Unfortunately, I don’t know enough about war planning to know whether these things are in fact a big deal and classified, or whether it really is a sideshow.
Anyone able to enlighten me?
(Sorry it’s behind a paywall, but this is all I got)
(Mods, I feel like this should be part of another thread, but I don’t know which one)
CIA Director John Ratcliffe testified under oath that Goldberg was added to the chat inadvertently, and the chats contained no classified information. POTUS concurs.
What I expect to happen here is that the Atlantic publishes the full content of the chats, based on Ratcliffe’s sworn statement that no classified information was involved. In their embarrassment, the administration will lash out by by having the FBI raid The Atlantic and arrest Jeffrey Goldberg. They will charge him for sharing information they swore wasn’t classified, and additionally for nefariously getting himself added to the chat.
I don’t think there’s anyway Goldberg comes out of this un-arrested. He’s embarrassed the administration and will be made to pay.
Here is a gift link:
Reading it now, but informing random people about imminent military action is a very big deal.
I completely agree it’s a huge screwup, but what I really want to know is whether the actual information shared is sensitive, and if so, how sensitive. There’s “we will use F18s” (I mean, sounds not all that exciting to me) and there’s “Our intel operative inside the Houthis, John McDoeface, confirms that the target is in his office”
One thing we should all remember:
To be found guilty of violating the Espionage Act does NOT require that the information be classified. It only requires that the information be capable of compromising the national security of the US.
How/if this applies here, and to whom, is really anybody’s guess at this point.
I feel safe in assuming that the most likely – if not the only – possible person at risk of being charged is Goldberg.
Disgustingly.
It’s sensitive, likely secret, because they were sharing information about an attack that hadn’t happened yet. If an adversary got that information, they could be ready with missiles, get the targets to safety, etc. The idea that this information wasn’t classified seems pretty ludicrous to me.
That’s leaving aside the problem with using Signal for anything sensitive, rather than actual secure channels, and with the messages set to self-delete in a week, which is probably also illegal, violating some records act.
Operational combat plans aren’t classified as SECRET (that is, designated in a Security Classification Guide as information available to people with a Secret or higher clearance and marked accordingly), but they are considered CUI (Controlled Unclassified Information) that should not be discussed on open networks, i.e. unapproved or non-governmental email, SMS or commercial cellular phones, unapproved commercial messaging or social media platforms, et cetera, even if encryption is used. The reasons for this should be obvious from the tactical advantages that Ukraine got early in the Russian invasion from Russian troops with inadequate communications systems using easily tracked and hacked cell phone. The irony is that SecDef Pete Hegseth assured others on the Signal chat that “We are currently clean on OPSEC,” (OPerational SECurity) when by definition they absolutely were not.
The White House has an entire agency—the White House Communications Agency—to facilitate secure communications at all levels in between executive staff and to the Department of Defense and National Intelligence infrastructure via the Defense Information Systems Agency. The was no reason to use ‘Signal’ or any other commercial app, regardless of how purportedly secure it is, for communications about tactical planning of an attack. If a junior military officer did this they would be disciplined, and a private contractor would be sanctioned (likely security clearance revoked and fired), so it is a serious violation.
To be honest, at first I assumed that this was an intentional leak (especially with Tulsi Gabbard involved) but it now just looks like these people are just a bunch of yahoos who actually know nothing about OPSEC and don’t understand or care about how using such systems compromises the integrity of tactical operations and can even put military members and intelligence operatives at risk. Because these people are incompetent bumblers!
Stranger
Yes, at a minimum this is CUI, but I would guess it is classified. We have a built environment that meets NIST 800-171 to handle our tiny bits of CUI as a federal sub-contractor. We would get our ass handed to ourselves if we moved that data to Signal and “they” found out about it. We are also subject to audit and we have our paperwork ready to go.
The top administration in this country are a bunch of dumbshits.
