War or Negotiations - a Non-existent Choice

Great Debates
1

I constantly see negotiations (with Iraq) being held up as an alternative to war by all sorts of well meaning politicians, pundits, and citizens. I think this viewpoint is foolish and unrealistic.

In any negotiation, a fundamental aspect of the negotiation is that each side has something that the other wants (either to receive a positive or avert a negative). A negotiation where one side has nothing - or not enough - to offer is not going to go anywhere. In this instance, the US wants guarantees of Iraqi disarmament/non-aggression. The Iraqis want the US to bug off. The Iraqis have had to put up with the US sanctions and no-fly zones etc. for some time now, but this is apparently not enough to bring them in line. In fact they permanently shut down the weapons inspection program a few years ago. Now Bush is talking tough, and - more significantly - is widely thought to be actually willing to go to war. Suddenly the Iraqis are more flexible. Not a coincidence.

Now it may be that the realistic threat of war is enough to actually bring them in line. So that “negotiations” are enough. But they are not a substitute for war. Because it is only the realistic threat of war that is giving teeth to the negotiations. The minute war is ruled out, the negotiations collapse as well. So to say that you oppose war but favor negotiations is to adopt an unrealistic position.

Of note: this does NOT necessarily imply that going to war with Iraq is a good idea. What I’ve said does not preclude the idea that there may be moral and practical considerations which outweigh any advantage to be gained by war. And it could still be that there might be other ways to accomplish the same goals (e.g. supporting oppositions, covert operations etc. etc.) This is being offered solely as a counterpoint to the notion that one can rule out war and use negotiations as an alternative.

And significantly, if ultimately negotiations are successful in bringing the Iraqis to heel, this will not be a vindication of the viewpoint that the strategy of “negotiations” was correct as opposed to war. Rather, it will vindicate the viewpoint that sometimes the willingness to go to war can accomplish the same aims without the actual cost of war.

A disclaimer: I have not been following the various Iraq threads too closely, and I apologize if this perspective has already been extensively discussed elsewhere.

2

True but it looks, to me at least, that the goal in all of this is not to ensure negotiations or the return of inspections or even any destruction of WOMD. The true goal appears to be something else.

When all of this started, the return of inspections wasn’t even such an issue. It was only introduced after a failure to produce evidence for ties with Al Qaeda and in the absence of international support.

I still have no idea what the hidden agenda behind the call for war is. It might be oil, simply a family vendetta on Saddam, a smoke screen for something domestic, I don’t know.
I have felt, from the beginning, that we are being lied to. Bush has been twisting and turning to push this war down our throats and the inspections are just a pretext.

This war will come, regardless of Iraq letting in inspectors, Bush wants it and he shall have it.

3

Negotiations in this case don’t necessarily mandate a threat of war. We could also negotiate to remove sanctions. Or to eliminate no-fly zones. Or to give Saddam a big wad of cash. There are many potential incentives.

However, we’ve seen that Saddam doesn’t care about sanctions that much, aside from the fact that it makes it harder for him to import components for his weapons research. So offering to remove sanctions in return for his cooperation is counterproductive - we may have more access to his bases, but he’ll be able to more readily build weapons. Similarly, I doubt Saddam really gives a fig about the no-fly zones at this point. Yeah, he fires at our planes, but I think that’s more for show. “Watch, citizens, as I brazenly toy with the Great Satan! Bwahahaha!” I suppose the big-wad-of-cash angle may work, but I have qualms about giving money to evil dictators in exchange for them not attacking us. Warning: that was a feeble attempt at sarcasm.

Basically, at this point, threat of war is all we have left, but I think that’s a pretty fair “negotiating” tool. More importantly, it’s in line with the cease-fire signed a decade ago. You stop making weapons, we stop turning your soldiers into bone-flecked splotches of red jelly. They aren’t doing very well keeping their side of the bargain, so we have little incentive to keep ours.

Further, the whole point of Security Council resolutions is that they have to be followed, or else. It’s the “or else” here that’s in debate. To the UN, apparently the “or else” is “we’ll frown at you and pass more resolutions.” To the US, the “or else” has always been taken to mean “war”.

Bottom line: I don’t think this is about negotiations any more, really. You can call them that, but Saddam has proven that he’s dangerous, and he’s not willing to play the game. Any “negotiations” with him are highly suspect, as we have ample evidence that he will do his damnedest to try and weasel out of them. If Saddam wanted to avoid war, he could probably give up all his weapons (which he refuses to admit to) and submit to the other demands Bush made to the UN, and we’d let him by. Frankly, I don’t see that happening.

You make it sound as if Bush wants war for the sake of war. You probably believe that, I suppose, but I think you’re grossly mistaken. Does Bush want war? I think so. Does Bush want war more than he wants inspections? Sure, but you have to ask yourself why. Does he want war because of oil, or vengeance, or because he’s a bloodthirsty evil tyrant, or some other conspiracy-laden reason? Or does he want it because he believes that inspections at this point would fare as well as inspections have previously (ie, not very)? Personally, I’m going to go with Choice Number Two.

Jeff

4

#2 was vengeance, right?

5

I don’t think the goals of the administration are relevant to this issue. Unless you base your position on issues on blind trust in the administration’s goals, that is, and I think few people do. My point is that to the extent that you personally support negotiations, you cannot support them based on the idea that they are an alternative to war, once war is ruled out.

FWIW, I agree with you that the inspector issue has been brought to the forefront in the manner you describe. But I don’t think this is an indicator of a hidden motive. Rather, I think the administration is skeptical of the ability of inspections to work for the intended purpose - based on past history - and did not focus on them from the start. But when international (& some domestic) opposition mounted they had to fall back on an insistance on inspections to avoid coming off as war-mongers. But again, this is peripheral to my point.

6

Saddam has demonstrated that he will not keep his word. Even if he agreed now to all demands, he would go back on that agreement, once there was no longer a threat of imminant war. That’s his modus operandi.

For the US to be able to exert the kind of pressure we are seeing now required a lot of money, diplomacy and US Presidential leadership. The recent horrors of Sept. 11 also played a crucial role. If we merely secure an agreement now, the problem will re-emerge – perhaps at a time when the world may be less willing to deal with it.