed the Third Circuit’s ruling to the US Supreme Court, but I have no idea what the current status or disposition of that case is, so for the moment, it appears as if the current word on the matter, at least in that jurisdiction, is that First Amendment rights of elementary students in public schools are not being violated by public schools limiting the distribution of religious materials to periods before school, during breaks (like recess) or after school hours.
Those are the same conditions the Plano School District adopted after initial discussions with the disgruntled parents who took offense when their kid passed out candy canes during school hours and the teacher told him he couldn’t do it.
But even that modification – allowing for greater freedom of distribution than previous (which only allowed for items to be placed on a table in a central location) – wasn’t good enough for these religious zealots. They’re still pursuing their case in the courts because they think even the new policy is too restrictive.
And as far as I know the US Supreme Court hasn’t ruled on this specific set of circumstances, which means that at the moment, Bricker is wrong.
That depends on where and when and under what circumstances, as evidenced by the findings in the NJ case, which concluded that no violations of First Amendment rights occurred by limiting distribution to the hours before and after school and during breaks for elementary school children.
Well I and the judges in the Third Circuit believe you’re wrong.
Then find me a cite, please. A specific case that acts as precedent that affords grade-school aged children the right to distribute religious materials during school hours in public schools. Seriously, if there is binding precedent on this matter I will gladly back down, but so far, in 12 pages, our supposed Constitutional Law expert hasn’t coughed one up yet, so I’m highly doubtful it exists.
And this cite doesn’t cut it. Read it carefully – the ACLU’s position is exactly the policy that was in force in the NJ school that the Courts in that case ruled were not a violation of First Amendment rights as regards grade-school aged children, and the same policies that are now being enforced by PISD. And yet the parents in both cases persist in pursuing the matter through ongoing lawsuits. Not to mention your cite refers only to high school students, and while I have no idea what the policies are for NJ students in the district in question, in PISD they are even less restrictive than those in force for grade school children and do appear to match the position of the ACLU.
Please explain to me how this policy deviates from the ACLU’s position.
If there has been a “chilling effect” on anything, it has been on teachers and school administrators having any confidence at all that whatever they say or do will not be challenged by someone in court.
Your sudden fondness for the actual text of the Constitution both surprises and encourages me. I assume you will be applying this newfound interest to the issue of abortion, yes?
Of course, even applying it to this situation would end this argument rather quickly in my favor. Permitting private students to handy out “Jesus Loves You” candy canes hardly qualifies as Congress establishing a religion.
Kindly stop mentioning the text of the Constituion as though it means anything to you. You don’t appear to have the slightest interest in reading the actual text of the Constitution in any issue – expect, I expect, the Second Amendment, which you are willing to read hyper-strictly.
Actually, what they sought is precisely in line with the Third Circuit’s ruling. The original Plano policy provided that students could only distribute materials by placing items on a “distribution table” from which students may choose to take or not take an item. The REVISED policy is the one in line with the Third Circuit, in which students are permitted to exchange materials 30 minutes before and after school at any entrance or exit, at designated recess periods, AND from the distribution table.
I certainly agree that the chilling effect you mention exists; I disagree that it is the ONLY chilling effect in play.
Which is why the ACLU defended that action, thus failing to chill any school boards for another few days, so how does this fit into your claim of chilling effects?
I guess I still see far less “chilling effect” and rather more “natural progression.” We have long since allowed theatres to remain open on Sundays. We no longer tell retailers they may not open on Sunday. We have (in many places) relaxed (although not yet abolished) “Sunday” liquor laws. Overall, there is a consistent movement away from Christian hegemony in this country. A diminution of Christmas references is part and parcel of the entire trend.
The problem I have with your “chilling effect” logic is that it “blames” the ACLU for idiotic administrations that react to non-existent conditions because they have misinterpeted the actions of the ACLU and the courts. In fact, I would say that any “blame” must be shared equally with or more heavily by the Religious Right, because they trumpet the decisions they do not like while ignoring the decisions where the ACLU sided with them*, creating an atmosphere of fear that is not supported by the evidence.
(*Such as the defense of the candy canes with scriptural messages.)
So Bricker, now that you’ve modified your position, care to explain if there’s anything worth discussing? You now seem to be saying that appropriate and legal lawsuits about illegitimate endorsement can also have an unintended chilling effect on legitimate religious expression.
Ok… so? We all argee that unintended consequences are bad and that sometimes overly scrupulous government officials go too far, and they shouldn’t. The ACLU agrees with you. Most everyone on this thread agrees with you. More importantly, the same sort of problem exists all over the place: people going too far to enforce a misunderstanding of a law. That’s bad, but I assume that in general you agree with everyone else: that’s bad, but it doesn’t illegitimize people being scrupulous about fighting against real abuses.
So… once you dropped the “war” rhetoric, where’s the debate? Now you seem to be haggling over side debates.
<Kid’s show host>
Today, the secret number in “Nine.” Bricker just said it, boys and girls. Everyone scream!
Scott, if you think you can make a serious point on that topic, start a new thread. This one is sufficiently similar to a trainwreck without deliberate hijacks.
Wonderful. I agree. The right of unborn children to live is absolutely one of the unnamed rights protected by the Ninth Amendment.
Or do you have a different method for determining what those unnamed, unwritten, not-in-the-text rights are, one that does not yield that result?