On top of that, considering that Signal is not an authorized communications app and is therefore not whitelisted for installation on state-managed devices, the fact that they were using Signal at all means, almost certainly, they were conducting this national security conversation on their personal consumer-grade smartphones.
Which, if they aren’t already laden with foreign spyware, will be soon.
I think intentional leak is still likely, but by a staffer. Consider this hypothetical - some intel or defense staffer actually familiar with OPSEC rules tells his superiors, over and over again, “you can’t use Signal, it’s not secure”. And they ignore him, over and over again. So, with no other recourse, he adds Goldberg to a chat, knowing this will publicize it and hopefully change practices.
It would actually be an interesting case. Remember how often Trump claimed that he could declassify things just by thinking about it? Well, he told reporters that the information wasn’t classified. Thus, poof, it isn’t classified.
IANAL, but seems like a pretty good defense to me.
Everybody on the call, and Goldberg, are all guilty of crimes under the Espionage Act. The problem is everybody on the call controls the corrupt prosecution of such guilt. Goldberg does not.
There’s literally a timeline of where manned aircraft will be at specific points in time. To borrow a phrase from Elon Musk, it’s “assassination coordinates”, except this is classified information that endangers the lives of US pilots.
Huge fucking deal.
I know the administration will say Goldberg committed some crime here. But they’re all under oath saying nothing classified was shared. By that logic, how do you reckon Goldberg is guilty of a crime, other than in Trumpworld’s made-up calculus of retaliation?
As quickly as this op was thrown together I doubt they went through the process of explicitly classifying anything and marking planning documents and orders. It’s actually a real pain in the ass to handle SECRET and above information, especially in any time sensitive context, and for an imminent operation not using any previously classified intelligence or systems probably not necessary.
The use of personal devices by military and government officials is quite common even though it is officially discouraged and for many applications (such as accessing .GOV and .MIL email accounts, prohibited). I’ve had lieutenants and captains direct me to send official email to their GMail and Yahoo accounts, to which my response is “No can do, sir” (or “ma’am”).
For sure, China, Russia, Iran, and others are taking every opportunity to load spyware on these unsecured and unsurveilled personal devices, but with people like Hegseth and Gabbard in their positions, does it really matter? These people are doing more damage and freely leaking confidential information much faster and freer than the most optimistic compromise op could hope to achieve.
Stranger
The Signal app remains secure. DoD claims there is a security vulnerability with the app, but the vulnerability is only caused by social engineering. In other words, a human compromised and that compromised human uses a malicious QR code in conversation.
It’s important to remember that these messages began before the operation, so if they were conveyed to a hostile nation, the attack could have been ambushed.
Although it’s one of the lesser reasons to be appalled by all of this, the use of emojis disturbs me. Michael Waltz texting:
Kill 'em good! Yay USA!!
Then Steve Witkoff with:
I mean, I have nothing against emojis on general principal-- if you’re texting a thumbs-up for the idea of getting pizza for dinner or something. But to use emojis in a military context such as this, in which people are getting killed, seems deeply stupid, frivolous and disrespectful.
No commercial encryption should be considered ‘secure’ without outside inspection of both the codebase and software management processes because of the ease of an insider inserting a virtually unidentifiable backdoor or ‘time bomb’, but even if the app and service could be considered secure the personal phones (which they are almost certainly using as Signal is not ‘whitelisted’ for installation on government devices as noted by @Cervaise) are not, and it is trivial to run a background app that sends periodic screen captures to a remote server without the user noticing.
Also, prone to misinterpretation; official communications , and especially those about military operations should be unambiguous and as free of interpretation as possible for reasons that should be obvious when involving aircraft, ordnance, and the lives of American servicepeople as well as noncombatants on the ground.
Stranger
As I said above, even CUI requires a lot of work to access, store and process. NIST 800-171 is not trivial and with CMMC coming, it’s going to get more difficult. At a minimum, this was CUI. They were talking about a freaking bombing raid with times and all. Not sharing the location of an archaeological site on federal ground.
Yes, this too.